THE DEVELOPMENT OF ST. AUGUSTINE FROM NEOPLATONISM TO CHRISTIANITY 386-391 A.D.

Alfred Warren Matthews

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Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 0-8191-0896-0 (Perfect)
0-8191-0895-2 (Case)

Library of Congress Number: 79-5497

PREFACE

Although the main results of the following study have been available to a few scholars for several years, it is only with this publication that they become available to the wide range of students who may have an interest in the formative years of Augustine's thought, particularly his early dialogues. While the study does not include some recent articles which would be helpful, some of them by the present writer, it is of considerable value in providing a rather complete examination of the period in light of primary sources and of secondary sources down to 1960. The major ideas and problems involved in studying Augustine in the period between his conversion and his ordination are well covered.

The author expresses his appreciation to Hartford Theological Seminary for the William Thompson Fellowship which made his study possible, to Harvard University and Professor John Dillenberger for assistance in the study of St. Augustine, and to the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, for providing faculty, staff, and library during the writing of this material. Old Dominion University has supported the preparation of the final draft.

Help from several persons is acknowledged in appropriate notes which follow, but extensive assistance was received from Professor J. H. Baxter, who directed the study, and from Professor James K. Cameron of the University of St. Andrews. R. P. George M. Folliet of Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, gave close personal attention to the project during the month the author spent using the library and visiting with the scholars of that institution. However, the author assumes responsibility for the final form of the discussion.

Appreciation for permission to quote from their publications is expressed to: Associated Book Publishers, Ltd.; J. P. Bachem G. M. B. H.; Editions Beauchesne; Longman Group Limited; A. R. Mowbray and Co. Ltd.; James Nisbet and Co. Ltd.; North Holland Publishing Co.; Oxford University Press; Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies; and Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.

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Introduction

Aurelius Augustine is a subject worthy of study. He is worthy both for his own genius and for his influence upon Western thought. Although a modern scholar may not be willing to agree with Simpson that Augustine is acknowledged to be the greatest mind in Christendom since St. Paul,[1] he may be willing to agree with Abercrobie who says that after St. Paul and the canonical writers Augustine is the greatest "...of all those whose written work has been wholly or largely devoted to the defense and propagation of the Christian religion: the greatest, not only in the supreme power of his unique personality, but also in the nature and extent of his influence upon Christian thought."[2]

Augustine's influence upon Christian thought or Western culture has been great. He has been viewed both as the last master of an old age and as the first man in a new one.[3] For a Western Christian, Protestant or Catholic,[4] to understand St. Augustine is to understand his own intellectual and spiritual ancestry.[5] If Whitehead could say that Western Philosophy is a series of footnotes on Plato, writes Dr. D. D. Williams, "...we can say with equal justice that theology in Western Christianity has been a series of footnotes to Augustine."[6]

Is there a need for further study of Augustine? Tomes about that saint are already too numerous to be mastered by any one scholar. In addition to works by Augustine and the shelves of works about him there are articles appearing quarterly in journals devoted solely to studies of Augustine. In the light of these studies, "To attempt to portray the unity of a heart and a mind which lives as deeply and as intensely as did Augustine is always a rash undertaking."[7]

Further study of Augustine is important. New articles stimulate fresh approaches to other aspects of the subject. The flood of uncorrelated minute studies makes more comprehensive studies desirable. Yet, few man are willing and able to spend the years of serious research necessary to present a thorough and comprehensive view of Augustine's entire life.[8]

New studies of Augustine may serve three purposes. In the first place, they can lead to a better understanding of a man who is great in his own right as a philosopher, theologian, clergyman, and author. Secondly, they can help modern students understand the tradition within which they live. Thirdly, they can help contemporary thinkers see more clearly the problems facing them in their generation.

Fresh studies of Augustine may be stimulated by new issues in current thought. One always had to recognize the danger of reading modern problems into Augustine. However, modern problems can drive one to hypotheses which are more adequate than those which have been used by previous scholars.

One current problem in theology is the relationship of ontological philosophy to Christian doctrine. An attempt to establish harmony between the two may be seen in the works of Dr. Paul Tillich. At the same time, Dr. Tillich approaches theology from the "existential" point of view. Some other theologians question whether such a combination of philosophy and Christian doctrine can prove satisfactory.

Augustine has been considered in light of "existentialism" and ontological philosophy.[9] The Jesuit scholar Solignac has said that there is no anachronism in speaking of St. Augustine's existentialism.[10] He has at once used that point of view together with a philosophy of essences. Of course, the term "existentialism" is difficult to define. Augustine's development cannot be identified with any one of the current philosophies which is called "existential". But there are similarities. In the broad sense of the term, Augustine may be recognized as beginning with the problem of himself in his world, as attempting to find or create meaning for his life.[11] In a narrow sense of the term, he may be considered as a matter of examining his own stream of consciousness.[12] The use of this point of view has not led Augustine to avoid conceptual thinking, as it has other writers in what is now commonly called existentialism.

The article by Solignac, in light of present theological problems, provides a stimulus for deeper study of Augustine on his relating philosophy and theology. One period which may be fruitful to examine is that in which Augustine was first combining Christian doctrine with philosophy. That period extended from his conversion in A. D. 386 to his ordination in A. D. 391.

There are previous studies of Augustine from 386 to 391. They all have certain strengths as well as certain weaknesses. Thimme's study of the period is limited by his hypothesis. He thinks that Augustine's earlier writings are not concerned with anthropology and soteriology but with metaphysics and speculation.[13] He has much evidence to support his position. He cannot, however, account for many of the definitely Christian anthropological--soteriological elements in Augustine's early writings. He is critical of Naville's work dealing with Man's fall and salvation.

Naville's work includes the period covered by Thimme as well as the earlier life of Augustine.[14] He is unable, in only one hundred and forty-five pages, to cover the breadth of Augustine's work in the five year period between conversion and ordination. His outline, however, would permit his accounting for many elements in the early writings rejected by Thimme. His tendency is to emphasize Augustine's philosophy at the expense of evidence for Christian doctrine.

A thesis by Sister M. P. Garvey helps to bridge the gap between the two older works and present scholarship. Although she examines the same five year period, her concern is to decide whether Augustine was a Christian or a Neoplatonist.[15] Her method is to summarize the contents of works produced by Augustine in that period. Only incidentally does she construct the system of Augustine's thought. Written in 1939, her thesis cannot consider the recent theories on the nature of Augustine's Platonism.

The work of Sciacca which appeared in 1949 is not limited to the period 386-391.[16] He considers Augustine from his early school days. His work is an excellent study of the doctrines of the soul and of God. In addition to the broadness of the period covered, the work is now of less value since it does not contain evidence from the studies presented since the Congrès International Augustinien of 1954.

There is room for another study of Augustine from his conversion to his ordination. It can be limited to that period alone. It can approach the period in light of Solignac's thesis of Augustine's "existentialism". It should include the evidence presented in the 1954 studies upon Augustine and works published since then.

The present study seeks to approach Augustine from 386 to 391 with an hypothesis which has not been applied to a previous study of this period. The hypothesis is that immediately after his conversion Augustine was a believer in Christ who wanted to know more about himself and his God. Although he had accepted the authority of Christ, he was willing to use Platonist thought to help him

understand his belief.

The title of the present thesis does not mean that Augustine was entirely Neoplatonist in 386 and exclusively Christian in 391 A. D. It is generally agreed that in the period shortly after his conversion the dominant tone of Augustine's writings was Neoplatonic and that at the time of his ordination his writings exhibited a definitely Christian view. The problem undertaken here is not that of deciding whether Augustine was a Christian or a Neoplatonist. The following dissertation attempts to go below the surface question of Neoplatonism or Christianity and to study Augustine's intellectual and spiritual development from his conversion to his ordination. It tries to show the relationships at various times in that period of Augustine's knowledge from the years as a student or teacher of rhetoric, his Neoplatonism, and his concepts of Christian doctrine.

The method of the present study is primarily historical. It seeks to describe accurately what Augustine did, thought, and wrote during the five year period. It endeavors to trace the stimuli which prompted his intellectual development and to explain how influences were related in his solution of various problems.

The method is secondarily systematic. In order to show the systematic structure of Augustine's thought, one section has been outlined systematically. The contents of each chapter are, however organized with consideration for historical development of concepts. The writer has made some attempt to outline the systematic section with attention to the historical development. He must admit, however, that in the outline the systematic overshadows the historical element.

In the long concluding section, the writer attempts to construct, on the basis of preceding chapters, a picture of Augustine's intellectual and spiritual development from his conversion to his ordination. In addition he tries to show briefly how this early period influenced Augustine's later development, philosophers and theologians after him, and theology in the modern period.

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INTRODUCTION

Notes

[1] W. J. Sparrow Simpson, St. Augustine's Conversion, p. 1.

[2] Nigel Abercrombie, Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought, p. 1.

[3] Christopher Dawson, "St. Augustine and His Age," in D'arcy, A Monument to Saint Augustine, p. 15.

[4] Adolf Harnack, Augustins Confessionen, p. 8.

[5] D. D. Williams, "The Significance of St. Augustine Today," in Battenhouse, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, pp. 3-4.

[6] Ibid. p. 4.

[7] Anton C. Pegis, "The Mind of St. Augustine," Medieval Studies, Vol. VI, 1944, p. 8.

[8] Stanislaus Grabowski, The All Present God, p. 23.

[9] For a specific reference one may take the quotation cited by D. D. Williams, op. cit. p. 13, from Paul Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. 1, no. 4, 1946.

[10] Aimé Solignac, S. J. "L'Existentialisme de Saint Augustin," Nouvelle Revue Theologique, Tome 70, n. 1, Jan. 1948, pp. 3-17.

[11] A broad definition of Existentialism is given in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, F. L. Cross, editor, p. 483.

[12] A narrow definition of existential philosophy is given in D. D. Runes, The Dictionary of Philosophy, pp. 102-103.

[13] Wilhelm Thimme, Augustin's Geistige Entwickelung in den ersten Jahren nach seiner "Bekehrung" 386-391, p. 4.

[14] H. Adrien Naville, Saint Augustin.

[15] M. P. Garvey, Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo-Platonist.

[16] M. F. Sciacca, S. Agostino, Vol. 1.

PART I

A LITERARY AND HISTORICAL SKETCH

Part I, A. Sources

An historical study of Augustine requires a careful selection of documents. At first this requirement would seem easy to satisfy, for one should study Augustine's own writings in that period--the dialogues, the attacks on the Manichees, and a few letters. Then, too, one should take into consideration other major writings referring to the period under study, such as the Confessiones and Retractationes. But the problem becomes complex when the historicity of the sources is questioned.

The historicity of the Confessiones has been challenged, but to attempt to give a full discussion of arguments which have been presented for and against their historical reliability would be out of place and, indeed, impossible within the scope of this dissertation. Moreover, this task is unnecessary, for it has been done recently by R. P. Charles Boyer, S. J.[1] On the other hand, the writer feels that he must give some justification for the particular view of the Confessiones held by himself. In order to clarify his position he presents the following six points which enter his consideration.

The first point concerns Augustine's health and retirement. In the arguments against their historicity it is said that in the Confessiones the author presents himself as leaving his teaching position for religious motives, whereas in the dialogues he says that he quit for reasons of health.[2] There is much evidence in the dialogues to support such criticism. Besides a general concern for his poor health,[3] there is mentioned a chest pain and, perhaps of less enduring nature, a toothache.[4] Of course, attempts to diagnose the chest malady from the description in the dialogues have proved fruitless.[5]

Health may be secondary to Augustine's religious motives. Unmistakably the Confessiones attest to the fact that Augustine was often seriously ill.[6] However, these books do not give health as the primary reason for his resigning his teaching post; it is only secondary. Was this action, as it has often been contended,

truly a hiding of his religious motives under cover of poor health as an excuse to the parents of his pupils?[7] Both elements could be present in his decision. Even the dialogues themselves admit that the illness served as an excuse to allow him to devote his time to the life of philosophy he had long planned.[8] Both the Confessiones and the dialogues can be true.[9]

A second issue is the apparent discrepancy between retirement and teaching. Raised against the Confessiones is the attack that in those chapters Augustine claims to have forsaken his teaching profession and to have spent his time in reading Scriptures and praying, while the dialogues witness to his continuing in his profession as a teacher of rhetoric.[10] In book IX of the Confessiones there is little reference to the teaching he did on the works of non-Christian authors at Cassiciacum; in the dialogues one finds an abundance of evidence. They bear witness that Augustine continued as a master of his subject.[11]

Augustine makes no claim that he abandoned his teachings based on the classics. He claims only to have forsaken the harshly commercial side of his teaching profession. By some readers the practice of the craft of his old profession has been found in the Confessiones as well as in the dialogues.[12] Certainly the De Civitate Dei indicates that he continued to be well informed in his old subject. Moreover, evidence is not lacking in the dialogues to show that besides such studies with his pupils he also practiced private prayer and Bible study.[13] Again, the witness of the dialogues and the Confessiones could be considered supplementary.

In the third place, Augustine is called a Neoplatonist rather than a Christian. The Confessiones present the recently converted Augustine as a devoted Christian while the dialogues indicate that his thought is dominated by Neoplatonism. There is much in the dialogues to justify Thimme's contention that Augustine's theory of redemption is basically intellectual-Platonic rather than Christian.[14] Furthermore, his argument is supported by such scholars as Gourdon, Alfaric, Becker, and Marrou.[15]

This argument cannot be evaluated with any finality here, for the question will arise often in the ensuing chapters. Some decision, however, can be made in regards to the Confessiones. The argument has behind it the assumption, perhaps based on theories of Harnack, that Neoplatonic philosophy and Christianity are mutually exclusive. Such a position fails to do justice to the religious character of Neoplatonism and to the presence of Platonism even in the New Testament.[16] Although Augustine has been brought up with a Christian background, in the period of the dialogues he certainly does not regard Christianity and Neoplatonism as enemies. He believes, rather, that they have many similarities. Of course he does not make many references to Christ, but his intention is that His authority shall be supreme in his life.[17]

As Van Bavel has pointed out, an immature Christology is not sufficient indication in every case for saying that one is not a Christian.[18]

In the fourth place, one should consider Augustine's emotional states. One argument is that the Confessiones picture Augustine thoroughly frustrated and unhappy until he is freed from all of his problems and given peace through Christianity while the dialogues show him relatively carefree and yet wrestling with problems of faith.[19] The Confessiones do in fact present Augustine in great misery and then in great peace.[20] The dialogues certainly picture him in a joyous mood and concerned further with problems of faith.[21]

The arguments placed together counteract each other. The joy of the dialogues witnesses to the peace found in the Confessiones. The problems of the dialogues point toward the struggle of the Confessiones. One cannot well doubt the description of the inner conflict portrayed in the Confessiones; nor has it been entirely resolved in the dialogues.[22] There is a great peace manifest in the dialogues which would bear out the description in the Confessiones. Furthermore, such a general framework of peace does not rule out subordinate questions which would require answering in order to live consistently with the decision he describes in the Confessiones.[23]

A fifth objection is that Augustine changes slowly rather than suddenly. Whereas the conversion is described as a revolution in the Confessiones, the dialogues do not mention such a sudden event. One is shown that the growth of Augustine is really through a slow evolution of thought. Gourdon has described it, in what were for him modern terms, as a conversion by evolution rather than revolution.[24]

This objection may be given an obvious answer. In their eagerness to apply something of Darwin's findings to religious studies some scholars have been led to misunderstand the Confessiones. For him, the incident is anything but an isolated revolution, though it is a major turning point.[25] Is S. Simpson correct when he maintains that due to his secretive character Augustine did not fully describe his conversion in the dialogues?[26] Perhaps the event is mentioned in covert references, as Courcelle suggests.[27]

A sixth attack is that Augustine's memory is failing in the Confessiones. Harnack maintains that in writing from a particular emphasis and point of view twelve years or so after the events, Augustine anticipated much.[28] The suggestion is that Augustine's memory cannot be trusted when it comes to giving a history of his life at the time of the conversion and the weeks following. This criticism is indeed a major problem which cannot be lightly dismissed, but it is not insurmountable.

It seems to the present writer that S. Simpson takes an unnecessary step when he suggests that the Confessiones describe what Augustine feels in his heart should have been, though in his head he knows it was otherwise.[29] One must always recognize the many points of agreement between Confessiones and dialogues.[30] Of course, being an autobiography, it differs in style and material from dialogues written to show the day by day intellectual activity. As any book of its type, it is highly selective, judging events from a more mature perspective and indicating their value for the writer in his later life.[31] In accord with his purpose some facts in the dialogues are omitted or pushed into the background while some not mentioned pointedly in the dialogues are brought to the foreground. These facts do indeed represent a development between the conversion and the episcopate.[32] But to admit development does not imply that the Confessiones fail to give some history of the early life of their author.

The above attacks have led to a better understanding of the Confessiones. They have driven scholars to a re-examination of the dialogues as well as the Confessiones, to a clearer concept of what is meant by "historical," and to a recognition of the strengths and weaknesses of each style of writing.[33] One now realizes that the attack has been made partly on the assumption that the dialogues are accurately recorded "objective history" while the Confessiones include the author's interpretation. As will be seen later, when the historicity of the dialogues is discussed in the next few pages, this is an assumption which can hardly be supported by the evidence.[34]

Recognizing the long-range post-view of the Confessiones , the present writer will use them for the witness they bear to Augustine's life in the period under study. But he will exercise care to distinguish Augustine's more mature evaluation from his concepts in the period described.

The historicity of the dialogues has also been challenged. Some have assumed that the dialogues give a contemporary written record, an objective description of Augustine's life at Cassiciacum. On this basis the Confessiones have been questioned. But the question has been inserted as to whether the dialogues themselves really conform to such an interpretation or whether they, like the Confessiones, are of a different nature. This problem has not received as much attention as has the one above, though it has not been entirely neglected.

One can easily see that the dialogues as they stand are not simply the stenographer's report. The least one can admit is that Augustine has composed the settings and introductions for his reports.[35] To that degree they are subjective. There are those who

would push further. From them three arguments are presented against the historicity of the dialogues.

The first point is that the dialogues are attempts at creative writing. The dialogues in their present forms are the products of an author versed in the classics who writes in conscious imitation of the Latin master, Cicero. Advocates argue that Augustine had long held literary ambitions, he had read widely in Latin literature, greatly admiring Cicero, and he wrote claiming the books as his literary productions.[36] For these reasons the historicity of the discussions "must inevitably be suspect."[37]

Against this attack is cited the lack of polish in Augustine's dialogues. There is the argument of Ohlmann, cited by O'Meara, that is the dialogues of Augustine are not historical, then they represent poor attempts at writing with the dialogue style. It is felt by some that for style alone, Augustine's efforts are not very successful when compared with the masterpieces of Plato or Cicero. However, a stronger argument is that though Augustine made some changes and additions, the dialogues are still closely based on a stenographer's record.[38]

Secondly, even the presence of the notarius has been questioned. O'Meara has pointed out that a common feature of dialogue method is to constantly assure the reader that the speeches conform to an actual discussion.[39] According to this argument the stenographer referred to by Augustine was not present at Cassiciacum but was introduced by invention as Augustine wrote the polished form of the dialogues after the classical models. In spite of the claim for accurate records, there seem to be many discrepancies such as those which occur in the dating of the dialogues. Upon the discrepancies Professor O'Meara has concluded, "Either Augustine made a mistake in interpreting the records, or deliberately altered them as he pleased, or there were no records kept."[40]

Meulenbroek has taken exception to doubting the presence of the stenographer. He thinks the stenographer wrote the documents which formed the basis of the dialogues.[41] And though Plinval recognizes that Augustine wrote introductions, he argues that the dialogues are accounts rendered of actual discussion. They were either noted by a stenographer or reproduced after a brief interval.[42] It adds a new aspect when one remembers that the dialogues were written in a short period, perhaps too short to allow Augustine to forget the major arguments and their advocates. For some external evidence one can consider Confessiones IX, vi, where, in discussing De Magistro, Augustine maintains that the words he put in the mouth of Adeodatus were really there in the boy's thoughts. To this may be added the statement in the introduction to Romanianus that the words are by Augustine and Alypius, though they represent the thoughts of the disputants. According to that evidence, if the

words are not verbatim, they are a representation true to character. Secondly, one has in the Retractationes, the books in which Augustine judges himself lest he be judged by God, the information volunteered that he was really alone when he was writing the Soliloquia, though for style he wrote of two interlocutors.[43] This device is far more obvious than his "style" mechanics in the other dialogues. Why does he explain his craft here and not explain it with the other dialogues? Is it possible that the situation was as he actually describes it in those dialogues?

A third question raised against the dialogues involves the credibility of some of the incidents described. Gudeman, like Hirzel, thinks that the seven day time element is only a stock device of dialogue craft; the whole is an imagination of Augustine.[44] Again, O'Meara raises some question about the improbability of certain incidents, such as De Ordine being set in motion by a mouse awakening Licentius. In the inspiration which Licentius exhibits in the early hours of the morning he sees the shadow of a "deux ex mechina" which "sounds the knell of historicity."[45]

There is some similarity between elements of Augustine's dialogues and those of his predecessors. Though similarity does not necessarily imply dependence or lack of historicity, one must admit that it is likely that Augustine may have used these devices in the course of a day's work. Some of the incidents may appear theatrical or extra-ordinary to the modern reader. Yet, the above arguments do not prove that the incidents did not happen. They may have been based on some incidents of the sort described.

The dialogues may be neither "objective" history nor "pure fiction." Considering the above evidence one can hardly be content with the assumption that the dialogues are documents giving "objective" history. Neither should one be prepared to say categorically that the dialogues are "pure fiction." If so, one needs to explain what Augustine was doing at Cassiciacum. The entire period described in the dialogues, Confessiones, Epistolae, and Retractationes would require a new explanation. It is much more likely that the dialogues have some basis in events that actually took place. Between the extremes of "objective" history and "pure fiction" is the position of Professor O'Meara who is the latest to examine carefully the historicity of the dialogues.

He permits elements of fact among what may be elements of fiction. After his probing examinations he concludes that the interlocutors named by Augustine actually were at Cassiciacum participating in discussions much like the ones described. The Retractationes support the details of the dialogues, so events may be accepted as historical unless they give serious grounds for suspicion. Nevertheless, he finds "ground for believing that the element of fiction is far from negligible."[46] Writing in a more

recent publication he concludes, "But in the main, although there may be much solid fact enshrined in them, the Dialogues of Cassiciacum are works of fiction and must be treated with appropriate reserve."[47] It is interesting to note that this argument is similar to that of a contemporary Biblical scholar who finds that in a more polished literery form and in an even older oral traditon, it is possible that events in history are reflected.[48]

There are also problems of historicity in later dialogues by Augustine. The preceding discussion has been concerned primarily with the writings at Cassiciacum. The Soliloquia form a separate type in that group of four. A further problem is raised by De Musica, which has no particular historical setting. Again, there are the many chapters of De Libero Arbitrio, III, in which one party of the dialogue is seemingly forgotten while the other continues alone at length. Each dialogue forms a special problem and will be treated in the section on Augustine's literary activities. However, the general attitude will be that described in the next paragraph.

The dialogues, like the Confessiones, are based on historical events. They are written according to a literary form and style chosen by their author according to his purpose. But they do not include all the possible facts. Those they do present are portraits rather than plain photographs, each scene being interpreted by the author according to his thought at the time of composition. Augustine has written the dialogues according to the periods he describes in the Confessiones, the Epistolae, and the Retractationes. The dialogues are dependable for giving one a picture of Augustine's thought in those periods and for pointing to the way he occupied his time. Thus, they are the major sources used for studying Augustine in this period, being supplemented by the Confessiones.

Several other sources deserve attention. One has no difficulty in using Augustine's books described in his Retractationes which are clearly dated within the period under study in this thesis. Yet, two different sources should be mentioned in addition.

The too often neglected Epistolae are perhaps the most accurate documents describing the thought and action of Augustine. In this century Thimme has written a history of Augustine on the basis of the letters, and J. S. Banks has pointed to them as "a comparatively unused mine of religious knowledge."[49] The recent article of J. M. Flood is simply a reminder of the excellent Introduction by Professor J. H. Baxter in his translation of Select Letters in the Loeb edition.[50] Though the letters are written according to the style of that day, often utilizing titles in the salutation which seem too "high-flown" for modern ears, they are intended primarily for their addressees. Consequently they are often more personal than the dialogues, showing the primary

concerns of Augustine at the time of writing. From them one receives a view of their author's friendships, his day by day activities, his literary efforts, and his philosophical and theological thoughts. All of these subjects are presented pointedly and interestingly.

The Retractationes are of value for the present study since they are written at the close of Augustine's varied life. They are not so much intended "to retract" or "to withdraw," for as Professor Burnaby has written, retractare is in the classical and post classical period commonly rendered "to reconsider" or "to revise."[31] Whereas Possidius thought of the work as only a correction of errors, Professor Burnaby regards it as an apology as well. From his mature view Augustine discloses what he believes to be the significance, dating and errors of his earlier writings. Though Augustine makes many corrections, one is often surprised at how much he lets stand without further comment.

The primary sources which can be utilized in the present study of Augustine are supplemented by many secondary sources. Besides later writings of Augustine, they include the Vita by Possidius, writings to Augustine, the writings of Augustine's contemporaries and predecessors, and finally, the ever growing number of writings published since the death of the Bishop of Hippo.

In summary, there are many different sources available for studying Augustine in the years 386-391 A. D. At various times in the ensuing chapters the writer makes use of all of those mentioned in the above paragraphs. It only remains for him to state his attitude in using those sources.

The writer uses the Confessiones with some reservation. For deeds that happened previous to the "conversion" itself they are indispensable, but they must be balanced by the evidence in the dialogues. The incidents reported in the Confessiones did happen. The interpretation placed upon them and the eveluation of them reflect Augustine's more mature thought. It would be unnatural for him to write such an account without imposing his later development upon his earlier experiences. The story is an outstanding biography of a human soul. However, in this study the writer is not concerned primarily with Augustine's later evaluation of the events. His first concern is with the events as they happened and with their sequence in Augustine's development until his ordination. For that reason the most important sources of information are not the Confessiones but the works actually produced in the period under study. The writer seeks to rely upon those works which not only record the events but also record the attitudes of Augustine towards them at the time of their occurrence. The Confessiones do point to important elements in the earlier writings which might

otherwise go unnoticed.

The dialogues themselves are not objective records. They are, in some measure, pieces of creative literature. Augustine is by no means pouring out details of his entire private life. They follow a certain pattern and are for a fairly wide circulation. They have a polished form and are probably organized to attract and keep the attention of readers in Augustine's time. But they remain reliable sources for studying Augustine's deeds and thoughts. They reflect his activities in those days and his attitudes toward life. They enable the reader to see what Augustine was thinking and the importance he attached to his thoughts.

Augustine's works before his ordination which are not bound to the dialogue method are more direct in their approach and exhibit more freedom. Except for the letters they are the most reliable sources for Augustine's thought.

The letters will be regarded as the most accurate record of Augustine's thoughts. They are not without a set style, but they are more personal and allow the author to speak with freedom. They serve to support certain material presented in the dialogues and other books.

The Retractationes are, in some ways, more reliable than the Confessiones, for Augustine attempts to deal critically with all of his works and to clarify the impressions he meant to convey. As sources for studying his early years they, like the Confessiones, are inadequate, because they impose thoughts from a later period. His earlier works are explained and defended in light of controversies which developed several years later. What he actually said in those early works must be given more consideration than what he later wished he had said.

The writings by Augustine's contemporaries are helpful in understanding his life. The amount of material actually describing his thought and activities from an objective point of view is extremely limited. Aside from the few letters written to Augustine, the most valuable material of his contemporaries is that describing events and attitudes which formed the background for Augustine's life.

Studies by recent scholars of Augustine are used to help analyze the primary sources for this five year period. It is understandable that all the studies which have some bearing upon Augustine's early life have not been utilized. The writer attempts to include a representative collection of books and articles. He seeks to present the views of Protestants and Catholics from Britain, America, and European countries. He tries to include views from several different disciplines in order to illumine many facets of Augustine's life.

Depending upon these sources with their peculiar strengths and weaknesses, the main study begins with an examination of Augustine's position immediately after his conversion.

Part I, A. Sources

Notes

[1]Charles Boyer, Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans La Formation de Saint Augustin. A long study giving a summary of each book involved can be found in M. P. Garvey, Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo-Platonist? A recent review is given by J. J. O'Meara, "Augustine and Neo-Platonism," in Recherches Augustiniennes, Vol. I, 1958, pp. 91-111.

[2] Hans Becker, Augustin:Studien zu seiner geistigen Entwicklung. p. 17.

[3] De Ordine I, viii, 26, J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina, volume XXXII, column 989; Soliloquia I, ix, 16, P. L. XXXII, 878.

[4] Contra Academicos I, i, 3, P. L. XXXII, 907, pectoris dolor; De Beata Vita, I, 4, P. L. XXXII, 961, pectoris dolor; De Ordine, I, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 980, stomachi dolor; Soliloquia I, xii, 21, P. L. XXXII, 880, dentium dolore.

[5] Among some possibilities, P. Courcelle rejects serious tuberculosis or asthma since Augustine was able to preach so long. "Les Premières Confessions de Saint Augustin," Revue des Études Latines, 1943-44, p. 172.

[6] For example Confessiones I, xi, 17, P. L. XXXII, 669; V, ix, 16, P. L. XXXII, 713; besides these there are the examples of experiences of extreme sorrow or despair. In a later period examples are seen in Epistolae XXXVIII and CXII, P. L. XXXIII.

[7]Boyer, op. cit. p. 138; E. B. J. Postma, Augustinus De Beata Vita, pp. 2-12; V. J. Bourke, Augustine's Quest for Wisdom, p. 69. Sparrow Simpson, St. Augustine's Conversion, finds a secretive element in St. Augustine's make up, p. 103. See Confessiones IX, ii, 2 and 4, P. L. XXXII, 763-764.

[8] Contra Academicos, I, i, 3, P. L. XXXII, 907; De Ordine I, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 980 very likely referring to the plan mentioned in Confessiones Vi, xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII, 731.

[9] David E. Roberts, "The Earliest Writings," in Battenhouse, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, p. 93; Postma, op. cit.; Bourke, op. cit.

[10] Louis Gourdon, Essai sur la Conversion de Saint Augustin, chapter 4.

[11] De Ordine I, vii, 26, P. L. XXXII, 989, the custom of studying Virgil, "...Nisi quod ante coenam cum ipsis dimidium volumen Virgilii audire quotidie solitus eram, ..." Also see the study by Sister M. I. Bogan, The Vocabulary and Style of the Soliloquies and Dialogues of St. Augustine, p. 200; W. Jaeger cites Augustine as a main source for Varro's theology. His citations are to the later De Civitate Dei. The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, pp. 2-4.

[12] For example the work of P. Courcelle on "Tolle Lege" in his Recherches sur les Confessiones, pp. 190-91, 225. See review by G. M. Folliet in L'Année Theologique Augustinienne, 1952, fasc. IV, p. 377, and the attack by J. O'Meara in The Young Augustine, pp. 183-84.

[13] Contra Academicos I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 905; De Ordine I, iii, 6, P. L. XXXII, 981; I, viii, 22, P. L. XXXII, 987; Soliloquia I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 869.

[14] W. Thimme, Augustins Geistige Entwickelung, "Augustins Erlösungslehre ist im Kern Intellektualistisch-platonisch, nicht christlich." p. 159. However he does admit some references to Christ as teacher.

[15] L. Gourdon, op. cit. chapter 4; P. Alfaric, L'Evolution Intellectuelle de saint Augustin. Vol. 1, pp. 519-26; H. Becker, op. cit. p. 55 and elsewhere; H. I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et La Fin de la Culture Antique, p. 167.

[16] W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 120. Compare with C. Boyer, op. cit. p. 150.

[17] The main argument is from Contra Academicos III, xx, 43, P. L. XXXII, 957, Mihi autem certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim reperio valentiorem.

[18] T. J. van Bavel, Recherches sur la Christologie de saint Augustin, p. 9. As de Labriolle, "Augustin D'Hippone" in Dictionnaire D'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques, Tome Cinquième, col. 455, correctly points out that Augustine was only a convert, not a perfect theologian.

[19] Louis Gourdon, op. cit.

[20] Confessiones VIII, vii, 17, P. L. XXXII, 757; VIII, xii, 29-30, P. L. XXXII, 762-64; IX, opening chapters, P. L. XXXII, 763-766.

[21] De Beata Vita I, 6, P. L. XXXII, 962; ii, 7, P. L. XXXII, 963; De Ordine, I, viii, 22; I, x, 29, P. L. XXXII, 987-991.

[22] De Ordine I, iii, 6, P. L. XXXII, 981; Soliloquia I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 869.

[23] Contra Academicos, the possibility of knowledge and Soliloquia, for example I, x, 17, P. L. XXXII, 878. Answer is given against Becker by W. Montgomery, St. Augustine, Aspects of His Life and Thought, p. 41. also P. de Labriolle, Saint Augustin, Vol. I, p. xv.

[24] L. Gourdon, op. cit. "En les termes modernes, saint Augustin n'a pas eu, croyens-nous, une conversion par révolution, mais une conversion par évolution.: p. 87. Becker, op. cit. p.16.

[25] W. J. Sparrow Simpson, Augustine's Conversion, p. 250.

[26] Ibid. p. 103.

[27] Contra Academicos II, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 921-22 is a reference to the garden. P. Courcelle, Recherches...pp. 188-189 finds references in De Beata Vita, i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 959 parallel to Confessiones VIII, xii, 28, P. L. XXXII, 761-62, tears, storm, calm.

[28] A. Harnack, Augustin's Confessionen, "So ist es nicht schwer, Augustin aus Augustin zu widerlegen und zu zeigen dass er in den Confessionen sehr vieles anticipirt hat." p. 17.

[29] W. J. Sparrow Simpson, op. cit. p. 237.

[30] P. Courcelle, Recherches, pp. 188-89 and "Les Premières Confessiones des saint Augustin" in Revue des Études Latines, 1943-44, pp. 155-74.

[31] P. Courcelle, Recherches, p. 38ff. and O'Meara, The Young Augustine, who suggests, "The story of Augustine's own conversion, therefore, is to some extent the story of a typical conversion: it is the story of Everyman...." p. 13.

[32] Roy Battenhouse, "The Life of St. Augustine," in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, p. 18.

[33] Paul Henry, "Augustine and Plotinus," The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 11; P. de Labriolle, op. cit. p. xxii; C. C. Martindale, S. J. "A Sketch of the Life and Character of St. Augustine," in A Monument to Saint Augustine, p. 82.

[34] J. J. O'Meara, The Young Augustine, p. 193.

[35] De Beata Vita i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 959; iv, 36, P. L. XXXII, 976; Contra Academicos I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 905; II, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 919; III, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 933; De Ordine I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 977; Soliloquia I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 869.

[36] J. J. O'Meara, "The Historicity of the Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine." Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. V, no. 3, July, 1951, pp. 150-178. See review also by A. C. de Veer in Bulletin Augustinien pour 1951, extrait de L'Année Theologique Augustinienne, 1952, fasc. Iv p. 385. Also see P. M. Schuhl, review of O'Meara's St. Augustine Against the Academics, Westminster Maryland, 1950. Revue Philosophique, Vol. 153, 1953, p. 485. Also John Burleigh, The City of God, p. 49; V. J. Bourke, op. cit. p. 72.

[37] J. J. O'Meara, The Young Augustine, p. 193.

[38] A. D. Nock, review of P. Courcelle's Recherches in The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. II, 1951, p. 226.

[39] J. J. O'Meara, "The Historicity of..." op. cit. See R. Hirzel, Der Dialog, Vol. II, p. 377.

[40] Ibid. p. 177.

[41] B. L. Meulenbroek, Metriek en Rhythmiek in Augustinus' Cassiciacum-Dialogen and Robert Philipson, "Sind die Dialoge Augustins Historisch" in Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Vol. 80, 1931, pp. 144-150.

[42] Georges de Plinval, "La Technique du Dialogue chez saint Augustin et saint Jerome," Actes du premier Congrès de las Fédération Internationale des Associations d'Études Classique, p.309.

[43] Retractationes, Prologus, 2, P. L. XXXII, 583; I, iv, 1, P. L. XXXII, 589.

[44] R. A. Brown, S. Aureli Augustini De Beata Vita, pp. 1-32. Hirzel, op. cit. 2 vols.

[45] J. J. O'Meara, "The Historicity of..." op. cit. p. 176.

[46] Ibid. pp. 177, 178.

[47] J. J. O'Meara, The Young Augustine, p. 193.

[48] John Bright, Early Israel in Recent Historical Writing.

[49] J. S. Banks, "Augustine as seen in his Letters" The London Quarterly Review, Vol. CXXI, Fifth Series, Vol. vii, 1914, p. 97. W. Thimme, Augustin, ein Lebens und Charakterbild auf Grund seiner Briefe.

[50] J. H. Baxter, St. Augustine, Select Letters. J. M. Flood, "St. Augustine in His Letters," The Furrow, Vol. 3, no. 5, May 1952, pp. 196-202.

[51] John Burnaby, "The 'Retractationes' of Saint Augustine: Self Criticism or Apologia?" in Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, pp. 85-92. Retractationes, P. L. XXXII, 583-625.

Part I, B

Augustine Immediately After His Conversion

It is hardly necessary to discuss in detail the cultural background of this period of Augustine's life. Since the time of Constantine the Great, Christianity had been recognized as legal in the Roman Empire. The decisions of Nicea had carried imperial approval. The Western bishops were growing in strength and influence as the power of the state weakened. The empire was under divided rule. Financial and population difficulties were multiplying. Barbarians were even threatening the peace of citizens behind the frontiers. Pagan sects and Christian heresies contended against the Catholics. Although Christian monasticism was growing, the lives of those outside the monasteries, even among "Christians," often continued in immorality. An attitude of resignation and retreat was common in many citizens.

Nor is it necessary to give a full account of Augustine's life up to the time of his conversion. His story is well known from the account in the Confessiones. His birth in North Africa in the town of Tagaste on November 13, A. D. 354, was into a family of a Christian mother and a pagan father. He was educated for a time in Madaura and later lived in Carthage practicing as a professor of rhetoric. While still under the influence of Manichean doctrine he journeyed to Rome. Students there often refused to pay their fees, so he gladly accepted an invitation to teach in Milan. In Milan he was attracted by the preaching of Bishop Ambrose and became interested in studying the Christian Scriptures. A short time later, in 386, he had a moving experience while in a garden, an experience which is commonly regarded as a conversion to Christianity. A short account of the early life of Augustine is found in Battenhouse, and a longer, yet readable, account is given by J. J. O'Meara in his Young Augustine. The present study begins with Augustine immediately after his conversion.

Several factors should be considered in order to understand Augustine immediately after his conversion. These factors involve changes from the life of Augustine previous to his garden experience to that which became his pattern subsequently. Aspects of his earlier life may be pointed out in order to show the nature of the changes which he underwent in a very short period of time.

One clear result of Augustine's conversion experience in the garden of Milan was his moral change. He abandoned a life of sexual lust in favor of a life of chastity. The sexual lust he had begun in his sixteenth year at his home town had not been censured by those who had cared little for his morals but much for his professional advancement.[1] Nevertheless, it appears that he soon gave his undivided loyalty to the mother of Adeodatus until she was dismissed at Monnica's promptings. The two year postponement of the marriage vows to his new fiancé was the trigger that had released him again into the endless whirlpools of lust.[2] His relationship to the Church and his inadequate faith in Christ had been of little practical consequence toward moral reform.[3]

Augustine's position after the garden experience was different. The verse he had read as a result of his response to the "tolle, lege," Romans 13:13, was directly aimed at his condition of fleshly lust. His comment on the experience was that as a result of it he no longer even hoped for a wife.[4] This statement does not mean that he ceased to have his manly desires or even to weigh the possible advantages he might have in marriage--the evidence is to the contrary--but he became, after that experience, able to maintain total abstinence in matters of sex.[5]

As a second result, Augustine made an occupational change. He abandoned the commercial side of his teaching in order to solve personal problems of faith and knowledge. From Augustine's early school days no efforts had been spared to prepare him to receive honors in the field of rhetoric. The sacrifices made by his parents and the aid forwarded by Romanianus had been rewarded by his superiority among his fellow students and approached fulfillment in his practice at Rome and Milan.[6] Though his reading of the Hortensius had led him to distrust honors as ends in themselves, he had continued plainly to commercialize his talents. It was from overwork in his field, he explained, that pains in his chest had developed which provided an excuse based on fact to offer for his resignation.[7]

The combination of ill health and moral change in the great turning experience was followed by his abandoning his public post at Milan in order to retire to the country estate of his friend, Verecundus.[8] Instead of turning his back on his former education, he resolved to forsake the primarily commercial nature of his previous endeavors and to pursue truths new to him, using his talents as a vehicle to speed him along the way.[9] It was in that frame of mind that he retreated to Cassiciacum.

Thirdly, Augustine changed his attitude toward the Catholic Church. Previous to the conversion he had not been committed to the Church. Monnica being of that persuasion, he had been reared to respect the Catholic tradition and had been, at his insistence, on one occasion, almost baptized.[10] But as a dashing young man he

had despaired of finding truth in the Church and even planned his wayward acts during the celebration of the rites of the Church.[11] His dissatisfaction with Faustus had not hindered his appreciation for the eloquence of Ambrose. Though he had recognized the truth in the message which the words of the Bishop of Milan conveyed, and though there had been some faith in Christ in his heart, he had not been ready to commit himself to it with entirety.[12] Even the actions of Victorinus, professor of rhetoric at Rome, which had impressed Augustine so much, had not moved him to surrender himself to the Catholic Church.[13]

After the garden experience Augustine viewed the Church with favor. It was after the conversion experience that he sent to Bishop Ambrose by means of letters, a description of his former errors and his resolutions for a new life. At the same time he asked Ambrose to recommend books for reading in order that he might be better prepared for the reception of such grace. It seems that Augustine meant he had decided to receive baptism, for in the next chapter he described his giving in his name for that purpose.[14] This was a new relationship to the Church; and though he had previously received Ambrose's teaching, his act of commitment came after the conversion scene.

Fourthly, Augustine underwent an intellectual change. He turned from Manichean and skeptical thought to Neoplatonic and Christian doctrines. It is almost impossible to describe the details of the change with final clarity, but the broad outlines can be brought into focus. The reading of Cicero's Hortensius in his nineteenth year had given Augustine a burning desire to pursue philosophy, and although his lusts had prevented his achieving what he had regarded as this end, he had joined himself to the Manicheans in search for truth.[15] Its prophet having died much earlier, Manicheism as a universal religion, based upon scriptures, thrived with all its missionary characteristics in the fourth century. As did wider gnostic doctrines it met human anxiety, described the conditions of existence, and offered a way of deliverance.[16] But when even the celebrated leader of the movement, Faustus, had failed to answer Augustine's questions, the latter had lost confidence. His remaining with members of the sect had been not so much due to commitment to them as it had been to lack of commitment to anything else.[17] He had then been ripe to be gathered to the Academics, but one sees that he had never been a thoroughgoing skeptic. It was in that period that he listened to Ambrose, and became familiar with Platonist doctrine.

The precise nature of Augustine's intellectual change deserves further study. His new intellectual position was not decided with finality. In general one may say that it involved two strands which were not entirely exclusive. One strand was Christian doctrine which he had received largely through the learned exposition

of ambrose, and perhaps, to a lesser degree, through the beliefs and practices of Monnica.[18] Those two people had even inspired him to do some reading in the Scriptures and elsewhere. The other strand was a form of Platonism derived from sources not yet entirely agreed upon by scholars. It had come, at least in part, from his own reading in the field.[19] The problem of the type and source of that Platonism is open to discussion.

Augustine's own references to the philosophy he had read should be carefully considered. His first mention is in the Confessiones VII where he recalls certain books of the Platonists (Platonicorum) translated from Greek into Latin which were given to him by a man full of pride.[20] He supplements this information when he narrates how he has reported to Simplician his reading some books of the Platonists (Platonicorum) which Victorinus, professor of rhetoric at Rome, has translated from Greek into Latin.[21] These two references in themselves are quite straightforward; however, the third reference, in De Beata Vita 4 is not so clear. In his introduction to Theodore, he mentions reading a few books. The question is whether the text should read Platonis or Plotini.[22]

Much has been written upon the correct reading of the De Beata Vita passage. F. Wörter, on the basis of five manuscripts, prefers, Platonis, as the Benedictine text reads, and thus he holds that Augustine may have read Plato directly.[23] Writing in this century, Combès favors Plotini for at least two reasons. The ideas which follow the reference are those of Plotinus, and it is that philosopher and not Plato who was translated by Victorinus.[24] Following a few years later, Paul Henry has supported the same reading. In his book on Plotinus he lists the readings of fourteen manuscripts which are as follows: Plotini, 6; Platoni, 2; Platonis, 3; Pollitini, 2; Pollitimi, 1. He explains the variation as due to the medieval copiests' unfamiliarity with Plotinus.[25] In a later article he buttresses his former position with the news that palaeographical investigation has shown him that the oldest manuscripts support Plotini.[26] The position has been more recently reviewed by Connolly in his study of Augustine's ascent to God.[27] The weight of latest scholarship falls in favor of the more difficult reading for the medieval copiests and supports Plotini.

Who the Platonists are to whom Augustine refers is by no means a settled question. Among some names which have been suggested as possibilities one finds Philo, Origen, Cicero, Plotinus, Porphyry, Apuleius, and Iamblicus.[28] Perhaps all of these show influence of Plato and are named by Augustine at one time or another. There are fuller discussions of these names and more to be found in De Civitate Dei.[29] But one readily sees that this book was written much later than the period under study, and since Augustine did not

live in a vacuum one may assume that he could have read some of those authors even after his ordination. Of course he described many philosophers even in his early dialogues, but again one must exercise caution since Augustine's discussion could be based upon secondary sources rather than upon his reading the original works or translations of the authors.[30] As will be discussed more fully in a later section, Augustine's use of Greek, at least before his baptism, was hardly sufficient to give him free access to works not translated into Latin.[31] With these clues in mind one limits the search to those books written in Greek and translated into Latin which appear with strength in the early writings of Augustine.

The answer comes in force, those who qualify are Plotinus and his disciple, Porphyry. But within this general affirmation one who listens carefully finds that some scholars emphasize one name while others put weight on the alternative. There are even those who would exclude one of the names as a possible object of the references cited above.

The name which has carried the greatest weight is that of Plotinus. He is a philosopher heavily influenced by Platonism and committed in his saintly life.[32] He is perhaps one of the last great thinkers who seems almost entirely outside the influence of Christian thought.[33] He is the one, proclaim many scholars, to whom Augustine has reference in the above passages. This claim is substantiated in several ways. 1) The philosopher translated by Victorinus from Greek to Latin is Plotinus. The few books mentioned could even refer solely to the several books of his Enneads.[34] 2) In Contra Academicos, Augustine says that Plato, the best of the philosophers, has appeared with force in the Platonist philosopher Plotinus. It would seem as though they have been close companions or that the former has lived again in the latter.[35] 3) In the same passage of the Confessiones where he first mentions reading the books of the Platonists, Augustine goes on to describe the Biblical account of the "spoils of Egypt." This description is undoubtedly, they say, a reference to Plotinus and perhaps to Porphyry. One may also notice that there is a reference to Athens and that Plato is associated with it; furthermore, knowledge of the ancients in general had been asscoiated with Egypt.[36] 4) In trying to arrange parallel passages to show the origin of Augustine's thought, more of the passages seem to show similarity with Plotinus than with any other philosopher. For example, in general, the "return to thyself" of Augustine is well known in Plotinus (redire ad meipsum//ἄναγε ἐπὶ σαυτόν).[37] Henry favors Plotinus so strongly that he almost leaves no room for any influence by Porphyry.[38]

The second group place emphasis upon Porphyry. Of those who favor Porphyry, Theiler is the one who limits the references to the commentaries by him.[39] He leaves no room for Augustine to

have direct knowledge of Plotinus. Augustine, he says, reading the disciple, merely calls the name of the master. Others simply allow room for Porphyry as well as for Plotinus. One can hardly doubt that by the time Augustine wrote De Civitate Dei he was familiar with Porphyry. Courcelle supports the thesis that Augustine had read the De Regressu Animae, fragments of which appear in the Bishop of Hippo's writings.[40] O'Meara holds that the work of Porphyry was read by the young Augustine in 386 and that he even had a greater knowledge of that philosopher than any other Neoplatonist.[41] Solignac is not entirely convinced by this argument and points out that while Porphyry is not mentioned in the earlier writings, Plotinus is named several times.[42] However, though O'Meara would grant priority to Porphyry, he does not go so far as to join Theiler in excluding Plotinus.[43]

The general agreement is, then, that the books Augustine read were in all likelihood those of Plotinus and Porphyry. These two men were master and disciple between whom there existed a great similarity of thought. Of the two, Plotinus seems to have carried the weightier name, and he was prior, at least in time, to his follower. It is safe to say, that this is probably the type of Platonism read and referred to by Augustine in his early writings. The present writer is inclined to hold that the greater influence was from Plotinus.

Besides the books of the Platonists Augustine read and reported as such, one must also consider other possible sources of influence of a Platonist nature. The recent suggestion of Courcelle is that Ambrose is a major source of Augustine's Platonism.[44] According to him, Augustine received Neoplatonism and Christian doctrine together in the sermons of Bishop Ambrose. Courcelle maintains that the Hexameron and the De Isaac vel de Anima exhibit strong influence of Plotinus. These sermons, he says, Augustine quite likely heard from 30 March to 4 April in 386 A. D. It was after that period, he continues, that Ambrose introduced Augustine to Theodorus who in turn led him to the books of the Platonists. Thus, Augustine received his Platonism from Christians. This theory has reopened the whole problem which is now being discussed. However, not every student of Augustine agrees with all details. 1) It has been doubted whether Courcelle proves that the Platonist passages in Ambrose came directly from Plotinus rather than from Origen or some of the other Christian thinkers.[45] 2) It is uncertain, as even Courcelle admits, whether the dating of the preaching of those sermons belongs to the spring of 386, and even if so, it is still uncertain that Augustine heard them.[46] 3) It has not been definitely established that Ambrose introduced Augustine to Theodorus who gave the latter books of the Platonists. Simplician hardly implied that he thought Augustine had read the books under the direct or even indirect guidance of Ambrose.[47] But even when all these objections are considered something remains. If Ambrose used Platonist thought, whether from Plotinus or

Christian sources, for some sermons, is it entirely unlikely that his other sermons, even the ones Augustine reported hearing, showed marks of Neoplatonism?[48] Even with all the uncertainties of the theory of Courcelle, his view makes it necessary for one to consider Ambrose as a likely source for Augustine's Platonist influence and for his way of combining Platonism and Christian doctrine.

Solignac argues that Augustine could have received Neoplatonic influence from another source. In a fascinating discussion, "Doxographies et Manuels dans la formation Philosophique de Saint Augustin," he indicates that the sources Augustine used as a professor of rhetoric were sufficient to give him much information on the tradition of philosophy.[49] Augustine had at his disposal certain doxographies transmitted in the writings of Cicero. For example, the parallel of Contra Academicos III, xvii, 37 to Republic I, x, indicates that before his conversion Augustine was familiar with material on Plato. Solignac also traces inspiration from Varro on the use of the arts and a translation of Apuleius as possible sources for Augustine's interest, after the tradition of Pythagoras, in numbers. Augustine had, argues Solignac, a valuable knowledge of philosophy through those manuals even apart from his "books of the Platonists."

Augustine's debt to Cicero is very great. In the early dialogues Augustine often spoke of him with praise. Through him Augustine probably received a fairly good knowledge of philosophy. But in addition to Platonism, Augustine received knowledge of two other positions which remained with him after his conversion. One was the Academic position and the other was the Stoic. Both were part of Augustine's intellectual position, although they were not new as Neoplatonism seemed to be.

Cicero's discussion of the Academics is reflected in Augustine's Contra Academicos.[50] But Cicero's various presentations of Stoicism sank deeply into Augustine. Stoicism included elements from Plato and Aristotle and found its way into various syncretistic philosophers and even into Christianity.[51] It was also present in Neoplatonism.[52] Certain Stoic elements were quite strong in Madaura, where he had studied as a boy.[53] Stoicism was always a factor along with Platonism in Augustine's early writings.

The next problem arising is how Augustine's new philosophy was related to his becoming a Christian. Several solutions have been offered. The first position is that Neoplatonism led Augustine to Christianity. The point of view which holds that Augustine was a Neoplatonist before he was a Christian has much support. For some scholars Neoplatonism is primarily a means of defeating, by a unity, the radical dualism of Manichean thought.[54] Others hold that Neoplatonism enabled Augustine to change his materialistic

concept of God for a spiritual one.[55] Again, the Platonist system which he admired enabled him better to understand Christian Scriptures, with which he found parallels.[56] For a variety of reasons many have held that Neoplatonism served as a means to Augustine's becoming a Christian.[57]

The second position is that Augustine was a Christian prior to reading Platonist books. Charles Boyer, who takes this approach, makes his point after carefully examining other positions up to the time of his writing. In that way he gives an excellent survey of the problem.[58] His theory that Augustine was a Christian from the moment he decided to submit to the authority and teachings of the Catholic Church is well known. In this valiant effort to counter the extremes of Protestant thought which made Augustine only a Neoplatonist, he has gained support from Capánaga, Sparrow Simpson, and Le Blond.[59] His theory has much to substantiate it. In Confessiones V, xiv, Augustine describes how after hearing Ambrose, first as a skilful orator, then as a teacher of truth, he had doubts about Manicheans or philosophers. He then decided, he says, to become a Catechumen in the Catholic Church, which his parents had commended, until he could find a guide for his life. This decision is certainly described earlier in the Confessiones than his reading of the Platonists.

A third view is that Augustine received Neoplatonism and Christianity together. Courcelle's emphasis on Ambrose as the source of Augustine's Platonism makes Christian doctrine and Platonism reach the hearer at the same time. Platonism is not an interlude before Christianity or a cause which led Augustine to Christian; it is associated with the exposition of the Christian teaching. However, Courcelle does not go so far as to say that Augustine was a Christian from the moment he heard and submitted to the teaching of Ambrose.[60]

The three different positions described above depend upon, in part, the standard one uses to decide when one is a Christin. One stand is that Augustine was a Christian at Cassiciacum. Scholars holding that view do not place his being Christian before the conversion experience, but they definitely do place it before the baptism.[61] As evidence they cite Contra Academicos III, xx, 43.[62] This stand is not simply based on moral change, but on accpting as ultimate the authority of Christ.

A second position is that though Augustine was influenced by Christian teaching he could not have been a Christian until he had received Baptism. Baptism is the technical sign of becoming Christian. Though Capánaga supports Boyer on submission to authority, he seems to undermine that position when he insists upon Baptism as a necessary complement to the conversion, as a work which infuses certain spiritual gifts.[63]

A third position is held by Gourdon, who argues that Augustine was not fully a Christian until about the time he wrote De Vera Religione. His standard requires a rather full understanding of the Christian beliefs. To say that Augustine's doctrine was incomplete does not necessarily admit that he was not a Christian. Regardless of which standard one holds, it would be difficult to deny that there was a great change in Augustine's thought when he was taken into the priesthood.[64]

The writings of Augustine himself can be used to see the standard he employed. One may ask what Augustine considered the most important step in his process toward a new life. His answer may be helpful since it is impossible to give here any final standard for deciding when one is a Christian. Although he mentions in the Confessiones his decision to become a Catechumen, one can hardly say that Augustine highlights that event.[65] Nor does he pay particular attention to his receiving baptism, though it was important to him. To the Manicheans he denies that full, right doctrine is the final test of whether one is a Christian.[66] But one cannot so easily dismiss the garden of Milan experience. Quite clearly it is presented as the most significant of all the events related in the Confessiones.[67]

It may well be that Boyer is not as radical in his position as it may first appear. In accepting the authority of the Church one would go on in the Church to a new moral life, a receiving of baptism and a deepened understanding of Christian doctrine. The point of Boyer's emphasis on submission to authority is to show that Augustine was a Christian before he read the Platonists. The present writer does not like to go so far as that. Such a position still leaves room for Neoplatonist influence to operate upon Augustine from other sources, Platonist or Christian, even before his submitting to the authority of the Catholic Church. Indeed, it is almost impossible to rule out Neoplatonism as a factor in Augustine's accepting and understanding Christian teaching.

The results of Augustine's conversion may be outlined in the following manner. He embarked on a life of a new moral character in which sexual lust was excluded and marriage was relegated to the background. He relinquished his teaching profession in so far as it was basically commercial and dedicated his life and his education to a search for Truth. Being strongly influenced by Ambrose and Simplician, he became committed to the Catholic Church. A new intellectual position replaced his former Manichean persuasion, a new intellectual position which was strongly influenced by Neoplatonist thought in combination with the teachings of the Catholic Church.

The results of Augustine's conversion are difficult to assess. On the one hand it is easy to overestimate the radical nature of his change so that his subsequent development is obscured. On the

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other hand it is easy to emphasize his slow intellectual and spiritual growth at the expense of the significant changes which began with his conversion experience. A true evaluation must recognize at the same time the important changes of the conversion, not so much in contents as in direction of thought, and the slow process of development, not so much in direction as in content. The precise details of the intellectual change will probably remain open to debate. The relationship of Porphyry and Plotinus in influence upon Augustine is interesting, but it does not seem to the present writer to remain a problem worthy of primary concern. The relationship of the philosophical knowledge Augustine possessed as a teacher of rhetoric to his newly discovered systems of thought is a problem which has only begun to receive the attention it deserves. In this area lies a new understanding of Augustine's philosophy and theology and its influence upon subsequent Western Christianity. How Neoplatonism was related to Augustine's becoming a Christian is still open for discussion. Part of the solution for the problem lies in defining when one is a Christian. The present writer believes that Augustine's statement of his commitment to Christ in Contra Academicos marks him as a Christian at Cassiciacum. The decision probably stemmed from his conversion experience and definitely preceded his baptism. He does not think that this position excludes the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy in Augustine's becoming a Christian.

Part I, B

Augustine Immediately After His Conversion.

Notes

[1] Confessiones, II, ii, 2-4, P. L. XXXII, 675-677.

[2] Ibid. VI, xiii, 23--VI, xv, 25, P. L. XXXII, 730-732. VIII, xi, 25-27, P. L. XXXII, 760-761.

[3] Ibid. VII, v, 7, P. L. XXXII, 737. As Hatch shows in his The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, the age was not entirely morally bankrupt even apart from Chriatianity.

[4] Confessiones, VIII, xii, 30, P. L. XXXII, 762-763.

[5] Soliloquia, I, x, 17-23, P. L. XXXII, 878-882.

[6] Confessiones I, xvii, 27, P. L. XXXII, 673; II, iii, 5-8, P. L. XXXII, 677-678; III, iii, 5-6, P. L. XXXII, 685; V, xii, and xiii, P. L. XXXII, 716-17.

[7] Ibid. III, iv, 7-8, P. L. XXXII, 685-686; IX, ii, 2-4, P. L. XXXII, 763-765.

[8] Ibid. IX, iii, 5-6, P. L. XXXII, 765-766. The influence of Simplician's story of Victorinus is not to be neglected. VIII,ii, 3-5, P. L. XXXII, 749-751.

[9] Fr. John Reeves, "St. Augustine and Humanism," in A Monument to Saint Augustine, p. 128. Confessiones IX, ii, 2, P. L. XXXII, 763-764.

[10] Confessiones, I, xi, 17, P. L. XXXII, 668-669.

[11] Ibid. V, xiii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 717; III, iii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 685.

[12] Ibid. V, xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII, 717; VII, v, 7, P. L. XXXII, 736-737.

[13] Ibid. VIII, ii, 3-5, P. L. XXXII, 749-751; VIII, v, 12, P. L. XXXII, 754.

[14] Confessiones IX, v and vi, P. L. XXXII, 769-770.

[15] Ibid. III, iv-vi, P. L. XXXII, 685-688.

[16] H. C. Puech, Le Manichéisme, especially pp. 53-88. For a short discussion, S. R. Hopper, "The Anti Manichean Writings" in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, p. 148.

[17] Confessiones V, vi, and vii, P. L. XXXII, 710-712.

[18] Ibid. V, xiii, and xiv, P. L. XXXII, 717-718; VI, i and ii, P. L. XXXII, 717-720.

[19] Ibid. VI, iii and iv, P. L. XXXII, 720-722; VIII, ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 749-750.

[20] Ibid. VII, ix, 13, P. L. XXXII, 740, procurasti mihi per quemdam hominem immanissimo turgidum, quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam versos;....

[21] Ibid. VIII, ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 750, quosdam libros Platonicorum, quos Victorinus...in latinam linguam transtulisset....

[22] De Beata Vita, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 961. Lectis autem Platonis* paucissimis libris....*Quinque MSS: Lectis autem Plotini.

[23] F. Wörter, Die Geistesentwickelung des hl. Aurelius Augustinus bis zu seiner Taufe, pp. 46-47.

[24] Gustave Combès, Saint Augustin et la culture Classique, pp. 10-11.

[25] Paul Henry, S. J. Plotin et L'Occident, pp. 87-94.

[26] Paul Henry, S. J. "Augustine and Plotinus," The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 1-23. See also C. Boyer, Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans La Formation de Saint Augustin, second edition, p. 76, footnote 1.

[27] Rev. S. Connolly, "The Platonism of Augustine's 'Ascent' to God," The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Vol. LXXVIII, July--December, 1952, pp. 44-53.

[28] L. Grandgeorge, Saint Augustine et Le Néo-Platonisme, p. 17-18; 30-38. Nourrison, La Philosophie de Saint Augustin, Vol. II. pp. 138-141. A. Solignac, S. J. "Analyse et Sources de la Question 'De Ideis'," Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, p. 315. F. Chatillon's point of discussion in Augustinus Magister III, p. 94-95. Augustine in Epistola CXXXVIII, says that Apuleius of Madaura is well known to Africans. P. L. XXXIII.

[29] Grandgeorge, op. cit. See also B. Altaner, "Augustinus und Philo von Alexandrien" in Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, 65 Band, 2 heft, 1941, pp. 81-90.

[30] E. G. Contra Academicos III.

[31] B. Altaner, "Augustinus und die Griesche Patristik," Revue Bénédictine, t. LXII, 1952, pp. 201-215.

[32] W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 120.

[33] P. Henry, "Augustine and Plotinus," op. cit. p. 2.

[34] Connolly, op. cit. p. 51 in questioning Courcelle's position. G. Combès, Saint Augustin et la Culture Classique, pp. 10-11.

[35] Contra Academicos III, xviii, 41, P. L. XXXII, 956; ..os illud Platonis...maxime in Platino, qui platonicus philosophus ita ajus similis judicatus est, ...ut in hoc ille revixisse putandus sit.

[36] Francois Chatillon, Melanges. "QVIDAM SECVNDVM EOS" in Revue du Moyen Age Latin, I, 1945, pp. 287-304. Étienne Gilson, "Egypte or Grèce?" Mediaeval Studies, Vol. VIII, 1946, pp. 43-52.

[37] S. Connolly, op. cit. P. Alfaric. op. cit. p. 522. Grandgeorge, op. cit. throughout. J. Burleigh, op. cit. p. 71.

[38] P. Henry. "Augustine and Plotinus," op. cit. "It may also be noticed that in these early works Porphyry is never mentioned. It is thus highly probable, not to say certain, that Augustine's teacher of spiritual philosophy was Plotinus, the genial author of the Enneads, and Plotinus only." p. 20. Also Swatalski, Plotinus and the Ethics of St. Augustine. Plotinus' Enneads are the only works referred to. p. 82.

[39] W. Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin, p. 2.

[40] Besides Courcelle, Les Lettres Grecques en Occident, p. 164. See Connolly, op. cit. p. 51.

[41] J. O'Meara, "A Master Motif in St. Augustine," op. cit. p. 314.

[42] A. Solignac, review of O'Meara's The Young Augustine, in Archives de Philosophie, Jan. - Mar. 1957. Tome XX, nouvelle Serie, cahier 1. pp. 138-141.

[43] J. O'Meara, The Young Augustine, pp. 153-154; "A Master Motif in St. Augustine," op. cit. p. 317.

[44] Courcelle, Recherches...III. Aux Sermons D'Ambroise: la Découverte du Néo-Platonisme Chrétien. O'Meara gives and account of the argument in his Young Augustine, p. 116. Roger Mehl,

"Notes sur l'actualité de St. Augustin," Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses, Tome XXXI, 1951, pp. 224-233.

[45] W. Theiler, Review of Courcelle's Recherches...in Gnomon, Band 25, 1953, p. 117.

[46] Courcelle, Recherches...pp. 122-124; Christine Mohrmann, review of Courcelle, Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. V, no. 4 Oct. 1951, pp. 249-254.

[47] O'Meara, The Young Augustine, p. 125. Confessiones VIII, ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 750, ...gratulatus est mihi quod non in aliorum philosophorum scripta incidissem....

[48] A. Solignac, "Nouveau Parallels entre saint Ambroise et Plotin" in Archives de Philosophie, Tome XIX, Nouvelle serie, cahier,3, Avril 1956, pp. 148-146. Henry, "Augustine and Plotinus," op. cit. p. 19 indicates this possibility; C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria.

[49] A. Solignac, "Doxographies et Manuels dans la formation Philosophique de Saint Augustin." in Revue des Études Augustiniennes, 1958, nos. 1, 2, 3. Seen in proof in September, 1957 by courtesy of R. P. Georges Folliet. Conclusion: when Augustine was converted and baptised he"...était deja armé pour une réflexion qui temoignerait d'une connaissance valuable de la tradition philosophique, même si l'on met à part la lecteure des libri Platonicorum." See also R. P. Maurice Testard, S. Augustin et Ciceron, thesis for Université de Paris, first seen proofs as above.

[50] Cicero, Academica.

[51] E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. pp. 24, 29, 32; E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, chapter XVII, "The Stoic Strain in Christianity." A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, p. 18.

[52] Cicero, De Finibus, De Natura Deorum, Tusculan Disputations. E. Zeller, A History of Eclecticism, pp. 162-170; See the recent article by Gérard Verbeke, "Augustin et le Stoïcisme" in Recherches Augustiniennes, Vol. I, 1958, for ideas Augustine received from Stoicism. The conclusion is found on pp. 88-89.

[53] Epistola XVI, 1. Maximi Madaurensis ad Augustinum. P. L. XXXIII, 81-82.

[54] Grandgeorge, op. cit. p. 150; S. Simpson, op. cit. p. 56, p. 143.

[55] Butler, op. cit. p. 57; Loofs, "Augustinus" Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. p. 274.

[56] Le Blond, op. cit. chapter iv.

[57] Alfaric, op. cit.; F. Mathon, "Quand faut-il placer le retour d'Augustin a la foi Catholique?" Revue des Études Augustiniennes, 1955, Vol. I, 2, p. 127. P. Courcelle, "Litiges sur le lecture des Libri Platonicorum par Saint Augustin," Augustiniana, Louvanii, 1954, p. 16; W. R. Matthews, God in Christian Thought and Experience, p. 99.

[58] C. Boyer, Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme... pp. 47-74. I. "La Dialectique de la conversion de Saint Augustin," in Essais sur la doctrine de Saint Augustin.

[59] Capánaga, "San Augustín en neustro tiempo," Augustinus, Madrid, 1956, I, 1. "La última indicación, de suma importancia, manifiesta en San Augustín el tránsito de una religión racionalista a una religión de autoridad." p. 40; Sparrow Simpson, op. cit. p. 139-40; Le Blond, Les Conversions de saint Augustin.

[60] Courcelle, "Litiges sur le lecture...." op. cit. p. 16.

[61] S. Simpson, op. cit. pp. 147-150; Gibb and Montgomery, The Confessions of Augustine, p. LXIII; Löhrer, Der Glaubensbegriff des Hl. Augustinus in seinen Schriften bis zu den Confessiones. p. 54.

[62] P. de Labriolle, "Augustin d'Hippone," Dictionnaire D'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques. Tome Cinquième, col. 456. J. Burleigh, op. cit. p. 66; Contra Academicos III, xx, 43, P. L. XXXII, 957. Mihi autem certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere; non enim reperio valentiorem.

[63] Capánaga, op. cit. p. 48. W. Thimme, "Literarish-Asthetisch Bemarkungen zu den Dialogen Augustins," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XXIX, 1908, p. 20, cites contrast between dialogues before baptism and those after.

[64] Marrou, S. A. et la Fin de la Culture Antique, p. 333; R. P. A. C. de Veer, review of E. Hendriks, "Augustinus' Visie op het Christendom..." Analecta Augustiniana Neerlancia, 1954, pp. 11-24. Revue des Études Augustiniennes, 1957, pp. 84-85. Muler, op. cit. p. 23. L. Gourdon, op. cit. p. 83. W. Thimme, "Grundlinien der geistigen Entwicklung Augustins," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XXXI, 1910, p. 193, takes a position that Augustine is not fully a Christian until one or two years after his baptism.

[65] Confessiones V, xiv, 25, P. L. XXXII, 718.

[66] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae I, xxxiv, 76, P. L. XXXII, 1342.

Part I, C

Augustine's Life and Literary Activities

Cassiciacum

The Confessiones bore witness to the joy Augustine experienced when he could in fact, as well as in spirit, leave the teaching post in Milan. It was a great blessing, he remembered, that his friend Verecundus, a non-Christian husband of a Christian wife, made available his country estate to the convert and his friends. Though Verecundus could not accept until later the demands made by Christianity and though he would miss the fellowship with his friends, he helped launch Augustine into a new kind of activity.[1] There is little wonder that Augustine remembered with pleasure his sojourn in the rural setting, for his writings reflected a constructive leisure which could appeal to any dedicated teacher also seeking to gain more truth.

Those who accompanied the retired professor helped make his stay an enjoyable one. Besides Monnica there was also his son Adeodatus. His brother and two cousins were present as members of the family. Licentius and Trygetius came along as students, while Alypius assisted the author in his literary productions.[2] All of these people participated in a life of ordered leisure. Augustine's thirst for knowledge kept him in pursuit of answers to his many problems. At the same time he kept a teacher's eye upon the discipline of his students.[3] There were frequent references to writings of Greek and Latin authors which Augustine knew in his profession and which he continued to place before his pupils.[4] They were also occupied with discussions in religion, philosophy, and morals. The informal approach was stimulated by the warm weather of early November which made it possible for discussions to be held inside and outside; the participants were to be found in the bathhouse or even in the meadow. One gets the impression that meal times were unhurried and of moderate menu, with attention being given to nourishing the soul as well as the body. Augustine, at least seems to have made use of the nights to examine his thoughts and his own position. It is also likely that some of the time was spent in reading and prayer. The only interruptions were the domestic chores with which they sometimes gave a hand;

however, even the chores were presented as a form of recreation.

Though Augustine was an experienced teacher, he had not gained any reputation as an author. Of course, in his twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh year he had written De Apto et Pulchro, dedicated to the orator of Rome, Hierius.[5] Those books, written in his Manichean days, were not of great importance or fame, and apparently even Augustine did not keep a copy of them. His discussion of the matter in the Confessiones implies that he regretted these early attempts at writing. Thus, it is in his De Beata Vita that one reads the first completed and still remaining work by Augustine.

The problem of the dating of the various dialogues becomes quite complex when one wishes to arrange them to show any development of Augustine's thought. Surprisingly enough, the dialogues of Cassiciacum present less difficulty than some of the works done after his return to Milan. The book by Ohlmann more or less follows the outline of dating suggested by the dialogues themselves.[6] According to this account the discussions took place in the following order in November, 386: 10th, Contra Academicos I, 5-11; 11th, C. A. I, 11-16; 12th, C. A. I, 16-25; 13th, De Beata Vita, 7-17; 14th, D. B. V. 17-23; 15th, D. B.V. 23-36; 16th, De Ordine I, 6-27; 17th, D. O. I, 27-33; 18th and 19th, no discussion took place; 20th, Contra Academicos II, 10-14; and 14-25; 21st, C. A. II, 25-30; 22nd, C. A. III, 1-7 and 7-45; 23rd or shortly thereafter, De Ordine II, 1-19 and 19-54. Among these the Soliloquia were written.

Such an outline has been challenged by van Haeringen who distinguishes between the time of discussion and the time of composition.[7] For him the order of debate was Contra Academicos I, II, and III, De Ordine I, De Beata Vita, and De Ordine II. No disputation took place between I and II books of Contra Academicos. However, De Beata Vita and De Ordine could have been composed then. The order of composition would by C. A. I, D. B. V., D. O. I, II, and C. A. II, III. The main point he makes is that Augustine would not interrupt the discussions of Contra Academicos by doing other works in between. The seven days he mentions were spent at rest. Gudeman, like Hirzel, finds the seven days only a common occurrence in the dialogue form.[8]

Van Haerengen makes an important point when he distinguishes between the date of the discussions and the date of the compositions. In the dialogues themselves Augustine gives the order of discussion--not the dates of composition in final form. Gudeman and Hirzel have some evidence in their favor, for if the discussions took place as Augustine described and were written immediately, what did he do from December until he returned to Milan?

The dating could be as Ohlmann gives it. According to his way

there would be a flurry of activity in November and then no more action which was recorded in dialogues. It may be, on the other-hand, that the distinction van Haeringen makes is correct. The radical view of Hirzel has been examined in a previous section, though he may be right on this particular point. The present writer finds that the datings of Ohlmann and Kavanagh, except for minor variation, agree with facts as they are given in the dialogues and in the Retractationes, especially concerning the presence and absence of Alypius. In De Ordine Alypius and Navigius have gone to the city. Yet, Navigius is present when De Beata Vita is discussed, and Alypius is absent.[9] Did Navigius go to the city after Alypius did on an independent mission? Or are there at least two different trips of Alypius--one with Navigius and one without? If this should be the case then the outline of Ohlmann would fall. It seems quite possible that Navigius traveled independently of Alypius.

Even if the dating of discussions as seen by Ohlmann and Kavanagh is correct, it is still possible that the dialogues in their present forms were written a few days or a few weeks later. It is possible that they reflect thought and deeds which took place after the original discussions.[10] All of this discussion is really not of ultimate importance in so far as one is only interested in the thought of Augustine, for the works in their finished form are previous to his return to Milan to receive baptism. They are representations of his life and work in that general period.

Although there is a problem in dating the dialogues, their confinement to a few months renders them less difficult than some of Augustine's other works. Books II and III of De Libero Arbitrio were finished in Africa, but it is likely that part of those books represent his thought at Rome. The De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus represent many stages of his development, for they were not finally collected until after he was made Bishop of Hippo. With rare exceptions, the Epistolae are also difficult to date accurately in the period under study. In comparison with some of Augustine's subsequent works, the Cassiciacum dialogues are narrowly dated.

The three books of Contra Academicos are addressed to Romanianus in order to win him to the love of Philosophy to which Augustine himself was come. Augustine held his benefactor in high esteem, as well he might. His parents had never been entirely comfortable financially and the death of the father restricted the activities of the young scholar even more. Romanianus, by his generosity, allowed Augustine to escape these bonds and encouraged his professional advancement.[11] He was interested in the subjects of that young man and seems to have been influenced by his intellectual fancies; he even wished to become part of a household devoted to study, but his social position made it impractical.

However, his son Licentius was entrusted to the guidance of Augustine.[12]

Augustine has only the highest praise for the manner in which Romanianus uses his wealth and mental ability. He is disturbed, on the other hand, that Romanianus remains in fluctuation between the positions of the Academics and of the Manicheans.[13] Contra Academicos is an attempt to examine the strength and weakness of the Academic attitude and an exhortation calling Romanianus to a new intellectual position. Although it is a calling to "Philosophy" there is an element of the faith of Augustine's youth involved in his reference to St. Paul.[14]

Augustine, in addition to exhorting Romanianus, is seeking to clarify his own attitude toward the Academics. His attraction to their manner after his leaving the Manicheans has not reached a full commitment, and the period of great change and renewal he has experienced challenges any thoroughgoing skeptical position. It is in this way that Contra Academicos comes to contain some of Augustine's definitive thought on establishing the fact of knowing and of truth in general.[15] As Boyer has pointed out, the negative aim of the work is to demonstrate the contradictions in the Academic stand while the positive aim is to show that one can have certitude of objective truths. Nevertheless, in his rational examination it happens that Augustine both supports and opposes the Academics.[16]

The source for much of Augustine's own dialogue is Cicero's Academica. There the tenets of the group he examines are presented.[17] In the course of his discussion Augustine mentions Plato, Socrates, Zeno, Arcesilas, Antiochus, Philo, Carneades, Plotinus, Epicurus, and other philosophers. With the exception of Plotinus, however, there is no good reason for believing he knows the authors other than in secondary sources.

In his understanding of the history of philosophy, Augustine does not wish to argue against the Academy as such. According to him it was Zeno the founder of the Stoic school who led to a change of practice in the Academy of Plato. Since Polemon did not trust Zeno, the secrets of Platonism were withheld from him. Arcesilas, after the death of Polemon, continued his policy of keeping the secret from Zeno, whose mind was bent to the corporeal, and from the unteachable populous. In such a manner they buried a treasure for posterity. Augustine gives this outline of the development of the New Academy.[18] Carneades, a lesser Platonist, founded the third Academy and insisted that one could follow the truth-like.[19] The real academy, however, always held that truth can be known. This fact is seen in Plotinus, who was so much like Plato that he was regarded as something of a "reincarnation" of the ancient master.[20]

Augustine singles out two points to attack. The first is that one is not able to perceive anything, and the second is that one ought not to give assent to anything.[21] As to the first, he knows that a disjunction is either true or false.[22] If one contends that he sees something, others must agree, for any dispute is over the words used to describe what is viewed. What one "sees" in dreams cannot be disputed any more than can what is said after the words, "it seems to me." As to the second statement, one living only by the probable, lives always in error, whether giving assent to it or not. Further, when one acts, he affirms something.[23] Moreover, how can one know the truth-like if he does not know the truth?[24]

With the heavy emphasis upon philosophy, one may well wonder in what way Augustine shows signs of any Christian influence. The passages are indeed scattered and not altogether strong; nevertheless, they are present. Besides praying for Romanianus, he has an unmistakable reference to his experience in the garden of Milan, his reading of the Apostle Paul. It was so powerful it could have led Romanianus to forsake the riches of the world.[25] Of God's care and providence he speaks at length.[26] In addition to identifying the power and wisdom of the most high God as the Son of God, he quotes His words, "Seek and ye shall find."[27] It is authority as well as reason which leads to truth. Of authorities, he finds none more powerful than the authority of Christ, from which he will not depart. Of reason, he is concerned not only to believe (non credo solum) but also to understand (intelligendo). In the meanwhile he expects to find among the Platonists that which is not repugnant to things he holds sacred.[28]

This statement is perhaps the best summary of Augustine's position at Cassiciacum.[29] He is only an infant in his understanding of Christianity and Neoplatonism. Since he finds certain similarities in them and since, probably, he has heard them together in the teachings of the Catholic Church, he sees no harm or particular difficulty in placing them together.[30] Truth is found by the use of authority and reason. Christ is the highest authority, and reason, following Platonist thought, will not be in opposition to it but will lead to understanding. As one readily sees, he uses the term "Philosophy" in a much broader sense than it is generally used today, and to that end he devotes the skills of his former profession.[31]

Whereas the Contra Academicos is based upon Cicero's Academica, Augustine's De Beata Vita shows similarities with Seneca's De Vita Beata and Cicero's Tusculan Disputations.[32] With its Stoic and Neoplatonic background it is not so much concerned to convert as to admire its recipient, Manlius Theodorus, a Christian as well as a Neoplatonist. However, in his later life he is to wish to withdraw some of the praise he so lavishly extends in this early writing.[33] The opening figure is a larger edition of that which

appears in the work to Romanianus. Within the port of philosophy, blocked by the mountain of vainglory (vanissimam gloriam) he pictures himself as sailing, having been drawn back from the vastness of the sea on which he wandered. But he has still not reached the shore of the happy life.[34]

The dialogue takes place during the absence of Alypius and upon Augustine's birthday. The scene opens with conversation playing upon the need for feeding the soul as well as the body. One who would have a happy life must not lack the proper soul food; however, he who tries to live on a diet of worldly possessions will be in want, since the source is unreliable. Happiness can only come in possessing what cannot be lost, that is, God.[35]

The happy man possesses God. To be happy a man must not be in want. He must have the measure of his soul, which is to be wise.[36] This wisdom is none other than the Wisdom of God, presented by divine authority as the Son of God who is the Truth.[37] There is an inner thirst of the soul which bids it to seek for God; as long as the thirst is insatiated, man is unhappy. Without the help of God no one can be happy. In conclusion, the full measure of the soul, the happy life, is in knowing piously and perfectly through whom one is led into truth, the truth one enjoys thoroughly, and that by which one is connected to the highest measure.[38] This statement Monnica applies to the Christian Trinity.

On the whole, the dialogue uses a philosophical approach, assuming that truth can be reached through reason. The attempt to define the happy life is a proper task for philosophy. One is also aware of Augustine's constant reference to literature he has used in teaching. But the whole story must include other elements. Besides the Christian words supplied by his mother, Augustine makes assertions for himself. The final sentences of the dialogue contain particularly Christian references in, "The Son of God is none other than the Wisdom of God" and "I am the truth."[39] The conclusion of the discussion as he sees it in the Retractationes is that the happy life is none other than "perfect knowledge of God."[40]

It is difficult to state the precise relationship between Neoplatonism and Christian theology in De Beata Vita. Except for apologetical purposes, one would hardly expect a mature Christian to be concerned with such a task and an approach as Augustine uses. Augustine's answers show only a limited knowledge of the Scriptures and the teachings of the Catholic Church; they are limited to passages with strong similarities to Neoplatonist thought. It may be that he is trying to combine two separate systems by pointing to a few common elements. It seems more likely, however, that he begins with an idea of the similarity and interrelatedness without being fully aware of the two independent masses beyond his limited field of vision at the time.[41] As he explains his situation to Theodorus, Augustine is sailing within the shelter of the port, but

he has not decided on just which part of the land he should bring his boat to rest.

De Ordine is prepared for Zenobius, referred to as a lover of poetry and the recipient of Epistola II.[42] The author fails to do justice to the theme he has chosen. The dialogue that follows goes the way of so many discussions in which the participants are stimulated by the importance of a subject but lack sufficient formal grounding to sift wheat from chaff and to mill a finished product. One who appreciates systematic development will find this piece of literature distracting.

Within the structural weakness of the presentation, however, lies part of its charm. Not only does Augustine sketch pictures of the informal, humorous life at Cassiciacum, but he also exhibits x-ray plates of the embryonic ideas developing within his mind, ideas which he is to deliver later in books now lost as well as in his more mature endeavors. On the first point, the lofty enquiry is set in motion when the author is disturbed late at night by such a lowly thing as the noise of water sounding in the bathhouse drain.[43] Licentius, the amateur poet, is invited to participate in discussion when he is occupied with the unpoetic task of frightening some troublesome mice. Later on, the discussion centers around the well-known cock fight just outside the door.[44] Not to be forgotten is the little anecdote about Monnica's rebuking Licentius for singing hymns in the toilet.[45] These and other incidents supplement the humorous passages in Augustine cited by Rodriguez.[46] Throughout one sees the friendly relationship of Augustine with his students. He is a most human personality whose very discipline is tendered by love.[47]

On the second point, one sees a number of subjects initiated or hinted at and left undeveloped. Among these are the liberal arts and their relationship to order, perhaps cultivated later in books no longer surviving and exemplified in De Musica.[48] One sees the beginning of inquiry into the nature of the human soul, its nature and its immortality.[49] He develops further his ideas on the relationship of reason and authority as well as his thoughts of man's duty to his neighbor.[50] The short discourses on the behavior of students are informative and amusing.[51]

The burning question for Augustine is how God can at once order all things and yet not be responsible for evil.[52] It had sparked during his late student days, and it had been smoldering for several years under Manichean dualism. Yet, when his estrangement from that system allowed the flames to spring up, what relief could he find in Neoplatonism or Christianity? Part of his work is given to this discussion. After many attempts by the students to reconcile God's goodness with the fact of the presence of evil while maintaining God's justice as well as His ordering of all things, the argument reaches its height--well below the clouds--

in the summaries of Augustine and Monnica. The son maintains that there was always order. It did not cause evil, but when evil was a fact it was included in God's order. Monnica continues by explaining that divine justice does not permit evil to go beyond the limits of order.[53] As Roberts points out, for the modern reader two questions remain. Why should one turn away from evil if it contributes to perfection, and how did man's inclination for choosing lesser goods ever arise?[54]

There is no strong evidence that Augustine had a deep comprehension of either the Neoplatonist view of evil or the Jewish-Christian explanation of the origin of evil when he wrote this dialogue. Although he approaches the problem with a personal concern, the discussion is sustained in a bath of only general philosophical-theological presuppositions. In this period his involvement reveals an intellectual impotency due to the inadequacy of fundamental seed thoughts. When this situation is coupled to his later explanation that since his companions could not follow deep penetration he abandoned the problem in favor of ordering students, one may conclude that the author is disappointed with the results.[55]

Two letters dealing with previous dialogues may be discussed at this point. The first, Epistola I, is directed to Hermogenianus upon his estimate of Augustine's Contra Academicos. Augustine finds it necessary to clarify what he has actually accomplished in that work. Instead of conquering (expugnavi) the Academics, he has rather imitated (imitatus) them. He reasserts his theory of secret teachings and maintains that the Academy was correct in hiding its truth from the masses who regarded the soul as material (corpus) This action, which once preserved men from error, at present keeps them from reaching truth. If men ever bothered to read that truth cannot be known they would fall into such a sleep that they could not be awakened even by the heavenly trumpet![56] He has not vanquished (vincerim)the Academics, but he has broken the bonds which kept him from the breasts of philosophy by a despair of truth, the food of the soul.[57]

Epistola II is a delightful, revealing message. Addressed to Zenobius, the recipient of De Ordine, it glows with Augustine's love for his friend. Something of his philosophy is shown too, for he admits that a wise man would avoid the things of the senses which are ever changing and thus are not (non esse). Although he tries to live by that guide and to hold to those things which are unchanging, he admits that he does not wish to follow the principle where his friends are concerned. In short, he wants to have Zenobius present to finish a former discussion.[58]

The first of the writings which have established Augustine as a master of introspection and psychology are the Soliloquia. Being primarily for the purpose of self-examination, his work is something of a preview of his superb perfection of that style in the

Confessiones. Although his dialogue with the Ratio is interesting, the most informative section is his long prayer which permits the reader to peer into the sanctuary of Augustine's private devotion.[59] For its theological concepts the Soliloquia will be examined in later chapters; at the moment it is sufficient to note that in the summary of his prayer Augustine sketches the outline for his future creations.

Having known certain expressions from different sources which he committed to memory, Augustine offers in his prayer the things he believes. Yet, he is not satisfied to believe only on the authority of the Church, for he has a thirst which can be quenched only by knowing for himself. He wants to believe and to understand intelligently.[60] The comprehensive object of his desire lies between two poles, to know God and the soul.[61]

In his knowledge of God, Augustine believes he must forsake knowledge which only comes from the senses. This much of the Academic skepticism he welcomes. For this reason he is not content to know God only as he knows his friends, since such knowledge is dependent upon sense experiences and is, therefore, imperfect.[62] The usefulness of reason, however, is another question. Whereas the senses are useless in arriving at mathematical truth, the mind, through proper reason, can readily come to it.[63] In the flight from the realm of the changing to the realm of the permanent, the soul cannot carry on its function properly unless it has overcome the bondage it suffers in the body.[64] Such bondage Augustine believes he has overcome through his renunciation of mistresses, marriage, worldly gain, and general comforts of the body, except in the measure that they are necessary for good health. In this manner he has sought to prepare his soul to be guided by inner light to the knowledge of God. Besides the negative approach, the ratio, on the positive side, must have in addition to eyes, looking, and seeing, the all important qualities of faith, hope, and love.[65]

As he sees the situation, the knowledge of God cannot come quickly due to the frailness of the human constitution, so it is necessary for the soul to progress by degrees. The soul is to begin its itinerary among the darker objects which bask in the light of another luminary and to ascend by stages until it can reach and endure that very brilliant light itself by which all things are illumined.[66] Nevertheless, he is not completely satisfied. Augustine is afraid that certain things, such as loss of friends, pain, and even death may interrupt his journey toward knowing God.[67]

The answer to these fears lies in the conviction that the soul is immortal. The soul knows something that is true, so truth is existent in the soul. Apart from the soul one could not declare that truth is. But just as truth is within the soul, it also exists beyond it. Truth is immortal. If immortal truth

dwells in the soul, then the soul is immortal.[68]

The modern reader who finds flaws in this argument for the immortality of the soul should remember that it did not completely satisfy Augustine. Book II of Soliloquia is manifestly incomplete. Though the answers are inadequate, the attempt is a noble one which makes a place for itself in theological literature.

The Soliloquia represent the crest of the young convert's productions in the rural retreat. They are a monument to his early personal struggles in morality, religion, and philosophy. In them one finds a good example of Augustine's endeavor to digest rationally the morsals he has taken at random on the basis of authority.

Of similar style to the Soliloquia is Epistola III, written to Augustine's beloved friend Nebridius.[69] Although he is a Docetist in his views of Christ, Nebridius is not at this time a baptized Christian. However, later he is to believe as Augustine and to die shortly after he and his household become Christians, probably before 391. It seems that Augustine is replying to a declaration that he has already obtained the happy life. He is sure that such praise is not altogether appropriate, for what would Nebridius have exclaimed had he actually read his work? Indeed, if one were to find the happy life, it would repel even the atomic theory of Epicurus and expose the inadequacy of the visible world. To know the truth one must overcome the things of the senses by not desiring them. When these more weighty matters are concluded, Augustine puts forth a question about a form of cupio he has used and asks for a letter in return which will require a long time to read.

That Augustine is consciously concerned with overcoming the life of the senses is demonstrated in his reply to Nebridius, who has inquired of his progress. In Epistola IV, he cannot define with precision each stage on the journey, for it is like growing into manhood--no one can point to a definite time when maturity occurs. Although he remains only a boy in the faith, he hopes he is one who shows some promise. When calling upon God, he begins to rise to Him, and he is often so sure in his own soul of the reality of things eternal that he sees no need for rational explanations.

As early spring of 387 approached, Augustine made arrangements to return to the city. His first weeks of retreat were over. To the importance of those happy days his writings bear witness. During that time he recovered some of his physical strength, calmed his restless spirit, and collected his fragmentary ideas. The tools of his profession had been applied with diligence to the tasks at hand, enabling him to assemble some of the materials supplied him by Catholic Christianity and Neoplatonist philosophy.[70] But perhaps his implements of classical heritage were more adequate than his recently acquired items of faith and reason. To advance

further he needed time in which to add carefully to his required supplies. This was his state when he came again to Milan.

Milan

Augustine returned to Milan in order to receive Christian baptism. Although as a young boy he had received the sign of the cross and the administration of salt, which numbered him with Christians not full members of the Church, he had not received baptism.[71] Giving in his name to receive the rite, Augustine joined the group of competentes in the beginning of Lent. As an athlete preparing to wrestle with the devil, Augustine probably underwent the fasting and customary subduing of the body.[72] On all the days of the week except Saturday he heard the lessons and sermons which instructed in morals and Chrisitan religion. On Palm Sunday he received the creed. He heard it expounded in the ensuing days. Then late on the Eve of Easter, April 24, 387, he received the sacrament of public baptism, which usually included, in Ambrose's days at Milan, the effeta, the renunciation, the threefold questioning and baptism, the anointing, the footwashing, and the vesting in white. Afterward followed the Easter Mass. During the next week there was instruction in the sacred mysteries and in the Lord's Prayer. It was in such a manner that Augustine became a full member of the Catholic Church, entering on another phase of spiritual development.

Augustine remained productive in writing while he received instruction toward baptism. Although Thimme has pointed to the change of style in the dialogues after the author's baptism, this change was a gradual development.[73] There is not a marked difference between De Immortalitate Animae and the Cassiciacum dialogues.

Augustine does not exhibit a definitely Christian understanding of life eternal in his De Immortalitate Animae. His concern for the immortality of the soul has not been satisfied at Cassiciacum, so he comes at the problem again with more determination. His endurance, however, is hardly rewarded with further penetration. The arguments are the same, and as has been suggested by Bourke and Wörter, like his earlier ones they derive ultimately from Plato's Phaedo and Phaedrus. It is doubtful whether Augustine knows the arguments directly from Plato.[74]

One argument for the immortality of the soul is that discipline (disciplina)is eternal, yet is only in that which lives. That which contains what always is must always be. Since disciplina can only be in the soul and always is, the soul must be immortal. Another argument is that the soul is immutable just as the body is mutable.

Furthermore, they cannot change positions, one becoming the other. Since the soul is life itself, it can never die. The reader finds many variations on the theme, but certain unproved assumptions arise repeatedly as bases for Augustine's arguments: 1)that disciplina is unchanging, 2) that it exists only in the soul, 3) that a thing containing something unchanging exists forever, 4) that the soul is the life of the body, and 5) that the soul cannot desert itself.

There is hardly any way in which Augustine's piece of literature can be regarded as the Christian answer to immortality of the soul. Instead of resurrection, his concern is only with the rational soul as it contains disciplina. There is a discussion of being and tending toward non-being. Of his early books this seems to show more than the others the influence of his Neoplatonism and his lack of Christian doctrine. However, he deserves credit for his purpose, for he seeks to give a rational basis for others, as well as himself, who believe in immortality of the soul on faith in authority.

The inspiration to use his knowledge of the liberal arts to proceed to the realm of the spiritual led Augustine to plan several works, each on a different discipline.[75] The endeavor was never successful. They included De Grammatica, De Dialectica, De Rhetorica, De Geometria, and De Arithmetica.[76] The De Grammatica as it stands today is hardly the work undertaken by Augustine. Five other books he only began and left in an unfinished state. Nevertheless, there remain the six books of De Musica from which one may receive an idea of the plan for the other works. De Musica was finished after he returned to Africa, and though the sections cannot be dated accurately, one would not be far wrong holding, in general, that the first five books are quite early while the sixth belongs to the period nearer to, yet before, Augustine's ordination as a Presbyter at Hippo.

De Musica may be divided even more closely. Marrou has suggested that the first chapter of book six is a later insertion, a revision made in a mature day and referred to in Augustine's letter to Memorius.[77] In that case, chapter two, which resumes the dialogue, was originally the next chapter after book five. Anyone who has read analyses made in detail of the first five books will readily understand Augustine's reluctance to convey them to his ecclesiastical friend.[78] He rightly states that the object of his work lies in book six.

The composition as a whole has more than just an antiquarian interest. Besides demonstrating his concern and knowledge in this particular field, the work shows how Augustine related his grounding in the liberal arts to his religious faith. The books reflect a marked Pythagorean influence as the author discusses harmony which is built on numbers. An interesting example of this influence is his presentation of the number "three," which he considers perfect

since it has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It is composed of "one," which is in every number and of "two," which is the beginning of multiplication. To this series can be added "four" and so on. In every instance all the numbers are well ordered.[79] Of less interest to the theologian is his discussion of grammarians who stress syllables by rule of authority and those who stress according to the rules of harmony. Even more specialized, he discusses types of feet, with names and illustrations, then the kinds of measures, rhythm, and verse. The concluding note of the first five books is an invitation to the Disciple to leave the vestiges of the sensible and to proceed to the chamber which is foreign to all body.[80]

Book six of De Musica concentrates upon the human soul. As a result of the first sin, the senses have become useful to the soul, which is now, in part, ruled by the body.[81] In spite of this influence, the soul also regulates the body, keeping it together in harmony. The soul is a kind of midway point in suspension between God and the body, free to choose to serve one or the other. Turning to God, its master, the soul is given a very easy life, but should it choose to serve the body its state is much lower than before. It becomes only the servant of a servant. Pride (superbia) is the beginning of every sin, and leads to a fall from the essential status (defectum ab essentia).[82] Such a love of the world becomes laborious, for in the world the soul does not find the true and eternal for which it seeks. The eternal can only be found when the soul, a creature, adheres with love to its Creator, God. The true order is the right ordering of one's soul as God himself has rightly ordered the creation.[83]

Augustine's aim to win those acquainted with the liberal arts to his concept of Christian religion is a noble one. However, one may doubt whether the results are worth the effort he expends. Augustine is never ready to dismiss entirely the higher disciplines of education; instead, he continues to use them in conjunction with the Christian religion as means or steps to aid man in his ascent to God. As one would expect, book six, even apart from chapter one, exhibits Augustine's growing knowledge of Christian doctrine.

Augustine, having received baptism along with Alypius, had no further cause for remaining in Milan. The longing for professional standing which had brought him to the city was dismissed. As a Catholic Christian he only sought how he might serve. Joined by Evodius, a young man of Tagaste who was a public official before his baptism, he left Milan and travelled to Ostia on his route to Africa.

Ostia

In Ostia Augustine had an experience which he was unable to describe.[85] The Confessiones do not attempt or claim to give a full and accurate report of the event. Even after several years Augustine cannot clearly analyze it. But the beauty and power of his language point to something awe inspiring. Indeed, his brief sketch belongs with that small group of accounts by those who have truly encountered the Foundation of the universe.

To attempt to trace the many strands woven in this tapestry would be out of order here. Not only would it involve a study of the life of Augustine until that moment, it would also indicate a failure to recognize the recent books which have done just that.[86] One can readily see the influence of Neoplatonsm, the Holy Scriptures, and the presence of the devout Monnica which are enumerated by Paul Henry.

As Augustine and his mother stood at the window overlooking the garden of the house where they were abiding, they inquired of the nature of life eternal. In their speaking they seemed to go beyond the power of the human mind in the body, they ascended into the realm of the Eternal. In that Presence they saw the inferiority of those things which are but witnesses or even messengers of God Himself. The world and its pleasures grew contemptible to them. But such soaring in the heights could not long endure. His mother concluded by informing him that she was through in this world, for her one wish, that he might become a Catholic Christian before her death, had been fulfilled.

That glimpse of the eternal could hardly be identified with that highest stage of the soul, the undivided contemplation of God. The participants were still under the limitations of life in the world.[87] That fact was pointedly brought home to Augustine when scarcely a week later his mother became feverish and died. According to his report of those days he was deeply grieved over the loss of one whose love had so patiently sustained and guided him during his thirty-three years.[88] Nevertheless, his grief was tempered by his faith and salved by the verses of devotion created by Bishop Ambrose.[89]

The death of Monnica removed the physical presence of one of the great influences in Augustine's life. The dialogues from Cassiciacum give evidence that Augustine, even at that time, was aware of her spiritual influence upon him, although his appreciation was to be more fully expressed in the Confessiones. Her strong hold upon him was probably more responsible for her son's attitude toward simple piety and toward marriage and sex than has been recognized. His memory of her, it seems, asserted itself in

his decisions even more than her physical presence had.

In his grief Augustine decided to leave Ostia and to return to Rome. The combination of his mystical experience and his mother's death so soon after his baptism seems to have accelerated his intellectual and spiritual growth. His writings after that time were to be further removed from the relatively carefree discussions of Cassiciacum which relied so much upon material from his days as a teacher of rhetoric. The next works were to bear the stamp of a more serious concern for Christian witness.

Rome

Augustine's sojourn in Rome before returning to his native city is also marked by the important literary works he only began, as well as those he completed. Among the books he finished there, two initiated him to the battles with heretics in which he was later to become a commander worthy of the title "defender of the faith." Although he had long before lost any intellectual respect he had once held for the Manicheans, he had not undertaken to write an examination of their proclamations. It was their attacks upon the Christians while he was in Rome which irritated him into bringing his artillery to bear on the fortresses he knew from the inside.[90]

According to him in De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, the Manicheans gain their recruits with a two-fold program; on one side they undermine and attack the Scriptures while on the other they make a great show of abstinence and chastity.[91] He opens his campaign of defense of the Christian position with an offensive drive to convert its enemies by using reason, a method which they would approve.

Manicheans must agree that the chief good of man is higher than he himself is. Since such a good must be higher than both body and soul, God is the only one Who can qualify. It is only in God that one has a happy life. The opening phase over, Augustine finds that reason is inadequate, used alone, for discourse on divine matters. He introduces the authority of Scriptures, especially those of the New Testament which even the Manicheans regard as true.[92]

To demonstrate the falsehood of the Manicheans who charge that Christians worship a god who is fickle and evil, Augustine brings together certain passages of the Old and New Testaments to show their similarity.[93] Perhaps the common link is the element of love. After citing the Great Commandment of Matthew 22:37, he points to the Old Testament concept of Charity found in Deuteronomy 6:5.

In a like manner Romans 8:28, 35 are paralleled in Psalm 44:22. It is only by love through Christ and the Holy Spirit that man can adhere to God, his chief good.[94] Moreover, whereas the Old Testament speaks of the "Wisdom of God" the New Testament presents the same in terms of Christ the truth. There is even harmony in the way they treat the four virtues, which are nothing more than the perfect love of God.[95]

Having gained ground even with imperfect weapons, Augustine presses the attack further by declaring that only the Catholic Church has had the good sense to see harmony in the two Testaments, united in the principle of love.[96] This love is not limited to love toward God; it is extended to twofold love of man's neighbor. Besides medicina, which involves all necessary for the health of his body, there is required disciplina, which restores the health of the soul. Again he praises the Catholic Church as the true mother of Christians who nourishes children and brothers in a way most suitable to their condition.[97]

To deal with the Manicheans on their second point, he says their great claim for chastity is only a shallow pretense when compared with those who abstain in the Catholic Church. They have failed to take account of the Anchorites, the Coenobites, the many houses of women, and even the clergy who abstain while living in the midst of the world.[98] Augustine admits that there are some bad Christians, for even the Catholic Church itself condemns them. But it is not the task of the Manicheans to judge them and slander the Church on account of them; it is God who will separate the wheat from the chaff. The attack of the Manicheans who demand that all Christians should abstain do not know their New Testament, for even the Apostle Paul permits those who are baptized to be married and to own property.

The second book, De Moribus Manichaeorum, opens with a countermarch on the Manichean theory of Evil. Against the Manichean claims that evil is one of two absolutes in the universe he advances with a new plan. Only that which supremely is can be called the highest good, which is God. The direct opposite of being (esse) is non-being (non esse).[99] The exact opposite of God is evil; the exact opposite of being is non-being. Therefore, evil is not a substance but the absence of all being. Whereas the Manicheans always ask the origin of evil, Augustine is primarily concerned to ask them what the evil is of which they speak. When the Christians maintain that God is the Author of all substances, they do not include non-being, for how is the Author of being also the Author of non-being?[100] If the Manicheans wish to say that evil is what is injurious, then they say by implication that what is injured is good. On the other hand, Catholics distinguish between the Good in Itself and that which is good by participation in a higher good. The latter can become less good only by an action

of falling away, for which God is not responsible.

Things which fall away were not made (facio) that way; they are only shaped (condo).[101] For God, ordering even those things which fall away, seeks to keep them from non-being and to move them toward Being. In conclusion, there is no evil substance as the Manicheans wish to maintain.

The author next demonstrates the absurdity of the Manichees' trying to list all sins under the three symbols of the mouth, the hands, and the breast.[102] Even more absurd is their doctrine that God is in constant war with the forces of Evil. If God must necessarily fight, there is a possibility of his being defeated. If God can be defeated, He is not omnipotent. If a being is not omnipotent, He is not God.

The above arguments are telling, but Augustine's greatest strength lies in his probing about in the moral teachings and practices of his former masters. While they make an exhibit of abstaining from meat and wine, they turn about and have gluttonous feasts and dainty morsals. In the final analysis they have no abstinence. The whole reason behind St. Paul's prohibition of wine and meat is love and respect for the weaker brethren.[103] When Augustine comes to the Manichean doctrine of God's being imprisoned in the material of the world, with great relish he begins pointing to an almost endless number of absurdities. For example, though they will not give food to beggars who are not Manicheans lest they imprison God, they may inconsistently give them money, with which the beggars can buy food.

Their claims in chastity are only a mocking of public faith. Although they prohibit marriage (nuptias) which would involve souls being imprisoned in bodies through procreation, they do not forbid intercourse (concubitum) for pleasure either with virgins or the wives of other men.[104] The only abstinence involved is from procreation--if possible. Their beliefs thus lead to all sorts of immoral practices, against which even those who wish for reform are not effective.

As the Contra Academicos helped the young convert formulate his attitude toward that position, so the books of De Moribus... led to a clearing of arguments to be used against his former Manichaeism. In them one sees the new Christian's admiration for his Church and its members, its morals, its Scriptures, and its doctrines. If Augustine was well informed on the history of the Church until his time, he silenced some dissenting evidence for polemical purposes. His criticism of the Manicheans was probably based on facts as he knew them from nine years in the group; however, as Willis has been criticized for a one-sided presentation of the Donatists, the present writer notes that Augustine's presenting any good points about the Manicheans would have been contrary to

his purpose.[105]

Neoplatonic influence permeates Augustine's answer to the Manicheans. Evil is non-being while Good is Being itself. Between these two extremes are all things in creation, but the fall of any is not the fault of God. It seems that Augustine's knowledge of Christian morals and the interpretation of Scriptures supporting them has improved with his instruction as a catechumen. On the whole, his use of the Scriptures is very limited, and his theology is uncomplicated by citations to contemporary or traditional authorities.

Augustine once again, before his return to Africa, approaches an investigation of the human soul. In his dialogue with Evodius, De Quantitate Animae, the latter proposes six questions for consideration. From where is the soul? What is its quality? What is its quantity? Why has it been given to the body? How is it affected when it comes to the body? How is it affected when it leaves the body?[106]

As to the first question, the soul is from God its creator. Since it is not made from any one or any combination of the four elements, it is impossible to name its substance. One can only say that the soul has its own nature just as has the earth and the human body. Although it is not made of God, it is similar to Him; it is an image (imago).[107] Thus, it cannot well be discussed as having dimensions in the physical sense. Nevertheless, it has measurable, varying force. The soul is influenced by the body in which it resides, yet instead of growing physically with that body, any growth is in terms of progress toward the better.[108] Whereas the body begins to fail in later life, the soul may continue in strength. So long as man does not plunge into the sensual life, his soul is that which gives him superiority over the beasts.

The soul, then, may be in varying stages of strength or progress.[109] The first or simplest step is the soul's control over the regular biological functions of the body. Second is the soul's position in the senses where life manifests itself more clearly. The grade that is proper to man, three, is the exercise of memory, not just in habit but in language, arts, and technical pursuits. Step number four is characterized in seeking the well-being of others while the fifth is that of purity. In the sixth stage the soul desires to understand intelligently those things which truly are.[110] The seventh position is not so much a step as a resting place to which the other steps lead, a state of enjoying the supreme Good.[111] Of course, Augustine cannot answer all the questions on the soul in one book, but the principle thing is simple. Although the soul is of the highest, it is not equal to God, for it is always a creature. Its end is not to worship any creature; it is to worship only God. That which gives the soul liberty and reconciles it to God is the true religion.[112]

De Quantitate Animae may well be considered as against the Manicheans. It is an examination and rejection of some of the more materialistic ideas of the soul and of God which Augustine once held. The soul and the body interact, but the soul is more independent, for it has a freedom to triumph over the body. As Wörter suggests, there is some influence of Virgil shown, and the stages of the soul reflect a Neoplatonist outline. Christian doctrine, however, is clearly present in the references to the authority of the Catholic Church, the Incarnation, and the Virgin Birth.[113]

While he was in Rome Augustine also began his famous De Libero Arbitrio. According to the Retractationes, he finished book I even while he was in Rome, but books II and III were not finished until shortly after his ordination as a Presbyter in Hippo.[114] Though this statement means that the written form of the dialogue was late, it does not exclude the possibility that parts of the last two books reflect discussion actually held in Rome. One could accurately date the various sections only if he knew the contents of Augustine's thought in each year of the period involved. This procedure is not practical since the content of Augustine's thought in each year is an unknown factor. The participation of Evodius has been taken as a sign indicating actual dialogue while his absence in the long speeches of Augustine has been taken as a sign that the latter was including his own ideas at the time of composition.[115] On that basis, book II, and book III, 1-10, and 46-47 would indicate earlier dialogue while the remainder of book III would indicate additions.

For this reason De Libero Arbitrio has its limitation for showing the stages of Augustine's development. It covers a period of about four years. It may well contain ideas that he did not use until after his ordination. But it does contain much that one must consider if he would know some of the most penetrating work of Augustine the Christian layman. Taking these facts into account, the contents may be used to form a picture of his thoughts.

Augustine has already indicated a way to overthrow the Manichean explanation of evil. It remains for him to develop his idea of man's freedom of choice. His premise is that God is both creator of the world and wholly good. As such, He is not the author of evil. Evil arises in the sin of each man, who is the author of his own evil deeds. The problem remaining is why sins are not charged to God, who created Man. Augustine's inability to explain rationally this difficulty does not lead him to lose faith in the premise.[116]

After discussing the subordination of temporal law to eternal law, he says that only God is above a soul ruled by reason. Since God would not lead man to sin and since anything else is below or weaker than reason in the mind, the decision must rest in the mind of man. Thus, nothing joins the mind (mentem) to cupidity (cupiditatis) except its own volition (voluntas) and free choice (et liberum arbitrium).[117] Penalty for sin is the resulting evil.

Yet, such a penalty is just if at the height of wisdom one should choose (delegerit) to become a servant of lust, of things perishable. For what is more completely in the power of the will than the will itself?[118]

When a man is unhappy as a result of a voluntary act, it does not mean that he deliberately chose unhappiness. It means, rather, that he chose for happiness that which does not give it. He chose to live after the transitory instead of the eternal. In such a situation the things chosen are not to be blamed but the one who chose them, for it was in the power of his will to determine what to choose. In this manner, Augustine, while at Rome writing book I, places the responsibility for sin not in the body or in man's being man, but in man's misuse of his free will.

Book two begins with the old question of why man should have been given free will if he would use it to sin. His answer is that if without free will there would be no evil, neither would there be a good life. In matters like this, he thinks, the authority of the Scriptures must be accepted before one can know; nevertheless, reason gives understanding to what one believes. From his discourse on the truth of numbers which are known apart from the senses he shows that there is a truth greater than human mind or reason. One has true liberty when one is subject to truth, for such truth and wisdom no one can lose unwillingly. God is the happy life of the soul, and man suffers only when he turns away from truth. Yet, even the one who turns away still subsists and so is under that which always is, for to lose all form means to return to nothing (in nihilum). In a defective thing the form itself is not defective. Even so, the free will is good though it be misused. However, Augustine is at a loss to explain why the will should ever turn away from God. Book II closes with a statement that man who fell spontaneously (sponte cedidit) cannot rise by his free will (sponte surgere).[119]

Book three finds Augustine pressing points which are later to be sources of irritation when he tries to fight the Pelagians. He insists both that God foreknows and that man has free will. Foreknowledge does not necessitate the action of the will, for if this were the case the term "free will" or even "will" would become meaningless.[120] There is little doubt that men do some things by necessity, but they do other things freely. What God foreknows is that man has the power to will.

After this point the tone of the writing changes. Evodius is almost entirely forgotten and Augustine presses ahead alone. There are ideas presented and developed which are uncommon in his other works of the period. Though one cannot judge with finality, there is some reason to believe that the ideas come from the period of his ordination as a Presbyter.

Although angels and men were created without sin, angels merit (promeritur) a higher order by their loyalty of will. [121] Since man chose to turn away from God he is of a lower order; yet, as a willful sinner he is more excellent than one who cannot sin due to an absence of will. Even in the punishment of evil souls the perfection of the universe is seen. Another factor in sin is man's being persuaded by his neighbor; however, as Augustine sees it, the yielding to the neighbor is also voluntary.

Two further major ideas remain. The first is Augustine's insertion of the doctrine of atonement which sees the Devil unjustly slaying Christ and as a result having to release all of those who believe in Him.[122] The other idea is the fact that man can will to do right and yet lack power to do right. Aurelius maintains that this is not the original state of creation but the state of fallen man which stems from the sin of the first pair and exhibits God's justice from the very beginning. Although the origin of souls is unsettled in the Catholic faith in his day, Augustine is confident that each soul pays the penalty for its sin. The question of why infants die before they accumulate merit may reflect the concern of a parish priest.[123] With many questions remaining unanswered, Augustine closes the book.

All the problems that arise for Augustine in later years never overthrow, to his way of thinking, his insistence upon man's free will and choice. Apart from it there can be no sin. His difficulty arises in part from his insufficient grounding in the Holy Scriptures in this period. He is not enough aware of the Pauline writings on predestination and the work of Christ to formulate an answer that will be a strong defense against all attackers. Although there is a Neoplatonic element in the work, the inquiry is one proper to Christian theology and in it he shows a deepening understanding of that subject.

Augustine's period at Rome let him begin those writings which were to involve him in the struggle of the Catholic Christian Church and those who attacked its doctrine or refused to abide by its decisions. His evaluation of Manichean morals in the light of Catholic practices served as a means of his intellectual growth. It helped him to comprehend and to evaluate his former Manichean position. It helped him to clarify his opinions of Catholic beliefs and practices. It also gave him an opportunity to use Neoplatonism in combination with Christian doctrine to defeat the Manichean stand on the problem of evil. Augustine's discussion upon free will was to give him a permanent place in the history of philosophy and of theology. He established for later Christian theologians the point that sin is always voluntary in its origin. Even his defense against Pelagius and Julian could not lead him to deny that element of his early work, which he began in Rome before his return to Africa.

Africa

Sometime in 388 A. D., perhaps after Theodosius had defeated the ambitious Maximus, Augustine returned to his native village. Frend has described it:

> One may regard Thagaste in the time of St. Augustine as typical of decaying Roman towns of fourth-century North Africa. A few large town houses would be inhabited by Latin speaking citizens.... Beyond the town walls the peasant lived a not very different life from that of his descendent today; he was a Berber, almost wholly uninfluenced by Roman civilisation and often hostile to its representatives.[124]

Although he would have many friends there, Augustine seems to have designed to live apart from public activities and to devote his time to study. Perhaps he was thinking of the life of St. Anthony or the life of monks in his region and tempering his own activities with elements found in their lives.[125] Nevertheless, without slackening his pace he continued his battle with the Manicheans.

To overthrow the Manicheans further, he thought it wise to defend the Old Testament from their criticisms. Where could he better start than with an exposition of Genesis? But his grappling with that book was to arouse problems for himself as well as the Manicheans. Again and again he was to return to it.[126]

Augustine begins his defense of Genesis in what he believes to be easily understood terms. Taking a literal interpretation for a start, he claims that time and creation began together, God creating solely because He wished to do so. The heaven and earth (coelum et terram) which He created included all things which He later formed. In creating those items God did not speak any particular language, for He did not call them but made them to be called (vocari fecit) by each in his own language.[127] God made all things good, even those which are despised by men who do not understand their order. The curse of the earth as a result of man's sin explains why thorns sprang up.

Augustine has difficulty with certain figures of speech. When Genesis says that man was created in the image and similitude of God, it is erroneous to infer that God has a physical body, for throughout the New Testament as well as the Old, God is referred to figuratively as having a body. He gave man the rule over animals through his reason rather than his body, though in the fallen state man has less reason than before the fall. Everything which God made was good. Augustine, since he believes the "seven days" to

be figurative, explains them in that manner, letting them refer to the seven ages in th two Testaments from Adam to the return of Christ. Interpreted according to another figure they equal the seven periods in the life of man or in the pilgrimage of the soul.[128]

Book II opens with the explanation of Augustine's shift from a literal to a figurative interpretation.[129] There are two ways of interpreting Scripture: the historical, in which the facts of history are narrated and the prophetic, in which future things are pronounced. In this manner he thinks he follows the example of the apostle who grasped many of the enigmas of the Old Testament. The fountains that watered the earth signify that God once nourished man's soul from within, while the drying of the fountains and the rain falling from the clouds indicate that man's knowledge became dependent upon exterior sources.

Speaking literally, man's being created from the mud of the earth (de limo terrae) does not mean he was created of evil, for the limus was not evil when God used it.[130] Moreover, the "breathed into him the spirit of life" (insufflavit in eum spiritum vitae) should not be interpreted as imparting in any way the nature of God (naturae Dei).[131] Interpreting figuratively, the pleasures of paradise signify the blessedness of man (beatitudinem hominis), while the four rivers correspond to the four virtues prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.[132] The dream of Adam indicates that the better things of man come not through the senses but through inner intelligence.

The above example of exegesis is enough to indicate the manner in which Augustine continues to discuss the creation of woman, the temptation, the fall, and the expulsion. Interestingly enough, he finds Christ hidden in the spiritual messages. His concluding section is a presentation of contrasts between Manichean and Catholic Christian teaching on selected subjects in Genesis.[133]

Although this work is primarily an attack on Manicheans, it is valuable in other ways as well. In it Augustine is trying to defend those very Scriptures which seemed so absurd to him before he joined the Manicheans. They are still giving him difficulty, for he often prefers to use the spiritual rather than the literal interpretation. In his interpretation he incidentally presents something of his world view and his understanding of Christian doctrine. Many of his references to classical Latin literature and to strict Neoplatonist doctrine are limited while his energy is turned to Jewish Scriptures and Christian Theology.

De Genesi Contra Manichaeos is Augustine's earliest attempt at systematic exegesis of Scriptures. The methods he uses are to be continued in his years as priest and as bishop. Although he respects the literal sense, he maintains that even some of the words which cannot well be interpreted allegorically are only

figures of speech. His method chosen for any particular interpretation seems to depend upon the point he wishes to win over his opponents. It is significant too that his first exegesis is in a defense of Genesis, a literal interpretation of which lies at the heart of his last works concentrating upon the original sin and fall. Augustine is never satisfied with his work on this great book and returns to it more than once. It is the most influential single study he makes before his ordination in forming his early system. His views of man, creation, and sin are, at the time of his ordination, based largely upon his exegesis of Genesis.

Augustine's friendships would never let him devote himself entirely to study. Epistola V, from Nebridius, indicates that Tagaste provided many interruptions to Augustine. His friend would proclaim that Augustine loves only God and wishes to devote himself to Him. Nebridius would be quite happy to welcome him to his own country home. However, he is sure that there is great love among the freinds in Tagaste.[134]

Sometime in the days soon after his return to Tagaste Augustine wrote the treatise De Magistro. It appears in the form of a dialogue between Augustine and Adeodatus.[135] The Confessiones speak well of the son's ability in discussion, and well they might if the writing under discussion accurately pictures the ability of Adeodatus.[136] Readers may find sections one through eighteen of this work on epistemology rather tedious as an exercise in dialectic dealing with words as signs. However, sections nineteen through twenty-eight recapitulate the former sections and then show that the things which are signified are more important than the signs which point to them.

According to Augustine, words have their value only in that they bid one to look for the things to which they point. Words do not teach, for the real teacher is Christ who dwells in the inner man.[137] This is an important statement which must be studied more carefully in a later section. But to continue, just as one uses the senses to know external things, he must look to the interior truth in order to know intelligible things. Words spoken by another do not actually teach anything; any understanting which results from such words is due to the one who hears seeing more clearly what is in his own mind. Quite often words do not accurately convey what one thinks. Education is not through hearing what the teacher says, but through looking inward to see whether what one is told is true. Finally, no one on earth is man's teacher; One is his teacher in heaven, Whom to know is blessed life.[138]

Augustine continues to distrust the senses for anything other than inadequate knowledge of the everchanging world of external objects. But important knowledge, intelligible truth, dwells

within man and it is there that he must look to find it. Augustine also identifies this inner truth with Christ the Truth. Even in the changing states of the human mind and reason there is present to man the unchanging, eternal Truth. If some similarity to Plato is found at this point, one should also recall Clement of Alexandria with his Στρωματεῖσ. Although this Christian element raises as many problems as it solves, it is definitely present and is the primary point in the whole work.

In the period around 389 the correspondence of Augustine continued to flourish. Something of the depth of his letters is pointed to in Epistola VI, from Nebridius. Expressing appreciation for messages from Augustine, Nebridius says they bring him the sound of Christ, of Plato, and of Plotinus.[139] In proposing a question for consideration, he inquires about the memory and its relationship to phantasies. He also suggests that phantasies may arise from themselves as well as from the senses. The problem of the memory is one to stimulate Augustine for several years.

Augustine replies in Epistola VII by countering the two proposals of Nebridius.[140] He thinks that memory can be used apart from images formed by imagination. Furthermore, the phantasy is dependent upon the senses, for what it forms takes its elements from those things which come to one through the senses. He warns Nebridius, however, to resist the influence of the senses.

The next question of Nebridius concerns dreams. How are they related to the body? Do higher powers influence the sleeping mind? There are the instances of the harmony of mind and body in which the needs of the latter exercise influence upon the actions of the former in dreams of meeting those needs.[141] In Epistola IX Augustine reasserts his point of the seventh letter that the body does indeed influence the mind as the mind influences the body.[142] On the personal side, he expresses sympathy for Nebridius' separation from his friends and advises him to turn his soul to God, for in Him all are bound together.

Epistola X is excellent for picturing Augustine's attitude toward life in this period.[143] He is prevented by certain ties from joining Nebridius permanently, even as Nebridius is prevented by considering the desires of his mother. The journey is too long for constant travel, and besides, such a spending of time does not permit the higher life that both should seek. Augustine finds a life of constant business a curse, especially to those who could and should live otherwise. As to himself he prefers to remain where he is, but he invites Nebridius to continue at a solution for the problem.

The Incarnation and the Trinity are the subjects of Epistola XI.[144] Augustine indicates that he has received some instruction on these matters but that he is far from understanding them

completely himself, even aside from explaining them to someone else. He maintains that the Catholic Church teaches that what is done by one member of the Trinity involves the presence of the other two. This principle he demonstrates with the illustration that 1) a thing is, 2) it is this or that, and 3) it remains as it is. Each phrase is different, yet one cannot be without the other two. He explains the Incarnation by saying it was necessary to stoop in order to lift those below to a higher level and that it was necessary to give men a model to follow, a teacher who would lead men to the sublime. Although the three work together, it was necessary that it appear to men that there could be some distinction in their functions. Here is a clear example of Augustine's abandoning the Plotinian trinity and adhering to Christian doctrine. One may notice, however, that he does not exhibit clearly a knowledge of specific creeds or particular local traditions.

Letter twelve, existing only in fragment, may be passed over in favor of Epistola XIII. It is to Nebridius, and shows that Augustine continues his old habit of staying awake thinking during the long, winter nights.[145] On such an occasion he toyed with their old discussion of a vehicle (vehiculum) of the soul. His opinion is that it is beyond comprehension by either the senses or the intellect and that any further concern with it would lead to useless speculation.

Epistola XIV contains two passages of particular interest. In speaking of great men, Augustine asks who is so great as the Man whom God took into union with Himself in a way entirely different from which he has taken any other man. He is separated from other men by a greater degree than the sun is superior to the other heavenly bodies.[146] One sees that if the former statement would indicate a kind of adoptionism, the latter tends to cancel it out. The second question is whether when the world was created through Christ He had in his mind only mankind in general or also specific men. Augustine does not at this point bring in his later idea or rationes seminales, but he does hint that included in the general idea of mankind would be specific men.

At that point Augustine finished his greatest Christian exposition previous to his ordination. In every way De Vera Religione stands at the summit of Augustine's productions as a layman. Sending his treatise to Romanianus, Augustine explains that Christianity is not just another philosophy but a fulfillment of all philosophy. This theme, as O'Meara sees it, is a master motif in Augustine in this period. Augustine argues that Christianity is a better form than Platonism, coming nearer to what the philosophers themselves envisioned but were unable to institute.[147]

Augustine maintains that if Plato were living in the fourth century A. D. he would become a Christian, following the example of

many Platonists. Christ not only taught what the philosophers advocated, but also He actually succeeded in persuading people to live that kind of life. Even Plato would agree that Christ, being under the help of God, deserves man's highest praise.[148]

Augustine sees the Academy being replaced by the Church, for it is the Church which is putting the teaching into practice in individual lives.[149] He says that as a result, people are carried away from the love of senses and of the temporal until they actually come to turn inward to things eternal. There is no doubt that the Catholic Christian Church has the true religion, for even those who fight against it are tolerated until they find accusers and are thus used for strengthening the Church. He would present to Romanianus the chief concern of this religion, which is what God has done for the salvation of the human race, renewing and restoring it to eternal life.

The specific doctrines of Christianity, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the Forgiveness of Sins, are all a part of the mercy which God has extended to the human race.[150] In the highest there is God, the supreme font of life. Death, on the other hand, is none other than wickedness, a tending toward nothing, which man chooses voluntarily in hope of material joys. Since the act of fall is voluntary, the punishment man receives for his sin is entirely just. He who follows the Great Commandment will be restored to God, to life. Nevertheless, man does not follow alone, for to heal man, God has used a means suitable to the times. The whole life of Christ is an education in morals, for He has avoided all those desires which consume other men and suffered what they fear most, thus robbing those things of their power over men.[151] Such manner of teaching fulfills rational discipline, for it is an illustration of piety beginning in fear and being perfected in love.

To transcend the world successfully and not just stop at seeing its bright spots, one must hold to the discipline of divine providence. When a man restored by the Grace of God remains subject only to Him, even the body will be restored to its original health.

As to the use of miracles, Augustine makes a statement which he later finds necessary to clarify. In this work he explains that men were once led to faith by visible miracles; they have now ceased, for they would be superfluous in the world covered by the Catholic faith.[152]

Whereas the old man lives according to age, the new man lives by celestial law, and his age is marked by spiritual advance. Again, Augustine describes this advance in terms of his seven stages but places the last beyond the pale of this life since in it one must always live with the old man. Concluding his discussion on

authority, he sees the greatness of the Catholic Church in her feeding each one according to the stage in which he is.[153]

When Augustine turns to the use of reason, he says that above the mind is God. God is above even the rational mind, and for this reason man should overcome the much lower order of the senses and material things. To worship anything other than God Himself is idolatry. One must remember in the use of reason that it does not create truth but only discovers it. However, if these things are inferior when compared to God, they are not to be despised. For in so far as they are, they are good. If the rational soul will cleave to God, even the body will become subjected and ordered.[154]

Augustine thinks that a man who has overcome excessive desires for mutable things cannot be overcome. He has a kind of inward fellowship with the one whom he loves as himself. This being true, he loves not only the neighbor's body but also the neighbor's real self.[155] Although he may use temporal things, he does not love them. He has no reason to fear the loss of anything, for he really has only God.

Reason is not given to man to make him subject to speculations and phantasies. If one would feed his mind, let him study the Scriptures.[158] The mind is not made for its own end, for the end of seeking is in not having further to seek. God is the source of the excellence of the mind; God must be the object of its worship. In conclusion, Augustine asserts that he worships God alone, God who is a Trinity of one substance, the Creator of all things and in Whom all live and move and have their being.[157]

The Church would do well to have more laymen who could produce a work as substantial as this one of Augustine! Even at this time after his baptism he has drawn no pointed contrasts between Christian doctrine and Neoplatonism. But Christian doctrine in a distinctive way permeates the entire treatise. This is the true philosophy, the true religion which makes a reality of the hope held by the philosophers. The true religion of the Catholic Christian Church is not an enemy of reason or the best philosophy, it is, rather, the fulfillment of the highest and best philosophy. When Neoplatonic concepts help him present Christian doctrine he uses them, where they differ he affirms the Christian doctrine as far as he knows it. He has come a long way in understanding the complexity of Christian beliefs since his retreat to Cassiciacum.

The above treatise was sent to Romanianus in 390 together with Epistola XV.[158] Something of the plagues of correspondence in those days is indicated by the shortage of writing materials. The letter is written upon parchment rather than papyrus. Besides the exhortation to true religion, Augustine includes in the letter a bit of instruction on stewardship. He suggests that Romanianus use his

temporal goods in a way befitting the place they deserve in order. They should be possessed by the owner and not become his master. Again he would urge Romanianus to cultivate a life of study and meditation, perhaps after the fashion the author himself set.

Of the early letters of Augustine, numbers sixteen and seventeen are, perhaps, the most famous. The first letter has been a source for holding that Christian martyrs died in Madaura, the home of Apuleius, in 180 A. D. Professor Baxter has attacked that theory and has suggested that the "martyrs" were really members of the Donatists who perished for criminal deeds as Circumcellions. Professor o'Meara has apparently not taken that interpretation.[159] Epistola XVI is from Maximus the Grammarian of Madaura, from the city where Augustine was once a student. Maximus recognizes Augustine, as Bourke suggests, as an authority on Christianity. But Maximus confuses Augustine's Catholic position with the Donatists of Madaura. He calls attention to the fact that fools in Madaura are worshipping executed criminals as though they were above the established Roman Gods. He takes the Stoic position that, of course, there is only one God but that He is worshipped under many names and forms, since His real name is unknown. He calls upon Augustine to defend or prove his theory of the God whom Christians claim to see in their secret meetings.[160]

The attack of Maximus, which indicates a misunderstanding of the Christian Church and its practices, is not squarely faced by Augustine's reply. In Epistola XVII he quickly dismisses Maximus' Stoic view of One God in form of the many. He does not explain the difference between Donatists and Catholics, although he informs Maximus that he should know better, for the Catholics also have a church in Madaura. Augustine says the Punic names of those men who are worshipped are no funnier than some of the pagan gods. He also attacks pagan worship. He declares that Christians do not worship a dead man. Then he haughtily breaks off further discussion until Maximus can be more serious.[161] The two letters are not fully satisfactory for understanding each other, but they are valuable for revealing the split in Christian Churches in fourth century Africa.

Besides sending letters along with books, Augustine used his correspondence to answer questions for his friends who were not Christians or who looked to him for a fuller understanding of that faith. Writing to Coelestinus, Augustine requests the return of his books on the Manicheans.[162] Otherwise the letter continues the theme given to Nebridius and Romanianus. His doubt that anyone can escape completely the cares of the world in this life is based on the fact that all things change except the Creator. One who beleives in Christ turns away from the lowest, changing order and has fellowship with the highest, God.

In Epistola XIX the idea of the De Magistro is asserted when

along with some books of his authorship Augustine sends the explanation that any truth is to be found in the reader rather than in the writer or in the manuscript. As he encourages him in his spiritual journey, Augustine expresses confidence that the Providence of God will not let a man of Gaius' gifts remain long outside the flock of Christ.

Epistola XX to Antonius indicates something of the warm fellowship and spiritual concern among Christian friends in that time.[164] Augustine expresses appreciation for the holiness and love of Antonius as well as his intercession for him. Remembering the little son of Antonius, he desires to see him grow up in God's law. He also hopes that Antonius' wife, whom Batiffol believes to have been a Donatist, will be instructed in the true fear of God and that schism may be avoided.[165]

One readily sees that the Epistolae include some of the finest thoughts of Augustine. Although many of the ideas are found in longer works, they are presented in a striking form when he briefly sketches them for the ready instruction of his friends.

Augustine was influential wherever he was and in whatever endeavor he engaged. His strong commitment to the Catholic Church was enough to draw the interests of his friends in that direction. Whereas he began at Cassiciacum trying to understand Christian teachings, after his baptism he began to defend them from enemies, and in a third stage he was recognized for his ability to explain Christian teachings.

Another work which cannot be omitted if one would understand Augustine before his ordination is the De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta-tribus.[166] As he explains it, after his baptism and when he returned to Africa he was constantly being asked questions during his free time. The answers were dictated and kept in no particular order; however, becoming a bishop, Augustine had the bits collected and put into a single volume so they could be easily consulted. In the Retractationes he even goes to the trouble of listing the questions separately.[167] One finds very little among them which is not already sketched in his other works, but in this collection the answers are pointedly direct. In addition to a few problems of philosophy, he has several comments on the exposition of Scriptures. Beyond this limit one cannot sketch the contents without treating each question separately, such is the diversity of their subjects. They will be taken into consideration in Part II of this work when they have bearing on the particular discussion.

The difficulty of dating the questions makes them of little value in accurately demonstrating development in Augustine's thought. Compassing about ten years, they probably include much of his thought after he was ordained a Presbyter. Although they

show he was being prodded by questions to keep his mind active, in a study such as the present one they they must be used with caution.

Augustine was, in some measure, spreading his influence in his surrounding area in spite of the fact that he led a life which intended to turn its back on the bustle of the world. Possidius has related that Augustine was recognized as an outstanding Christian, as material for ordination.[168] Augustine himself was not unaware of that fact, for he actually avoided the office. There may have been several reasons involved in his attitude. He had already demonstrated his willingness to understand, defend, and expound Christian doctrine, but he was also concerned with his personal life of devotion. In all of his work there was that existential concern, the question of his own salvation, wisdom, and contemplation. He had good reason to doubt that one could find the happy life as a priest in the Church of his day. Did he know something of the bitter struggles of Athanasius against the Arians, of the time-consuming arguments of the various councils? He was certainly aware of the struggles Ambrose had to face with the imperial court as well as the heretics and rabble rousers.[169] The situation seemed even worse in his native Africa. Besides the unpredictable nature of Church members, there were the Donatists who were in struggle with the Catholics. Even more severe were the Circumcellions whose character may be debated, but who received the blame for all sorts of outrageous acts against the clergy and Church buildings.[170] Considering those factors, he may have been justified in trying to escape such a busy and responsible office. The fact was that he avoided any Church that might need a bishop.

It was in all innocence that he went to Hippo in 391 to see a friend.[171] In that city where the ancient Church has been excavated and recently studied by archeologists, the Catholics had a bishop. However, Augustine did not realize that Valerius was quite old and looking for an assistant in his duties, expecially one who could speak the language of the people.[172] Perhaps recognizing and pointing out Augustine, Valerius made his needs known publicly to the assembled congragation. Then, in a manner similar to the experience of Ambrose, Augustine was seized by the crowd and brought forward to recieve ordination as a Presbyter in the Catholic Christian Church of Hippo.

The manner and significance of the event cannot be well understood apart from the letter of Augustine concerning it. Epistola XXI to Valerius, Augustine's bishop, is at once a description of the event of ordination, a commentary or evaluation on his life as a Christian to that time, and a fervent plea in regards to his future.[173] Augustine is aware that one can make an easy, good thing out of the priesthood, but he finds such an approach condemned in the sight of God. On the other hand, if one takes the job seriously and tries to follow the will of God, there is no office so difficult and hazardous. He is full of desire to follow

the will of God, but he finds that he is not equipped to fulfill the severe duties of his office.

His shedding tears at the rite has not been due, as some of his friends have thought, to his disappointment at not being made a bishop but to the realization of his own unpreparedness. He has often criticized others for failures in that office, but he now realizes from experience that he is less equipped to carry on his work than he has hitherto imagined. He has been ordained when he was just planning to turn to an uninterrupted study of the Scriptures. He now finds that his equipment is as nothing and that his deliverance can be gained only by a thorough study of the Scriptures. He may spend his time in many ways, but he feels constrained by the judgment of God to cease all else until he has gained a mastery of the Scriptures themselves. The remainder of the letter is a pointed and pressing request for freedom from parish duties in order to prepare for the demands ahead.

With the ordination of Augustine, the period under study ends. It is significant that the sudden binding into the leadership of the Catholic Church of Hippo led to an evaluation of Augustine's life from his conversion up to that rite at the hands of Valerius. Hendrikx and Wundt have rightly seen it as a major turning point.[174]

The five years from his conversion to his ordination were eventful ones for Augustine. The changes involved in his conversion marked the direction his ensuing activities were to follow. Only slowly did he begin to understand the significance of his decision in terms of his appreciation for classical Latin authors, ancient Greek philosophies, Manichaeism, Neoplatonism, and the various interpretations of Christian doctrine. His commitment to the authority of Christ was definite. But he did not have a clear idea of the Christ to whom he was devoted nor of the means by which His authority was made known to believers. He did not think of his new commitment as excluding his former intellectual endeavors or his new found Platonism.[175]

The months at Cassiciacum enabled him to work his way through his incapacitating difficulties. Life in the rural retreat permitted the healing of his physical complaints which were real although they may well have resulted, in part, from emotional difficulties as well as from persistent study. His spiritual difficulties were being healed under the balm of his new moral decisions, his reading, and his prayers. His intellectual problems were partly unraveled by his attacking them with his knowledge as a professor of rhetoric, his new ideas from Platonism, and such bits of Christian teaching as he could remember and apply. His emotional and intellectual difficulties were met almost entirely from within himself, from giving birth to and nursing those ideas which had been planted in his mind even before his conversion.

The days in Milan gave Augustine some of the definite marks of a Christian. The instruction he received from one of Christendom's most illustrious bishops gave some solid content to Augustine's understanding of Christian doctrine.[176] That course for Catecumens was one of his primary lectures in systematic theology. It enabled him to broaden his horizons. He was aware of something more than Latin poetry, dialogues, and Platonist philosophy. His baptism marked him as a member of the Catholic Church. His life was involved with its life. To understand and to defend it was to know and protect something of himself.

In Ostia Augustine received two impressions which influenced his behevior in the following years. The ascent above mundane realms while in conversation with his mother indicated the mystical side of Augustine. His concern with administration, writing, or the mechanics of worship could not obscure his actual participation in the eternal. The death of his mother confirmed his desire to avoid the changeable world of sense in favor of the unchangeable world of the intellect. Her death may have helped to turn him to a more active support of the Catholic Church to which she had been so devoted.

His work at Rome enabled Augustine to distinguish Christian thought from Manichaeism on several points. He was able to express his appreciation of the Catholic Church's morals. He pointed out the spiritual quality of the human soul. He effectively examined the problem of evil. He was growing in his appreciation of the Church as an institution teaching faith and morals.

In Africa Augustine continued his life of retirement and leisurely investigation. He produced works which helped to establish his reputation as a defender and a teacher of the Christian position. His exposition of Genesis led him to define his attitude towards interpreting the Scriptures. In his letters and in oral discussion he answered questions upon the Christian faith put to him by his friends. To Romanianus he explained Christianity as the fulfillment of the things the Platonists wanted to give to mankind. Although Augustine was aware of some distinctions between the two systems of thought, he beleived that they had important similarities.

Augustine's activities and thoughts in the five years could be described as sheltered. Although he was not aloof in an ivory tower, he was able to select the problems he would examine, and he was able to deal with them in relative leisure. His skirmishes with his enemies were not the direct combat on the open field but of firing over the walls of his fortress at bands of robbers. His philosophy and theology were those for an intellectual in semi-retirement. He had reason to be happy over his progress within such a short period. His spiritual life had grown strong. Many of his philosophical and theological problems had been met with

some satisfaction. He had built a system of thought which was adequate for the demands of the life he was leading. However, his product was to be tested by a different standard.

The sudden ordination as a Presbyter of Hippo soon led him to an evaluation of the results of his five years of retirement. His letter to Valerius expressed the opinion that Augustine's preparation was not adequate for the life of a priest. His preparation was not one which could withstand the manifold stresses of a public life in North Africa. Augustine asked for time to prepare for his new office. He requested an opportunity to supply his deficiency. His inventory did not lead him to ask for time to study the Latin classics, the systems of philosophy, or even to examine his own thoughts upon the matter. His request for time to study the Scriptures indicated that he felt his weakness to be at that point. His deficiency was in a knowledge of the contents and interpretation of the Scriptures. There, he thought, he would find the doctrines he would need to fulfill his role as a Presbyter. That was Augustine's evaluation of his product of the five years from his conversion until his ordination.

Part I, C

Augustine's Life and Literary Activities

Notes

[1] Confessiones IX, iii, and iv, P. L. XXXII, 765-769.

[2] De Beata Vita i, 6, P. L. XXXII, 962, Contra Academicos I, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 907-908. Sizoo, "The Year of Alypius' Birth," Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. II, no. 2. April, 1948, pp. 106-108. For Licentius see Epistola XXVI, P. L. XXXIII, 103-107.

[3] É. Gilson, "L'Ideé de philosophie chez saint Augustin et chez saint Thomas d"Aquin," Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae Thomisticae, Taurini-Romae, pp. 75-87.

[4] A Solignac, "Doxographies...." op. cit.; H. Becker, Augustin, Part II.

[5] Confessiones IV, xiii-xv, P. L. XXXII 701-704.

[6] D. Ohlmann, De S. Augustini Dialogis in Cassiciaco Scriptis, p. 27; Alfaric, op. cit. p. 404. D. J. Kavanagh, Answer to Skeptics in Schopp, Writings of Saint Augustine Vol. I. differs slightly from Ohlmann, probably in the way he counts the seven days, for he has them terminate on the 19th and C. A. disputed 19, 20, 21--one day earlier than Ohlmann. p. 109.

[7] O'Meara, "The Historicity of the Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine," op. cit. p. 158. and R. A. Brown, De Beata Vita, p. 32. J. S. Reid places discussion of Cicero's Academica in 62 B. C. and composition of the dialogue as late as 45 B. C., p. 8 of The Academics.

[8] R. A. Brown, Ibid. and Hirzel, op. cit.

[9] De Ordine I, iii, 7, P. L. XXXII, 981; De Beata Vita i, 6, P. L. XXXII, 962.

[10] His use of scribo in every instance of describing the dialogues of Cassiciacum in the Retractationes may be cited against the probability of this, for the order is that given by Ohlmann for the discussions.

[11] Contra Academicos II, i and ii, P. L. XXXII, 919-922.

[12] Confessiones, VI, xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII, 731; Contra Academicos I, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 907-908.

[13] Ibid. I, i, 3, P. L. XXXII, 907; II, i-iii, P. L. XXXII, 919-923.

[14] Ibid. II, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 921-922; II, iii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 923.

[15] C. Boyer, L'Idée de Vérité dans la Philosophie de Saint Augustin. p. 13. Also M. Sciacca, S. Agostino, Vol. I, part II.

[16] Boyer, Ibid, p. 21; O'Meara, "Augustine and The New Academy," an unedited article seen through the courtesy of R. P. G. M. Folliet; Retractationes I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 585; Epistola I, P. L. XXXIII, 61-63.

[17] O'Meara, Ibid.; The Young Augustine, pp. 110-114. See J. S. Reid's edition of The Academics.

[18] Contra Academicos III, xvii, 38, P. L. XXXII, 954-955. O'Meara thinks Augustine had no evidence for his theory of a secret doctrine in the Academy. It was a common theory of the time. "Neoplatonism in the Conversion of St. Augustine," op. cit. p. 340.

[19] Ibid. III, xviii, 40, P. L. XXXII, 955.

[20] Ibid. III, xviii, 41, P. L. XXXII, 956.

[21] Nihil posse percipi and Nulli rei debere assentiri. Ibid. III, x, 22, P. L. XXXII, 945.

[22] Ibid. III, x, 23, P. L. XXXII, 945-946.

[23] Ibid. III, xv, 33, P. L. XXXII, 951.

[24] Ibid. III, xv, 34, P. L. XXXII, 951-952; II, vii, 19, P. L. XXXII, 928.

[25] Ibid. II, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 919; II, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 921-922.

[26] Ibid. I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 905-906.

[27] Ibid. II, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 919; Matthew 7:7; Ibid. II, iii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 923.

[28] Ibid. III, xx, 43, P. L. XXXII, 957, ...apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido. Kavanagh, op. cit. translates "Sacred Scriptures," p. 220. cf. p. 135 where he says in this period Augustine uses mysteria and sacra

to designate the Sacred Scriptures.

[29] J. Burleigh, op. cit. p. 66. David Roberts, "Augustine's Earliest Writings," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXIII, 1953 p. 163.

[30] David Roberts, Ibid.

[31] Grabowski, op. cit. "Wisdom or philosophy practically means a conduct of life which is in harmony with Christian ideals: philosophy is Christian living. This is the sense which occurs in his dialogues at Cassiciacum." p. 274.

[32] F. Wörter, op. cit. p. 103f; R. A. Brown, op. cit. pp. 44-50; J. Hessen, Augustinus vom seligen Leben, p. xxvi, "Sein Dialog atmet den Geist des Stoizismus und Neoplatonismus."

[33] Retractationes, I, ii, 1, P. L. XXXII, 588; Courcelle, Recherches ....p. 154; R. Jolivet, IV Dialogues Philosophiques, p. 289.

[34] De Beata Vita, i, 5, P. L. XXXII, 961-962.

[35] Ibid. ii, 11, P. L. XXXII, 965. The idea is found also in Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum II, xxvii.

[36] Ibid. iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 975.

[37] Ibid. iv, 34, P. L. XXXII, 975-976.

[38] Ibid. iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976. Illa est igitur plena satietas animorum, haec est beata vita, pie perfecteque cognoscere a quo inducaris in veritatem, qua veritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo. (alternate readings are possible).

[39] I. Corinthians 1:24, ..Dei Filium nihil esse aliud quam Dei Sapientiam. and John 14:6, Ego sum Veritas. De Beata Vita, iv, 34, P. L. XXXII, 975.

[40] Retractationes, I, ii, 1, P. L. XXXII, 588. Perfectam cognitionem Dei.

[41] E. B. J. Postma, Augustinus de Beata Vita.

[42] De Ordine, I, vii, 20, P. L. XXXII, 986-987. R. P. Russell, "Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil" in Schopp (ed) Writings of St. Augustine, Vol. I, pp. 229-233.

[43] Ibid. I, iii, 6, P. L. XXXII, 981.

[44] Ibid. I, viii, 25, P. L. XXXII, 989.

[45] Ibid. I, viii, 22, P. L. XXXII, 987.

[46] P. Conrado Rodriguez, "El Humerismo de S. Augustin," La Ciudad de Dios, Vol. CLIV, 1942, pp. 213-236.

[47] De Ordine, I, x, 29, P. L. XXXII, 991.

[48] Ibid. II, xiii, 38--II, xv, 43, P. L. XXXII, 1013-15.

[49] Ibid. II, xv, 43, P. L. XXXII, 1014-15.

[50] Ibid. II, ix, 26, P. L. XXXII, 1007 and II, viii, 25, P. L. XXXII, 1006.

[51] Ibid. I, x, 29, P. L. XXXII, 991, and II, viii, 25, P. L. XXXII, 1006.

[52] Retractationes, I, iii, 1, P. L. XXXII, 588.

[53] De Ordine, II, vii, 23 and 24, P. L. XXXII, 1005-1006.

[54] David Roberts, op. cit. p. 169.

[55] Retractationes, op. cit.

[56] Epistola I, 2, P. L. XXXIII, 62; ut nec coelesti tuba evigilent.

[57] Ibid. I, 3, P. L. XXXII, 62-63, quo ab philosophiae ubere desperatione veri, quod est animi pabulum, refrenabar.

[58] Epistola II, P. L. XXXIII, 63.

[59] Soliloquia I, i, 2, --I, i, 6, P. L. XXXII, 869-872. Pierre de Labriolle, V, Dialogues Philosophiques, II, p. 401

[60] Ibid. I, iv, 9, P. L. XXXII, 874.

[61] Ibid. I, ii, 7, P. L. XXXII, 872. Deum et animam scire cupio. Otto Zanker, "Der Primat des willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin." Beitrage zur fördering Christlicher Theologie, 1907. "Zwischen den beiden Polen Gott und Menschenseele lagen alle die Fragen, die Augustin beschaftigten." p. 35. Zeller says that true worship for the Stoic is mental effort to know God. Stoicism... op. cit. p. 343.

[62] Soliloquia, I, iii, 8, P. L. XXXII, 873.

[63] Ibid. I, iv, 9, P. L. XXXII, 874.

[64] Ibid. I, xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII, 882.

[65] Ibid. I, vi, 12, P. L. XXXII, 875-876. ...fide.... spes....charitas.

[66] Ibid. I, xiii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 881-882.

[67] Ibid. I, ix, 16, P. L. XXXII, 877-878.

[68] Ibid. II, xiii, 24, P. L. XXXII, 896-897.

[69] Epistola III, P. L. XXXIII, 63-66. M. M. de Gonzague, "Un Correspondant de Saint Augustin: Nebridius," in Augustinus Magister Vol. I. J. J. Gavigan, "St. Augustine's Friend Nebridius" The Catholic Historical Review Vol. XXXII, 1946-47, pp. 47-58.

[70] M. I. Bogan, The Vocabulary and Style of the Soliloquies and Dialogues of St. Augustine. "Richness and variety characterize the vocabulary of the Soliloques and Dialogues. To the verbal inheritance bequeathed by Cicero it owes much." Also, "...Neologisms bear witness to his inventive genius." p. 200.

[71] Confessiones, I, xi, 17, P. L. XXXII, 668-69.

[72] Ambrose, De Mysteriis , P. L. XVI, 389-410; S. H. Dudden, Saint Ambrose, Vol. I, pp. 336-342. and F. van der Meer, Saint Augustin, Pasteur d'Ames, Vol II, p. 121.

[73] W. Thimme, op. cit. Die nach Taufe geschrieben Dialoge Augustins stehen, literarish betrachtet, zu den frühren in einem auffallenden Kontrast. p. 20.

[74] F. Wörter, op. cit. p. 162f. and V. J. Bourke, op. cit. p. 78. Alfaric, op. cit. suggests Plotinus Enneads IV, 7. See Pierre de Labriolle, V, Dialogues Philosophiques, pp. 165-167; Plato, Phaedo, 105. The argument assumes that the soul equals life.

[75] Retractationes; I, vi, P. L. XXXII, 591. G. Bardy, Les Revisions, Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, Vol XII, pp. 565f. gives a supplementary note on these works. Also Alfaric, op. cit., p. 410.

[76] Solignac, "Doxographies...." op. cit. suggests that the movement from corporeal to incorporeal was probably inspired by Varro. Although it is not likely he knew of their work, perhaps through works of Apuleius.

[77] H. I. Marrou, St. Augustin et la Fin...., Appendix, note D, pp. 580-582; Epistola CI, P. L. XXXIII, 367-369.

[78] Franco Americo, "Il 'De Musica' Di S. Agostino" Didaskaleion, 1929, VIII, Fasc. III. pp. 1-196. also Velez, "El

Numero Agistiniano." in Religion y Cultura, XV, 1931, pp. 139-196.

79 De Musica I, xii, 22ff. P. L. XXXII, 1096.

80 Ibid. V, xiii, 28, P. L. XXXII, 1162.

81 Ibid. Vi, iv, 7, P. L. XXXII, 1166-1167.

82 Ibid. VI, xiii, 40, P. L. XXXII, 1184-1185.

83 Ibid. VI, xiv, 43, P. L. XXXII, 1186. The love is expressed in the Great Commandment of Jesus which includes love to God and to neighbor.

84 Confessiones IX, viii, P. L. XXXII, 770-772.

85 Ibid. IX, x, P. L. XXXII, 773-775. W. R. Inge in Christian Mysticism says, "It would be hardly justifiable to claim St. Augustine as a mystic, since there are important parts of his teaching which have no affinity to mysticism; but it touched him on one side, and he remained half a Platonist." p. 128.

86 P. Henry, La Vision D'Ostie, and J. Lebreton, "Sainte Monique et Saint Augustin--La Vision D'Ostie," in Recherches de Science Religieuse, Tome XXVIII, 1938, pp. 457-472.

87 C. Boyer, "Essais...., " X. "La Contemplation D'Ostie," p. 288, differs with Butler by saying that intuitive vision is reserved by Augustine for the future life.

88 Confessiones, IX, xi, and xii, P. L. XXXII, 775-778.

89 Ibid. Kenneth Kirk, in The Vision of God says, "It is not easy to unravel the stages by which Augustine passed from Platonism to Christianity, but it cannot be doubted that he intended the great scene of ecstasy at Ostia to crown the story, and to give an impression of the greater and enduring certitude conferred upon him, once he had becoem a Chrisitan, as contrasted with his transient experience of Platonic days."

90 Bourke's stand that Augustine's attacks on Manicheans are a sure defense against Julian's charge that he reintroduced that system may not be altogether convincing. op. cit. p. 195.

91 De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae i, 2, P. L.

XXII. 1311.

[92] Ibid. vii, 11, P. L. XXXII, 1315.

[93] Ibid. x, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1317-1318.

[94] Ibid. xiii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 1321.

[95] Ibid. xv, 25, P. L. XXXII, 1322.

[96] Ibid. xviii, 33, P. L. XXXII, 1325.

[97] Ibid. XXX, 62, P. L. XXXII, 1336. ...mater Christianorum verissima....

[98] Ibid. xxxi, 65f, P. L. XXXII, 1337ff.

[99] De Moribus Manichaeorum, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 1345.

[100] Ibid. ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 1346.

[101] Ibid. vii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 1349.

[102] Ibid. x, 19, P. L. XXXII, 1353.

[103] Ibid. xiv, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1358.

[104] Ibid. xix and xx, P. L. XXXII, 1373-1378.

[105] H. Chadwick, review of G. G. Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy. London, 1950. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. II, 1951, pp. 228-230. "One wonders if they were really such blockheads as Augustine and Mr. Willis would lead us to suppose." p. 229. F. C. Burkitt, The Religion of the Manichees says, "Several of Augustine's works still remain among our chief authorities for doctrines of Manichaesim." p. 11.

[106] De Quantitate Animae, i, 1. P. L. XXXII, 1035. Pierre de Labriolle V, Dialogues Philosophiques, pp. 221-224.

[107] Ibid, ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 1037.

[108] Ibid. xvi, 27, P. L. XXXII, 1050.

[109] Ibid. xxxiii, 70, P. L. XXXII, 1073-1074.

[110] Butler, op. cit. p. 236.

[111] Plato, Republic, vii.

[112] De Quantitate Animae, xxxiv, 78, P. L. XXXII, 1078.

[113] Ibid. xxxiii, 76, P. L. XXXII, 1076-1077.

[114] Retractationes, I, ix, 1, P. L. XXXII, 597. See F. J. Thonnard, Vol. VI, Dialogues Philosophiques, p. 497.

[115] Alfaric, op. cit. p. 412; Thimme, Augustins Geistige Entwickelung, p. 9; Bourke, op. cit. p. 84.

[116] De Libero Arbitrio I, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1224.

[117] Ibid. I, xi, 21, P. L. XXXII, 1233.

[118] Ibid. I, xii, 26, P. L. XXXII, 1235.

[119] Ibid. II, xx, 54, P. L. XXXII, 1269-1270.

[120] Ibid. III, v, 15, P. L. XXXII, 1275.

[121] Ibid. III, v, 15, P. L. XXXII, 1278.

[122] Ibid. III, x, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1286-1287.

[123] Ibid. III, xxiii, 66, P. L. XXXII, 1303.

[124] W. H. C. Frend, "A Note on the Berber Background in the Life of Augustine," The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XLIII, 1947, p. 190.

[125] R. P. G. M. Folliet, "Des Moines euchites a Carthage in 400-401," Studia Patristica, Vol. II, pp. 386-399.

[126] J. Blick, "Le Processus de la creation d'apres saint Augustin," Melanges offerts au R. P. Ferdinand Cavallera, 1948. p. 179. Retractationes I, x, 1, P. L. XXXII, 599.

[127] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos, I, ix, 15, P. L. XXXIV, 180.

[128] Ibid. I, xxiii, 35, P. L. XXXIV, 190.

[129] Ibid. II, ii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 197.

130 Ibid. II, viii, 8, P. L. XXXIV, 200-201.

131 Ibid. II, viii, 11, P. L. XXXIV, 201-202.

132 Ibid. II, viii, 14, P. L. XXXIV, 203-204.

133 Ibid. II, xxviii, 42--xxix, 43, P. L. XXXIV, 218-220.

134 Epistola V, P. L. XXXIII, 67.

135 Retractationes I, xii. P. L.XXXII, 602. F. J. Thonnard. Vol. VI Dialogues Philosophiques pp. 7-11. J. H. Burleigh, Augustine, Earlier Writings, pp. 64-66.

136 Confessiones IX, vi, P. L. XXXII, 769.

137 De Magistro xi, 38, P. L. XXXII, 1216.

138 Ibid. xiv, 46, P. L. XXXII, 1220.

139 Epistola VI, P. L. XXXIII, 67. Illae mihi Christum, illae Platonem, illae Plotinum sonabunt.

140 Epistola VII, P. L. XXXIII, 68.

141 Epistola VIII, P. L. XXXIII, 71.

142 Epistola IX, P. L. XXXIII, 72.

143 Epistola X, P. L. XXXIII, 73.

144 Epistola XI, P. L. XXXIII, 75.

145 Epistola XIII, P. L. XXXIII, 77.

146 Epistola XIV, P. L. XXXIII, 80. Homo quem Deus suscepit, longe aliter quam ceteros sanctos atque sapientes? Quem si cum aliis sapientibus conferas, majori distantia continetur, quam collatione solis cetera sidera. (hominibus).

147 Beginning with Contra Academicos III, xx, 43. P. L. XXXII, 957. O'Meara, "A Master-Motif in St. Augustine," op. cit. p. 315; Dories, H. "Das Verhaltnis des Neuplatonischen und Christlichen in Augustins 'de vera religione,'" Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft. p. 100ff.

148 De Vera Religione, iii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 123-124.

149 Ibid. iii, 4, P. L. XXXIV, 124-125.

150 Ibid. viii, 14, P. L. XXXIV, 129.

151 Ibid. xvi, 31, P. L. XXXIV, 135.

152 Ibid. xxv, 47, P. L. XXXIV, 142. Retractationes, I, xiii, 7, P. L. XXXII, 604. They do not occur in the same way they are described in the Acts of the Apostles.

153 De Vera Religione, xxviii, 51, P. L. XXXIV, 144.

154 Ibid. xliv, 82, P. L. XXXIV, 159.

155 Ibid. xlvi, 89, p. L. XXXIV, 162.

156 Ibid. li, 100, P. L. XXXIV, 166.

157 Ibid. lv, 113, P. L. XXXIV, 172.

158 Ibid. Epistola XV, P. L.XXXIII, 81. The writer is indebted to Professor J. H. Baxter for reading letters XV, XVI, and XVII with him and for his comments upon various passages.

159 Bourke, op. cit. pp. 121-122; O'Meara, The Young Augustine, p. 31; J. H. Baxter, "The Martyrs of Madaura, A. D. 180," in The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XXVI, 1925, pp. 21-37. E. H. Haight, Apuleius and His Influence.

160 Epistola XVI, P. L. XXXIII, 81-83; Bourke, op. cit. pp. 121-22. Zeller, Stoics...op. cit. p. 348. See Arnold, Roman Stoicism, chapter xvii for St. Paul's use of Stoic position.

161 Epistola XVII, P. L. XXXIII.

162 Epistola XVIII, P. L. XXXIII, 85.

163 Epistola XIX, P. L. XXXIII, 86.

164 Epistola XX, P. L. XXXIII.

165 Pierre Batiffol, Le Catholicisme de Saint Augustin, Vol. I, p. 125.

166 De Diversis Quaestionibus Octaginta-Tribus, P. L. XL.

167 Retractationes I, xxvi, P. L. XXXII, 624ff.

168 Possidius, Vita S. Augustini Episcopi, IV, P. L. XXXII, 36-37.

169 Ambrose, Epistolae. Augustine, Confessiones, IX, vii, 15-16, P. L. XXXII, 770.

170 J. H. S. Burleigh. Review of Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy in Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. IV, 1951, pp. 324-326. Burleigh thinks there is not enough evidence to call circumcellions "nationalists" or "social revolutionaries." According to him they were an embarrassment to their own party. p. 324.

171 For spelling see the discussion by Holmes V. M. Dennis, 3rd. "Hipponensis or Hipponiensis," in Vol. LII, 1931, pp. 274-277 and A. Souter, "Hipponiensis," Vol. LIII, 1932, pp. 162-164, both in American Journal of Philology. For an archeological survey, see Hippone la Royale, avialable through Études Augustiniennes, Paris.

172 Discussion by S. Simpson, op. cit. pp. 15-16.

173 Epistola XXXI, P. L. XXXIII, 88.

174 A. C. de Veer, review of E. Hendriks, "Augustinus' Visie op het Christendom in Bij het Zestiende Eeuwfeest van de Geboorte van Augustinus." in Revue des Études Augustiniennes, Vol. III, no. 1, 1957, pp. 84-85. Max Wundt, "Ein Wendepunkt in Augustins Entwicklung," Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, Band XX, p. 60.

175 B. B. Warfield's statement, "His first Christian writings were a series of religio-philosophical treatises, in which he sought to lay the foundations of a specifically Christian philosophy." is not far wrong if one interprets "philosophy" and "Christian" the way Augustine does in De Vera Religione. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol II, p. 219.

176 The statement by de Plinval, "Le premier effet de l'ordination d'Augustin fut de l'annexer a la vie militante de l'Eglise pour en faire le defenseur de la verite catholic." is true enough. However, one should not forget that Augustine was a defender even as a layman. Pour Connaitre La Pensée de Saint Augustin. p. 95. M. P. Garvey holds that Augustine was a Christian throughout 386-391 but allows room for progress in

Augustine's knowledge of Christianity. op. cit. pp. 344-345; 348.

[167] Retractationes I, xxvi, P. L. XXXII, 624ff.

[168] Possidius, Vita S. Augustini Episcopi, IV, P. L. XXXII, 36-37.

[169] Ambrose, Epistolae. Augustine, Confessiones, IX, vii, 15-16, P. L. XXXII, 770.

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PART II. THE THOUGHT OF AUGUSTINE

A Systematic--Historical Examination

In presenting Augustine's thought, the writer seeks to combine a systemstic and an historical approach. In Part I, the discussion of Augustine's life and literary activities, a whole view of Augustine's development has been seen. But such a purely historical approach is not able to follow the growth of any particular doctrine. It fails to indicate the system of thought behind the various writings. A systematic organization of Augustine's thoughts, on the other hand, reveals the interrelatedness of ideas which appear in several different works. Within the systematic outline, however, a study of each doctrine can be arranged in chronological order to show how Augustine's thoughts on any particular subject or doctrine developed within the five year period.

It would be desirable in this examination to arrange the systematic outline with some regard to Augustine's development. The ideal way to organize the systematic outline would be to have it correspond closely with his theological growth. But applied to Augustine, such an attempt would lose its systematic nature. Augustine is concerned with almost all of the doctrines from the time of his conversion. In his system, as in any other, one doctrine indirectly includes all the others. Yet, no systematic theologian can present all of his subjects at once. In order to be presented clearly, each doctrine must come in sequence. The problem in arranging a systematic outline of Augustine's thought is deciding the order in which the various subjects should appear.

Several different ways of organizing Augustine's thought are possible. Outstanding scholars of Augustine, when speaking with the present writer, have preferred different schemes of organization. They have all been aware that any particular outline has weaknesses as well as strengths. One could follow the conversion experience in the Confessiones and begin with the study of Man's relationship with God. As Professor Baxter has suggested, there Augustine is concerned with his sin and the means of his salvation. The difficulty with such an organization is, from a systematic point of view, that in Augustine those doctrines need a prior explanation of his peculiar views upon

God and Man. One could go by the Soliloquia and divide all of Augustine's thought between God and the soul. Only a forced organization, however, would enable the writer to include much material that belongs neither under the subject of God nor under the subject of the soul. A strictly systematic outline could begin with the doctrine of God, as Père Thonnard has suggested. That approach, nevertheless, does not permit the historical element of Augustine's early concern with the soul and human knowledge to receive proper emphasis. One can begin with a doctrine of man, attempting to recognize Augustine's early concern with the soul and man's ability to know. Within this starting position one could follow, as Père Folliet and Père de Veer have suggested, an "existentialist" outline. That approach is unable to utilize some of the advantages offered by the other methods discussed. It does, on the other hand, give a logical point from which to begin a systematic study, and it recognizes the fact that Augustine was personally involved in the system of thought he was building. From a doctrine of Man it is easy to move to doctrines of his world and his encounter with God. When these two main poles of God and of Man have been discussed, it is natural to move to a discussion of the relationship between them. The writer uses that organization since it seems to him the most satisfactory under the circumstances. He is aware however, that its systematic advantages outweigh its historical comprehensiveness.

Part II, A. Man

One of Augustine's earliest concerns is with a doctrine of man. He does, of course, think of man in relationship to God and to his world. He is concerned with sin and the problem of evil. Man, however, is one central problem for him in the Cassiciacum dialogues. In Contra Academicos Augustine attempts to decide whether man can have reliable knowledge of anything. In De Beata Vita he tries to find how man can have a happy life. De Ordine, after endeavoring to solve the problem of evil, turns to an ordering of man's life. The Soliloquia discuss the human soul and its proper relationship to God. There is, then, some historical reason for beginning a systematic study of Augustine's thought with a doctrine of man.

Augustine believes that man is composed of two elements. When one reads Augustine he hardly finds the unified view of man which has sometimes been pointed out in Hebrew thought. Augustine more often speaks of a unified division. This view becomes evident in the earliest writings, for in De Beata Vita all soon agree that man is composed of both soul and body, each of which requires its own particular food.[1] The two elements are still present under different terms when he describes man in the assertion of the ancient philosophers as being "rational and mortal."[2] The "rational" separates him from the lowliness of the beasts, while the "mortal" separates him from the divine.

Man is composed of soul and body. In De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae the problem of the relationship of the two elements arises. Should one picture them yoked together as two individual horses, or would it be more accurate to think of them as joined like a centaur? When one uses the term "Man," does he refer only to a soul which guides a body or only to a body in the service of a soul? Without settling the problem, Augustine implies that if one term does not refer to the unified elements, he would apply it singly only to the soul. Nevertheless, he would not confuse this better part of man with its Chief Good, for the Chief Good of the soul would of necessity have to be higher than soul itself.[3] From the point of view of Man, a man seems to be a rational soul who has the use of a mortal and earthly body.[4] Again referring to the two different foods mentioned in De Beata Vita, he names the one which benefits the body medicina and that which pertains to the soul disciplina.

The unity of the body and soul is maintained by Augustine even

in his exposition of Genesis. In De Genesis Contra Manichaeos, book II, the body is discussed in terms of the limus. When God created man de limo terrae, it was creation from an appropriate element, an element created from nihil as were the very heavens, an element without corruption. To this element the soul was joined by water; however, the material is of no particular importance, for it was good and ordered in the image (imago) and similitude of God (similitudo Dei).[5] The material or non-material of the soul, insists Augustine, is not part of the very nature of God. The breathing in (insufflavit) the breath of life (spiritum vitae) cannot be simply equated with the soul, for Man was a created body (corpus) and a created soul (anima) already joined. The effect of the breathing in the breath of life was to operate in a living creature (in animam viventem).[6] Thus one sees that consistently in the period under study Augustine maintains that man is a unit which includes two elements, body and soul.

Augustine's twofold division of man stands in contrast with other views. It has been pointed out that Plotinus used a triad in man just as he did in the divine, perhaps involving number mysticism of Pythagoras.[7] One also recalls the threefold distinction which occurs in the writings of St. Paul. However, Augustine seems to have been content with a twofold nature. In such a view, as one can see, many functions assigned to spirit in a three part division would be assigned to the soul.

It is evident that Augustine does not regard the two elements of man as equal. Each stands on its own merits. Since the body has been a problem for Neoplatonists as well as Manicheans, it is not surprising that even at Cassiciacum Augustine has developed some opinions to formulate. As he examines himself in the Soliloquia he decides that one who wants to work for the better interests of the mind should avoid bodily contacts, especially the kind that are so necessary to marriage. Of course, he does not go to the extreme of neglecting the body altogether, for it is a part of man and must be cared for if its health is to be preserved.[8] "Reason" answers that this reply may be only a surface answer and that in his depths Augustine may require something else.[9] However, the author is convinced that the only intercourse he is to permit himself is with Wisdom, a relationship which is not carnal.

As a matter of fact, the body is detrimental to reaching wisdom, for light does not appear to one shut up in a cave. Since the body dies while the soul continues immortal, it may be considered somewhat superfluous.[10] Yet, even in this early period he is persuaded that since it is a creature of God it must not be fully dispaired of but considered as a good.

In Rome Augustine states more clearly the function of man's body. He is convinced that the body is the weaker element in man; for example, it diminishes with the onset of old age, while the soul may well continue in strength.[11] He is willing to go even further

and maintain that among all goods which man possesses in this life, the body is the most serious prison or bond.[12] Still, he does not despise it. It is a part of being man in earthly life. It is worthy of care. In helping a neighbor, his bodily needs must be fed medicine, which includes food, clothing, shelter, and general health. But though the body is a good because it exists, Augustine regards corporeal creatures lower in the scale than even the sinful of spiritual creatures.[13]

In Africa, he maintains essentially the same view of the body but his study of Genesis affects his position. He is willing to admit that the state of man in the body is deplorable, but he explains that this was not the original state at the time of creation. The mortal nature of the body is a result of damnation after sin (post peccatum). The same is true in the case of carnal union. The command of God to go forth and multiply is meant to be interpreted in a spiritual sense before the fall.[14] One may see in this explanation the fear and disgust with which Augustine regards sexual intercourse to which he has been a bond servant for so many years. It seems inconceivable to him that a good God could have ordained a perfect state in which lustful physical copulation would have a place. The original state of the body was good, being made in the image and similitude of God. The material of construction was also good. The fact that the body is fragile and destined to death is nothing other than a merited damnation (damnatione meruimus).[15]

Continuing his discussion on man and woman, Augustine believes that Man is the head of Woman as Christ is the head (caput) of Man. This relationship signifies that the body ought not to rule but to be ruled by the soul and that both are to be ruled by reason.[16] The body is not evil, not even the flesh God used to fill the space in Adam from which the rib was taken to make woman. It was not the flesh of concupiscence but like flesh of the heart upon which the law of God is written.[17] He maintains that woman was taken from man as the name implies, especially when one uses instead of mulier and vir the closer translation virago and viro.

In his last major production in Tagaste Augustine reaffirms his belief that the human body is good, for it is not nothing. Present life and conditions being considered, there is much about the body which is worthy of admiration. If they are of a lower order and subject to corruption, the digestive and reproductive processes are, nevertheless, good and pleasant. When one considers the human form he realizes that its beauty is ordered in number and is not evil. Certainly the human body is better than that of the worm, yet there is much that could be said in praise of such a low biological form.[18] This goodness of the human body, however, is not only intrinsic, for its order is subject to the relationship of the rational soul to God. It may be compared to a chariot which is good so long as it is driven well, but if the driver is careless he finds fault with it. A body which is well controlled is a

remarkable good.[19]

Augustine's view of the body has similarities to and differences from other thinkers. The idea of the body as simply a container of the soul or cloak of the soul is widespread in the world of thought.[20] Upon Augustine, Adam has remarked, "The gnostic condemnation of the flesh as a corrupting principle--which view he ahd got from the Manichees--was not corrected by Neoplatonism, but rather confirmed."[21] Unlike Manichean concepts, however, Neoplatonism of Plotinus' brand does not regard the material body as evil. For Plotinus the body is a lesser good; as something existing it is not evil. This admission, however, does not keep him from longing to be free from the body.[22] His desire does not lead him to concentrate on destroying the body or abusing it with an end of freeing the soul. Such too is Augustine's position. His subordination of the body does not prompt him to neglect its welfare. Nor is he content to admit that it is good simply because it has existence. In expounding Genesis, he takes a more positive view and asserts that in the original state of creation the body was not mortal or corrupted but perfect after its own kind. So his view of this element of Man, while involving Neoplatonist elements, shows some influence of the Hebrew views expressed in Genesis.

It seems to the present writer that Augustine never gives man's body the respect it deserves. He admits that as something created by God and continuing to exist it is good. Moreover, he does not neglect the health of his body or seek to make it suffer. But he maintains a dislike for it, especially for its involvement in reproduction of the species. There are several reasons which may be offered in explanation of his view. First, there is his disgust with his own fornication which occurred when he let fleshly desire rule over his intellect. There is the Stoic influence of reason over the physical. Thirdly, there is the example of Christians living in a way to disregard the body. Fourthly, there is the Manichean idea that the body is evil. All of these factors are in Augustine's background and make it difficult for him to accept the Hebrew respect for the human body. His failure to appreciate the physical body also has an influence upon his theory of knowledge by making the senses almost unimportant, upon his views of marriage by ruling out passion, upon his concept of love to neighbor by subordinating love for the physical part of the whole person, upon his doctrine of Christ by a tendency to subordinate the full manhood to the Godhood, and upon his concept of the life eternal by reluctance to give room for the resurrection of the body as it is expressed in the New Testament.

Augustine clearly contrasts the soul, the second element of man, to the body. His personal concern in Cassiciacum is to know the soul as well as God. Especially is he concerned to know whether the human soul is immortal. The conclusion he reaches by rational arguments is that the soul is definitely immortal.[23] But the fact that while he is in Milan he devotes a whole book to the subject would

seem to indicate that he has not been satisfied at Cassiciacum. In the De Immortalitate Animae he thinks that reason, which has an unchanging, mathematical certainty, can only be present in the soul. This proposition necessitiates the soul's continuing without change. On another approach, since the soul is the life of the body it cannot be death.[24] Again, there is nothing which deserts itself, and since the soul is life it cannot die. The arguments continue at length, but the above are enough to indicate his concern, his approach, and his conviction on this matter. If one considers here De Musica, which Augustine only begins in Milan, one finds that the soul is distinguished from the body and should, under proper conditions, serve as a guide to the body rather than following its dictations.[25]

De Quantitate Animae goes beyond the general question of the permanence of the soul to concentrate upon its other characteristics. Concerning its substance Augustine does not attempt to give a final answer. He does deny any material nature to it, for it is not made either from any one of the four elements of the physical world or from any combination of those four.[26] God has given to the soul its own nature just as He has made the earth or the human body. To be more accurate, it seems to Augustine that the soul is not God but similar to God. (Videtur mihi esse similis Deo).[27] Just as an image of a body reflected in a mirror is different from the body itself, lacking the body's power, so the soul differs from God. As to the quantity of the soul, it has some similarity to the word "justice" which is not described in terms of three dimensional space. But even such an immaterial thing as wind is measurable in terms of varying force, which is true with the soul. If one were to insist on the soul's being measured by the size of the thing which it inhabits, then he would be led to the absurdity of holding that the soul of an elephant is greater than the soul of a man. In conclusion, the soul is to be respected but conceived as lacking physical dimensions.[28]

The conditions of this life prescribe that the soul shall be related to a body. Such a relationship, of course, means that the soul is under some influence from the body, for disturbances in the body also move the soul. In other respects the soul shows some independence. It is not determined by the size of the body, for its greatness is measured in form rather than quantity. Neither does it grow larger in the body, for its development is measured in terms of progress toward the better.[29] For this reason, size and age are not primary factors in determining the capability of the soul. How much knowledge the soul actually brings with it upon entering the body is a disturbing question for Evodius and Augustine. The latter is of the opinion in this period that the soul coming into the world brings all knowledge with it. Once the soul is in the body it is powerful in all the parts. In a worm the soul is united when the worm is united, but when it is cut into many sections, the soul is not divided. It continues to move each of the physical parts.[30]

After the examination of the soul and its relationship to the body, Augustine returns to explain what he means by the progress of the soul. He likes to think of the moving upward and onward in terms of seven steps or grades. The first level involves the soul giving life on the most simple, biological level.[31] In the second stage the soul rules over the senses and the sensations which are common in forms of animal life. Although the first two stages are included in man, his particular characteristics of memory and the liberal arts distinguish grade three. Step four finds the soul paying more attention to itself. In it man flees the things of the world, looking to the welfare of his own soul as well as to the welfare of others. Purity without struggle may be said to portray the fifth stage. In grade six the pure soul contemplates the very highest, which is Truth itself. The seventh division he imagines not so much as a stage as an abiding place to which the other steps lead. It is the state of eternal serenity in the presence of the truest and highest Good.

To think properly of the soul, one must consider its relationship to God as well as to the body. One should not consider the soul equal to God. But under no circumstances should the soul worship any creature, for it, surpassing all other creation, has nothing any higher than God. It has for its essential task, then the worship of God. Its progress in this matter may be described in the terms animatio, sensus, ars, virtus, tranquillitas, ingressio, and contemplatio.[32] In these stages the soul of man advances to exercise the free will which God has given it. The end of man is fulfilled in true religion, that which joins the soul to God.

In other works at Rome, Augustine's ideas on man's soul appear in passing. In the books of De Moribus there is an assertion that the chief good of man is not just whatever happens to be good for the body.[33] But his statement that the soul's place in creation is determined by the use of free will is developed more fully in his De Libero Arbitrio.[34] Free will becomes a function of the soul in Augustine's system. There is nothing which compels the mind (mentem) to join cupidity except the free will. One who wishes to have a happy life, on the other hand, also has only to will it.[35] Even as the soul is the whole life of the body, so is God the happy life of the soul.[36] Thus it has a choice only between a happy existence or a miserable one. In loving the eternal the soul is made strong, but any other choice leads to misery. Even a miserable soul does not really desire non-existence.[37]

The immortality of the soul leads to a discussion of its particular origin. Augustine is not sure whether all souls are derived from one or whether each has a separate existence which it forgets when overcome by a mortal body. At this stage he is aware of four theories about the origin of the human soul.[38] One is that it comes from propagation, while another considers it created with each individual born. A third possibility is that it pre-exists

and comes to the body of the newly born, and a fourth is as three except the soul comes of its own volition. To the best of his knowledge at the time, Augustine is not aware of any Catholic commentaries which would enable a person to emphasize any one theory over the others. His refusal to speculate indefinitely is seen in his Epistola XIII where he ceases to question further upon a vehicle of the soul.[39]

In Africa, Augustine continues to describe the soul. De Vera Religione, which appears in about the same general period as book III of De Libero Arbitrio, emphasizes the function of choice that decides the soul's stage of progress toward God. The soul is in itself good; any vice in it is of its own doing and not a part of its created nature. Its suffering and pain can be due to nothing other than its failure to hold to God in whose image Man is made. In the command to love the neighbor Augustine exhibits his real view of Man, for in that loving, one is to seek the essential part of the neighbor, his real self, which is the soul rather than his body.[40]

Among the eighty-three diverse questions one finds free will discussed much as it has been above. Besides reiterating that the soul is not of the same substance of God, since it is created, Augustine maintains that it is similar to the Trinity in that it is much discussed but little understood.[41] However, simple though it may be, man's whole wisdom lies in knowing which is Creator and which is created and to which he ought to give his first allegiance.[42]

In summary, the soul is one of the two poles of Augustine's whole theology, especially in this early period. He has a driving thirst to understand it fully. This early concern appears with even greater polish in the classic Confessiones and De Trinitate.[43] In Augustine there can be no doubt that the soul forms the essential part of man. Adequate proof is difficult to find among his first writings, for, as Gilson has remarked, it is with him an a priori conviction that the soul has an independent existence. It is a separate substance, not of physical dimensions, which is joined to a substance body, to make a third substance, man.[44] Its function in the body is to give the body life and to order all its activities. Since he includes other functions in the soul, the higher part belongs to the rational mind which is joined with the proper use of the free will.[45] Just why the soul is in the body is not clear. Is the union accidental? Is it an essential part of being man?[46] To these possible interpretations of some of his passages one must add that Augustine does not see the union of the soul and the body to form man in original creation as any sort of penalty, as Neoplatonism does.[47]

Whatever its origin may be, the soul is not an emanation of God.[48] It is, rather, something which is created, although it is the highest in potentiality of all creatures. Its precise origin

Augustine does not even pretand to give. There are passages which may be taken to suggest a pre-existence of the souls, but he is careful to explain that he does not intend to hold a theory of reminiscence.[49]

The destiny of the soul is another matter. The soul is immortal but can have varying positions inthe scale of being. Its position is entirely dependent on its use of its free will.[50] If the soul desires, it can make progress toward the higher order by means of certain stages which lead it away from the lesser physical goods until it can contemplate the supreme Good, even God.[51] In his doctrine of the soul Augustine is greatly dependent on the type of thought which finds expression in Neoplatonism. However, his denial that the soul is of the same substance as God and his insistence upon its having been created distinguish his views from those of that philosophy and indicate that his difference comes through the teachings of Christian theology.

Augustine's early concept of the soul is not without difficulties. He places so much of man under the name "soul" that the only part which is non-soul is the physical shell of the body, and that is sustained and enlivened by the soul. His early idea that a priori the soul is life and can never die has unpleasant implications, for there is, then, another eternal which he claims is not God. His failure to explain definitely the origin of each individual human soul is understandable, but it later creates some unsolved problems in his attempt to defend the doctrine of original sin against the Pelagians. In addition, the greatest reason why his early concept is inadequate for a twentieth century view of the soul is the fact that contemporary theology should also deal with the findings of modern psychology. In the recent works upon depth psychology is much material which needs to be considered in order to construct an adequate Christian doctrine of the soul.

His positive contributions to the doctrine of the soul are many. He carefully explores the mental complexities of man. He sets forth with insight the elements of man which separate him from other animal life. Moreover, over a long period he helps to distinguish the essentials of a Christian doctrine of the soul from the concepts of Greek philosophies.

Man, who is made of soul and body, is a knowing creature. Just as is psychology, epistemology is a major concern in Augustine's Anthropology. His first concern at Cassiciacum is to establish the fact that man can know. In De Beata Vita ii, 7; Soliloquia II, i, 1, as well as later in De Civitate Dei, X, x, 14, he seeks to establish certainty upon the principle that if one doubts he must also be in order to doubt. Certainty is thus placed within one's consciousness.[52] This development enables him to challenge the Academic principles that one cannot know anything and should give his assent to nothing.

However, from this struggle two answers emerge. One is that he does not deny the senses and their value during man's life in the world, and the other is that the senses have only an inferior role in Man's gaining knowledge.

Man's senses are of limited value in gaining knowledge. As he writes his examination of the Academics, Augustine agrees with them in their undercutting any sort of "naive realism." In the Soliloquia he finds that a man is not equivalent to his senses, for error lies not in the things themselves or objects of sense but in the senses. Yet, while a man's senses may be in error, he can be right. Although they may give some information about one's friend, they are inadequate for the understanding one needs to have of him. In such matters, then, senses are to be rejected.[53] Reason even recommends that things of sense ought to be entirely forsaken. Augustine seems to follow this advice to the point of rejecting marriage as being dulling to the mind. In forms of higher knowledge, such as geometry, senses may be of some little help in the beginning, but they are insufficient. Whereas senses could not perceive an infinite number of lines drawn through the center of a circle, reason demands that it can be done.[54]

A more extreme view of the senses appears in the Milan writings. When the soul wishes to know (intelligere), he maintains in De Immortalitate Animae, it turns from the body, for the body is not able to help the soul in this undertaking. The matter is satisfactory if the body refrains from impeding the soul. De Musica implies that the heights of knowledge lie far beyond the limits to which the senses can be extended.[55] In book VI, however, he sees the function of the soul a bit differently. It is not simply to flee from the senses; it is to rule over them and to use them. When the soul is in the body the two interact, sensation coming through the body to the soul. Since the numbers of sense are lowest and those of judgment the highest, the senses are to be subordinated and ruled by the soul.[56]

While in Africa Augustine recognizes the senses as the stimuli of the soul. In his major work on epistemology, De Magistro, he assigns to the senses the role of conveying to the soul impressions or various signs. But these signs or impressions are by no means end products of knowledge. Their function is to drive or stimulate man to turn inward to his own soul in order that he might examine the truth to which the signs point.[57] In Epistola VII, he admits that the mind cannot contain images of material things entirely apart from the service of bodily senses.[58] In a way, they do more than merely stir up memories already within man. However, he has difficulty in believing that apart from these senses the soul is under complete illusion. He is confident enough, on the other hand, to advise Nebridius to forsake the world of sense.

Augustine's imaginary speech with Plato in De Vera Religione

demonstrates agreement between themselves on the role of senses. In order to know truth one must forsake the reports of the bodily senses in favor of a pure mind (pura mente). This distrust does not mean that senses were created to be so weak, but as a result of the fall they are in a state of being overcome by the world. He is not willing to go so far as to call the senses deceivers, for such an accusation would imply that they have some intention to make that appear to be which is not. They are assigned a more passive role as mere reporters. The act of judging and eveluating the reports lies with the mind. Thus, in knowing, Man needs in addition to the five senses another, which is a kind of sixth sense, that is mental strength, to contemplate the eternal. This need for judging senses is also discussed in De Diversis Quaestionibus IX.[60]

Mistrust of senses does not leave Augustine in skepticism. It is interesting that the first project of the young convert in his rural retreat is an undertaking to defeat any absolute skepticism.[61] He does not criticize the doubt of knowledge brought by the senses, but he does establish that apart from the senses man can know. His use of the doubting subject to prove its own existence has been linked to the argument later used by Descartes.

Augustine's view of the senses has much to commend it. He recognizes the limitations of the five senses in the higher pursuits of man. Even in matters of physical observation the senses have to be evaluated and corrected by human reason. In the realms of mathematics, philosophy, and theology the senses can play only a minor role. If Augustine's view has a deficiency it is in his failure to recognize the real contribution to human knowledge the senses can make by helping gather new data. From before his own time until a thousand years afterwards there is a distrust of the senses which prevents their being critically developed and used to enrich man's understanding of himself and of his world.

On the surface one can find many similarities between Augustine and Descartes. One example is the turning inward to find truth and a mistrust of the senses. There are even some close parallels in the words they used.[62] On the other hand, upon closer examination, which has brought forth abundant literature in recent years, there are some significant differences. Augustine does not altogether abandon senses, nor does he limit man's knowledge to the individual's rational processes.[63] From his use of cogito he does not develop a whole system.[64] That the thinking self is, stands as only one argument among others equally certain.[65] It would be unfair to both Augustine and Descartes to say that the latter is only a recent expression of the former. Augustine's admiration for mathematical certainty never leads him to reject the senses entirely. He simply recognizes the limitations of sense impressions and the need for exercise of judgment where they are concerned. In higher knowledge, he considers, perhaps a Neoplatonist idea that like alone sees like.[66]

Augustine's distrust of the senses is balanced by his trust in the functions of the soul which may be called mind or reason. Even as early as the composition of De Ordine he recognizes within himself that which discerns and connects. To this element he gives the name reason (ratio) which he describes as either the soul or something related to it. This element in man places him above other animals, for he is rational being.[67] In his discussion with his own Ratio, Augustine implies that he judges men not as units but according to their exercise of reason. His love for the robber continues, since even that creature exercises reason. Of course, he prefers those who use reason better. The idea is advanced that the study of the liberal arts does not so much add information as it brings up from oblivion those things which have been previously buried there.[68] Moreover, whereas bodily senses are almost useless in a subject like geometry, reason is able to judge the truth.

The writings from Milan show more clearly how Augustine conceives the relationship of soul and body. For his argument on the soul's immortality in De Immortalitate Animae it is necessary to hold that reason, which is immortal, is so closely related to the soul as to be inseparable. He supports that proposition by declaring that since reason and soul are not two substances they cannot be divided. He has no patience with anyone who would say that what man sees with his eyes has being while what is discerned with the intellect has no being. Only the demented would dare to doubt that the intellect is to be preferred more than the eyes.[69] When one considers the involved journey through the first five books of De Musica from the point of view of the sixth book, he sees that the examination of music and poetry are leading away from the bodily senses to the use of reason at the exclusion of those five senses.

Two works at Rome make important contributions to understanding his view of reason, though their references are brief. The De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae emphasizes that the high place Augustine gives to the rational soul does not mean that it is to be thought of either as God or as a part of God. It is always the created and not the creator; it is always subject to the sovereignty of God.[70] Evodius puts forth the opinion in De Quantitate Animae that the soul enters the world in ignorance. Augustine answers in a manner that would exclude any necessity for knowledge to enter by way of sense impressions. Contrary to Evodius he here holds a position which seems to indicate a belief that the soul does not enter in a state of ignorance but that it comes into the world with all knowledge. What one describes as apprehension is none other than recalling or remembering.[71] When this question arises again in De Libero Arbitrio, Augustine is not so positive in his disagreement with Evodius, but he does remind him that it is not entirely clear that the soul has never been wise before its life in this body.[72] Leaving this question, the discussion resembles more closely his earlier considerations. When reason (ratio)or mind (mens)or spirit (spiritus)dominates Man's irrational emotions, he becomes balanced

in accordance with what is discovered to be eternal law. Although the rational mind is not God, only He is found to be more excellent.[73] Is reason a sixth sense? When one considers ordinary animals it would seem that there is some sort of sixth sense which judges impressions from the other five. Nevertheless, he is unwilling to call the sense "reason." When he examines man, he denies that there is any "sense" which perceives itself and other senses. What man knows he apprehends by reason. Without reasoning, even reason itself could not be comprehended. Reason, he thinks, permits a common access to knowledge which the senses make impossible. Although an object may be the same for all, each man has his own senses. Then too, it must be admitted that two observers cannot have exactly the same part of the same thing at the same time. On the other hand, when reason alone is involved, these limitations vanish. Numbers are independent of bodily senses, unchanging, and common to all rational beings.[74]

De Genesi Contra Manichaeos furnishes further examples of Augustine's elevation of human reason. In the order of creation man's reason gives him dominion over the other animals; given a spiritual interpretation, this statement indicates that those movements of life which man has in common with the animals ought to be dominated with temperance and modesty (temperantiam et modestiam).[75] Both soul and body should be under the domination of mind (mens). His interpretation of the fall has certain implications for reason and senses. The dream of Adam indicates that the vision of higher things comes not through the senses but through inner intelligence. Such was the situation before man's sin, for God then spoke to man through an inner spring.[76] However, the darkness of the evening when man and woman hid from God after eating the forbidden fruit indicates that the light of inner reason had left them.[77] According to this interpretation, the turning to the senses for knowledge instead of to inner reason is one of the signs of man's fallen state.

If De Magistro is one of his clearest statements of the use of reason in man, it is also one of the most difficult books to understand and explain accurately. Augustine first affirms that a knowledge of universals does not come through listening to others but through turning within oneself to the truth which presides over the mind. This idea is common enough, but he further identifies the truth presiding over the mind as Jesus Christ who gives to each according to his ability to receive.[78] Whereas the senses are of some use in knowing the sensible world, to know the intelligible world one uses reason and turns to the interior truth. The Godhead is introduced again when he concludes that words of an earthly teacher do not give truth; one is taught by the things themselves which God manifests to him.[79]

As in Genesis, the subject of dreams arises in Augustine's correspondence with Nebridius. Whether dreams are signs of images placed in the human mind by higher powers neither man is sure. Augustine indicates, however, that a vision in a dream of things

one has never seen in the sensible world may be a result of a combination of elements which actually have come to the mind through sense impressions.[80]

Augustine recognizes memory as a function of the soul closely related to reason. Although this subject is later to become fascinating for the Bishop of Hippo, in this early period he is only beginning to make enquiries. It is mentioned in De Musica where he holds that sensations are evaluated by numbers of judgment aided by the memory (adjuvante memoria).[81] His discussion with Evodius in De Quantitate Animae maintains that memory, a function of the soul, is, like the soul, non-spatial, for it can hold images of gigantic cities within its small compass.[82] To this statement may be added his letters with Nebridius which were above discussed.

Reason, then, becomes identified with the soul in its highest function. Reason rules not only the body but also the soul itself. Whereas it is dependent in part upon bodily senses, especially for knowsedge of the sensible world, it alone is able to know the higher truths. But how the reason gains its knowledge is one of the problems in Augustine. Indeed, interpreted in one strict sense, he denies that senses add any knowledge to man. Part of the question centers around the function of memory. There are places which may lead one to believe that the soul brings knowledge into the world with it and gradually remembers it when under stimulation to do so. However, these passages taken alone would distort Augustine's views.[83] In the whole period under study, one finds that Augustine departs from the Platonic role of memory. This function becomes for him something that stores up images received in this particular life in the world rather than in some previous life from which the soul fell.[84] Moreover, in his later writings he repudiates the kind of reminiscence and memory which he has found characteristic of Plato.[85] To gain a clear picture of Augustine's epistemology in the period under study one must look at other factors, and in particular, his doctrine of illumination.

Augustine's estimate of reason does not lead him to deny the influence of the body upon the mind or of the senses upon receiving knowledge. He also recognizes that reason has its limitations. But from the modern point of view, it seems to the present writer that Augustine overestimates the power of human reason. He realizes that the body can sway its decisions, but he is not sufficiently aware of the subconscious forces operating in the human mind itself. The studies in depth psychology now show subconscious forces at work in the human mind which place limitations upon human reason. Those forces are almost entirely overlooked by pre-Kantian thinkers. In his stand, however, Augustine is only sharing in the weakness common to the various followers of Plato down to his own time.

In some passages, for example De Ordine II, ii, 7, and Soliloquia II, xx, Augustine speaks of truth being interior to Man.

This manner of speaking is not necessarily a reference to knowledge stored in the soul before it entered the present life. In the De Magistro the truth in Man becomes vital and is hardly to be thought of as a body of knowledge which he remembers. The problem is further complicated when he speaks of an inner light which illumines man; moreover, he indicates that truth is made known to man by God. He identifies Truth with Christ and declares that He is present to the mind of each man, giving truth to him if he will but turn inward to behold it. As Boyer has indicated, Augustine dismisses a Platonic doctrine of reminiscence in favor of his doctrine of illumination.[86] In recent years this doctrine has become one of the major themes for discussion in studies of Augustine.[87]

The present writer is hardly so presumptuous to think he can give any final answer on Augustine's theory of illumination. The various interpretations all have points which seem true as well as those points which are not so obvious in Augustine's works in the particular period here under study. It may not be far wrong to indicate that part of the difficulty arises in Augustine's own uncertainty or lack of full, systematic development of this point. Some indication of recent studies and their relevance to the early writings, however, would hardly be out of order here.

The passages studied above seem to support the suggestions of Cayré and Jolivet that Augustine gradually relinquished a Platonic view of reminiscence and a doctrine of innate ideas in order to accept a more vital form of inner truth in the concept of illumination.[88] But how this feature works in man is more vague. D'Arcy and Gilson have rightly tried to formulate the exact steps of the cognitive process showing how the inner light of divine illumination is related to sense impressions.[89] Although this formulation is a necessary function of philosophy, one may be led to conclude that their sketches are more complete than anything Augustine worked out in this period. Allers has distinguished between physical and spiritual light and the use of the former in sensual knowledge.[90] This may be interesting, but one wonders if it is necessary or even helpful in understanding Augustine's views on illumination. Physical light certainly plays only a small introductory role in Augustine's early examinations of the subject.

Much closer to Augustine's passages on illumination in this early period of writings, it seems, are the view of Jansen, Boyer, and Thonnard.[91] They seem to indicate an approach which is more embracing and more spiritual. God is Truth in whom every man and every truth abide. Apart from this fundamental Truth and Being one does not know truth. Since this knowledge is not conveyed to man through the external senses, it must illumine from within. It is not something which is a part of created man's being or some once and for all store of knowledge. It is, rather, a vital bathing of thought, just as all life is sustained by the power of God. Without the continuous presence of His action there is no being and no truth.

To try to go much further in systematic formulation leads one to exceed the evidence provided in this period.

The origin of the doctrine of illumination in Augustine is not easily traced. Somers has suggested that his belief in the presence of God in man probably derives from the Sumerian myth of man's being created in the image of God; where the image is, God is present.[92] Some element of this view is perhaps present; nevertheless, in the present period Augustine does not greatly emphasize this aspect--certainly not out of all proportion as it seems to have been done in some recent Protestant theological discussions.

Without defining exactly how Augustine receives or develops his ideas on the subject one may see some existence of similar thoughts in systems before the fourth century. In Plato one has the "Ideas" by which all sense impressions are judged. In Christian thought "Ideas" are easily transferred to the mind of God. Stoics present the idea that the existence of God is a preconception in the mind of every man. In the thought of Plotinus there is nothing which has being apart from its abiding in that which is above; that above the human reason is none other than a part of the Godhead. Moreover, there is the work of Clement of Alexandria identifying Christ with the teacher of all men. With this sort of background one may be led to select passages of Scripture in a particular manner. Christ is the light of every man coming into the world; He is the Truth; He is the Son of God. Add to these the belief that the Son is very God and one has elements from which one could construct the passages which appear in Augustine's early writings. Just what is the product of his own work and what comes from which particular sources are matters which can hardly be settled with finality.

One of the factors which have stimulated so much investigation of Augustine's doctrine of illumination is the nineteenth century condemnation of ontologism that came forth in Gioberti.[93] Does Augustine hold that the human mind has a natural capacity for knowing directly the mind of God? Several points in Augustine are against this tendency. In the first place, the inner light is not a part of man such as the senses and reason. It is from God and shed graciously. Vision of God is extremely limited by Augustine.[94] It is reserved for the highest degree of souls, for those who have become especially prepared--not for everyman just because he is man. Moreover, he does not maintain that this inner light is man's only knowledge of God. On the contrary, as will be seen in another section, it is only one among several sources for such knowledge. It would be unjust to level against him a charge of ontologism in the form which was condemned.[95] On the other hand, Augustine's suggestions are not free from all problems. How does he identify this inner knowledge with Christ? If Christ is present teaching every man in the world, why are some men seemingly unaware of the fact? How can he account for error? Does he not drag God into

man's sinful acts? There are answers which may be given to all these questions; whether they are entirely satisfactory is doubtful.

Thus far in Augustine's Anthropology one has seen something of the composition of man, his origin, his similarity to other animals, and his superiority to them in the rational soul. Moreover, the supreme element of man leads to a consideration of man's relationship to God in matters of epistemology. The question remains how this creature is related to the Creator in other matters.

Man is related to God. In De Beata Vita it is stated that all men have a relationship to God; whereas the good have Him for themselves, the evil have Him against them. He possesses every man, but only those who have Him in their souls possess God.[96] If one knows God, he knows the origin of Man.[97] For not only is God Man's creator, but also Man is sustained and defended in his life by the continuous presence of God.[98] No thing can exist of itself or apart from its source of being.[99]

Especially considering the soul, only God is superior to it. For this reason the soul should worship only God.[100] Although the soul becomes like Him in so far as it subjects itself to His illustration and illumination, it is ranked in the order of creation according to the way in which it uses its free will.[101] God is Being, which no one really wishes to escape, not even the suicide.[102] The present condition of man in the world is due to a choosing of what appeared to be better than God; only in that choosing did man lose the close relationship to God which he had enjoyed from the time when he was made in the image and similitude of God.[103]

Augustine is correct in recognizing that man cannot be understood apart from God. This point of view is essential to any Christian doctrine of man. Both in his composition and in his means of knowing man is interpreted in light of his relationship to God. Augustine's doctrine of illumination, however, can be interpreted in such a way as to make most Christian theologians deny a relationship in which God is involved in human error.

In his concern to know himself, Augustine gradually builds a rather complete picture of man. Part of his ideas come from self examination, especially through introspection. Others indicate a familiarity with the general philosophical heritage of his age, including thoughts usually identified with Plato, Pythagoras, the Stoics, and Plotinus. His study of the Scriptures, as has been seen above, contributes important elements and helps in his breaking with the philosophers on some significant points.[104]

Augustine's view of the soul of man is sometimes in agreement

with Plotinus and sometimes at variance with him. He does not join the Stoics in their concept of the soul as material; on the contrary, he confirms with Plotinus its spiritual nature.[105] He disagrees with Plotinus when he denies that the soul is a part of God, and affirms that the soul is a creature, as Genesis declares.[106] Augustine does not uniformly regard the soul's being in the body as a fall either by necessity or by free will, as Plotinus suggests. Augustine thinks the soul is created in the body by God; its fall is in freely choosing to become subservient to the passions of the body.[107] Like Plotinus he regards the soul immortal by its very nature.[108] He avoids affirming any particular theory of the origin of each man's soul, and though traducianism attracts him in later periods, he always avoids affirming that theory.[109]

Augustine's theory of knowledge also deviates from Plotinus and more ancient philosophers on some points. Augustine is closer to the Academic and Neoplatonist distrust of senses than were the Stoic materialists. But in common with Stoics and Neoplatonists he places great faith in the power of human reason.[110] Although he seems to lean toward a doctrine of reminiscence such as is found in Plato's Meno and in Plotinus, he finally gives his support to illumination.[111] His idea of illumination has parallels in Plotinus, but it also has parallels to "Wisdom" of the Old Testament and Johannine verses in the new Testament. His idea of Christ as the inward teacher has been developed further by apologists in the Society of Friends.[112]

Man cannot be understood apart from God in Augustine's system. Van Steenbergher rightly sums up Augustine's philosophy as, "la philosophie de la participation."[113] Man is a creature made by God and sustained by Him. This emphasis upon relationship is re-emphasized in the opening chapters of the Confessiones, book I.

Augustine's doctrine of man has influenced greatly subsequent philosophy and theology. Professor Reinhold Niebuhr says that Augustine is "... the first Chrisitan theologian to comprehend the full implications of the Christian doctrine of man." The soul for Augustine is not purely rational, for like Plotinus' νοῦς it represents the capacity for self knowledge and introspection. This feature enables Man to reach self transcendence.[114] Martin Buber has contrasted Augustine's view to Aristotle's view of man by saying,

> The Augustinian man wonders at that in man which cannot be understood as a part of the world, as a thing among things; and where that former wondering has already passed into methodical philosophizing, the Augustinian wondering manifests itself in its true depth and uncanniness. It is not philosophy, but it affects all future philosophy.[115]

The Augustinian doctrine of man, while not completely developed

before 391 A. D., is at least well under way to the form it takes in later writings from Hippo.

Augustine's doctrine of man in 391 is recognizably Christian. He has an appreciation of man which includes elements of Greek philosophy and Jewish-Christian Scriptures. If his formal anthropology has a weakness it is his failure to paint an adequate picture of the whole man. The richness of his concept of the soul is presented at the expense of poverty in his concept of the non-rational side of man. His picture of man may have been made more adequate by supplementing the colors from Greek rationalism with the pigments from the Jewish and Christian tradition presented in the Scriptures of the Christian Church.

Augustine's doctrine of man in 391, the present writer thinks, is inadequate as a Christian doctrine of man for the twentieth century. Augustine only outlines the areas which a Christian doctrine should cover. A Christian doctrine of man for the present day must correct the proportions of Augustine's outline and supplement his contents with new knowledge which come from a closer examination of Scriptures, philosophies, religions, psychologies, anatomies, and anthropologies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Notes

[1] De Beata Vita ii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 964.

[2] De Ordine II, xi, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1009, Homo est animal rationale mortale.

[3] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae iv. 6--v.7. P. L. XXXII. 1313.

[4] Ibid. xxvii, 52, P. L. XXXII, 1332.

[5] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, vii, 9, P. L. XXXIV, 201.

[6] Ibid. II, viii, 10, P. L. XXXIV, 201.

[7] W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, Vol. I, p. 122.

[8] Soliloquia I, x, 17, P. L. XXXII, 879.

[9] Ibid. I, xi, 19, P. L. XXXII, 879, ad hoc enim valet quod a quibusdam doctis viris dictum est, ita omnes stultos in anos esse, ut male olere omne coenum, quod non semper, sed dum commoves, scentias.

[10] Ibid. II, xix, 33, P. L. XXXII, 901.

[11] De Quantitate Animae xxi, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1055.

[12] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xxii, 40, P. L. XXXII, 1328, ...inter omnia quae in hac vita possidentur, corpus homini gravissimum vinculum est....

[13] De Libero Arbitrio, III, xii, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1288.

[14] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, xix, 30, P. L. XXXIV, 187.

[15] Ibid. II, vii, 8, P. L. XXXIV, 200.

[16] Ibid. II, xi, 15, P. L. XXXIV, 204.

[17] Ibid. II, xii, 17, P. L. XXXIV, 205. II Corinthians 3:3.

[18] De Vera Religione xli, 77, P. L. XXXIV, 156.

[19] Ibid. xlv, 83, P. L. XXXIV, 160.

[20] Jean Pepin, "Saint Augustin et le symbolisme néoplatonicien de la vêture." Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, 1954, pp. 293-306.

[21] Karl Adem, Saint Augustine--The Odyssey of His Soul, (tr. by McCann) p. 24.

[22] Porphyry, Life of Plotinus.

[23] Soliloquia II, xix, 33, P. L. XXXII, 901, R. Immortalis est igitur anima:

[24] De Immortalitate Animae ix, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1029. ...haec autem vita, quae deserit ea cuae moriuntur, quia ipsa est animus, et seipsam non deserit; non moritur animus.

[25] De Musica VI, v, 14, P. L. XXXII, 1170.

[26] De Quantitate Animae i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 1036.

[27] Ibid. ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 1037.

[28] Ibid. xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII, 1049.

[29] Ibid. xvi, 28, P. L. XXXII, 1051.

[30] Ibid. xxxii, 68, P. L. XXXII, 1073.

[31] Ibid. xxxiii, 70, P. L. XXXII, 1073.

[32] Ibid. xxxv, 79, P. L. XXXII, 1079.

[33] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae iv, 6, P. L. XXXII, 1313.

[34] De Moribus Manichaeorum vii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 1349.

[35] De Libero Arbitrio I, xiii, 29, P. L. XXXII, 1237. ...ut nihil aliud ei quam ipsum velle sit habere quod voluit.

[36] Ibid. II, xvi, 41, P. L. XXXII, 1263. Sicut enim tota vita corporis est anima, sic beata vita animae Deus est.

[37] Ibid. III, vii, 20. P. L. XXXII, 1280.

[38] Ibid. III, xxi, 59, P. L. XXXII, 1299.

[39] Epistola XIII, P. L. XXXIII, 77-78.

[40] De Vera Religione, xlvi, 89, P. L. XXXIV, 162.

[41] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus II, IV, VIII, XXXVIII, P. L. XL, 11, 12, 13, 27.

[42] Ibid. LXXXI, P. L. XL, 96-97.

[43] Martin Grabmann, Grundgedanken des Heiligen Augustinus über Seele und Gott, p. 21; also Michael Schmaus, Die Psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus.

[44] É. Gilson, Introduction a L'Étude de Saint Augustin, p. 57, p. 59, p. 74.

[45] G. Verbeke, L'Evolution de la Doctrine du Pneuma, p. 497; E. Dinkler, Die Anthropologie Augustins distinguishes among Pauline, Neoplatonic, and Augustinian views of the relationship of the soul and body. See A. Gardeil, "Le 'Mens' D'aprēs S. Augustin et S. Thomas D'Aquin." Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, XIII, 1924, pp. 145-161; F. J. Thonnard, "Les Fonctions sensibles de l'âme humaine selon S. Augustin." L'Année Théologique Philosophie de Saint Augustin, Vol. I, p. 166.

[46] E. Fortin, "Saint Augustin et la doctrine néoplatonicienne de l'âme," Augustinus Magister III, p. 371, points to De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae I, xxvii, 52, which seems to indicate that the soul being in the body is an accident and to De Ordine II, xi, 31, where the soul joined to a mortal body indicates that the union is essential to being man.

[47] Nourrison, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 205.

[48] David Roberts, "Augustine's Earliest Writings," op. cit. pp. 172-173, points out the temptation to make the soul co-eternal with God even while affirming its creation. James Morgan discusses the four views, p. 96 and erroneous views, p. 126, The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine. J. Blick, "Platonisme et Christianisme dans la conception Augustinienne de Dieu Créateur," Recherches de Science Religieuse, Tome XXX, numero 2, Avril 1940, pp. 172-190. For the Catholic view today, P. Galtier, "Saint Augustin et l'Origine de l'Homme," Gregorianum, Vol. XI, Fasc. 1. 1930, p. 23.

[49] De Quantitate Animae xx, 34, is explained so as to deny a previous life of the soul. Retractationes I, viii, 2, P. L. XXXII, 594. Nourrison, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 118.

[50] Clarified (and modified) in light of the Pelagian controversy. Retractationes I, ix, 5 and 6. P. L. XXXII 597-598. Cunningham correctly shows that Augustine never intended to deny free will even in sinful man. His estimate of Calvin is another question. St. Austin, p. 86. B. Roland-Gosselin, La Morale de Saint Augustin, p. 84; Joseph Ball, "Les développements de la doctrine de la liberté chez saint Augustin," L'Année Théologique, 1946, Fasc. iv, p. 413.

[51] One may consider here the words of Dinkler, "sieht er den Menschen nicht vor dem paulinischen Entweder--oder des κατὰ

σάρκα oder κατα πνεῦμα sondern sieht er ihn im 'Prozess' in der Entwicklung." op. cit.p. 160. Morgan, op. cit. p. 35 sees the influence of Aristotle in this progress of the individual soul. G. Cayré has pointed out that contemplation is an essential part of Augustine's thought. Mélanges Augustiniens, p. 4.

[52]D. J. Kavanagh, op. cit. p. 96.

[53] Soliloquia I, iii, 8, P. L. XXXII, 873.

[54] Ibid. II, xx, 35, P. L. XXXII, 903.

[55] De Musica V, xiii, 27, P. L. XXXII, 1161.

[56] Ibid.VI, xi, 33, P. L. XXXII, 1181.

[57] De Magistro, P. L. XXXII, 1193 and following sections.

[58] Epistola VI, P. L. XXXIII, 68-70.

[59] De Vera Religione iii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 124.

[60] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, IX, P. L. XL, 13.

[61] É. Gilson, Introduction a L'Étude.... op. cit. p. 49. C. Boyer, L'Idée de Vérité... op. cit. pp. 41-42.

[62] E. Przywara (S. J.) "St. Augustine and the Modern World," (tr. by Watkins) in A Monument to St. Augustine, pp. 251-286. Nigel Abercrombie, Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought. e. g. p. 61.

[63] Cunningham, op. cit. p. 40; Pegis, "The Mind of St. Augustine," Medieval Studies, Vol. VI, 1944, p. 38.

[64] C. Boyer, L'Idée de Vérité... op. cit. p. 40; A. C. Vega Obras de San Agustin, Tomo Secundo. Introduccion a la Filosofia de San Agustin, p. 225.

[65] M. C. D'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," in A Monument to Saint Augustine, p. 164.

[66] Edwin Hatch, op. cit. V. Christianity and Greek Philosophy; W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, pp. 137-138. Boyer, op. cit. p. 53. Leo W. Keeler, Textus Selectos Collegit et notis instruxit Sancti Augustini Doctrina De Cognitione.

[67] De Ordine II, xviii, 48, P. L. XXXII, 1017; Ibid. ii, xix, 49, P. L. XXXII, 1018, Quando autem melior, et pecoribus praeponendus? Quando novit quod facit. At nihil aliud me pecori praeponit, nisi quod rationale animal sum.

[68] Soliloquia II, xx, 35, P. L. XXXII, 902-904.

[69] De Immortalitate Animae x, 17; P. L. XXXII, 1029-1030.

[70] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, xii, 20, P. L. XXXII, 1320.

[71] De Quantitate Animae, I, xx, 34, P. L. XXXII, 1054-1055.

[72] De Libero Arbitrio I, xii, 24, P. L. XXXII, 1234.

[73] Ibid. I, x, 21, P. L. XXXII, 1233.

[74] Ibid. II, vii, 15--II, viii, 29, P. L. XXXII, 1249-1257.

[75] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos, I, xxx, 31, P. L. XXXIV, 188.

[76] Ibid. II, iv, 5, P. L. XXXIV, 198.

[77] Ibid. II, xvi, 24, P. L. XXXIV, 208-209.

[78] De Magistro xi, 38, P. L. XXXII, 1216. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus (Ephes. iii:16,17), id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia:

[79] Ibid. xii, 40, P. L. XXXII, 1217.

[80] Epistolae VIII and IX, P. L. XXXIII, 71-73.

[81] De Musica VI, viii, 22, P. L. XXXII, 1175-1176.

[82] De Quantitate Animae I, v, 8, P. L. XXXII, 1040.

[83] R. Jolivet, "San Augustin y la preexistencia platonica de las Almas." Augustinus, Vol. I, 1, 1956, pp. 49-51; C. Boyer, L'Idée de Vérité..." op. cit. p. 189. On the relationship of the "memory" to intellect and will, mainly based on De Trinitate, see P. Lope Cilleruelo, "Introduccion al Estudio de la Memoria en San Agustin." La Ciudad de Dios, Vol. CLXIV, 1952, p. 13.

[84] É. Gilson, Introduction....op. cit. p. 101; M. Sciacca, S. Agostino, Vol. I, Chapter V, La Memeria; P. A. Kertész, Doctrina S. Augustini De Memoria Mentis.

[85] Sciacca, op. cit. pp. 256, 264-265. In Retractationes I, iv, 4, P. L. XXXII, 590, he repudiates the way he implied that liberal arts merely bring out truths already within man. He places over against this his view of illumination. He refers the reader to De Trinitate XI for a refutation of Plato. See Robert J. O'Connell, S. J. "Pre-Existence in Augustine's Seventh Letter," Revue des Études Augustiniennes, XV 1-2, 1969, pp. 67-73.

[86] C. Boyer. L'Idée de Vérité...op. cit. p. 189.

[87] H. Somers, S. J. "Image de Dieu et illumination divine," Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, p. 451.

[88] F. Cayré, Initiation a la Philosophie de saint Augustin, p. 221; R. Jolivet, "San Agustin y la preexistencia...." op. cit. pp. 49-50.

[89] D'Arcy,"The Philosophy of St. Augustin" in A Monument to Saint Augustine. He agrees with Gilson (Introduction ...op. cit.). "Illumination of the thought by God in Augustinianism, illumination of the object by a thought which God illumines in Aristotelianism: that is the difference between the two systems." p. 182.

[90] Rudolph Allers, "St. Augustine's Doctrine on Illumination," Franciscan Studies Vol 12, No. 1, March 1952, pp. 27-46. "Illumination et verites eternelles," in Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, pp. 477-490.

[91] P. B. Jansen, (S. J.) "Zur Lehre des hl. Augustinus von dem Erkennen der Rationes Aeternae," Grabmann and Mausback, Aurelius Augustinus, pp. 111-136; Boyer, L'Idée...op. cit. p. 206; Especially F. J. Thonnard, "Caractères platoniciens de l'ontologie Augustinienne." Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, pp. 317-327. "Tout est intelligible par l'être qui est Dieu et dont tout être participe selon l'ordre,' dira saint Augustin, affirmant par la sa mentalité platonicienne, mais Chrétienne." p. 327.

[92] Somers, op. cit.

[93] F. Cayré, Initiation...op. cit. p. 224f.

[94] Ibid. Gilson, Introduction.... p. 112.

[95] É. Gilson, "The Future of Augustinian Metaphysics" in A Monument to Saint Augustine, (tr. Edward Bullough). Although he was the antipodes of ontologism he was poorly protected against it. p. 299; P. Prime, "Tenuissima Forma Cognitionis: Predication in St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge." The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XLIII, 1942. "Thus modern scholars show a unanimous, and surely unnecessary, zeal to rescue the Doctor from the taint of Ontologism." p. 45.

[96] De Beata Vita 34, P. L. XXXII, 976.

[97] De Ordine II, xviii, 47, P. L. XXXII, 1017.

[98] Soliloquia, I, i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 869.

[99] De Immortalitate Animae viii, 14, P. L. XXXII, 1028.

[100] De Musica VI, v, 13, P. L. XXXII, 1170. Superior illa solus Deus est; De Quantitate Animae XXXIV, 77, P. L. XXXII, 1078, Hic ergo solus Deus animae colendus est, neque discrete, neque confuse.

[101] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xii, 20, P. L. XXXII, 1320; De Moribus Manichaeorum vii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 1349.

[102] De Libero Arbitrio III, viii, 22, P. L. XXXII, 1281.

[103] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, xvii, 27, P. L. XXXIV, 186.

[104] J. Turnus, S. J. "Paulinische, Philonische, Augustinische Anthropologie," Scolastik, XI Jahrgang, Heft 1, 1936, criticizes Dinkler by saying, "...Dinkler's...Anthropologie Augustins ist nicht die Anthropologie Augustins. Die gesuchte Darstellung steht also immer noch aus." p. 98. In this period the present writer feels it would be misleading to type Augustine as simply a mean between the poles of Paulinism and Neoplatonism.

[105] E. Zeller, The Stoics...op. cit. p. 211. Plotinus, Enneads IV, ii, 1.

[106] Plotinus, Enneads IV, iv, 32; V, i, 3; IV, viii, 5.

[107] Plotinus, Enneads I, i, 9 and 12; I, ii, 3; IV, viii, 5. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XII, xxi and xxiii, P. L. XLI, 372, 373.

[108] Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 1.

[109] E. J. Bicknell, "Sin and the Fall," in Essays Catholic and Critical, p. 214; Augustine, Epistola CXLIII, 7; P. L. XXXIII, 588; Epistola CLXVI, P. L. XXXIII, 720-733. De Anima et ejus Origine, P. L. XLIV.

[110] Plotinus IV, iv, 22; Cicero, Academica; Zeller, The Stoics ...op. cit. p. 79.

[111] Meno, 82ff.

[112] Plotinus, Enneads V, ii, 4. Robert Barclay, Apologia. True knowledge of God is revealed inwardly by his Spirit (intus revelatur Spiritu ejus.) Proposition 2. W. C. Braithwaite, "Society of Friends," in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VI, pp. 142B--147B. The writer is indebted to Professor E. P. Dickie for suggestions on bibliography for this point.

[113] Van Steenbergher, Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, Vol. I, p. 44.

[114] R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. Part I, pp. 165-166.

[115] Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, (tr. by R. G. Smith), p. 128.

Part II, B. The World

An Encounter Area of Man and God

Man meets God in the world. As has been seen in the discussion of Man, at least two other areas are involved which require further study. Man experiences through his senses what he infers to be an external world. He is more than just a stream of consciousness; he is man in the world. He is related to God, partly through his reasoning processes. In Augustine's writings man's knowledge of his world and his relationship to God are closely linked. The external world is a means of knowing God; knowing the action of God leads to an understanding of the world which is object for man.

1. Man's Search for God

Augustine believes that man can know God. In the previous chapter it has been shown that Augustine's earliest task after his conversion is to establish that man can know something. He also establishes his belief that man can know God. His earliest completed work of Cassiciacum pictures all the disputants agreeing that God may be had in order for one to have a happy life. Monnica is granted the point when she says that no one is able to come through to God without seeking Him. Augustine suggests that as long as one continues to seek for God he has not found Him.[1] Furthermore, to assure that man should be prompted to the search there is a certain admonition emanating from the fountain of truth which bids man to remember God and to seek after Him.[2] The Soliloquia demonstrates that Augustine is aware of the Scripture which says in effect that God opens to those who knock; he also uses this verse in the form of a short prayer for Evodius who has worked so diligently in the didalogue of De Libero Arbitrio.[3] From these sections one sees that Augustine not only believes that man can know God, but also he gives some place to Man's activity in the process.

Augustine thinks Man by his own action can know God through two major means. Among the possible means he suggests, the first includes the arts and sciences. In De Ordine he attempts to show how all things in creation, expecially the arts, are ordered. Using these means the human reason advances by degrees lest it

should fall. From a treatment of syllables, rhythm, and numerical form reason discerns number and proportion and infers that the eternal must be of that same form. The erudite man is one who develops unity out of the various branches of learning. Upon reaching that unity he may well search for things divine; not only things to be believed but truths to be contemplated, intelligently understood, and retained.[4] On the other hand, one who has not grasped with some thoroughness the results of the various learned disciplines will be likely to fall into many types of errors in trying to reach the High God.

In the Soliloquia he carries further his investigation of the liberal arts and knowledge of God. Augustine does not think he would be satisfied under any circumstances to know God only as well as he knows the figures of Geometry. One cannot hold that the knowledge is the same, for in comparison with knowledge of God, geometry is nothing. "Reason," nevertheless, counters this position by suggesting that although the objects of knowledge may differ, the manner of knowing may be similar. Concluding this particular matter Augustine says, "As much as the heaven differs from the earth so much does the intelligible majesty of God differ from those true and certain proofs of the disciplines."[5] Although this statement may be true, the things of that nature have their place, for "Reason" maintains that as the eyes of some must be trained by the progression from objects which can be seen only in another light on up to those which shine themselves, even so the mind must be trained before it can behold that certain ineffable and incomprehensible light of minds.[6]

The whole point of De Musica is that through a study of number and order in the arts one can progressively work past the bodily senses until one comes to the abiding place which is foreign to all body.[7] These arts play a part, but they must be abandoned before one can know God. The soul is really seeking the eternal which is not found in the changing beauty of the world. In connection with this idea one may consider De Magistro which holds that signs are not knowledge but simply indicators which point beyond themselves to that which one is to know.

The danger of coming to a knowledge of God based on a use of sense impressions is described in De Vera Religione.[8] When one uses the objects of the world in order to arrive at God, he often does not approach Him at all. He becomes involved with the corporeal, and instead of rising above it he only imagines it greatly extended. This result is not unusual, for any of the corporeal things thought by man to be good can be extended without limitation by the process of cogitation. It is easy enough to execrate the flesh, but it is difficult not to think carnally. On the other hand, visible things are not without their value. However, instead of dwelling on them in vain curiosity one should take steps toward things immortal.[9] The primary object of consideration is not the inanimate substance

but the living nature by which it is sensed. Living nature is above the body. Above the senses of the body which behold is the reason. Corporeal evidences of nature are recognized as only one step in a long stair leading to knowledge of God. The above points are stated more sharply in De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus when he asks why even those who study the heavens apart from the senses, like the mathematicians, have, in their penetration, failed to come upon the Lord of the heavens.[10]

The order in the liberal arts and elsewhere which is beheld by the senses Augustine does not reject entirely as a means leading to knowledge of God.[11] On the other hand, knowledge of order is not an end in itself. It should serve only as a means of coming to something higher. To know nature through the senses is never to be equated with knowing God.

Man can by his own act know God through a second means, that is reason. Although Augustine finds the liberal arts and sensual knowledge insufficient for knowing God, he assigns a more important role to reason in man. Trygetius, in Contra Academicos, puts forth the opinion that although the intellect rarely reaches God, the senses never touch Him.[12] Moreover, though the author admits the place of the authority of Christ, he insists upon using his reason so that he may not only believe but also know.[13] Nor does he hesitate to use his reasoning powers in a study of the Platonists. De Ordine, while also exhibiting his views on authority, shows that he is in favor of using his reason in true philosophy, for the believes it leads to the first principle (principium sine principio).[14] He admits that though authority is first in the point of time and is safest for the multitude, it does not exclude reason's being the first to be desired by the erudite. Not by faith alone but also by trustworthy reason is the human soul led into the perfect life.[15] Indeed, it is God who has given to man such a prizing of the truth.

In Soliloquia Augustine and "Reason" agree that the "seeing" function of the soul, which is reason, can know God when it looks rightly. First it is necessary for the soul to be healed by faith, hope, and love. Then it may look rightly; the end of which looking is the vision of God (visio Dei). This is perfect virtue, reason coming to its end (ratio perveniens ad finem suum), which is the happy life.[16] De Musica uses reason for the purpose of separating the reader from the things of sense so that he might turn to the love of immutable truth. It is, then, used as a means to knowing God.

From the Roman period came some of the most important passages for understanding Augustine's use of reason in knowing God. Writing on the morals of the Catholic Church, he does not attempt to give a rational proof for the existence of God, since even the Manicheans already beleive in it.[17] Moreover, he implies that reason alone is

not sufficient in knowing God. It may lead to a knowledge that one needs help in knowing God; however, when it comes directly to knowing things divine, reason falters. Being blinded by the very brightness of the object it seeks, it returns to darkness.[18] Any knowledge of God must be in terms of the intellect, though the human mind is not of the same nature as God. Again in De Quantitate Animae he gives an opinion on authority and reason. The advantage of authority without further question is that in so doing one has a ready answer. If his friend Evodius wishes that, then Augustine would not prevent him. On the other hand if he wishes to use reason correctly and not as the masses who fall into all sorts of opinions, he must make slow progress. Accurate use of reason means exploring all the byways and eliminating any sign of falsehood.[19]

Augustine uses reason to "prove" the existence of God. In the second book of his work on free will one finds the passages which come as close to constructing "proofs" for the existence of God as Augustine ever does in his early period. Besides his "proof" by the authority of Scriptures, he has at least two recognizable proofs established by the exercise of human reason.[20] The first proof by reason is far from compact since it extends over several chapters and sections. When it is reconstructed in essential steps it may seem quite simple. As in De Beata Vita he establishes the certainty of man's knowing that he doubts. From this point, three statements are made: Man exists. He lives. He has intelligence. Since these statements are arranged in ascending order, reason becomes the highest factor in the soul of man, who is the highest in the created universe. The only thing superior to the mind of man is Truth. Unless there is something higher than Truth, Truth is God.[21] Following closely after this discussion one finds an unpolished and modest "proof" from the order of nature. All existing things have a form and beauty. These forms indicate that the things were created. Since man also bears form and beauty he is not the creator. The creator is, then above man. That above man must be God.[22] These are the clearest and most complete examples Augustine gives in his early writings of his belief that man, by initiating a use of his reasoning powers, can know God.

The African writings also indicate a great respect for reason in knowing things divine. Evidence is found in Augustine's allegorical exposition of Genesis. In the second chapter of that book he finds the dream of Adam to be an indication that higher things are seen through a vision in the inner intellect rather than through the bodily senses.[23] Indeed, before his fall man lived in the presence of God by the light of inner reason, but after his sin, as is indicated by the darkness of evening in the garden of pleasure, the light of inner reason deserted man.[24] His book De Magistro also stresses the superiority of reason and interior truth.

Even in using authority Augustine finds that man must utilize the power of reason. Reason has to decide which authority to obey.

Moreover, reason does lead through to intelligence and cognition.[25] Over the reason of a pure soul (rationi purgatioris animae) which is able to come through to truth, there is no human authority. Yet, the emphasis is on the pure soul which is certainly without pride in its reasoning.[26] Just as God is not subject to the bodily senses, so He is even above the mind.[27] After all, reason does not manufacture (facit) truth; it discovers (invenit)it.[28] Reason, then, is above the senses, but it must recognize its limitations in the presence of God.

Man's efforts in philosophy Augustine does not dispise. He believes in De Ordine that the admonition in Colossians 2:8 is not aimed at all philosophy but only the philosophy of this world.[29] Philosophy sends out reason and compels men not to reject the mysteries but to understand them as far as that is possible. True, genuine philosophy has no other business than to teach what one should think of the principle of all things.[30] It is concerned with the questions of God and of the Soul. However, Augustine is not willing to accept the witness of philosophers as an authority for knowledge of God. He is not quite willing to know God only as He was known by Plato and Plotinus, for the way he views the situation, even if what they said is true it does not necessarily follow that they knew them.[31] Although he is eager to use reason and philosophy to understand or know God, he is not willing to accept philosophers' words as final authority.

In this period Augustine maintains throughout his writings a confidence in man's efforts to come to a knowledge of God. The senses perceive form and order which at least lead questioning man from the changes of time to things more abiding. However, they are only imperfect tools which are to be utilized carefully, and only within limits. He is willing to put more reliance upon man's reason. In lower stages it is able to take over where the senses leave off, and in geometry, mathematics, and music it can detect a higher and more permanent form of order and beauty. He welcomes its use in philosophy, the function of which is to deal with God as well as the soul.[32] He is also aware that the reason has weaknesses. Especially in fallen man is reason likely to stray into error, for in this state it is not prepared for the bright light of that which it seeks. Knowledge of God can come only to a soul which has progressed to purity, which has the virtues of faith, hope, and love.[33] Reason is to be prepared for contemplation of the divine, which is the highest form of knowing God.

For Augustine the being of God is assumed from the beginning of the period under study. He is not one of those systematic thinkers who must move very slowly, limiting himself to the points he has established by original investigation and reasoning. However. he is not entirely adverse to giving a rational structure to the belief.[34] Thus one has Augustine's rational account for his belief in God's being.[35] Although it is not a bad argument, it does perhaps show

vulnerability at the points indicated by Roberts.[36] One must recognize that the above arguments are only two among several others Augustine uses. Reason may establish that God is and in a very limited way what He is, but Augustine does not make reason the major source of man's knowledge of God.

Although Augustine does not exhibit a thoroughgoing rationalism, he does not wish to dispense with reason. It is the highest function of man, and what he knows comes to him through the strengths and weaknesses of that capacity. Unlike Kierkegaard of more recent times, Augustine never declares reason superfluous or a stumbling block in knowing God.[37] In his assertions in favor of reason and the efforts of man, Augustine is fighting a crippling skepticism rather than the radical results of rampant Hegelianism.

Augustine maintains a healthy respect for man's ability to search for God and, in some measure, come to a knowledge of Him. He recognizes in all of man's intellectual activities certain signs which point toward God. Man is able to see the signs and to use them in his search for God. Human reason is capable of understanding some things about the divine; indeed, it is the gate through which all knowledge of God must enter. At the same time, Augustine is aware of human limitations. The evidence that the arts and the senses can give of God is definitely limited. Even human reason cannot begin to comprehend the complexity of the Eternal. Thus, while Augustine rightly defends human ability, he declares that it is dependent upon action of the Godhead in self-revelation. God's natural gifts to every man need to be supplemented by means from another dimension.

2. God's Search for Man

For Augustine there are two major divisions of how man might know things of importance: Authority and Reason. The latter approach has been sketched above. Under "Reason" one may rightly include most of the efforts taken by man to know God. On the other hand, Authority represents that which is given to man; it is not directly the product of his own reasoning or other endeavors. To contemporary thinkers it may seem that Authority and Reason are mutually exclusive. However, no such dichotomy exists in th mind of Augustine. The use of Aughority and Reason is not an either/or proposition.

The statement which gives Augustine's view of the relationship of Authority and Reason for the whole period under study here is that passage oft cited in Contra Academicos.[38] In that disputation Augustine believes he ahs gained some defense against the arguments of the Academics. Furthermore, he believes man comes to knowledge by a two-sided thrust, one side being authority and the other reason. The most powerful authority, as far as he is concerned, is that of

Christ; it is to rule over his whole life. He is not content only to believe, for he is eager to come to a rational understanding of his beliefs. Reason is a complement for even the highest authority, since authority is to be rationally understood. They are at each other's service in leading man to truth.

The relationship Augustine conceives between Authority and Reason is clarified by his advice to his students in De Ordine.[39] He makes a distinction between chronological priority and priority in value, assigning authority to preference in the point of time and reason to preference in terms of value. Authority, he admits, is undoubtedly better for an uneducated multitude, but he maintains that reason is more appropriate for the erudite. Chronologically, however, all who wish to come to great truths are not learned in them, so they need the guidance of authority. When they are oriented to the new surroundings, they may begin using reason to gain a rational interpretation. Returning to authority, he distinguishes two kinds. While there are authorities human and divine, he readily gives priority to the divine.[40]

Augustine's twofold approach to truth continues in his late work of the period under study. In De vera Religione he sees authority as a means of preparing man for the use of reason, while reason in turn leads to understanding.[41] Reason is not absent even in the early stages of action, for it is always necessary to choose which authority one will follow. Truth, however, is the highest authority to which all else must be subjugated.

With the examination of the above passages one can form a picture of Augustine's whole approach to knowledge in his early days of writing. Authority is a means of gaining information and can serve as a rule for those incapable of individual rational comprehension, but reason is present even in choosing authority and leads to an understanding and a knowledge of those truths first received by authority.[42] For a summary one can hardly do better than to quote the words of O'Meara who says, "There is plenty of evidence to show that he believed: (1) that authority could dispense altogether with reason; (2) that authority aided by reason was more desirable than authority alone; (3) that reason depended on some authority so that it might begin to operate; and (4) that reason could arrive at an understanding of everything taught by authority."[43]

Augustine's way of relating authority to reason, it seems to the present writer, is one of his lasting contributions to Christian theology. Augustine pictures a dynamic relationship; it may not be entirely wrong to say that he conceives a kind of dialectical relationship. Individual reason in its beginning to understand the Christian religion can advance much more rapidly with the aid of authority. Yet, authority should be based upon reason and should come to the individual through his reason. In turn, the individual uses reason to investigate authority. Through this interaction reason advances and authority becomes more adequate to guide reason.

In the history of Christianity it is evident that a failure to maintain a tension between those two poles leads to serious consequences. An overemphasis upon authority stifles individual intellectual growth, excludes the liberating action of the Spirit, and leads to institutional decay and individual rebellion. An overemphasis upon reason leads to a despising of those traditions which are the identyfying points of Christianity, results in individual isolation instead of social communion, and renders a unified view of Christian thought and experience impossible. Christians in the twentieth century would do well to understand and follow Augustine's balance between authority and reason.

Augustine finds three main sources of Authority. They can be distinguished, though they are not mutually exclusive. The first source of divine authority is the Church. Although the Church will be discussed more fully in a later section, from passages already examined since the opening of this dissertation some conclusions may be drawn. It was in the Church of Ambrose that Augustine had been moved by the doctrines of Catholic Christianity, and it was that institution with all its manifold resources for the aid of man to which he looked for guidance in knowing God. His submission was to the Christ of the Holy Scriptures expounded by the bishop before the congregation of worshippers within the walls of a Church erected to His glory. As has been seen, there were other means, but he did not conceive that rightly used there could be any conflict between them and the Catholic Church. In a day when heretics made their own canons and manuscripts of corrupt nature circulated widely, it need not have been a rash or isolated incident when he said in a later period that he would not believe the gospels except for their support by the authority of the Catholic Church.[44] Historically he did come to believe through that authority. And in that age it was a good defense. To interpret the fourth century Church and place of Scriptures almost entirely in terms of sixteenth century conflicts may very likely lead to a misunderstanding of Augustine's position.

In these early years Augustine gives no evidence that he is aware of the possibility of the Church's corruption as an institution to the point where it could fail to serve as one of the highest authorities on Christian faith and practice. He does not conceive that the Church as an institution could possibly be in conflict with the authority of Christ which he has taken as ultimate. He has little reason to think of such a state in the Catholic Church. It is only in later centuries after the height of the institutional Church's power, that some of its members come to demand a major reform in order to bring its practices into line with the authority of Christ.

The second source of divine Authority is the Scriptures.

It will be remembered that the preaching of Ambrose led Augustine to a respect for the Scriptures, and in a limited way, to a study of their content. On this source the preaching and teaching of the Catholic Church were based. There was no question of Scriptures or Church for Augustine, for the two went together. For him the Scriptures were an important source to be used in coming to a knowledge of God. His understanding of them may well be discussed at this point.

One of the greatest questions in Augustine's use of Scriptures for knowledge of God is his ability to utilize the original languages of the two testaments. His knowledge of Hebrew was for all practical purposes non-existent.[45] One sometimes finds a reference to Hebrew words, but they seem to come to him from other people.[46] From his opposition to Jerome's translating directly from the Hebrew it is seen that at that late date in his life he had no high opinion of Hebrew manuscripts.[47] Perhaps he thought it was not absolutely necessary, since the Septuagint, he maintained, was produced by seventy scholars working separately and yet agreeing on all points.[48] It was sufficient for him to check the Latin by the Greek.

There is also some doubt about Augustine's knowledge of Greek. According to the Confessiones he was exposed to Greek language in school but had a strong dislike for it. By the time he wrote the early dialogues he at least had a knowledge of a few Greek words and of Latin words which were almost transliterations of Greek. In the De Trinitate he admitted that he did not know the Greek works on that important subject. With this evidence some scholars are ready to conclude that Augustine knew extremely little Greek.[49]

On the other hand, there are those who cite Greek words Augustine used around 400 A. D. and after and conclude that his knowledge of Greek was more than superficial.[50] Moreover, they think he read Latin translations by choice ratehr than by necessity.

Between the above extremes there are, of course, some median positions. Marrou, pointing to the work of E. Angus, holds that upon evidence in Augustine's works he had a limited knowledge of Biblical Greek, a very slight knowledge of Patristic Greek, and no working knowledge of Classical Greek.[51] This evaluating of degrees of knowledge with type of Greek seems to fit the facts better than a blanket statement for or against high proficiency. However, the present writer prefers to consider with it the theory of Courcelle who maintains that Augustine's knowledge of that language improved in years of controversy.[52] Although he had some background in Greek language he was not really called upon to employ it until his exegesis depended upon it. It is very likely that as he worked as a bishop his knowledge improved. When he was later called upon to defend his views against those whom he considered as heretics it is not improbable that he turned to Greek documents and improved his knowledge of the language as he used it.

Keeping several theories in mind, one sees that the question, "Did Augustine know Greek?" is much too general. The answer depends upon what standard one uses, what type of Greek is meant, and what period is under discussion. In general one may say that Augustine knew some Greek but that it was always a foreign language which he had not mastered. In the period under discussion in the present work there is little evidence for supposing he made much use of Greek, even in the limits of checking his few Scripture quotations, for in the Retractationes he has to correct inaccurate quotations which, he explains, were due to his using faulty manuscripts.[53] With this language ability Augustine approached the Scriptures.

Augustine had a particular way of interpreting the Scriptures. He had despised the Scriptures until he heard the exegesis of Ambrose who used the allegorical method of interpretation.[54] Allegorical interpretation had long been in use. Greek philosophers used it to reconcile the older myths of the gods with their particular philosophies, as Grant has shown. Wolfson has mentioned that rabbis used non-literal interpretations to supplement or supplant the literal. St. Paul and Philo both employed allegory. Ellis thinks that St. Paul's use was more Alexandrine than Palestinian but that it was different from Philo's use. Philo's use, says Kennedy, had as its aim showing "the universal validity of Jewish religion enshrined in the Pentateuch." Clement and Origen are prime examples of Christians using allegory to demonstrate the harmony of the Scriptures and ancient philosophy.[55] It is not strange, then, that Augustine used a method which had proved helpful in reconciling Scriptures and philosophy, a method which had made the Scriptures appear to him as equal to the best philosophy.[56]

Augustine maintained that there are two ways of interpreting the Scriptures; the historical, in which the facts of history are related and prophetic, in which things of the future are pronounced.[57] But here one may turn directly to the writings of the period under study in this paper.

Scriptures represent divine authority. In De Beata Vita he accepts, on divine authority, the Son of God as none other than the Wisdom of God.[58] Since this quote is from I Corinthians 1:24, it is clear that the Scriptures bear for him the weight of divine authority.

How Augustine thinks the Scriptures should be interpreted is seen in his work in Genesis against the Manicheans. The dominion over the beasts of Genesis 1:28 should not be interpreted in any carnal sense; the same is true of 2:28. It is an error to try to interpret the resting on the seventh day in a literal, carnal manner. Allegory is only a veil which hides the truth and when the passage is interpreted in the allegorical way the veil is lifted.[59] However, one may have some doubts about Augustine's use of allegory. For example, he has the seven days in Genesis referring to the seven ages of the world, but since the ages come out unequal he has to make further

explanations. Applied to the life of man, the first two ages may signify his infancy and childhood, the periods ruled by the five senses. The other periods are of fourteen generations instead of ten, that of adolescence being when the senses are extended to reason. This step leads to seven, which doubled, because there are two sexes, gives fourteen. The final day in man's life is unnumbered since its length is unknown.[60] If one finds this explanation of Augustine's unsatisfactory, in section I, xxv, 43 he gives an alternative; six days may also refer to the six days in good works and in religious life.

Scriptures, Augustine says, may be interpreted in two ways. The way according to history gives a report of deeds while that according to prophecy announces the future. Both means have been given the sanction of the apostles, and to continue always in a strictly carnal sense leads to blasphemy.[61] In addition to these means there is an example of Augustine's finding New Testament figures in the Old Testament, for he makes Adam represent Christ and Eve represent the Church. The examples of his interpretation could be multiplied at length, but the above is a sufficient sample. Augustine can, then, expound Scriptures either according to the letter or according to the spirit.

Augustine's view of Scripture is seen in two dialogues completed in Africa. He argues with Evodius that if they accept the authority of the Scriptures as to the existence of God they should also accept them in regards to the free will.[62] It seems, too, that one should consider his general views in De Magistro as they would apply to Scriptures. There the word itself is not the knowledge, for the word is a sign which points beyond itself. It depends upon whether the observer has in his mind and turns inward to seek the truth to which the word points. Literalism in a very narrow sense is rather ruled out. Presumably the words of Scriptures should drive one inward to seek truth within himself.[63]

De Vera Religione adds more information on Augustine's view of Scriptures. Unlike the Manicheans, he refuses to divide the Old and the New Testaments, for he maintains that they do not speak about two different Gods. According to him, Providence is always the same but presents itself to creatures in various ways, depending upon which way is most beneficial to them at that particular time.[64] But immediately before his ordination as a Presbyter Augustine still has questions about Scriptures and their interpretation. He is not sure what part is exact history and whether it should be allegorized in the same way as speeches. What is the solution for the translation of Scriptures into various languages? How are the characteristics attributed to God to be interpreted when they are crude and detestable even in mortal men? How should one handle the anthropomorphisms? These things Augustine pushes aside in his writing to Romanianus and insists upon diligent study of the Scriptures.[65]

He explains in the diverse questions that exposition of Scriptures is not entirely arbitrary, for it should be done according to the faith. Moreover, allegorical exposition should not lead to the conclusion that one doubts the historicity of events described.[66] If man by exerting his natural capacities can know something of God, he can know more by means of divine authority seen in the Holy Scriptures. But the Scriptures are not God.

Augustine's view of the Scriptures has much to commend it. In the first place, he recognizes the need for man to have a source outside of the narrow confines of his own interests to guide him in his understanding of God. He slowly recognizes the Scriptures as a means of understanding the nature and work of God to which senses and reason can only point as existing. He is to be commended, too, for being aware that in addition to records of history which can be interpreted almost according to the letter, the Scriptures contain many figures of speech and stories which are symbolic.

Much about Augustine's view of the Scriptures raises problems not only for himself but also for later generations. He indicates that he is not sure which parts are literal and which parts should be interpreted figuratively. Modern Biblical scholars can sympathize with him at that point. But the weakness in his approach is that he can interpret the same passage both literally and allegorically and hold both views at the same time. When he interprets the early chapters of Genesis historically and makes that interpretation a bulwark for defending a doctrine of original sin, he establishes a real difficulty for modern theologians who hold to the mythological nature of those chapters and accept an idea of evolution which springs from Darwin's theory. Can they accept "orthodox" doctrine which rests upon such an interpretation of Scripture? His allegorical interpretation permits several different things to be signified by each passage. One is, then, likely to find in the signs that which best fits his own system of philosophy or theology. Augustine is not satisfied with his knowledge of Scriptures in the days before his ordination. In later years he often has to back down before the superior knowledge of Jerome. It is not unusual, then, for modern scholars to find his views inadequate or misleading.

The third source of divine authority, in addition to Church and Scriptures, is action of the Godhead. Love, inspired by the Holy Spirit, leads to the Son, the Wisdom of God, by which the Father is known.[67] Besides his teaching on the Father of Wisdom,[68] Christ's whole life on earth as man was an education in morals, showing the nature of Man and of God.[69] In addition to being the Wisdom and Virtue of God He is consubstantial with the Father. Then through the Holy Spirit, and especially Christ, one has knowledge of God.

Many passages apply to action of the Godhead undistinguished as persons of the Trinity. The passage of De Beata Vita on the inner

light declares that there is an urging within man which leads him to remember and to seek God. The author then identifies this urge to seek the divine as action on the part of God Himself.[70] Without His help none is wise and happy. Furthermore, Augustine's own resolve to search for truth is none other than a gift of God through the prayers of his mother.[71] The advice of "Reason" to the young convert is that he should not trust his own devices but commit himself to God who will lift him to Himself, letting only that which is for his benefit come to the one so lifted.[72] In his exposition of Genesis he maintains that man works in the dryness of sin, needing the succour of God which falls as rain from the clouds.[73] Besides his emphasis on man's duty and other means of knowing God, Augustine does not overlook His Gracious Presence to man, drawing him to Himself.

Even in his early period Augustine is aware of the necessity for God's direct aid in making Himself known to man. It is to Augustine's credit that his appreciation for the institutional side of the Catholic Church and his reliance upon the Scriptures do not obscure his belief that man is always dependent upon the direct action of the Godhead to lead him to Truth. As the Confessiones show, his appreciation for the direct action of God in making Himself known increases along with his greater understanding of the Church and of the Scriptures.

In order to benefit fully from the source of divine authority, Augustine thinks, man must undergo a change. Faith accompanies reason on the way to the highest life.[74] He implies in a discussion that God is more likely to reward the prayer of those who live rightly.[75] Moreover, he indicates in the Soliloquia that without faith, hope, and love there is no soul made whole in order that it may see God.[76] The soul must overcome its longing for the things of the sense world before it can see that which it desires to behold. In De Libero Arbitrio Augustine and Evodius take for themselves the teaching in Isaiah 7:9 that unless one believes he cannot understand. This idea is clarified in a later section, but the end of belief is that one should know.[77] One first has faith that God is, then approaches with knowledge. In De Vera Religione it is the purified soul which has no authority over its reason. Furthermore, such a soul has no curse of pride, for that characteristic does not lead to truth. Mental strength of the kind needed for contemplating the eternal is acquired when one praises God, trusting in faith, waiting in hope, and seeking in love.[78] Number twelve of the diverse questions suggests that although God is present everywhere, one cannot see Him unless he has a pure soul.[79]

Augustine's own experience leads him to believe that only as one grows in faith and commitment can one grow in knowledge of God. Detached observation, reason, or submission to authority is not enough to lead to a full knowledge of God. Each insight to the divine that man acts upon leads him to a higher plane. There his

horizons are broadened and he finds a new opportunity for action. The process must be sustained throughout man's life if he would continue to grow in his understanding of God. This is one of those real spiritual insights which is parallel to that of the Apostle Paul, who was not content with what he had attained but pressed on to perfection of knowledge.

In summary of Augustine's theory of how Man knows God, it may be said that he is probably not conscious of the system as it has been divided in the above sections. However, he includes several different elements constantly. He never equates sensual knowledge with the knowledge of God Himself. Moreover, even such an excellent faculty as reason has its limitations. He does maintain that man is given help beyond himself. The Holy Scriptures are one form of divine authority to be used by man to be led to truth, although Man may have some difficulty in correctly interpreting them. They do not, however, go contrary to correct reasoning. Besides, there is the actual presence of the Godhead working upon man and helping him thirst for, work toward, and arrive at knowledge of God. Man is not passive in the process, for he must actually change, become purified, and be strengthened in order to behold the truth which he seeks. This is man in the world, encountering God.

The greatest strength of Augustine's view on how man in the world comes to a knowledge of God is its balance and sense of proportion. Man's ability is balanced by dependence upon God's action. The evidence of the senses must be supplemented by the exercise of reason. Human reason must be aided and tested by authority. The institutional Church, while in part producing and preserving the Scriptures, is guided and judged by the Scriptures. The objective sides of authority are enlivened and tested by direct, divine action to the individual. The action of the Godhead to make itself known must be accompanied by man's response in commitment. Augustine's balanced view has not been surpassed and has seldom been equaled by major philosophers or theologians coming after him.

3. Man's Understanding of His World

The world in which man lives is in relationship to God. Reasoning man comes to a knowledge of God. In return, coming to a knowledge of God leads him to an understanding of the world in which he lives. The most striking thing about Augustine's view of the world is that the world is under the heavy sway of time, always changing, coming into existence and departing from the form in which it has been known. The world is opposed to the numbers of the rational mind, the truth above it, or the Eternal which he identifies as God. But his views may be seen more exactly in a study of his own writings.

Augustine declares that the world has been created by God. Since his first important world view was based upon the Manichean dualism it is not surprising that one finds his interpretation after his conversion set forth mainly in the works aimed at that group. Not only do they give a picture of Augustine's new interpretation, but also they present his understanding of Manichean doctrine. He first insists that the world, including heaven and earth, is a product of only one God rather than two, for there are not two Gods of good and evil or of Old and New Testaments.[80] This God, as Father, was accompanied at the creation of the world by his Son is referred to in Wisdom 9:9 as Wisdom.[81] The Catholic Church, whose doctrine Augustine accepts, recognizes God as the Author of all nature and substance (naturarum atque substantiarum). Yet, he warns the Manicheans, this statement does not mean that He is the author of evil (non esse Deum auctori mali), for how can the author of being also be the author of non-being (non esse)? Since he denies that evil is a substance, it follows that evil was not created by God.[82]

There is only one good in itself, which is God, the Author of being. Any other good is so only by participation, and, since it is mutable, it can fall away at any time.[83] One does not expect to find that the things produced by a workman are as good as he is; even so, the works produced by God are not found to be as good as He. The world, then, is of a created substance (factam substantiam) which is subject to corruption.[84] This statement does not mean that God creates evilness; on the contrary, He makes (facio)the good, but when evil occurs He shapes (condo) it, bringing it back from non-being (non esse) to being (esse).[85] This attack is pointed directly at the Manicheans who conceive of a good god contained as a prisoner in the evil world, though daily passing from earth to heaven and giving fertility to plants and other things.[86]

The articles of faith which are stated in De Libero Arbitrio identify the creator of all things with God. He made all things out of nothing without any help. Every good thing, whether great or small, comes from Him, and He is to be praised for the lesser as well as for the greater goods.[87] No matter where one looks in world, one owes praise to the Creator.[88] To be even a lesser good means that a thing must first be good. Everything which has being is either God or from God; everything which is good is either God of from Him.[89] Even when one condemns the fault in a creature, he praises its Creator.[90]

In the defense of Genesis one sees clearly how Augustine conceives of the beginning of the world. Indeed, Genesis poses problems of the world which are to call him to a fresh study time and again. His difficulty seems to lie not only in defending the book against the Manicheans, but, in addition, in reconciling differences between Hebrew and Greek cosmology. Starting with the opening verses of chapter one he explains the in principio fecit Deus coelum et terram. Rebuking the Manicheans for their question, "What

was God doing before He created?" he gives two explanations. His first attempt, saying that the world was not made in time but in Christ according to John 1:1ff, is hardly to the point of discussion. Perhaps more acceptable is his argument that before the beginning of time there was no time at all. There was no time when God was not Creator, for God made time.[91] Thus, creation is temporal while God is eternal. The position that time and the world were created together is to be very important.[92] Both are only relative instead of eternal. Although he does not work out his concept of time in this passage as he comes to do in later works, one sees the germ of Augustine's break with a Platonist idea of history and the foundation upon which he can build a concept which might be called more distinctively Christian.[93]

Augustine believes that the world, as a product of God, is good. God made all things good. The world was not taken from Himself, that is begotten, so that it might be considered equal to Him. On the contrary, it was made from nothing so that it could not be considered equal to God the Father, nor to His Son through Whom all things were made.[94] If one is puzzled as to why the world exists, there is no answer more simple or fundamental than God willed the world to exist. The Manicheans, by asking how God was able to make the earth if it was invisible and not composed (invisibilis and incomposita), elicit from the author the explanation that God first made the world and then formed it. When they try to maintain their dualism by contending that the darkness is not material but a name applied to the absence of light. Like evil, darkness is not (tenebrae nihil sunt).[95]

Augustine denies, further, that the water contained the Spirit of God, for this also is to speak in corporeal terms.[96] Moreover, since the Scriptures do not actually say that God made the water, whence did it come? To this question Augustine replies that under the names "heaven and earth" Genesis includes all that God created and later formed. This is another doctrine which Augustine is to build upon much later.[97] The creation took place all at once; the forming of individual creatures that seem to come and go, being made according to eternal forms, develop in ensuing times from that potential.[98] Augustine continues by saying that the material was unformed, which the Greeks, he believes, called chaos.[99] It is altogether proper, he thinks, to speak of it as having been made out of nothing. Ordinary tradesmen can readily make things if they have the material, but God created the material which He later formed. It is this unformed material (informis materia)made by God from nothing that is referred to under coelum et terra. This material was to become the heaven and earth as it is now known.[100] "Heaven," "earth," "darkness," and "abyss" are names applied to the unformed material from which God formed the world.[101]

As one goes deeper into Augustine's wrestling with Genesis

it is seen that he is, perhaps, more interested in defeating Manichean attacks than in presenting his own views of the world. But one also realizes that his exposition reveals something of his doctrinal position at the time as well as the foundations he lays for his future formulations. To return to their trifling questions, the Manicheans contend that et vidit Deus lucem quia bona est means that God did not know light until that moment. If such were the case, Augustine maneuvers, how would He, never having seen light, judge it to be good?[102] Not to be outdone, they pick up the verse which says God called the light day and the dark night, and ask what language God spoke. Augustine maintains that these verses do not imply that God actually spoke in any sort of human language such as Hebrew or Greek. He made these things to be called (vocari fecit) by each one in his own language.[103] When it is said in Genesis that the water was brought together in one place, one is to understand that visible water, that below the firmament is meant, for above is the invisible and unformed.

The above questions on the goodness of the world are unusually simple when they are compared to some which follow. Augustine has much difficulty, due to his background in both Manichean thought and Neoplatonism, in affirming the goodness of material things. His enemies have found a soft spot when they ask how anyone can call useless, spiney growth and unfruitful trees good. Following a different line here from that he usually takes in proclaiming that everything is good in so far as it exists, he grants the Manicheans part of their point--some things on earh are accursed.[104] Nevertheless, he does defend Genesis by saying that the accursed form was not the state of original creation. As that book proclaims, all things were created good, but the earth has been cursed as a result of man's sin. Thus, from the sin of man one finds many horrid and unfruitful things; "the earth shall be cursed to you." He does not wish to interpret the passage as punishment to senseless creatures but as a means of reminding man of his sin in order that he might turn from it.[105]

Although Augustine may well be accused of escaping some problems of the world's goodness through his use of allegory, let it be said that he remains with a literal interpretation under some rather heavy fire. When the Manicheans ask how God could possibly measure the days if the sun and moon were not created until the fourth day, the expositor finds an explanation in terms of men who would be in a cave hidden from the sun and yet would judge according to the time it would take the sun to revolve from east to west.[106] The Scriptures have a custom of transfering words for human things to things divine.

Augustine changes his pattern somewhat in his reply to the question of why God made so many pernicious animals. He does not readily admit that they are useless in the present world. On the contrary, he suggests that they may only appear that way to those

who do not understand their proper use. To one who is uninstructed, many of the tools in the artisan's shop would appear useless. But the artisan knows their use and they are valuable for his purposes. Although the utility of some things is hidden from mankind, the Creator knows their use for His purpose.[107] Augustine admits that he is one of those who do not understand why mice, frogs, and other such animals were created, yet he knows that each is good after its own kind with measure, order and number. The least one can understand is that when these creatures seem offensive to him they drive him from this life to a better one. Useful animals should be utilized while others are avoided, for since God has ordered all things well there is beauty even in these harmful animals.[108]

When the Manicheans complain that the creation account in Genesis is full of anthropomorphisms, Augustine readily agrees. He rather bases his argument upon their acceptance of the New Testament. Even in that group of writings there are to be found human figures of speech in the description of things divine. As examples one might consider the figure of the Son sitting at the right hand of God or that of the earth as God's footstool (Matthew 5:34f). However, those who understand the spirit of the Scriptures do not insist upon interpreting these figures as bodily members; on the contrary, they are symbolic or expressive of spiritual powers. They are heretics who hold false interpretations.[109]

Once again Augustine maintains that all creation is good. Each thing of creation appeared before God with measure, number, and form of its constituted genus. God judged each to be good. But when all things of creation were viewed together they were not only good; they were very good. Although the expositor continues with another chapter, there is a tendency to repeat himself, which one who holds to a theory of verious documents interwoven into the Genesis account might readily explain. The reader is refreshed somewhat by the inclusion of more allegorical interpretation.

In his long work to Romanianus, De Vera Religione, Augustine declares that all things were made by God, the unchanging Trinity, through His supreme Wisdom.[110] He does not again say that He created them for the reason that He wished to; he argues that they were brought into existence out of nothing, for existence as such is good. The things which now exist were made by God, and those which do not exist now but which may exist receive their potential existence from Him.[111]

In the Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus there are a few references which supplement the material discussed above. When the convert was asked why God wished to create the world he replied that such a question seeks for an efficient cause. However, there is not efficient cause where God's free will is concerned.[112] Perhaps more important is his treatment of the "Ideas" of Plato.[113] He is not overly concerned that it was Plato who first used the term

or that he should apply that particular word. Considered in the Latin, one may apply formas or species. The Greek λογοι is not Ideas so much as rationes. However, the important point of the discussion is that all things are created good, created according to a plan contained in the mind of God. One is free to use any of the above forms in discussion, but it is more difficult to know the truth of the matter than to call the words. Another clue to his understanding of the Scriptural teachings of the world is seen in his interpretation of Genesis 6:7, "I repent of having made man."[114] This statement is not to be taken literally; it is, rather, another human expression being applied to things divine. When a feeble human mind sees something come into existence and then disappear, he is moved to say that God repents of having made it.

In summary, it is seen that Augustine understands the world as a good product of God. He makes it very clear that although the world is created by Him, it is in no way to be equated with Him. The world is created together with time and hangs under the sway of time. Opposed to this fact is the eternity of the Creator, not eternity in terms of time but of unchangeableness.[115] He is unchanging, but the world of man remains only so long as it remains in God. Besides his concept of time, Augustine differs from Plotinus in the reason for the origin of the world. Whereas that Platonist philosopher looks upon the world as an emanation from the three first principles, coming into being just as a result of their being what they are, Augustine insists that the world exists because God in freedom of choice willed it to exist.[116] Moreover, it is not generated of Himself but is created in a divine act out of nothing.

For Augustine, creation does not imply a fall. Like Plotinus he maintains that all is good which is; but the world is not less good simply because it has existence.[117] Each thing is to be admired according to its own form and order and accepted as useful to the plan of God, even if man does not understand it. The world, furthermore, is not an accident, for it was made according to eternal forms which are in the unchanging mind of God.[118] Nothing really new is created after the original act, for all things which have appeared since then or may come into being in the future were and are present in potentiality.

One sees two pictures which Augustine focuses, or tries to focus into one view. There is the philosophical outlook in which the world is hanging precariously between Being and non-being while there is the Scriptural view expressed in human forms of an artisan who has fashioned a product.[119] These together form the view of the world created for Augustine, although when he sees any conflict or necessity of choice between the Platonist and the Old Testament views he seems to dismiss the former.

Augustine is positive that the world exists only because it is ordered and sustained in every moment by the God who has created it. In the early dialogues of Cassiciacum Licentius asks who can deny that all things are ordered and administered by God.[120] The major question is whether evil is included in God's order. When Trigetius advances the opinion that it is impious to maintain that evil things are contained within the order of the world, Licentius counters with the idea that it is the very order of evils that they are not to be liked by God.[121] Augustine believes that there is an order which can lead to God. Moreover, he suggests that prostitutes and other forms of evil included within order serve to prevent greater evils.[122] Without such order in the world there would be no true or false arguments, music, geometry, astronomy, or numbers. Order in itself is entirely good. It was not the cause of evil, but when evil became a fact in man's world it was included in God's order. Augustine maintains that there naver has been or never will be anything without some form of order.[123]

From his prayer in the Soliloquia one sees that Augustine believes the stars, day and night, the return of the seasons, and the phases of the moon are all part of God's ordering of the created world.[124] In the discussion on the immortality of the soul he holds that a substance cannot exist as any particular thing apart from an ordered form by which the substance is what it is.[125] Moreover, upon careful investigation one discovers that ordered changeableness imitates that which is unchangeable.[126] Nothing can exist which is entirely opposed to the first and highest substance.[127] The temporal is always dependent for its existence upon the eternal.

When one thinks of treatises on order in this period, the De Musica must be included. The subject can hardly be considered as the world or creation in the usual sense, yet it is something which is neither man nor God but which comes to man in the world. In the first book there is the introduction to the presence of number in music and the magnificent order which it exhibits. It is hardly necessary at this point to represent the various books and chapters which discuss in detail the various types of syllables and feet, but in book six the results are given a more general application. Augustine maintains that even when man's works are evil the works of God are good. All of the harmony and order which he has mentioned in the previous books come from God.[128] Without Him the leaves do not fall, and by Him even the hairs of the head are numbered.[129]

Augustine's work on the freedom of the human will helps to clarify how his concepts of number and form apply to the created world. Through the numerical series Evodius finds extended a fixed and unchangeable law.[130] One may also think of Wisdom which orders all things through number, for this characteristic is given to even the smallest and the most remote things. Augustine is not able to give a full explanation of the relationship between

Wisdom and number, but he thinks it is evident that both are unchangeably true. Then he invites Evodius to behold the heaven, the earth, and the sea; all things that are in these or above them have their form because they all have number. Remove these numbers and things are nothing![131] Their entire being is dependent upon the one who also made number. However, these forms of individual objects are not entirely independent, for there is an eternal form by which existing things are ordered and prevented from slipping into nothing. This form itself is not contained in or diffused through the conditions of time and space, yet it is able to form and sustain those objects which do exist within non-eternal conditions.[132] No thing can form itself; the form must be given to it. As Psalm 102 indicates, although things in the world are in flux through ordered movement, the eternal which moves them remains the same. One who approaches wisdom through observing the created universe finds it meeting him in the way and rendering it more pleasant.[133] Everything which has existence has form and is sustained by it. Everything may move up or down the scale of being between God and nothing, but as long as a thing exists it has form which is good.[134]

In book three of De Libero Arbitrio Augustine maintains that the ordering of the universe is perfect. Although there are inferior creatures or some greater than others, the lesser help man to recognize the greatness of the superior. One should never wish the lesser goods to be removed or made equal to the greater. All together must be contemplated in the perfection of the universe.[135] Augustine is aware that one could take this argument to mean that sin, evil, and things of inferior quality should remain. This he denies, for he maintains that the creation was perfect before sin, but when sin became a fact it was necessary for the perfection of the universe that the sin be punished.[136] The earthly sphere is by no means incorruptible, yet in so far as it is possible it preserves the image of superior things (imaginem superiorum), and shows forth traces of higher things.[137] In other sections he continues to discuss order but he brings in other elements such as predestination. Since this book was finished after his ordination and there are no strong parallels in works known to be prior to his assuming ecclesiastical office it may be well to forgo a discussion of these passages in this historical reconstruction.

De Vera Religione gives the latest developments of Augustine's world view previous to his ordination. There is no life which is not from God, for He is the very fountain of life.[138] Nor is any life, as life, evil. It is evil (malum)only to the degree that it tends towards death (vergit ad mortam). Evil is not created, nor is there any being, as such, which is evil. A life which chooses to subjugate itself to a lower form of creation, submitting to that which God has created it to be superior, falls away and tends to nothingness. This choosing to fall away is the wickedness, not that the created body as such is nothing.[139] Matter cannot exist without

the sustaining of the eternal. God is this essence from which all exsitence is derived and is good. Death in the world is not to be considered from God. Death is a going to nothingness, which is the opposite of God, who is life. A thing is said to die as it tends less to be.[140]

That which is from God, that is generator, is the same as He is (genetum est idipsum est) because it is not made. But those things which are made (facta sunt), being created, are always dependent upon His good, the highest good or highest essence (id est summa essentia).[141] Even in the state of sin these things are not separated entirely from their essence, otherwise they would not be at all. In all such ordered things form and number are noticeable and lead to thoughts of things immortal.[142] On the other hand, one must always recognize the lower forms for what they are, always seeing them in the correct perspective, that is, in their right place in order. The fault with things is not so much what they are as what they are not. Although the unity may be incomplete, without it bodies would not be. To exist a body must have some unity, and to have unity it must derive it from the highest or supreme unity.[143]

The ordered world is good, but it may lead one away from God as well as to Him. Sin in man comes in his freely choosing to worship the creature rather than the Creator.[144] It is a failing to recognize the proper order of the created world. Augustine levels an attack at those who, rather than worship individual parts, worship the creation as a whole, thinking of all creation as some great God of which individual things are but parts.[145] Those who are led to such a worship clearly have not known the Author and Creator of the universe.[146]

When a comparison is made to nothing, everything which has existence is good.[147] The entire gradation in existence is judged pleasant by the principle of unity. This whole order exists through its dependence upon the eternal, for through the Father and the Son all things were made according to the form of unity.[148]

In summary, when Augustine observes the world he finds all governed by number and form.[149] This number and form is dependent upon highest Being by which all was created. Only when these created things abide in the eternal which bestowed the forms do they remain what they are. Were the forms to be removed from a creature it would cease to be. All creation is dependent upon the ordering and unity which comes from God. Although everything which exists is to be praised for its existence, not all things are equal on the scale of ordered being. The fault in some existing things lies in what they are not, and under the conditions of creation all things tend to nothing. Although the universe is full of order and glory, one is not to identify it as God; it is made, not generated, and is inferior to as well as dependent upon the Supreme Essence.

One sees that Augustine's view of the world in which man lives is composed of three major elements. The first influence is Manichaeism with its view of a god imprisoned in corrupt material. The world for them was a battleground of good and evil. Opposed to this view is the Neoplatonist view of the singularity and orderedness of all being. Then there is Christian teaching which is concentrated in the Prologue of the Gospel of John and in Genesis. In order to defeat the Manichean position Augustine counters it by defending the world view set forth in Genesis. While he expounds this book according to the letter, he does not hold to a strict literalism. He readily admits that the reality being indicated is inadequately described in the limitation of human forms of speech. But he intends to defend the essence of the Genesis view. Much of his interpretation of Genesis as well as independent passages on the order of being is, nevertheless, under strong Neoplatonist influence. However, as has been seen, his familiarity with Genesis and John results in his making some significant breaks with Neoplatonism. He repudiates emanation, the necessity of the world coming into existence, and the eternality of the world.[150] On the other hand, he defends the creation according to an eternal plan, the dependence of existence upon Highest Being, the absence of a positive evil, and the superiority of the eternal over the temporal.

Although Augustine proclaims that the world in which man finds himself is the creation out of nothing by act of Highest Being through Wisdom or the Son of God, he also maintains that this world as man knows it now is in a state of fall. It is good, made according to form and order, and sustained by divine action in time lest all things deteriorate into nothing. All things exist for a purpose known by the Creator though it may be hidden from knowing man.[151] Even the presence of the forms and order and the evidence of the eternal do not render the world a fit object for man's worship. Creation is under the sway of time, subject to coming and going according to the plan of the Eternal. To cling to these lesser beings as though they were eternal is a failure in man which upsets the proper order of creation and can only lead to his misery and tending toward nothing. The world is not to be worshipped in itself; its proper use leads man from material to form, from the temporal to the eternal, from evil to Good, from the created to the Creator, and from being to Being.

Augustine's view of the world is difficult to criticize. By the standards of the age in which he lives he gives a satisfactory world view. At the time of his ordination his concept is decidedly Christian. In contrast to the Neoplatonists he expounds a Hebrew-Christian idea of the origin of the world. Against the Manicheans he proposes a Neoplatonic-Christian view of the nature and origin of evil. Like that philosophy and those theologies he believes that the world is sustained in every moment by God. His view is to remain the predominant one in Christian theology down until the modern period.

The question which must be asked of Augustine's world view is one which must be asked of the views of all "orthodox" Christian theologians since Augustine. The question to be asked is one which has arisen since the renaissance. In light of the astounding discoveries in astronomy, biology, chemistry, physics and geology on the one hand and discoveries in textual and literary-historical criticism of Scriptures on the other, is the "orthodox" Christian world view adequate? Is this world view based on a religious myth of the creation and the fall which has, unfortunately, been regarded too long as an accurate history of theose actual events? Even those "liberal" Christian theologians who have undermined the main foundation of the "orthodox" Christian world view have often continued to hold that doctrine. For many other Christians the Genesis account describes in essence the true view of the world, and they have no difficulty in declaring Augustine's concept of the world adequate in outline even if it is not sufficient in detailed contents. The present writer is inclined to believe that the whole problem of a Christian world view deserves a bolder and more exacting study than it has yet received.

Augustine thinks of man living in the world and knowing God with whom both he and the world are in relationship. In Augustine, Man is aware of God enlightening him as an individual, but the words of Buber also apply:

> This man, as we recognize him in Augustine, in Pascal, in Kierkegaard, seeks a form of being which is not included in the world, that is, he seeks a divine form of being with which, solitary as he is, he can communicate; he stretches his hands out beyond the world to meet this form.[152]

Yet, in seeking God, man relies upon himself and his world. He approaches God with the reason which God has given to him. Brunner is correct in recognizing Augustine's trust of human reason, but in the period here under study Augustine is not as prone to remember reason's limitations as he is later in life.[153] Man approaches his world with reason, and there he finds signs which direct him towards God. Man also has the help of divine authority. For Augustine, reason and authority belong together in giving man a knowledge of God.[154] Even better knowledge of God comes through direct help of the Godhead.[155]

God is known through His world. The world was made by Him and is good. Augustine denies that there is any positive evil, for evil is nothing. This view, which is Plotinian, seems to be inadequate in considering minus qualities of value, as E. R. Dodds has pointed out.[156] However, Augustine thinks even things which appear evil to man are good. God sustains the world in every

moment, and without God the world would not continue.

Augustine's view of Man in his world is, in some ways, similar to mid-twentieth century philosophies and theologies. In trying to understand himself, man raises the question of God. In his encounter with his world he comes to a greater understanding of God and through that understanding to an understanding of his world. Augustine's view grows out of his own experience which is similar to that of man in "existentialist" philosophy. Man seeks to know himself, his existence, and his world. He tries to find or create meaning for his existence. Augustine's man, like Buber's man, is not satisfied simply to encounter the world or to speculate upon its origin and its destiny. He is not content with things which only point to a "first cause" or an "idea" of order. He always struggles to go beyond these signs to the One to whom they point, to the One through whom man can know himself and his potentialities, as well as his world and its relationship to him.

Differences are also found between Augustine and systems of twentieth century thought. The chief difference is, perhaps, that Augustine's man uses many different means to come to a knowledge of God whereas many modern systems neglect or exclude some possibilities. Augustine uses the rational while "existentialism" generally scorns it. He relies on the senses, nature, and arts, while a theologian like Karl Barth almost excludes them. He recognizes the value of the institutional church as a teaching authority, while many Protestants minimize it in favor of individual interpretation. He values the direct action of the Godhead upon man while some Protestants and Roman Catholics tend to exclude it to favor the institutional Church or the canonical Scriptures. He also accepts a view of Genesis which is not shared by several groups of Christian theologians. It is upon this point that the present writer finds Augustine more worthy of respect than of imitation.

Man comes to a knowledge of God through the world in which he lives. The next question is, "Who is the God man knows?"

Part II, B. The World

An Encounter Area of Man and God

Notes

[1] De Beata Vita, iii, 19, P. L. XXXII, 969. Sed nemo, inquit, potest pervinire ad Deum, nisi Deum quaesierit.

[2] Ibid. iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976.

[3] Soliloquia I, i, 3, P. L. XXXII, 871. Matthew 7;8; De Libero Arbitrio III, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1272-1273.

[4] De Ordine II, xvi, 44, P. L. XXXII, 1015, ...non jam credenda solum, verum etiam contemplanda, intelligenda atque retinenda.

[5] Soliloquia I, v, 11, P. L. XXXII, 875. ...adducorque ut assentiar quantum in suo genere a coelo terram, tantum ab intelligibili Dei majestate spectamina illa disciplinarum vera et certa differre.

[6] Ibid. I, xiii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 881-882.

[7] De Musica V, xiii, 28, P. L. XXXII, 1162.

[8] De Vera Religione xxi, 41, P. L. XXXIV, 139.

[9] Ibid. xxix, 52, P. L. XXXIV, 145.

[10] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, XLV, P. L. XL, 28.

[11] B. B. Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and Augustine, pp. 156-57 criticizes John Owen who finds Augustine's doctrine one of severe skepticism. Warfield is right in saying that man's not knowing truth is not his original state as far as Augustine was concerned. The early writings permit even sinful man some knowledge of truth.

[12] Contra Academicos I, vii, 22, P. L. XXXII, 916.

[13] Ibid. III, xx, 43, P. L. XXXII, 957.

14 De Ordine II, v, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1002.

15 Ibid. II, xix, 50, P. L. XXXII, 1018.

16 Soliloquia I, vi, 13, P. L. XXXII, 876.

17 De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae I, vi, 10, P. L. XXXII, 1315.

18 Ibid. I, vi, 11, P. L. XXXII, 1315.

19 De Quantitate Animae vii, 12, P. L. XXXII, 1041-1042.

20 De Libero Arbitrio II, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1242-1243.

21 Ibid. II, iii, 7, P. L. XXXII, 1243; II, xiii, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1260; II, xv, 39, P. L. XXXII, 1262.

22 Ibid. II, xvi, 44-II, xvii, 46, P. L. XXXII, 1264-1265.

23 De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, xii, 16, P. L. XXXIV, 205.

24 Ibid. II, xvi, 24, P. L. XXXIV, 208-209.

25 De Vera Religione xxiv, 45, P. L. XXXIV, 141.

26 Ibid. xxv, 47, P. L. XXXIV, 142.

27 Ibid. xxxvi, 67, P. L. XXXIV, 152. (Deus enim non corporalibus sensibus subjacet, sed ipsi menti supereminet).

28 Ibid. xxxix, 73, P. L. XXXIV, 155. Non enim ratiocinatio talia fecit, sed invenit.

29 De Ordine I, xi, 32, P. L. XXXII, 993, ...non omnino philosophos, sed philosophes hujus mundi.... Compare with Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, I, xi, P. G. VIII, 747.

30 Ibid. II, v, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1002.

31 Soliloquia I, iv, 9, P. L. XXXII, 874. Clement of Alexandria in his Cohortatio ad Gentes, VI, P. G. VIII, 171, thinks Plato knew truth about God in some degree.

32 B. M. G. Reardon, "The Realation of Philosophy to Faith in the Teaching of St. Augustine," Studia Patristica, Vol. II, Aland and Cross (eds.) Berlin, 1957, pp. 288-294, especially p. 291. J. Geyser, "Die erkenntnistheoretischen Anschauung Augustins zu Begin seiner schriftstellerischen Tätigkeit," in Grabmann and Mausbach (eds.) Aurelius Augustinus, pp. 67 and 69. K. Adam, St. Augustine, The Odyssey of His Soul, p. 34.

[33] One may compare this to Platonism as seen in a statement by W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, Vol. II, p. 231, "So the whole of Platonism, on its religious side, may be summed up in the beatitude, 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.'"

[34] J. Burleigh, The City of God, p. 61; E. B. J. Postma, op. cit.; René Cadiou, "Notes sur la première Théologie de Saint Augustin," Recherches de Science Religieuse, Tome XXVII, année 1937, p. 606.

[35] James Morgan, The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine, pp. 227-231; J. Sestili, "Argumentum Augustinianum de existentia Dei," Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae Thomisticae, pp. 241-265; C. Boyer, "Le Preuve de Dieu Augustinienne," in Études sur Saint Augustin, Archives de Philosophie, Vol. VII, Cahier II, 1930, p. 125' Sciacca, S. Agostino, Vol. I, pp. 289-290; J. Hessen, Augustins Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, pp. 41 and 125.

[36] Roberts, "The Earliest Writings," in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, p. 117. On the basis of his elaborate ontology Augustine "...assumes: (1) that the possibility of apprehending objective truth indicates that the structure of Being is rational as a whole and (2) that the grounding of Being in rational order is equivalent to grounding it in 'Goodness.' Anyone who rejects these assumptions is bound to feel that there are gaps in the 'proof.'"

[37] B. Romeyer, S. J. "La Raison et la Foi au Service de la Pensée Kierkegaard Devant Augustin," Archives de Philosophie, Vol. XVIII, 1952, pp. 7-41. "Rien de pareil à ce besoin augustinien de rationalité primordiale ne se laisse découvrir chez Kierkegaard. Tout au contraire." p. 36.

[38] Contra Academicos III, xx, 43, P. L. XXXII, 957. Nulli autem dubium est gemino pondere nos impelli ad discendum, auctoritatis atque rationis.

[39] De Ordine II, ix, 26, P. L. XXXII, 1007.

[40] Ibid. II, ix, 27, P. L. XXXII, 1007-1008.

[41] De Vera Religione xxiv, 45, P. L. XXXIV, 141.

[42] J. Burleigh, op. cit. pp. 60, 61; R. Cadiou, op. cit. p. 607.

[43] J. O'Meara, "St. Augustine's View of Authority and Reason in A. D. 386," The Journal of Theological Studies, (Irish Theological Quarterly), Oct. 1951, p. 344.

[44] Contra Epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti iv, 6, P L. XLII, 175-177. This interpretation, which is close to that given by A. E. Taylor, Faith of a Moralist, II, p. 142, differs somewhat from that offered by Professor Burleigh, op. cit. p. 63. "What is certain is that we have here an extreme utterance unparalleled elsewhere." The expression may be unparalleled, but it seems to the present writer to characterize Augustine's views on the matter in the period under study here. Professor E. P. Dickie in God is Light, p. 27, shares Burleigh's view. Augustine rightly notes that canon is set by the Church. De Doctrina Christiana II, vii, 12f, P. L. XXXIV, 40-44.

[45] J. Reeves, "St. Augustine and Humanism," in A Monument to St. Augustine, p. 140; Cunningham, op. cit. p. 155; J. R. Smith, "Augustine as an Exegete," Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. LXI, 1904 p. 320. Before his death Augustine recognizes the need for knowing Hebrew in translating Scriptures. De Doctrina Christiana, II, xi, 16, P. L. XXXIV, 42-43.

[46] H. Becker, op. cit. "Diese Stellen zeigen zur Genuge, dass Augustin das, was er von dem Hebräischen weiss und sagt, nicht aus direkter Quelle, dem urtext schöpft, sondern aus den Aussagen anderer." p. 143.

[47] M. Montgomery, op. cit. p. 88; J. R. Smith, op. cit. A. Algeier, "Der Einfluss des Manichäismus auf die exegetische Fragestellung bei Augustin," Grabmann and Mausbach, op. cit. pp. 1 and 12. Augustine's correspondance with Jerome shows that Augustine was slow to recognize the value of translating from the Hebrew, of which he had no reading ability. He finally admits that Jerome is a Biblical scholar while Augustine is too occupied with clerical duties. Epistola LXXIII, 5, P. L. XXXIII, 247.

[48] Montgomery, op. cit. p. 88; Smith, op. cit.

[49] Bogan, op. cit. lists rare and unusual words taken from Greek, pp. 90-92. J. R. Smith, op. cit. lists errors and misunderstandings in Greek; W. H Semple, "Augustinus Rhetor," The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. I, no. 2, October 1950, pp. 139.

[50] H. Becker, op. cit. p. 138; Montgomery, op. cit. p. 191.

[51] Marrou, Saint Augustin et La Fin...op. cit. p. 632.

[52] Courcelle, Les Lettres Grecques en Occident, Part II, chapter ii, "Saint Augustin et L'Hellenisme en Afrique." G. Bardy, in reviewing Courcelle's position in Revue du Moyen Age Latin, I, 1955, says on p. 316, "Quant à prétendre que la controverse pelagienne a obligé saint Augustin à lire quantite de textes grecs (p. 151), c'est la une exagération manifeste." S. Salaville, "La Connaissance du grec chez saint Augustin." Echos D'Orient, XXXII, 1922,

pp. 387-393, cites passages which would indicate progress.

[53] P. Guilloux, "Saint Augustin Savait-il le Grec?" Revue D' Histoire Ecclesiastique, tome XXI, 1925, p. 83. C. H. Milne, A Reconstruction of the Old-Latin Text or Texts of the Gospels used by Saint Augustine. See Epistola LXXV, 19, P. L. XXXIII, for poor versions of Scripture in circulation.

[54] Confessiones V, xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII, 718. Also J. Stroux, "vier Zeugnisse zur römischen Literaturgeschichte der Kaiserzeit," Philologus, XL, 399-403, is an example of his use of allegory on the Song of Songs.

[55] R. M. Grant, The Letter and the Spirit, Chapter I; H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Vol. I; E. E. Ellis, Paul's Use of the Old Testament, pp. 53-54; H. A. A. Kennedy, Philo's Contribution to Religion, p. 31; Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria, p. 57; Jean Danielou, Origen (tr. by W. Mitchell). pp. 139-143. The writer wishes to thank Dr. R. McL. Wilson of St. Mary's College for suggesting bibliography for this point.

[56] P. J. Llamas, "San Agustin y la Multiplicidad de sentidos literales en la Escritura," Religion y Cultura, XV, 1931, pp. 238-274; A. S. Peese, "Caeli Enarrant," Harvard Theological Review, XXXIV, no. 3, July 1941, p. 198; C. J. Costello, St. Augustine's Doctrine on the Inspiration and Canonicity of Scripture, p. 49.

[57] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, ii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 197. He explains this two way interpretation later in a sermon of the New Testament. Sermo LXXXIX, 4-7, P. L. XXXVIII, 556-558.

[58] De. Beata Vita, iv, 34, P. L. XXXII, 975. I Corinthians 1:24.

[59] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, xxii, 33, P. L. XXXIV, 189. He later says there are signs which may be interpreted both literally and figuratively. De Doctrina Christiana II, x, 15. P. L. XXXIV, 42.

[60] Ibid. I, xxiv, 42, P. L. XXXIV, 193.

[61] Ibid. II, ii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 197.

[62] De Libero Arbitrio II, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1242-1243.

[63] De Magistro xiv, 45, P. L. XXXII, 1219-1220.

[64] De Vera Religione xvii, 34, P. L. XXXIV, 136

[65] Ibid. L, 99 and LI, 100, P. L. XXXIV, 165-166. In De Doctrina Christiana I, xxxvi, 40, Augustine says true interpretation of Scripture should always lead to love of God and the neighbor. P. L. XXXIV, 34.

[66] De Diversis Quaestionibus, LXIV, P. L. XL, 54-59.

[67] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae I, 17, 31. P. L. XXXII.

[68] De Libero Arbitrio II, xv, 39, P. L. XXXII, 1262.

[69] De Vera Religione xvi, 32, P. L. XXXIV, 135; LI, 100, P. L. XXXIV, 166.

[70] De Beata Vita iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976. Admonito autem quaedam, quae nobiscum agit, ut Deum recordamur, ut eum quaeramus, ut eum pulso omni fastidio satiamus, de ipso ad nos fonte veritatis emanat... nihilque alius etiam hoc apparet esse quam Deum...." See C. Boyer, "Sur les rapprochements entre Saint Augustin et l'idéalisme," Sofia, Vol. Vi, 1938, p. 483. Augustine's God is transcendent as well as immanent; see Arnold, Roman Stoicism, pp. 223-24. He says for Stoics the existence of God is a preconception in the minds of men.

[71] De Ordine II, xx, 52, P. L. XXXII, 1019-1020.

[72] Soliloquia I, xv, 30, P. L. XXXII, 334-886.

[73] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, vi, 7, P. L. XXXIV, 200.

[74] De Ordine II, xix, 50, P. L. XXXII, 1018.

[75] Ibid. II, xx, 52, P. L. XXXII, 1019. He clarifies this in Retractationes I, iii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 589.

[76] Soliloquia I, vi, 12, P. L. XXXII, 875-876.

[77] De Libero Arbitrio I, ii, 4, P. L. XXXII, 1224, Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis (Isaiah vii:9, sec. LXX); II, ii, 6, P. L. XXXII, 1243.

[78] De Vera Religione xxv, 47, P. L. XXXIV, 142.

[79] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, XII, P. L. XL, 14.

[80] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae x, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1317-1318. Augustine continues a similar statement of God as Creator in De Civitate Dei, xi, iv, P. L. XLI, 319.

[81] Ibid. xvi, 28, P. L. XXXII, 1323.

[82] De Moribus Manichaeorum ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 1346.

[83] Ibid. iv, 6, P. L. XXXII, 1347.

[84] Ibid vi, 8, P. L. XXXII, 1348.

[85] Ibid. vii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 1349.

[86] Ibid. xv, 36, P. L. XXXII, 1360-1361.

[87] De Libero Arbitrio II, xviii, 50, P. L. XXXII, 1267.

[88] Ibid. III, xii, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1288.

[89] Ibid. III, xiii, 36, P. L. XXXII, 1289. Omnis igitur substantia aut Deus, aut ex Deo; quia omne bonum aut Deus, aut ex Deo.

[90] Ibid. III, xiii, 38, P. L. XXXII, 1290.

[91] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, i, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 174. Deus enim facit et tempora:

[92] W. A. Christian, "Augustine on the Creation of the World," Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XLVI, Jan. 1953, pp. 1-25; A. Demph, "Simultanschöpfung," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 1951, pp. 49-51; Augustine continues to hold the view in De Civitate Dei, XI, vi, P. L. XLI, 321-322.

[93] Jean Guitton, Le Temps et L'Éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin, p. 360; J. Weinand, Augustins erkenntnis kritische Theory der Zeit und der Gegenwart.

[94] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, ii, 4, P. L. XXXIV, 175. ...nec ea genuit de seipso, ut hoc essent quod ipse est; sed ea fecit de nihilo, ut non essent aequalia, nec ei a quo facta sunt; nec Felio ejus per quem facta sunt.... This stand is against the Stoic position as well as Neoplatonism. Zeller, Stoicism.... op. cit., pp. 155-156.

[95] Ibid. I, iv, 7, P. L. XXXIV, 177.

[96] Ibid. I, v, 8, P. L. XXXIV, 177.

[97] Hans Mayerhoff, "On the Platonism of St. Augustine's Quaestio de ideis," The New Scholasticism, Vol. XVI, no. 1, 1942, pp. 16-45; A. Solignac, "Analyse et Sources de la Question 'De Ideis'" Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, pp. 307-315. Origen and Augustine agree that God made the matter from which all things are formed. Περὶ ἀρχῶν _____, II, i, P. G. XI, 181.

[98] P. Galtier, "Saint Augustine et l'Origine de l'homme," Gregorianum, Vol. XI, Fasc. 1, 1930, pp. 5-31. In Genesis 1:1f, there is simultaneous creation, but he points out some "contradictions" in chapter 2:1ff, such as woman being created after man. But the present writer does not see that this should raise any

serious difficulty with Augustine's view of simultaneous creation. The material with potentialities was made from nothing all at once. Presumably the possibility for woman to be taken from man was included.

[99] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, v, 9, P. L. XXXIV, 178. ...quod credo a Graecis chaos appellari.

[100] Ibid. I, vii, 11, P. L. XXXIV, 178-179.

[101] Ibid. I, vii, 12, P. L. XXXIV, 179.

[102] Ibid. I, viii, 13, P. L. XXXIV, 179.

[103] Ibid. I, ix, 15, P. L. XXXIV, 180.

[104] Ibid. I, xiii, 19, P. L. XXXIV, 182

[105] Ibid. maledicta erit terra tibi....

[106] Ibid. I, xiv, 20, P. L. XXXIV, 183.

[107] Ibid. I, xvi, 25, P. L. XXXIV, 185.

[108] Ibid. I, xvi, 26, P. L. XXXIV, 185-186. Plotinus says it is asking too much to expect the created world to equal the Intelligible world. Enneads II, is, 4. St. Thomas Aquinas thinks the inequality of things contributes to the perfection of the universe. Summa Theologica Part I, Q. 48, A. 2.

[109] Ibid. I, xvii, 27, P. L. XXXIV, 186.

[110] De Vera Religione xviii, 35, P. L. XXXIV, 137. Quis ea fecit? Qui summe est. Quis hic est? Deus incommutabilis Trinitas, quoniam et per summam Sapientiam ea fecit, et summa benignitate conservat. Cur ea fecit? Ut essent. Ipsum enim quantum cumque esse, bonum est; quia summum bonum est summe esse. Unde fecit? Ex nihilo.

[111] Ibid. xviii, 36, P. L. XXXIV, 137.

[112] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, XXVIII, P. L. XL,18.

[113] Ibid. XLVI, P. L. XXXVII, 31. Quas rationes, ut dictum est, sive ideas, sive formas, sive species, sive rationes licet vocare, et multis conciditur appellare quod libet, sed paucissimis vedere quod verum est.

[114] Ibid. LII, P. L. XXXVII, 34.

115 W. A. Christian, "The Creation of the World," in Battenhouse, op. cit., p. 321; H. Hausheer, "St. Augustine's Conception of Time," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI, 1937, p. 509; F. Beemelmans, Zeit und Ewigkeit nach Thomas von Aquino. pp. 10-11; S. Grabowski, The All Present God, p. 231. "In other words, God and the universe belong to different categories of being." Robert Jordan, "Time and Contingency in St. Augustine," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. VIII, nol 3, 1955, pp. 394-417.

116 Grandgeorge, op. cit. p. 107; O. Perler, Der Nus bei Plotin und Das Verbum bei Augustinus als vorbildliche ursache der Welt p. 126. "An Stelle der platonischen Emanationslehre tritt die Lehre von der Erschaffung aus nichts und zwar von anfang an."

117 Grandgeorge, op. cit. p. 107; R. Jolivet, Essai sur les Rapports entre La Pensée Grecque et la Pensée Chrétienne, section on "Saint Augustin et la doctrine du mal."

118 Sister R. M. Bushmann, "St. Augustine's Metaphysics and Stoic Doctrine," The New Scholasticism, Vol. I, no. 3, 1952, pp. 283-304.

119 W. A. Christian, op. cit. p. 327; H. Armstrong, "Spiritual or Intelligible Matter in Plotinus and St. Augustine," Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, pp. 277-283.

120 De Ordine I, v, 14, P. L. XXXII, 984. Quis neget, Deus magne...te cuncta ordine administrare?

121 Ibid. I, vii, 17-18, P. L. XXXII, 985-986.

122 Ibid. II, iv, 12, P. L. XXXII, 1000.

123 Ibid. II, vii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 1005.

124 Soliloquia I, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 871.

125 De Immortalitate Animae, viii, 14, P. L. XXXII, 1028.

126 Ibid. viii, 15, P. L. XXXII, 1029.

127 Ibid. xii, 19, P. L. XXXII, 1031.

128 De Musica VI, xvii, 57, P. L. XXXII, 1191-1192.

129 Ibid. VI, xvii, 58, P. L. XXXII, 1193.

130 De Libero Arbitrio II, viii, 20, P. L. XXXII, 1251.

131 Ibid. II, xvi, 42, P. L. XXXII, 1263. Intuere coelum et terram et mare, et quaecumque in eis vel desuper fulgent, vel

deorsum repunt vel volant vel natant; formas habent, quia numeros habent: adime illis haec, nihil erunt.

[132] Ibid. II, xvi, 44, P. L. XXXII, 1264-1265. quae neque contineatur et quasi diffundatur locis, neque potendatur atque varientur temporibus, per quam cuncta ista formari valeant, et pro suo genere implere atque agere locorum ac temporum numeros.

[133] Ibid. II, xvii, 45, P. L. XXXII, 1265.

[134] Ibid. II, xvii, 46, P. L. XXXII, 1265-1268.

[135] Ibid. III, ix, 24-25, P. L. XXXII, 1283.

[136] Ibid. III, ix, 26, P. L. XXXII, 1283-1284.

[137] Ibid. III, ix, 28, P. L. XXXII, 1284-1285.

[138] De Vera Religione xi, 21, P. L. XXXIV, 131. Nulla vita est quae non sit ex Deo, quia Deus utique summa vita est et ipse fons vitae....

[139] Ibid. Vita ergo voluntario defectu dificiens ab eo qui eam fecit, et cujus essentia fruebatur, et volens contra Dei legem frui corporibus, quibus eam Deus praefecit, vergit ad nihilum; et haec est nequitia: non quia corpus jam nihilum est.

[140] Ibid. xi, 22, P. L. XXXIV, 132.

[141] Ibid. xiv, 28, P. L. XXXIV, 134.

[142] Ibid. xxix, 52, P. L. XXXIV, 145.

[143] Ibid. xxxiv, 63, P. L. XXXIV, 150.

[144] Ibid. xxxvii, 68, P. L. XXXIV, 152. sed etiam serviant creaturae potius quam Creatori (Romans 1:25).

[145] Ibid. Sed inter hos illi sibi videntur religiosissimi, qui universam simul creaturam, id est mundum totum cum omnibus quae in eo sunt, et vitam qua spiratur et animatur, quam quidam corpoream, quidam incorpoream esse crediderunt; Hoc ergo totum simul unum Deum magnum esse arbitrantur, cujus partes sint caeterae.

[146] Ibid. Non enim universae creaturae autorem conditioremque noverunt.

[147] Ibid. xli, 78, P. L. XXXIV, 157.

[148] Ibid. xlii, 81, P. L. XXXIV, 159.

[149] P. M. Valez, "El Numero Agustiniano," Religion y Cultura, XV, 1931. XV Centenario de la Muerte de San Agustin. p. 150. "Pero el numero en S. Agustin es algo mas que una pura funcion matematica; es tambien de una significacion filosofica mayor, como ya se ha dicho; y asi es sinonimo de orden, ritmo, proporcion o analogia de proporcionalidad, armonia y hasta idea, acto, forma, energia, razon, ley, perfeccion y belleza de las cosas en si y en su conjuncto."

[150] Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 1-3; I, i, 1.

[151] Plotinus and Augustine agree that when wrong has occurred it can be used to good ends. Enneads III, ii, 5.

[152] Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 167.

[153] Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 355f.

[154] This position is found in contemporary Protestant thought. For an example see Nels F. S. Ferré, Faith and Reason, p. 230. For an evaluation of the use of allegory see R. M. Grant, The Letter and the Spirit, p. 105ff.

[155] Dr. John Baillie has distinguished between propositions about God and knowledge of God Himself. In this early period Augustine does notlet propositions lead him away from the reality to which they point. The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, p. 39 and p. 60.

[156] E. R. Dodds, Select Passages Illustrative of Neoplatonism, p. 19.

Part II, C

God

Man's attempt to understand himself makes it necessary for him to attempt to understand God. In the preceding sections it has been seen that man's search to understand himself involves the question of God; it also leads to an investigation of man's world and the process of knowing, both of which depend upon his understanding of God. For Augustine's philosophy of this period God is not simply introduced as a supreme element; on the contrary, He is essential to every phase of it. At this point it may be well to organize the implications of the divine seen in previous examinations and to include those aspects which have been hitherto neglected. God's nature may be considered first.

The De Beata Vita discloses Augustine's earliest concepts of the nature of God. As may be expected, his early reference is to his repudiation of the corporeal God pictured by the Manicheans. In his introduction to Theodorus he says that the sermons of Ambrose have instructed him that one should think neither of the soul nor of God as being corporeal; the human soul is that which is nearest God.[1] It is also implied that God is by nature the bestower of the happy life which the company seek.[2] Further along, Licentius agrees for the entire group that God is eternal and always remaining.[3] Moreover, by reconstructing the words "God's Son is indeed God" one may conclude that the nature of God is that of his Son.[4] If one reconsiders the passage on illumination, God is seen as an inner light which leads to Himself, the Truth, without degeneration.[5] Since there is wholeness and perfection, God is most omnipotent.[6] He is one substance, excluding all variation.[7]

The nature of God is discussed in a few passages of De Ordine, which is primarily concerned with His work as Sustainer. Discussing with Licentius, Augustine maintains that the face of God for which one hopes is none other than truth.[8] But in the second book, the unchangeableness of God which the group have asserted seems to be challenged, for if God is eternally just, He must have eternally judged between good and evil, which makes those two eternal. The problem is solved to the satisfaction of the desputants when it is declared that God is always just, but when evil and good were distinguished in fact, then was the justice of God, the Eternally Just, exercised.[9] After listing the various disciplines which one should master before

he can come to understand the soul or God, he mentions that God is better known in knowing what He is not.[10] This statement implies that there is no adequate metaphor for or possibility of direct comprehension of the full nature of God. He is better understood through a negation of things known. Again asserting the eternality of God, Augustine maintains that it would be absurd to say that a new thought has developed in Him.[11] If He is the source of all, whence would a new plan occur? He is the fount from which flows all truth and is Himself the Father of Truth.[12] Moreover, Augustine conceives of God as One who hears and answers prayers.[13]

The nature of God is described in the Soliloquia. One of the greatest sources for understanding Augustine's concept of the nature of God during the Cassiciacum retreat is the prayer at the opening of the Soliloquia. It may, however, represent more what he holds on authority than what he can rationally defend.[14] For him God is the Father of Truth (Deus pater veritatis), wisdom (sapientiae), true and highest life (verae summaeque vitae), happiness (beatitudinis), the good and the beautiful (boni et pulchri), intelligible light (intelligibilis lucis), man's vigil and illumination (evigilationis atque illuminationis nostrae), and the pledge which admonishes man to return unto Him.[15] Then, after several sentences upon God as sustainer, he resumes in section four, statements upon the nature of God. By Augustine, God is addressed as: one eternal, true substance (una aeterna vera substantia), where there is not to be found any discrepancy (discrepantia), confusion (confusio), transition (transitio), want (indigentia), or death (mors). With Him there is supreme concord (summa concordia), clarity (evidentia), constancy (constantia), fullness (plenitudo), and life (vita). With Him there is neither lack (deest) nor excess (redundat). In Him the one begets and the one who is begotten is (est) one.[16] To Augustine, God is his: God (Deus), Lord (Domine), king (rex), father (pater), cause (causa), hope (spes), wealth (res), honor (honor), home (domus), country (patria), health (salus), light (lux), and life (vita). All of the richness and variety of these terms are applicable to the nature of God.

Although the primary concern for God in De Musica is as creator and sustainer, there are a few references to His nature. He is pictured in one place as a master whom a slave can either serve or reject in order to be enslaved to another servant of the master.[17] He is also related to the essence (essentia) from which the soul can fall away.[18] Again He is held to be supremely good (summe bonus) and just (summe justus).[19]

The writings from the Roman period, like those of Cassiciacum, although to a greater degree, reflect Augustine's differences with the Manicheans on the nature of God. In the De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae he repudiates immature views of a limited God which moves about in space or one which is conceived

in human forms and points to the maturity of those who maintain that the nature of God is not only superior to the human body but also above the human mind. Above all, God is substance unchanging.[20] In the sequel he holds that the highest being is that which always has its own mode, which never changes, is never corrupted, and which is not subjected to time. These things can only be said of God, who is being (esse); He has no opposite, for being (esse) has no opposite except non-being (non esse).[21] To clarify his position he contrasts these points with the Manichean views which make God subject to change and under threat of being overcome by another power which could prove stronger. Unless evil is equally strong, why has God not defeated it?[22]

The nature of God is described further in De Libero Arbitrio. Augustine holds that the pious think the best of God, which means that by His nature He is omnipotent and unchanging.[23] In his "proof" for the existence of God he identifies God with Truth, which is above the human mind and reason.[24] God is, and is truly the highest being.[25] This fact is to be demonstrated by reason as well as to be received by faith. Highest being is that from which man fell away. Book three introduces the problem of foreknowledge which is an outgrowth of his view of the nature of God. Since He is unchanging and has no new plan or "change of mind," it follows that there should be foreknowledge. The problem arises whether this foreknowledge excludes the possibility of free will in man.[26] Although the bulk of the treatment in book three is perhaps after his ordination, it may be said here that Augustine attempts to maintain both foreknowledge in God and free will in man.

Discussing the nature of God in De Vera Religione, he declares that all goods are from Him, and that any things which are less than the highest good are not God.[27] He is that above the rational soul and in Him abide the prime forms of life, essence, and wisdom.[28] In his concluding sections Augustine's summary is that he worships only one God, who is the Principle (Principium) of all things.[29] Considering the collection of questions and answers compiled by Augustine, at least two apply to the nature of God. In question seventeen he explains the unchangeableness of God in a way which makes all time present to Him.[30] Furthermore, in twenty, one should not speak of the location of God, for location is terminology proper to body--which God is not.[31]

In summary of Augustine's concept of the nature of God in this period one may say that God is. Often he speaks of God as Being (esse), the source of all lesser beings. This Being is beyond objects of the world, even the highest of the personality of man. There even seems to be something impersonal implied in the description, such as is later employed in the Confessions VII, 23 which reads Id quod est instead of the Biblical

Ego sum qui sum.[32] But always to be remembered is his statement which implies that God is like the Son of God, who has been present as personality. Of equal emphasis is the eternality of God, as Augustine points out, not so much in terms of timelessness as in terms of unchangeableness.[33] He is the eternal, the unchanging, as opposed to the changing world of thought and physical objects. These two assertions he makes over and again, but they are two sides of one coin and are arrived at in part through the via negativa.[34] Although this method is not developed into a system of formulation about God by Augustine, it does play a small part.

As Being, the source of all beings, God is also identified as Truth, Wisdom, Good and Justice, by which exist all imperfect truths, knowledges, goods, and justices.[35] The nature of God becomes for him the ground for all that is known to man and for all activities known or to be made known. Though Augustine finds the terms inadequate and even misleading unless one is careful, he speaks of the divine in human terms, even using the titles of master and king. Aside from these titles which indicate influence from the Scriptures, there is almost nothing to distinguish his concept of the nature of God from the Absolute in Plotinus.[36] As Augustine points out, his concepts are given him by authority rather than by his reasoning process. Much of what he holds seems first to have come upon assumption and only later to have been supported by rational argument.[37]

Augustine's concept of the nature of God, like those concepts held by most Christians both before and after him, suffers from combining many incompatible elements from various sources. On the one hand, he holds elements from Greek philosophy. Even at the beginning of the period he thinks of God as eternal and unchanging, similar to the "ideas" of Plato. God is unchanging, the mover of all things, yet unmoved. God is Being. God is Truth. These ideas of God, Augustine accepts from his general acquaintance with Greek philosophy without a critical evaluation of their truth. On the other hand, he holds ideas from Hebrew tradition. Within that tradition alone there are many incompatible ideas of God existing side by side. Without the theory that an evolving concept of God is described in the Old Testament, Augustine is only vaguely aware of the difficulties. He does use some of the metaphors used by the Psalmists to point to aspects of God's nature.

Augustine's difficulty is one of Parmenides in conflict with Heraclitus. He asserts unchangeableness of God at the expense of the earlier Hebrew concepts of the dynamic or even dialectical quality of the divine. This particular balance gives rise to the doctrine of foreknowledge and leads to the doctrine of predestination. Such a balance forms a difficult problem for St. Paul and plagues every Christian theologian since him. It seems to

the present writer that there is room for a study of the nature of God which would carefully define and evaluate the many different elements which have been grouped into what is usually known as the "orthodox" Christian idea of God's nature.

God's nature is seen in His work. With his emphasis upon the unchanging "otherness" of God, Augustine seldom speaks of His nature apart from implications of His "action" or "work."

The first "work" of God was in creating. In the prayer of the Soliloquia Augustine addresses God as the Maker of the Universe (Deus universitatis conditor),[38] and as the One who made man according to His own image and similitude (Qui fecisti hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem tuam....).[39] De Musica mentions the providence of God through which He created and rules all things.[40] It is God who made the earth from nothing.[41] When he defends Genesis against the Manichean attacks Augustine seems to discuss the "action" of God. He proclaims that God who created heaven and earth[42] is the author of all nature and substances.[43] The theme of creation out of nothing is also repeated in De Libero Arbitrio.[43] As Genesis records, God created heaven and earth together with time,[45] creating and then forming.[46] Through His Word all natures and substances were made[47] according to an eternal "plan" in His "mind."[48] It is readily seen that these passages on "action" of God come almost directly from the Genesis account, and differ decidedly from the pattern one would expect in a philosophical account which begins with pure, unchanging, highest being.

The second work of God is His sustaining the world. The sustaining power of God need not conflict with the nature Augustine describes in above passages. Whereas the happenings of the world may appear to be by chance or under the rule of fortune (fortuna), in reality there may be behind them secret providence.[49] God is the supreme measure of all things.[50] Returning to the prayer of the Soliloquia, one sees Augustine's faith that things which have no being in themselves alone are given being by God.[51] By Him even the self-destructive is preserved and the world, which includes a sinister part, is ordered with perfection. The greatest dissonance is ordered inferior to the better.[52] While to turn from God is to fall, to die, and to perish, to cling to Him is to be preserved from evil. He orders the heavens and the seasons, providing constancy and change.[53] By Him man is preserved from his infirmities, is given wisdom, and is converted to God.[54] God is He who leads one to live the better life.[55]

Considering passages from those works which Augustine begins at Milan and at Rome, one will recall the order in the books of De Musica which is evidence of the supreme order or God. Placed in other terms, the law of God governs the falling of the leaves

of the trees and the numbering of the human hairs.[56] Early in De Libero Arbitrio he says that God is the just ruler of all which He has created;[57] and later, that no one is above His rule.[58] In the African period he says divine providence looks after not only individuals but also mankind as a whole.[59] He is the one God from Whom, through Whom, and in Whom are all things.[60]

Taking all these views together, although Augustine would prevent any identification of God and the world, he maintains that all beings are dependent upon Him. God is, then, not entirely remote from the created universe, for it depends upon him for its existence and orders.[61] He is its foundation without which existence cannot be explained; He is not an abstract.[62]

Augustine's view of the work of God recognizes His immanence as well as His transcendence. Although he believes in the changelessness of God and His being of a different nature from the world or even from the human soul, Augustine does not follow the Gnostics in separating Him entirely from the world. Against the Manicheans and the Stoics he refuses to identify any part of God with the physical world. Yet, if God is that without which things would not continue to be, if He is closely related to the form preserving physical things, how does He escape being identified, in part, with them? In light of modern physics which does not recognize the division of material and form, as Augustine does, how can one satisfactorily relate God to form and order without involving Him as part of the physical universe?

The above views are present in Augustine's writings of the period under study, but taken alone they would represent only a partial account of his total concept of God. The picture cannot be completed without an examination of how the supreme unity is understood in terms of Trinity. Before dealing with the doctrine as a whole it may be well to investigate the passages bearing upon the individual members.

The Father can hardly be discussed under that term apart from the Son. But Augustine does argue that the Father is known through His Son, or His Wisdom.[63] And when it is maintained that the Father alone knows the day, this is a correct way of speaking, since it is the Father who makes the day known to the Son.[64] The De Vera Religione also shows how the Father and Son are alike, as does one of the diverse questions which indicates that the resemblance is by similitude and that there is one substance.[65] Question sixty differs slightly from the above answer, for both Father and Son know the day. The information is kept secret since it is not useful to mankind.[66]

The second person of the Trinity is mentioned more often.

At the beginning of his new life after the "conversion" experience it is the Authority of Christ which Augustine takes for the guide of his life.[67] He is at least acquainted in this period with the Church's doctrine, for he says that God's Son is none other than the Wisdom of God and that the Son of God is truly God.[68] Though God is tripotent, He assumes the body of man in which to dwell.[69] At Milan he writes of Christ as the Wisdom of God and the light of all.[70]

Augustine's compositions at Rome give other passages which indicate the extending scope of his understanding. In his pointing to the unity of the Testaments he mentions the apostle who said that the Son of God is His Wisdom and virtue.[71] Moreover, he mentions parallels between I Corinthians 1:24, Matthew 11:27, and Wisdom 9:9; for Wisdom refers to the Son of God.[72] In both Testaments, God is one; regardless of whether one uses "Wisdom" or "Son of God" it is the means by which the Father is known.[73] The Son of God is the New Man which is in place of the old, Adam.[74] He also speaks of the Son as all powerful, eternal, in the form of man born of a virgin.[75]

The Son is the only begotten, for all else was created out of nothing. He is generated from God and equal to Him. Through this virtue and wisdom of God all things were created from nothing.[76] He "proves" that God exists; he adds to this statement from the content of faith that Wisdom is begotten from the Father and is equal to Him.[77] Christ is identified as Truth, who tells man that the hairs of his head are numbered.[78] Moreover, the Lord Jesus Christ is spoken of as right hand of God stretched out from above.[79] If elements which may not be previous to Augustine's ordination are included, it is seen that he holds that the assuming of flesh did not completely separate the Word of God from the celestial. He is the one who has freed man from the law of the devil.[80]

Writing on Genesis after his return to Africa, Augustine tells the Manicheans that God did not create the heaven and earth in time but in Christ, the word with the Father through whom all things were made.[81] He is man's Lord (Dominus) who admires the faith of those who believe. The Lord Jesus Christ is the spiritual Adam without sin who restores man to paradise as he did the robber who was crucified with him.[82] He is the Wisdom of God and head of man as man is head of woman.[83] The story of Adam shows that man should forsake his parents and adhere to his wife, so Christ has left his Father, and his mother, the carnal synagogue, and has adhered to the Church. The Two have become one flesh, for Scriptures say that He is the head of the Church which is His body. Although He is born of the flesh of the seed of David, he is born of the virgin Mary who has conceived through the Holy Spirit.[84]

Not to be overlooked is the difficult passage which identified the eternal Wisdom of God dwelling in the inner man as Christ, the one teacher of man.[85] In an epistle to Nebridius he discusses the Son of God in a manner which shows a shadow of adoptionism. He is a great man taken into union with God. However, that shadow is almost entirely removed by his clarification that this uniting has been in a manner never paralleled with other wise and holy men. The Son of God is separated from them even greater than is the sun over the other celestial bodies.[86]

In his discussion with Romanianus upon beliefs of the Catholic Church he lists Incarnation, virgin birth, death, resurrection from the dead, ascending into heaven and sitting at the right hand of the Father.[87] Again, speaking of the work of Christ, he makes certain statements about His nature. Christ is the Son or Wisdom of God, coeternal and consubstantial with the Father, who took human form; the Word was made flesh and made his habitation among men.[88] Unity, Truth, and Word he identifies as the second part of the Trinity, present with the Father in beginning.[89] Yet, this truth in the form of man underwent threefold temptation as in described in the Scriptures.[90] The Son may be referred to as Father of Truth and Father of Wisdom for His is the image and similitude of God through Whom all things receive form and unity.[91]

Among the collection of questions made at Hippo one finds several which give evidence on Augustine's concept of the second person of the Trinity. As He took the form of man to save man, even so He was born of woman in order to save woman.[92] The Son is coeternal with the Father, thus there is no time when God was not the Father.[93] There is, on the surface, some problem as to how Christ could be with his mother and, at the same time, in heaven. Augustine's explanation is that the situation is similar to a word of man which is heard by many yet by each individually.[94] He also shows that the Son must be equal to the Father, for He could not be above the Father, who is perfect, nor below Him. The latter would mean that the Son is imperfect.[95] In the figures for the building of the temple Augustine finds significance for the building of the body of the Lord Jesus. The number fourty-six, when multiplied in a certain way gives 276 or nine months and six days. This figure is connected with His conception in April and his birth on January the eighth.[96] Jesus combines the two functions of priest and king; whereas Matthew traces the royal lineage, the priestly is traced by Luke.[97] When speaking of the second element of the Godhead "verbo" which is employed by the Gospel of John is a good choice. Λογος , it could be rendered either rationem or verbum. But since rationem may not imply as well the dynamic, verbum, which stands for action, more accurately describes the relationship between God and His works.[98]

In his Cassiciacum period Augustine does not express any recognition that the second person of the Christian Trinity could differ radically from that of Platonism. Therefore it is not surprising that he fastens upon those passages of Scripture which describe the second element as Wisdom, the Word, or that through which all things have been made. On the other hand, there are factors introduced from the teachings of the Catholic Church and from the Scriptures which are opposed to that purely philosophical concept. These he uses in preference to the Platonist views, but he does not, in the period here under study, deliberately state the differences in the two systems.[99] The incarnation, death, resurrection and glory in the presence of God are distinctively Christian, as he admits. The virgin birth, the days of pregnancy, the genealogies are quite Scriptural and place further emphasis upon the human side of the incarnate Lord. The divine and the human are interestingly combined in his reference to the man God took to Himself, a man who has surpassed all other wise men in their wisdom. Both the divine and the human, the eternal and the mutable are present in Augustine's early concept of Christ. But is there a particular emphasis? It is not strange that his respect for Neoplatonism should lead him to an emphasis of the divine, ontological, and rational. It is a dominant interest of the Catholic Christianity he accepts as opposed to Arianism. One can hardly picture Augustine having difficulty emphasizing the equality of Father and Son, though there is subordination in Neoplatonism.[100] On the other hand, while he emphasizes the human side enough to avoid docetism, he is far from a full picture of an "historical Jesus." As is illustrated by Augustine's placing Christ interior to man in the knowing situation, his concept of the human role is almost limited to Christ's being an extremely wise man in possession of Truth.[101]

Within this period there seems to be no marked discovery in Augustine's Christology. There seems to be a stating for himself, a developing understanding of those ideas he has accepted upon the authority of the Catholic Christian Church.[102] One can say that his concept of the second division of the Trinity is based upon Christian belief and dogma as well as upon rational philosophy.[103]

Augustine is aware of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but his references to it in this period are few. In Rome he writes that the Love which leads to a knowledge of God is inspired by the Holy Spirit.[104] Then later, defending Genesis, he denies that the Spirit of God moving over the water had any corporeal form.[105] The Holy Spirit is mentioned again in this book and also among the several questions in collection, but there is nothing very definite about the characteristics of it such as one finds in the Acts of the Apostles or in Augustine's writings on the Son.[106]

He deals much more fully with the doctrine of the Trinity itself. At Cassiciacum, when Augustine says that the Happy Life if found in recognizing the one through whom one is led to truth, the nature of that truth and the bond which links one to the chief measure, these three in unity, his mother replies indicating that her son is thinking of the Trinity.[107] Or again, in De Ordine he recognizes the first Principle as God omnipotent and tripotent, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.[108] In his discussion of the morals of the Catholic Church, he says that God is trinity in unity. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit together are one God, of Whom, by Whom, and in Whom are all things. For this reason Paul can say, "To Him be glory," for God is one.[109] The formula "of Whom, by Whom, and in Whom" is repeated in De Libero Arbitrio.[110] It is an error, he says in the same work, to hold that the substance of God is mutable or that it is more or less than Trinity. However, he refuses to discuss further in this place the equality of the persons of the Trinity and the qualities of each.[111]

Augustine's own estimate of the Trinity is given in a letter to Nebridius. The Trinity is set forth in the Catholic Church as something to be believed and, by a few, to be understood. Whatever is done by one of the members must be understood as being done by all together. He wonders why it is not said that the whole Trinity became incarnate rather than just the Son. He admits, on the other hand, that he does not have a full understanding of the Church's teachings.[112] He tries to explain the unity by saying that any substance first, is; second, has form; and third, remains what it is. When speaking of the substance or any one of the three aspects, all three are involved. This statement indicates the inseparability of the Persons of the Catholic Trinity.

In the De Vera Religione, he maintains that there is one God; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. All creation was made through and is sustained in the Trinity. Each did not act separately, but the Father acted through the Son and the Holy Spirit in unity, with creatures bearing evidence of this Trinity.[113] Of course, this is one of those doctrines which one must believe before one can come to understand it.[114] Perhaps his most accurate appraisal of the situation is that the Trinity is much spoken of but little understood.[115]

That Augustine holds on faith a belief in the Christian Trinity in the period here under study is beyond dispute. He also makes it clear that he is no expert in the subject and that his attempts at rational understanding meet strong limitations. There is evidence to illustrate that he intends to hold the Christian formulation which emphasizes the equality of the members rather than the Neoplatonic trinity which permits a

subordination of the second and third elements.[116] His knowledge of the doctrine seems to be limited to what he can absorb from the teachings of Ambrose. Indeed, scholars are almost sure that he never masters the intricacies of the Trinitarian debate which has taken place in the fourth century.[117] Augustine believes the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. To say that he comprehends it in the period under study or that he involves it in all the philosophy he uses would be going too far.[118]

Augustine's concept of the Holy Trinity is as valuable to the student of Church History for what it fails to present as it is for what it does say. As a well educated layman Augustine is aware that the Catholic Church teaches the triune nature of God. He accepts that doctrine upon the authority of the Church. He has some definite ideas about God as the Father and some clear ideas about the relationship of the Father and the Son. He has little knowledge of the Holy Spirit and its relationship to the Father and the Son. The doctrine, he thinks, is to be believed by all Christians, but there are few who can understand it. Even at the time of his ordination his understanding of the doctrine is very incomplete. If Augustine with his outstanding ability has not a fuller knowledge of the doctrine, how many of his contemporaries can understand it? How important is the doctrine of the Trinity to the laity of the Christian Church in any age?

It has been seen that Augustine's concept of God involves several elements. While God is pure Being, One and Eternal in the sense of never changing, He is also Creator, Sustainer, and Governor of all that is.[119] Though He is one God in unity, He is also Three: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each being able to act individually yet accompanied by the presence of the other two. These three are one substance and entirely equal.[120] Considering all aspects together there is one omnipotent, eternal God, from Whom, through Whom, and Whom are all things. His concept of God he intends to hold within the context of the Catholic Christian Church.[121] But besides these distinctively Christian elements, one may also see influence from and even some protest to Plato, Cicero, Plotinus, and the Manichean writings. He has these influences upon him, but they are balanced by or even overcome through his understanding of the Holy Scriptures expounded by the Catholic Church in light of the formulations of its councils.

The greatest problem of Augustine's early doctrine of God is his combining elements of the impersonal, immovable One of Neoplatonist philosophy with the self conscious, gracious, Triune God of Christianity. In terms of God, he agrees with many of the principles of philosophy, but he imposes upon them Christian concepts. Although it is inadequate to think of God in terms of personality, one wonders whether the difficulty can

can be solved by conceiving God as impersonal.[122] In terms of the second person of the Trinity, Augustine finds strong similarities both with Neoplatonism and with Christian creeds. Yet, in this early period, his concept of Christ lacks the human richness given especially in the Synoptic Gospels.[123] The Holy Spirit is also lacking in personality in Augustine's concept of this early period. His whole idea of the Godhead, even in later writings, struggles with the problem of the personal and the impersonal. The single selfhood of God has been suggested inadequate to accommodate the idea of three persons or centers of consciousness.[124] As W. R. Matthews has put it, Augustine leaves for subsequent thinkers not a solution, but a problem.[125]

This chapter on Augustine's concept of God highlights problems faced by him and many other Christians in formulating a doctrine of God. He finds himself confronted with an unfocused doctrine made of rays from many sources. Beams from the light of various Western philosophers blend with those from Eastern religions and with those from Hebrew priests and prophets. Some of the beams come directed through the lenses of Christian apostles and bishops while others come indirectly from various reflectors. Each viewer tries to see clear an image as he can. He alone cannot utilize all the light from all the sources. He can only select what his equipment and position allow him to use. The image he forms is partly dependent upon his own ability. But there are certain points that must be included and certain ones which must be excluded if his image is to be judged as Christian.

Augustine tries to form a Christian image of God which is not in strong conflict with some of the ideas of Greek philosophers. To the concept of the Eternal above all time he joins the concept of God the Creator and Sustainer of the world. To the concept of impersonal Being he joins the concept of a personal God. To the concept of the supreme One he joins the concept of the Trinity. There are enough elements which are common in other concepts held by those called "Christian" to justify calling Augustine's a "Christian" concept of God. Modern students of theology may be moved to ask whether Augustine's image of God is an accurate representation of the Ultimate.

Part II, C

God

Notes

[1] De Beata Vita, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 961.

[2] Ibid. I, 5, P. L. XXXII, 962; ...nihilque aliud video quod magis Dei donum vocandum sit. Augustine's early concept of God is not as radically transcendent as Plotinus' first principles. Ennead V, iii, 11-15.

[3] Ibid. ii, 11, P. L. XXXII, 965; In response to Augustine's question Deus, inquam, vobis aeternus, et semper manens videtur?

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[7] Ibid. iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976. Quae tria unum Deum intelligentibus unamque substantiam exclusis vanitatibus variae superstitionis, ostendunt.

[8] De Ordine, I, viii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 988.

[9] Ibid. II, vii, 22, P. L. XXXII, 1004-1005.

[10] Ibid. II, xvi, 44, P. L. XXXII, 1015. ...Deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo.... See Plotinus, Ennead VI, ix, 3-4; De Civitate Dei VIII, ii, 3, P. L. XLI, 948

[11] Ibid. II, xvii, 46, P. L. XXXII, 1016. In Deo enim novum exstitisse consilium, ne dicam impium, ineptissimum est dicere. In De Civitate Dei he upholds foreknowledge of God against Cicero. V, ixf, P. L. XLI, 148-153.

[12] Ibid. II, xix, 51, P. L. XXXII, 1019, ...Deum videre, atque ipsum fontem unde manat omne verum, ipsumque Patrem Veritatis.

[13] Ibid. II, xx, 52, P. L. XXXII, 1019.

[14] Soliloquia I, iv, 9, P. L. XXXII, 874.

[15] Ibid. I, i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 870.

[16] Ibid. I, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 871. Retractationes correct this according to John 10:30, Ego et Pater unum sumus. I, iv, 3, P. L. XXXII, 590.

[17] De Musica, VI, v, 13, P. L. XXXII, 1170.

[18] Ibid. VI, xiii, 40, P. L. XXXII, 1185.

[19] Ibid. VI, xvii, 56, P. L. XXXII, 1191

[20] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae x, 17, P. L. XXXII, 1318.

[21] De Moribus Manichaeorum i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 1345.

[22] Ibid. xii, 25, P. L. XXXII, 1355-1356.

[23] De Libero Arbitrio I, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1224.

[24] Ibid. II, xiii, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1260; 37, 1261.

[25] Ibid. II, xv, 39, P. L. XXXII, 1262. Est enim Deus, et vere summeque est.

[26] Ibid. III, ii, 4, P. L. XXXII, 1272. Compare with Plotinus, Ennead V, i, 4.

[27] De Vera Religione xix, 37, P. L. XXXIV, 137. Quia igitur bona sunt, ex Deo sunt: quia non summa bona sunt, non sunt Deus.

[28] Ibid. xxxi, 57, P. L. XXXIV, 147.

[29] Ibid. lv, 112, P. L. XXXIV, 171.

[30] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus. XVII, P. L. XL, 15. ...omne praesens est apud Deum.

[31] Ibid. xx, P. L. XL, 15-16.

Part II, C

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[28] Ibid. xxxi, 57, P. L. XXXIV, 147.

[29] Ibid. lv, 112, P. L. XXXIV, 171.

[30] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus. XVII, P. L. XL, 15. ...omne praesens est apud Deum.

[31] Ibid. xx, P. L. XL, 15-16.

[32] This is discussed by C. Butler, Western Mysticism p. 61. Exodus 3:14. Such a reference is more noteworthy since the Confessiones are set in a very personal relationship between Augustine and God. See also R. McL. Wilson, The Gnostic Problem, The Septuagint gives opportunity for syncretism. "The use of ὁ ὤν in one passage (Exodus 3:14), and more freely by Philo, suggests the identity of the personal God of the Jews with the impersonal Absolute of the Greeks." p. 32. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072 a and b.

[33] W. A. Christian, op. cit. p. 321.

[34] V. Lossky, "Éléments de 'Theologie négative' chez Saint Augustin," Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, pp. 575-581. This is not necessarily limited to Christian Platonism or mythical theology. "L'ignorance au subject de l'Etre divin, dans le De Ordine, est l'envers négatif des connaissances de l'être crée: on parvient à distinguer Dieu de ce qu'Il n'est pas, sans pouvoir dir ce qu'il est in Lui-même." p. 577; R. P. Russell points out similarity to method used R. P. Russell points out similaity to method used later by Scholastics and discussed by Thomas Aquinas as a principle source of knowledge in Contra Gentiles 1.14. p. 320, footnote 1, The Fathers of the Church, St. Augustine, Vol. 1.

[35] C. Boyer, L'Ideé de vérité... op. cit. "Dieu, pour saint Augustin, c'est donc la vérité." p. 96; B. P. Jansen, "Zur Lehre des hl. Augustinus von dem Erkennen der Rationes Aeternae," Grabmann and Mausbach, Aurelius Augustinus, p. 126. "Ohne Gott givt es keine Wahrheit, alle Wahrheit grundet in ihm." The "one" in Plotinus is sometimes considered above being. Ennead V, v, 4-12.

[36] W. R. Inge says, "...Plotinus, after protesting that nothing can be said of the Absolute, tells us a good deal about it or him, investing him in fact with the attributes of a personal God." Vol. II, p. 115.

[37] W. P. Tolley, The Idea of God in the Philosophy of St. Augustine, p. 1.

[38] Soliloquia I, i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 869.

[39] Ibid. I, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 871.

[40] De Musica VI, xvii, 56, P. L. XXXII, 1191.

[41] Ibid. VI, xvii, 57, P. L. XXXII, 1192. Compare with Plotinus, Ennead V, vii, 1-3; V, vii, 7.

[42] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae x, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1317. This creation is not the same as the necessary unfolding of potentialities of the Godhead as it is sketched by Plotinus. Ennead IV, viii, 6.

[43] De Moribus Manichaeorum ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 1346. ...omnium naturarum atque substantiarum esse auctorem Deum... Plotinus, Ennead III, viii, 9, The One is prior to the sum of existence.

[44] De Libero Arbitrio I, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1224.

[45] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, ii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 174

[46] Ibid. I, iii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 176.

[47] De Vera Religione lv, 113, P. L. XXXIV, 172.

[48] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus XLVI, P. L. XL,

[49] Contra Academicos I, i, 1. P. L. XXXII, 905-906.

[50] De Beata Vita iv, 34, P. L. XXXII, 975-976.

[51] Soliloquia I, i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 869. See Plotinus, Enneads VI, v, 1 and VI, vii, 12.

[52] Ibid. I, i, 3, P. L. XXXII, 870-871.

[53] Ibid. I, i, 4, P. L. XXXII, 871.

[54] Ibid. I, i, 6, P. L. XXXII, 872.

[55] Ibid. II, vi, 9, P. L. XXXII, 889. Plotinus' "First" does not move toward any other. Ennead VI, viii, 8.

[56] De Musica VI, xvii, 58, P. L. XXXII, 1193.

[57] De Libero Arbitrio I, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1224. ...rectorem quoque justissimum eorum omnium quae creavit...

[58] Ibid. III, xv, 44, P. L. XXXII, 1292. Quia enim nemo superat leges omnipotentis Creatoris...

[59] De Vera Religione xxv, 46. Quoniam igitur divina providentia, non solum singulis hominibus quasi privatim, sed universo generi humano tanquam publice consulit.... P. L. XXXIV, 142. Compare with Plotinus, Ennead III, iii, 2f; Zeller, Stoics, op. cit., p. 144.

[60] Ibid. lv. 113, P. L. XXXIV, 172. unum Deum ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia....

[61] Hausheer, "St. Augustine's Conception of Time," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI, 1937, p. 509 is correct in pointing to the absolute difference of time and eternity in Augustine. But God as sustainer of the universe balances this point and keeps God from being entirely unrelated to the present existence of the world. This is also applicable to Grabowski, op. cit. p. 231 when he says, "In other words, God and the Universe belong to different categories of being."

[62] F. J. Thonnard. "Caractères platoniciens de l'Ontologie Augustinienne," Augustinus Magister, Vol. I, p. 318.

[63] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xvii, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1324. ...per quam Pater ipse cognoscitur.

[64] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, xxi, 34, P. L. XXXIV, 190. Matthew 24:36.

[65] De Vera Religione xliii, 81, P. L. XXXIV, 159; De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus XXIII, P. L. XL, 16.

[66] Ibid. LX, P. L. XL, 48.

[67] Contra Academicos III, xx. 43. Mihi autem certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere:....

[68] De Beata Vita iv, 34, P. L. XXXII, 975. ...Dei Filium nihil esse aliud quam Die Sapientiam (I Cor. 1:24): et est Dei Filius profecto Deus.

[69] De Ordine II, v, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1002.

[70] De Musica VI, xvi, 52, P. L. XXXII, 1190.

[71] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xvi, 27, P. L. XXXII, 1322.

[72] Ibid. xvi, 28, P. L. XXXII, 1323.

[73] Ibid. xvii, 30 and 31, P. L. XXXII, 1324

[74] Ibid. xix, 35 and 36, P. L. XXXII, 1326.

[75] De Quantitate Animae xiii, 76, P. L. XXXII, 1077...a Filio Dei potentissimo, aeterno, incommutabili susceptum hominem....

[76] De Libero Arbitrio I, ii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 1224. Filium Dei...Dei Virtutem et Dei Sapientiam nominamus, per quam fecit omnia, quae de nihilo facta sunt.

[77] Ibid. II, xv, 39, P. L. XXXII, 1262. ...quod aeterno Patri sit aequalis quae ab ipso genita est Sapientia.

[78] Ibid. II, xviii, 49, P. L. XXXII, 1267. Matthew 10:30.

[79] Ibid. II, xx, 54, P. L. 1270.

[80] Ibid. III, x, 30, and 31, P. L. XXXII, 1286.

[81] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, ii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 174.

[82] Ibid. II, viii, 10, P. L. XXXIV, 201. ...qui peccatum non fecit (I Peter ii:22); et ab illo recreati et vivificati resituamur in paradisum, ubi Latro ille cum ipso eo die meruit esse, quo vitam istam finivit (Luke xxiii: 43).

[83] Ibid. II, xii, 16, P. L. XXXIV, 205.

[84] Ibid. II, xxiv, 37, P. L. XXXIV, 215-216.

[85] De Magistro xi, 38, P. L. XXXII, 1216. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus (Ephes. iii:16, 17), id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia....

[86] Epistola xiv, 3, P. L. XXXIII, 80. ...quis, quaeso te, hominibus tantus apparuit quantus ille homo quem Deus suscepit...

[87] DeVera Religione viii, 14, P. L. XXXIV, 129. ...Non enim jam illa hominis sacrosancta susceptio, et. Virginis partus, et mors Filii Dei pro nobis, et resurrectio a mortuis, et in coelum ascensio, et consessus ad dexteram Patris...

[88] Ibid. xvi, 30, P. L. XXXIV, 134. ...Sapientia Dei, id est unicus Filius consubstantialis Patri et coaeternus, totum hominem suscipere dignatus est, et. Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis (John. 1:14).

[89] Ibid. xxxvi, 66, P. L. XXXIV, 151.

[90] Ibid. xxxviii, 71, P. L. XXXIV, 153. Matthew 4:1-10 and Luke 4:2-12.

[91] Ibid. xliii, 81, P. L. XXXIV, 159.

[92] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus XI, P. L. XL, 14.

[93] Ibid. XVI, P. L. XL, 15.

[94] Ibid. XLII, P. L. XL, 27.

95 Ibid, L. P. XL, 31-32.

96 Ibid. LVI, P.L. XL, 39.

97 Ibid. LXI, P. L. XL, 49-50. The same position is found in De Consensu Evangelistarum, I, ii, 4, P. L. XXXIV, 1044.

98 Ibid. LXIII, P. L. XL, 54.

99 He takes this step in Confessiones VII, ix, 13, P. L. XXXII, 740-741.

100 C. Boyer, L'Idéé...op. cit. p. 84f. Ambrose: Gesta Concilii Aquileiensis Contra Palladium et Secundianum Haereticos, P. L. XVI, 916-939. also De Fide, books I and II, P. L. XVI, 527f.

101 J. Burleigh is correct that Augustine had not adequately dealt with Incarnation up to the time of De Magistro; however, he had accepted the doctrine on faith. The City of God, p. 71.

102 Capánaga, "San Agustin en neustro tiempo," Augstinus, Vol. I, 1956, p. 35. For a view of Augustine's more mature understanding of the second element of the Trinity see De Trinitate I, xiif, P. L. XLII, 836-844.

103 T. J. van Bavel, Recherches sur la Christologie de saint Augustin, p. 11. "L'Incarnation est, pour le nouveau converti, une mystère sublime, ineffable, inaccessible aux orgueilleux, et un preuve de la miséricorde divine."

104 De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae I, xvii, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1324.

105 De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, v, 8, P. L. XXXIV, 177. Et Spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam....

106 Ibid. I, xxii, 34, P. L. XXXIV, 189; De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus. XLIII, Quare Filius Dei in homine apparuit, et Spiritus sanctus in columba? He does not seem to know well Ambrose's De Spirito Sancto, P. L. XVI, begin 703. For a developed view see Augustine's De Trinitate XV, xvii-xix. P. L. XLII, 1079-1987.

107 De Beata Vita iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976. ...a quo inducaris in veritatem, qua veritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo. Quae tria unum Deum...Fove percantes, Trinitas.

[108] De Ordine II, v, 16, P. L. XXXII, 1002. ...unum Deum omnipotentem eumque tripotentem, Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum sanctum....

[109] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII

[110] De Libero Arbitrio III, xi, 33, P. L. XXXII, 1287. ...a quo et per quem et in quo facta sunt omnia.

[111] Ibid. III, xxi, 60, P. L. XXXII, 1300. De cujus Trinitatis unitate et aequalitate, et singularum in ea personarum quadam proprietate, non hic locus est desserendi.

[112] Epistola XI, P. L. XXXIII, 75-76.

[113] De Vera Religione vii, 13, P. L. XXXIV, 128-129. ...sed et simul omnia et unamquamque naturam Patrem fecisse per Filium in dono Spiritus sancti.

[114] Ibid. viii, 14, P. L. XXXIV, 129.

[115] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus XXXIII, P. L. XL, 27.

[116] Grandgeorge, op. cit. p. 96; J. Blick, "Platonisme et Christianisme dan la conception augustinienne du Dieu Créatuer," Recherches de Science Religieuse, Tome XXX, n. 2. p. 184. Plotinus, Ennead I, vii, 2; II, ix, 1; V, i, 10.

[117] C. C. Richardson, "The Enigma of the Trinity in Battenhouse, op. cit. p. 239; V. J. Bourke, Augustine's Quest for Wisdom, p. 206.

[118] J. Itturrioz, S. J. "El Trinitarismo en la filosoffa de San Agustín, " Revista Española de Theología, Vol. III, no. 1, 1943. Some of the passages he cites are not clearly referring to the Trinity. They may well be matters of dialectic. His statement, "que el trinitarismo agustiano no es una supraestructura de su filosoffa, ni siguiera su corona y mejor acabamieto; es la vida, el nervio de su filosoffa," p. 128, would not be true of the period here under study. Compare these early references to the Trinity with those in Augustine's later De Trinitate. A summary is found in XV, iii. P. L. XLII, 1058-1061.

[119] W. P. Tolley, op. cit. p. 44; É. Gilson, Philosophie et Incarnation selon saint Augustin, p. 27; Bruno Swatalski. Plotinus and the Ethics of St. Augustine. p. 40; Plotinus, Ennead III, viii, 9.

[120] P. Alfaric, op. cit. pp. 520-521; J. Burleigh, The City of God, p. 69. A.. Dahl, Augustin und Plotin. p. 107. I Chevalier, S. Augustin et la Pensée Grecque les relations Trinitaires, distinguishes between relationship of procession or generation and a distinction in trinity which does not mean a difference of substance. He thinks early Augustine shows procession. Perhaps he does, but in the period under study here he also says there is no difference in substance.

[121] Compare with Symbolum Augustini, the African form of the Apostles' Creed and also the Nicene Creed. The Creeds of Christendom by P. Schaff, Vol. II.

[122] R. Otto suggests that opposition to the idea of personality in God does not always deny personality but may only point ot that which exceeds the concept of personality, which is only a part of God. The Idea of the Holy, pp. 202, 208.

[123] H. R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p. 224. It seems rather, that Augustine, though influenced by Neoplatonism, always recognizes elements of the Christian creeds denied by that philosophy. For the nous see A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, p. 33.

[124] E. J. Bicknell, "The Trinitarian Doctrine of Augustine and Aquinas," in Essays Catholic and Critical, p. 150.

[125] W. R. Matthews, God in Christian Thought and Experience, pp. 99-100.

Part II, D

The Relationship of Man and God

Man is related to God in the ways which have been described in previous chapters. Man in the world is aware of God in his life. He knows that he has been created by God and that he continues to live only because he is sustained by Him. But in relationship to God, he understands that his actual position is far different from the potential status he has been given in creation. Man in the present world is in an imperfect relationship to God.

1. Sin

The definition of sin is a description of man's imperfect relationship with God. Examining Augustine's earliest writings, one does not find any formal attempt to give a definition of sin. The problem of evil is discussed at length in De Ordine, but those who participate in that dialogue assume that their terms are defined when, in fact, they are not. Augustine's first definition of sin arises in his discussion with the Manicheans.

De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae indicates that sin has been an act of coveting mortal things and of turning away from the divine.[1] It is, then, a turning away from God. On the other hand, it is an attempt to be equal to Him. Man's sin, Augustine says, is his desire to become like God, and pride leads to disobedience. In turn, there is brought about a lusting after things which are other than God. That lusting leads to a separation from Him.[2] To covet is to begin to sin. It leads to a breaking of God's law in a manner which is described in the Old Testament story of Adam.[3]

Evil and sin are not systematically distinguished in Augustine's earlier writings. For that reason one examines his explanation of evil for evidence of his definition of sin. The sequel book, De Moribus Manichaeorum, presses members of that sect to clarify what they mean by evil. According to Augustine, they would answer that evil is contrary to nature. Granting their point, he replies that they mean evil has no nature and is not a substance. Nature means being in its own kind. Although "nature" is the old term, the present word is "being," "essence,"

take in later years.

The cause of sin is given more attention in De Musica. Augustine finds an explanation in the Scriptures, Initium superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo, and initium omnis peccati superbia (Eccl . 10:14 and 15). Pride is the beginning of the fall, for man thought himself without need of God.[21] The love of inferior pleasures, then, pollutes the soul.[22]

The books written at Rome against the Manicheans deny that God is the cause of evil. Augustine implies that passions (cupiditatibus) would turn man away from the laws of God were temperance not restraining them.[23] Although the Catholic Church recognizes God as the author of all substances, it also maintains that He is not the author of evil.[24] God makes (facio) good, but He shapes (condo) evil after it has become a fact. The material from which God has created man was not evil.

De Libero Arbitrio states that sin is voluntary. It is unthinkable that God should be the author of evil; neither could He justly punish one for evil deeds unless they were voluntary.[26] Sin arises in the free choice by man. After he has turned away from Highest Being for something less, he considers that evil which deceived him through his lack of knowledge.[27] Why does man turn from God? If one could name an efficient cause, the act would no longer be voluntary. When the act is voluntary there can be no efficient cause. God is not the cause. The opposite of God is nothing (nihil). Nothing is not something and cannot be a cause. A movement to defect does not exist unless one wills it.[28]

The cause of sin is not in the nature of free will itself. If by nature free will turned from God it would not be free will. The mind's turning from Creator to creature arises as a voluntary movement. Goodness of God is exhibited in His creating even those whom He knew would sin. A creature which sins through its free will is still more excellent than a creature which cannot sin due to the absence of free will.[29] To some people there may appear to be two sources of man's sin. One source is his spontaneous thought while other is the persuasion by his neighbor. But closer consideration discloses that yielding to or refusing the persuasion rests ultimately upon man's will.[30] If one yeilds to something less than or equal to oneself, the sin is by free will. If one is corrupted by something stronger than oneself, sin has not occurred in the one violated, for vice lies in the stronger.[31]

The root of all evil, reads I Timothy 6:10, is avaritiam. The Greeks call it φιλαργυρια for love of money. This immoderate desire is also knows as cupiditas. The cause of evil is, then, a bad will.[32] No prior cause can be given; the act is from will

or not from will. The possibility of modification is introduced, for there are things done in ignorance which are wrong.[33] Moreover, there are times when one wills to do right but lacks the power.[34] Augustine explains that the description in those passages of Romans and Galatians is not a description of the essential nature of man. They are, rather, a description of man emerging from damnation. His inability to fulfill his will is a part of the penal state; it is the result of sin rather than the first cause of sin. Man suffers today the effects of the sin of Adam and Eve since he does not humble himself to rely on God's aid. Involuntary personal acts are termed sins because they have their origin in the first sin when man acted in freedom. Equity would not permit Adam to beget children better than himself.[35] On one hand, if all souls are derived from one, who can deny sinning when the first man sinned. A soul born in ignorance is under no necessity to remain that way. On the other hand, if the soul has existed previous to coming to the body, it still has the duty to govern with virtue and not succumb to the body.[36] Souls pay for their own sins which can be ascribed only to exercise of their wills. Although some of the material discussed in the above section may be from after the ordination, it is consistent with the definitely early section. The portion which could be entirely late is Augustine's explanation of how one can will to do good and not be able to do so.

De Genesi Contra Manichaeos further explores the cause of sin. Augustine is reluctant to admit the presence of a physical devil in the garden of Eden. He views the temptation as one of thought.[37] Even today man's sin may be expressed in the characters which prefigure it. The serpent makes a temptation through thought. One who is persuaded is like woman. If reason (ratio) consents man is expelled from the happy life (beata vita) and paradise, for sin occurs in an act of the will although overt action does not follow.[38] Viewed in one way the cause of man's sin is his desire or will to be even as gods.[39] For Adam to blame Eve and Eve to blame the serpent was absurd. There was no reason for her to think she should obey the serpent rather than God.[40] Eve's deduction was through an offer of wisdom, but her sin originated in her free will.[41]

Other passages are found in De Vera Religione clarifying the cause of sin. There would have been no sin if the soul had not worshipped some creature in place of God.[42] The cause, if any, implied would lie in a wrong choice. Even the evil angel or devil has only conditional existence. He is evil through free choice, for he loved himself more than God and refused to obey Him. Since his pride led him short of supreme being, he fell.[43] The first vice of the rational soul is in its doing that which highest inner truth forbids. Vice arises in man through his own

action.[44] The origin of impiety is using the creation contrary to the will of God. The origin is choosing to worship a creature rather than the Creator.[45] Evil is sin and sin's penalty which arise only in a voluntary defect from essence.[46]

De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus also dismiss any efficient cause of sin. Contrary to the will of God, man exercised his own free will in a way which led to his fall.[47] There is no other cause for evil.[48]

The cause of sin as Augustine conceives it is easy to summarize. Sin is not due to influence by some evil power which is completely against God. Sin is not caused by God Himself. The cause of sin must lie in man. The nearest to a cause for sin one can come is man's free will. But free will has no cause. The will is not by nature prone to make the wrong choice, otherwise there would be no sin. Strictly speaking, sin has no "cause." It originates in man's exercise of his free will.

Augustine's answer has received much criticism. He has been criticized because he finds no positive cause for evil.[49] He does not explain, it is said, how man became inclined to prefer the lesser goods.[50] To the present writer it seems that these criticisms are directed to aspects of Augustine's system other than his explanation of sin's origin. They seem to disagree with his definition of sin. If they would accept his definition of sin, no other explanation of its origin could be given; any other origin would produce action which Augustine would not judge to be sin.

Other problems do exist with serious consequences. Augustine has already written on the condition of man's not being able to do what he wills. But the results of original sin go back to the free decision of the first pair of humans. In this area is to develop his later doctrine during the Pelagian controversy. However, although he then gives greater weight to the limitations upon man's free will, he does not dismiss it.[51] He intends to recognize, even in his latest works, free will as origin of sin.[52]

Augustine's explanation of the cause of sin has influenced subsequent Christian theology more than any other of his teachings. His teaching has two chief points, both of which are present in this early period. On the one hand, he insists that sin is completely voluntary, for by definition, defect by other means is not sin. On the other, he is aware that men since Adam can will to do right and not be able to do so. These two facts which emerge from the experience of mankind must be present in every Christian doctrine of sin. How the two aspects should be related is a problem which twenty centuries of discussion have not settled. It seems to some Protestant denominations

that Roman Catholics have emphasized freedom of the will and have broken from Augustine's belief that man can be unable to what he wills. To some Protestants and some Roman Catholics it seems that there are Protestants claiming to follow Augustine who emphasize man's inability to do what he wills in such a way as to destroy the place of free will as a cause of sin. The present writer does not offer to solve the problem, but he does offer an observation upon Augustine's combining of the two poles. In the early period before his ordination, Augustine emphasizes freedom of the will without sufficient regard both to the limitations of the will itself and to man's ability to make his actions conform to his will. In the last days of his fight against Pelagianism Augustine emphasizes the limitation of the ability to will and the ability to act upon the will with a danger of denying its freedom. His early answer is given before he is sufficiently aware of the problem described by St. Paul, and his later answer is extreme in order to counter the extremities of Pelagianism. A completely satisfactory solution of the cause of sin has yet to appear in Christian theology.

The results of sin also influence man's relationship to God. De Ordine declares that although evil is not caused by God, it is included in God's order when it becomes a fact. Evil is not outside divine order and given a fitting place within it.[53] The teacher in De Musica tells the pupil to marvel that the body is able to move the soul, for had it not been for the first sin the soul could have governed the body without deterioration, corruption, and death.[54] If the soul had not sinned it would have had the energy to overcome the body of death.[55] Whereas obedience to the laws of God could have kept man at the head of creation, his sin has led him to be pursued by the law.[56]

Augustine lists the evils which follow sin in De Libero Arbitrio. The soul is dominated by lust, accepts the false as though it were true, and is plagued by fear and longing. This penalty is altogether just even if it is harsh.[57] God has established the universe so that man may either sin or not sin. If he sins he deserves the punishment which follows the sin. One should refrain from saying that sinful things ought not to be. They are punished only in relationship to what they might have been. There is no interval between the sin and punishment, for the beauty of the universe must not be defiled. Moreover, what at present is not openly punished is reserved for future judgment.[58] One form of punishment is man's inability to do right when he wishes to. Man in such a state is not good and does not have the power to do good. He has both ignorance and difficulty which are the two sides of punishment. But it is only just that man should lose what he cannot rightly use.[59] The sin of the first pair has been given a penalty which extends to all offspring, for those begotten are not better than their

parents.[60]

In De Genesi Contra Manichaeos the penalty for sin has been extended to all creation. Extensive punishment does not mean that all creatures have sinned, but as a result of man's sin they are placed before man in such a way as to turn him from his fallen state.[61] Man himself has lost his state of perfection, his being created in the image of God.[62] Furthermore, carnal generation of the species is a result of the fall, for before that time man and woman lived in a chaste relationship described by the Lord in Luke 20:34.

The figures of the fountains in De Genesi also give the penalty for sin. Man was created to be nourished from within, but sin resulted in his becoming dependent upon human words.[63] He now works in the dryness of sin, and his body has become fragile and destined to a death merited by damnation.[64] The unhappiness is essentially due to man's turning away from God, for he is by created nature unable to be happy apart from God.[65] However, the turning away from God was a turning inward to himself to hypocracy and passion. Darkness symbolizes the fact that reason had left man. The serpent is sentenced first since he does not confess his sin. His punishment is to have power over those condemned by God.[66] Woman is to suffer in childbirth as a sign of punishment. The thorns among which man works are the torturous questions and thoughts for the provisions of this life. No man escapes this sentence.[67] All the punishment above described is entirely just.[68]

Penalty for sin is discussed further in De Vera Religione. Penalty serves the purpose of teaching one the difference between the precept which he disobeyed and the sin he committed. Comparing former and latter states one easily sees the good he did not love enough.[69] The condemnation is not itself evil, for condemning sin contributes to the perfection of the universe.[70] In abandoning highest being is freedom from justice and slavery under sin.[71] Misuse of the mind to love fleshly things rather than eternal things leads to one's being cast into exterior darkness. This darkness begins with fleshly knowledge and weakness of bodily senses. Punishment keeps sinners from peace, for what they have sinfully loved will be perfected in them.

One of the several questions states that penalty differs according to the sin. Some sins are from ignorance, some from infirmity, and some from malice.[73] Augustine quotes Hebrews 12:6, "For the Lord corrects those He loves, and whips every son he receives."[74] Penalty follows sin. The universe could not remain beautiful without punishment being given for sin. The punishment is an element for good in a world where sin has occurred. This fact may be seen in terms of the Genesis story of the fall or in another way. Man is made for fellowship with God, but turning

away brings misery. The punishment or evil which follows sin renders it more difficult for man to exercise his free will. He sometimes has the experience of not being able to do the good he wills to do. Although the results of sin are altogether just, they are miserable.

The penalty for sin in Augustine's early thought is conceived in two ways which are supplementary. His earliest views of the results of sin concentrate upon the limitations to the human mind. In the fall, mind comes under sway of the body. Reason becomes more dependent upon the senses. Man turns outward rather than inward to gain knowledge. The body exceeds the power of the will. As he expounds Genesis, Augustine finds more serious penalties which apply to the whole of creation. Thorns and pests spring up to plague man. A life of intellectual leisure is ended by the necessity for physical labor. More striking is what seems to the present writer to be Augustine's projection of his opinion that physical union for purposes of reproduction is a penalty for sin. Then in his latest works of the period he begins to discuss possible punishments for sin which will be inflicted after the life on earth. The weakest part of Augustine's early concept of the results of sin is his failure to recognize the pervasive social evil which results from sinning individuals and that evil's role in prompting further sin.

Augustine's doctrine of sin may be summarized in a few words. Sin is the voluntary act of turning away from God. There is no cause for the action other than man's free will. But the act of sin is evil and man calls its results evil. The penalty follows immediately upon sin, informing man of the serious nature of his action and at the same time rendering it difficult for him to extract himself through his free will.

Several influences are seen in Augustine's formulation of sin. One is his reaction to the Manichean doctrine of evil as an absolute being and as a state of unending conflict. He finds another position in the combination of Neoplatonism and Christianity, especially in the book of Genesis. From Neoplatonism he takes the idea that evil is nothing and that alienation from Being is a turning toward non-being. He differs from Neoplatonism by distinguishing between ontological inferiority and sin which is a voluntary act of choosing the ontologically inferior.[75] Moreover, his concept of sin is formed in part through his defense of Genesis. Although there is little new added to the definition and explanation of sin, the penalty is seen in terms of Genesis and select passages from the Pauline letters.[76]

Most criticism of Augustine's doctrine of sin is leveled at the answers given in the Pelagian controversy. In that period

Augustine continues to hold his early concepts of the nature and cause of sin.[77] But he lays greater emphasis upon the results of sin. In formulating a systematic doctrine of original sin, Augustine relies heavily upon St. Paul, but to some scholars it has seemed that Augustine has exceeded Paul's severity.[78] He has placed too much emphasis upon a literal interpretation of the Genesis account with a result that he may over value the original perfection of man.[79] Although his early writings fail to give adequate attention to the crippling results of sin, his later ones seem to many Protestants and Roman Catholics alike to overstate man's imprisonment in destiny.[80]

Man in the world is aware that he is in relationship with God. One of the possible relationships is alienation. Man is understood as one who has turned away from God as an act of choice. He is one under the penalty of sin. Part of the penalty is his inability to accomplish the restoration he seeks.

The doctrine of sin held by Augustine before his ordination contains the essential outline of his views at the end of his days as a bishop. In terms of definition, cause, and results of sin the seeds of his later concept are present. Although his doctrine is not formed apart from experience, it is based more upon writings of others which he has taken as authoritative than upon his observations of his world. It is the concept of a theorist rather than the concept of a Christian priest involved in the evils of Church, State, economics, and family. He rightly relies heavily upon the Genesis story, but his practice of regarding those chapters of history of actual facts prevents his using the story only as a guide to help him make his own interpretation of sin on the basis of other evidence. The freedom from regarding the Genesis story as history of actual events, which has come in the last century, has not been able, in so relatively short a time, to correct the results of that earlier view. Augustine's pre-ordination view of sin is helpful in understanding his later concept and the concepts of those who claim to follow him. It is not satisfactory as a concept of sin for twentieth century Christian.

Part II, D

The Relationship of Man and God

1. Sin

Notes

[1] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae vii, 12, P. L. XXXIII, 1315.

[2] Ibid. xii, 21, P. L. XXXII, 1320.

[3] Ibid, xix, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1326. This definition is different from Clement of Alexandria's statement that everything contrary to right reason is sin. Paedogogus, I, xiii, P. G. VIII. 371.

[4] De Moribus Manichaeorum ii, 2, P. L. XXXII, 1346. Idipsum ergo malum est, si praeter pertinaciam velitis attendere, deficere ab essentia et ad id tendere ut non sit. Compare with Plotinus, Ennead III, ix, 2.

[5] Ibid. v, 7, P. L. XXXII, 1347-1348. Plotinus makes Evil that which is without form or Being. It is non-being or matter (without any form). Ennead I, viii, 3; I, viii, 9. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 48, A. 1.

[6] De Libero Arbitrio I, i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 1223. Ex quo male facere nihil est, nisi a disciplina deviare.

[7] Ibid. I, iii, 7, P. L. XXXII, 1225.

[8] Ibid. II, xvi, 43, P. L. XXXII, 1264.

[9] Ibid. II, xviii, 53, P. L. XXXII, 1269. Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono, et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut exterius, aut ad inferius, peccat.

[10] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, xv, 22, P. L. XXXIV, 207. Videmus his verbis per superbiam peccatum esse persuastum: ad hoc enim valet quod dictum est, 'Eritis sicut dii.'

[11] De Vera Religione, xvi, 31, P. L. XXXIV, 135. Non enim ullum peccatum committi potest, nisi aut dum appetuntur ea quae ille contempsit, aut fugiuntur quae ille sustinuit.

[12] Ibid. xx, 38, P. L. XXXIV, 138.

[13] Ibid. xx, 40, P. L. XXXIV, 139.

[14] Ibid. xxi, 41, P. L. XXXIV, 139-140.

[15] Ibid. xxxvii, 68, P. L. XXXIV, 152.

[16] Ibid. xl, 76, P. L. XXXIV, 156. ...cum in his omnibus non sit malum nisi peccatum, et poena peccati, hoc est defectus voluntarius a summa essentia, et labor in ultima non voluntarius: quod alio mode sic dici potest, libertas a justitia, et servitus sub peccato.

[17] H. C. Puech, Le Manicheisme, pp. 74-75.

[18] Grandgeorge, op. cit. p. 115.

[19] De Ordine I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 978.

[20] Ibid. II, xviii, 48, P. L. XXXII, 1017-1018.

[21] De Musica VI, xiii, 40, P. L. XXXII, 1184-1185. Ecclesiasticus 10:14f.

[22] Ibid. VI, xiv, 46, P. L. XXXII, 1187.

[23] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xix, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1326.

[24] De Moribus Manichaeorum ii, 3, P. L. XXXII, 1346.

[25] Ibid. vii, 9, P. L. XXXII, 1549.

[26] De Libero Arbitrio I, i, 1, P. L. XXXII, 1223. .. quisque malus sui malefacti auctor est. The Fall in Plotinus is by necessity or by nature rather than by choice. Ennead IV, iii, 13.

[27] Ibid. II, xvi, 43, P. L. XXXII, 1264.

[28] Ibid. II, xx, 54, P. L. XXXII, 1269-1270. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II, xv, P. G. VIII.

[29] Ibid. III, v, 15, P. L. XXXII, 1278.

[30] Ibid. III, x, 29, P. L. XXXII, 1285. Plotinus, Ennead V, i, 1, speaks of a free choice in the soul's fall, but this idea conflicts with his notion of fall by nature of things.

[31] Ibid. III, xiv, 39, P. L. XXXII, 1290. In Plotinus man is an active agent in sinning whether he wishes to sin or not. Ennead III, ii, 10.

[32] Ibid. III, xvii, 48, P. L. XXXII, 1294-1295.

[33] Ibid. III, xviii, 51, P. L. XXXII, 1295-1296.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid. III, xx, 55, P. L. XXXII, 1297.

[36] Ibid. III, xx, 56f, P. L. XXXII, 1298.

[37] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, xiv, 20, P. L. XXXIV, 206-207.

[38] Ibid. II, xiv, 21, P. L. XXXIV, 207.

[39] Ibid. II, xv, 22, P. L. XXXIV, 207.

[40] Ibid. II, xvii, 25, P. L. XXXIV, 209.

[41] Ibid. II, xxvii, 41, P. L. XXXIV, 218.

[42] De Vera Religione x, 18, P. L. XXXIV, 130.

[43] Ibid. xiii, 26, P. L. XXXIV, 133.

[44] Ibid. xx, 38f, P. L. XXXIV, 138. Est autum vitium primum animae rationalis voluntas ea faciendi quae vetat summa et intima veritas.

[45] Ibid. xxxvii, 68, P. L. XXXIV, 152.

[46] Ibid. xl, 76, P. L. XXXIV, 152.

[47] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus. III, P. L. XL, 11.

[48] Ibid. IV, P. L. XL, 12.

[49] N. Abercrombie, op. cit. "No positive causality is found or required for an absence of being. This is the weakest part of Saint Augustine's moral philosophy; we may here regret the defects of that pagan tradition which elsewhere served him so well." p. 33.

[50] David Roberts; op. cit. p. 169.

[51] One may say with Thonnard, "Dans l'âme humaine, qui reste au centre des préoccupations philosophiques d'Augustin, un des faits les plus frappants est la domination universelle de le volonté." p. 337, "Les Fonctions sensibles de l'âme humaine selon S. Augustin." L'Année Théologique Augustinienne, 1952, no. 4; J. Morgan, The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine, pp. 154-156, lists four ways Augustine used "freedom:" 1) In a general way that distinguishes man from a machine. 2) Freedom enjoyed only by Adam, posse non peccare. 3) Freedom after his fall is freedom to sin. 4) Freedom in a restored state which cannot sin.

[52] Joseph Ball, "Les développements de la doctrine de la liberté chez saint Augustin," L'Année Théologique, 1946, no. 4, holds that throughout Augustine's writings he maintains man's free will, even in his doctrine of grace.

[53] De Ordine II, vii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 1005.

[54] De Musica VI, iv, 7, P. L. XXXII, 1166.

[55] Ibid. VI, v, 14, P. L. XXXII, 1170-1171. Romans 7:24f.

[56] Ibid. VI, xi, 30, P. L. XXXII, 1130.

[57] De Libero Arbitrio I, xi, 22, P. L. XXXII, 1233.

[58] Ibid. II, xv, 44, P. L. XXXII, 1292-1293.

[59] Ibid. III, xviii, 51 f. P. L. XXXII, 1295-1296.

[60] Ibid. III, xx, 55, P. L. XXXII, 1297. He later thinks sinful children are born of good parents. De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia I, xix, 21, P. L. XLIV, 425-426. Man was created good, but all men now partake of sin of the first man. Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, II, iv, 8, P. L. XLIV, 576.

[61] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos I, xiii, 19, P. L. XXXIV, 112.

[62] Ibid. I, xviii, 29, P. L. XXXIV, 187.

[63] Ibid. II, v, 6, P. L. XXXIV, 199.

[64] Ibid. II, vii, 8, P. L. XXXIV, 200.

[65] Ibid. II, xv, 22, P. L. XXXIV, 208.

[66] Ibid. II, xvii, 26, P. L. XXXIV, 209.

[67] Ibid. II, xx, 30, P. L. XXXIV, 211-212.

[68] Ibid. II, xxii, 34, P. L. XXXIV, 213-214.

[69] De Vera Religione xx, 38, P. L. XXXIV, 138.

[70] Ibid. xxiii, 44, P. L. XXXIV, 141.

[71] Ibid. xl, 76, P. L. XXXIV, 156.

[72] Ibid. liv, 104, P. L. XXXIV, 168. Perficietur ergo in eis quod amant, ut ibi sint ubi eis sit ploratus et stridor dentium. (Matthew 22:13).

[73] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus XXVI, P. L. XL, 17-18.

[74] Ibid. LXXXII, P. L. XXXVII, 98-99.

[75] S. R. Hopper's statement cannot be accepted if it intends to deny the distinction which the present writer has shown in Augustine. "The Anti-Manichean Writings," in Battenhouse, op. cit. p. 168.

[76] J. Burleigh, The City of God, p. 53. "His alleged continuing Manicheaism seems to me to be in reality his Paulinism; where the problem of evil is resolved into the problem of sin." Cunningham, op. cit. p. 86, rightly says that Augustine always maintained men are fully responsible for their actions; see Retractationes I, xiii, 5, P. L. XXXII, 603-604.

[77] F. R. Tennant in Philosophical Theology, vol. II, p. 182, thinks that Augustine suppresses the positive side of sin, man's choosing something other than God, not simply neglecting God. Passages cited above indicate that there is some ground for Tennant's view, but Augustine does say that man chooses what appears to him to be better than God.

[78] E. J. Bicknell, "Sin and the Fall," Essays Catholic and Critical, p. 214. Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology, pp. 335-344.

[79] N. P. Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin, p. 360.

[80] A. E. Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist. p. 165.

Part II, D

The Relationship of Man and God

2. Salvation

Man is in relationship to God, but the relationship may be one of alienation. The consequences of alienation are unpleasant and threatening. Anyone who understands his condition and its variation from that for which he has been created may be concerned to restore a proper relationship with God. Restoring the relationship may be spoken of as salvation.

Augustine's definition of salvation is not concise and consistent. At various times he speaks of the process of restoration in different terms. With his greater understanding of Christian doctrine his formulations become more definite. This process of defining salvation is seen through a study of his writings arranged in chronological order.

The first dialogue on salvation describes it in terms of the happy life. Augustine believes that one who has God has a happy life.[1] To be happy one must have the object of his desire when he wishes it; he must not be able to lose it against his will. Wisdom, or supreme measure, is an object which gives happiness. But wisdom is none other than the Son of God. Happiness comes in attaining the supreme measure, in having God in the soul.[2] The happy life, satisfaction of the soul, comes by piously and perfectly recognizing by whom one is led into truth, the truth enjoyed, and that through which one is connected to the supreme measure.[3]

Augustine also speaks of salvation as vision of God. Far from the senses there is another world perceived by a few souls.[4] Jesus has discussed it in His words, "My kingdom is not of this world."[5] In the Soliloquia "Reason" holds that no mind is healed (sanatur) in order that it can see God or understand Him unless it has faith, hope, and love. When it is healed, the soul must rightly look. The end of the soul's looking is the vision of God (visio Dei).[6]

Salvation is described as joining oneself to God. In De Quantitate Animae he defines true religion as that which

overcomes the breach introduced by sin and unites the soul to God.[7] Although following after God indicates an appetite for happiness, he says in De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, finding Him is happiness itself.[8] To reach Him does not mean to be exactly as He is. It means, rather, to be near Him, to be in contact with Him, and to be occupied by His truth and sanctity. The four virtues are nothing other than perfect love of God.[9] He is man's highest good. To love God with all one's heart, soul, and mind is man's one perfection.[10]

De Libero Arbitrio uses the above mentioned terms to define salvation. The happy life comes to one who truly wills it. The joy which comes from using the good will may be described as the happy life.[11] God commands that the effort be made and prepares the blessed city (civitatis beatissimae) for those who triumph over the devil.[12]

De Genesi Contra Manichaeos introduces two new elements in definition. Sin is overcome when one possesses the spiritual Adam, the Lord Jesus Christ. By this channel one is restored to paradise.[13] Deeper in his exposition he explains that by hating flesh and by a strong love of truth in the present life it is possible for one to merit angelic transformation.[14]

De Vera Religione implies that salvation is contemplation of the eternal. The blessed life is constituted in worshipping one God. In the Christian religion alone is one led to truth and happiness.[15] Augustine seems to say, in his imaginary conversation with Plato, that the object of salvation is the healing of the human mind in order that it might behold unchanging form. To contemplate this eternity is given to the rational and intellectual soul.[16]

Salvation may also be defined in terms of stages of the soul's development.[17] The ages of a "new man" are measured in spiritual advances rather than in years. In the first grade man is given nourishing historical examples to follow. In the second stage he begins to forget things human and to look toward the divine. The third step finds him with chaste union of soul and body. Fourthly, he is ready to meet and overcome the persecutions of the world. In the fifth stage he has peace and tranquility on all sides. The sixth stage is his passing into perfect form. In the seventh and highest stage man enjoys eternal rest and perpetual beatitude. But Augustine says that no one can live as the new and heavenly man in the present life, for he must always live with the old man.[18] The truly unconquered man does not hold to God in order to merit extra good but because to hold to God is good in itself.[19]

A fourfold relationship of man is seen in the diverse questions. One stage is man before the law, freely following

carnal appetites. The second is man under the law, prohibited from sin yet not free from it. Thirdly, under grace his bent to sinning is broken. In the fourth stage man lives in peace completely ruled by the spirit.[20]

Through Augustine's definitions of salvation runs a common denominator. Salvation is overcoming the temporal by progressing toward and adhering to the eternal.[21] The happy life, paradise, vision of God, truth, the blessed city, unchanging form, and the kingdom not of this world all incorporate the realm of the unchangeable. This state is the restoration of man to the condition he lost through sin.

As Augustine's definition of sin is man's turning away from God to worship some creature as ultimate, so follows the definition of salvation as man's turning away from the worship of creatures in order to worship the true Ultimate. Whereas sin delivers the soul into the power of the body, salvation finds the soul in triumph over the body. Whereas sin destroys the vision of God, salvation restores it. Although Augustine's definition of salvation may be regarded as Christian, its elements have closer affinity with ideas of salvation from philosophies of Greece than they do with most of the ideas of salvation found in the Old and New Testaments and the Apocrapha.

The means of salvation is a problem deserving careful attention. Although various means suggest themselves, they may be divided into two classes. The first group concerns what man can do by his own effort while the second concerns what God must do in order for salvation to be completed. Augustine discusses both groups as means of salvation.

Man's part in salvation is described in the early dialogues. Order leads to God, and unless one holds to it in the present life one will not come through to God.[22] The vision of God is the result of right looking. But right looking incorporates faith, hope, and love.[23] Augustine thinks there are various approaches to wisdom, yet that singular, truest good is comprehended according to one's sanity and firmness.[24] Man makes the decision whether he will be a servant of God or something other than God. The immutable is found when man turns inward toward God.[25]

Man's requirements are emphasized in the books on morals. The soul becomes like God in so far as it subjects itself to Him for illustration and illumination.[26] Even Paul exhorts man to temperance, to put off the old man and to put on the new. Augustine's use of the passage suggests that man himself can accomplish that action.[27] Man should love God with all his heart, soul, and mind. This devotion is the one perfection in man, and Augustine does not deny that it is man's action.

Man undergoes seven stages in overcoming the temporal to arrive at the eternal. Although Augustine recognizes the Son of God as an example for man to follow, he does not deny that the decision to take the steps and the effort to progress are action by man.[28]

The treatise on free will gives particular attention to man's role in his restoration. Whereas bad will gives an unhappy life, good will brings a happy one.[29] If one wishes to be happy he has only to will it.[30] Merit appears in extreme form in book three when he says the life of sublime creatures is merited by their will to hold fast to righteousness.[31] Below them are those who have lost happiness but who have not lost their ability to recover it. He advises those who escape misery to love the very desire they have to be, for the more one wishes to be the nearer he is to the highest.[32] Not only does God command men to overcome the devil, but he also rewards those who do.[33] Those who ask, seek, and knock justly avoid punishment. Anyone who refuses progress remains in sin and even graver ignorance.[35]

Augustine finds in Genesis that man has certain responsibilities. Sin is death, but man's turning from fleshly evil to reason is life.[36] As Adam was cast out of the garden, so heretics are dismissed from the Catholic Church. But one who follows the Great Commandment will come to the tree of life and live into eternity.[37]

Later works also recognize man's role in his recovery. Since it is possible even in life's body to work toward righteousness, Augustine says in De Vera Religione, one should put aside pride and become obedient to God alone.[38] One should strive against being lost in material things. To return to his original state man should turn inward to truth, recognize that he is not as it is, and seek to agree with it.[39] The unconquered man loves God simply because loving God is in itself a good act.[40] In the various collected questions he implies that man has an active part in his salvation. Referring to Paul and James he thinks that works do not justify a man by merit. On the other hand, man's justification is accompanied by good works.[41]

The meaning of the above passages is quite significant. They do not necessarily mean that man alone saves himself. They do indicate that man has a part in his restoration. He has decisions to make and actions to carry out. He does not cease to be man, that is to have reason and free will, in order to be saved as an empty shell.[42] He is an agent in his salvation. Yet, he is not the only factor involved in his salvation. God's help is also present.

Augustine rightly gives man a place in his own salvation. He is an active agent in the process of his salvation and not simply a pawn to be replaced by another from God's hand, as Dr. Barth seems to imply. Man makes the decision whether he will accept the means of salvation. He does the good works which accompany salvation. He progresses through the various stages that lead to a vision of God which is more nearly perfect. Man's action in his own salvation is a part of New Testament teaching which Augustine does well to observe.

Augustine recognizes even in the Cassiciacum dialogues that God makes salvation possible for man. He tells Theodorus that of all things he can think of, nothing deserves more than the happy life to be called a gift of God.[43] God possesses all things though not all have Him in their souls. It seems as though God is present inside of man urging him to seek Him without tiring.[44] Without God's help no one is wise and happy.[45] "Reason's" advice to Augustine in the Soliloquia is to believe constantly in God and to commit himself wholly to him. He is not to rise by his own power; he is to be a servant of the Lord. For God will lift him to Himself and let nothing come upon him except for his good.[46]

De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae shows the necessary part God plays in man's salvation. Although man has turned from God and His law, in righteousness and mercy God has given to man precepts of true religion to be observed.[47] The Holy Spirit inspires the love which leads to God.[48] God's discipline restores the health of man's soul. Indeed, the nature of sin is such that there would be no hope of salvation unless God sent down his medicine. In his discipline are included both restraint (coercitionem)and instruction (instructionem).[49]

Even later works recognize God's aid to man. In De Libero Arbitrio one who journeys toward wisdom finds it meeting him on the way, showing itself to him, and rendering the path more pleasant.[50] Every soul needs to implore His aid in its efforts to overcome the difficulties in living aright,[51] for God helps as one advances toward the Chief Good.[52] The original means God used in aiding man was through an inner spring of the intellect, he says in expounding Genesis. But in the present age God waters from a cloud, that is, from Scriptures, prophets, and apostles.[53]

De Vera Religione presents striking evidence that Augustine emphasizes God's aid in saving man. His help is given in part through the Church which gives means to participate in the grace of God. Within that body divine providence uses all sorts of people to edify man.[54] In following the religion of the Catholic Church man's concern is history and prophecy of the dispensation of divine providence in time in order to save man, to reform and

to restore him to eternal life.[55] God's aid is necessary, for the soul of man is so overcome by sin that completely alone he could not attain likeness to God. Yet, God has mercifully used creation to remind the soul of its former state and has come in this manner to aid all men.[56] To the man who diligently and piously listens to the teachings of the Church, God gives help. And the soul which believes that the grace of God is helping it overcome the things of the present life is restored to the eternal. It enjoys God through the spirit which is a gift of God (Donum Dei).[57] The Holy Spirit given by God restores both mind and body to stability.[58] Moreover, Divine Providence has so moderated man's punishment that even in the present life he is permitted to go toward justice, putting aside pride and committing all to Him.[59] At the time when the soul is regenerated through the grace of God, that is, restored to its integrity and made subject to the One who has created it, then even the body will be restored to its original strength and will begin to possess the world instead of being possessed by it.

Several questions in Augustine's collection recognize God as helper in man's salvation. The Law was a means given by God to teach His people until the time when they were ready for Christ.[60] Before grace is given through faith, the soul remains under the rule of passions. But its perfection comes by degrees.[61] At the same time, God is actively correcting those whom He loves.[62]

Augustine recognizes that God makes man's salvation possible. Without His gracious action man would not even be reminded of the position from which he fell. Moreover, he is given means adapted to his need and ability by which he might be restored to wholeness. God acts through the Church, Scriptures, creation, and man's thought in order to lead him to the wholeness in which he was created.

Man's action, Augustine correctly says, must be made possible through God's aid. The general support of all things living is not enough. God aids man directly through appearing to his reason. He guides him through the communion of the Church. He teaches him through the Holy Scriptures. There is no opposition in Augustine between God's direct prompting of man and His aid to him through the Chruch and the Scriptures. Although Augustine recognizes that all things come from God, he also declares that God can use more than one means of saving man. A particular aid to man from God the Father is through God the Son.

God as Jesus Christ is a particular aid to man in Augustine's thought. The element is present in the dialogues of Cassiciacum. One who has his measure, that is wisdom, is happy. But wisdom means the Wisdom of God, who is the Son of God.[63] The Son is

none other than God, and one who has Him is happy. In this early period of Augustine's discussions "Wisdom," "Son of God," and "God" may be used interchangeably to describe the means to the happy life. Jesus Christ is presented as a teacher in De Ordine, for He makes a statement about a world which is far from sense experience.[64]

Christ as Saviour is recognized in the late sections of De Musica. God desired to be born in human flesh, to suffer the death of flesh, and to pay man's debt to death without having merited it Himself.[65] After lamenting the fate of the human soul in the body, Augustine quotes Romans 7:24f on who will deliver man from the body of death, which concludes: I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord.[66]

Christ is the Lord who in the gospel prescribes how man is to live, he says in discussing the morals of the Catholic Church. Christ directs man to love God with all his heart, soul, and mind.[67] From the love of Christ, Paul proclaims, nothing can separate man.[68] He is the Wisdom of God by Whom the Father is known.[69]

De Libero Arbitrio presents two different views of the role of Christ in man's salvation. On the one hand He is described as Truth, the God who liberates from the condition of sin and death. Truth says to those men believing in Him, "If you abide in my words you are truly my disciples, you shall know the Truth and the Truth will make you free."[70] Since man fell by his free will (sponte cecidit) but cannot rise by the same method (sponte surgere), Augustine exhorts him to hold with firm faith the right hand of God stretched out from above, even Jesus Christ the Lord.[71] On the other hand, in what is almost surely a development after his ordination, one finds a rather full theory of atonement. Augustine holds that the Word, the Son of God, who has had and will have the devil under His laws, has subjugated the devil to man. The Son extorted nothing from the devil through violence but overcame him through the law of justice. It was just for the devil to take control of the human race after Adam's fall, but he made the mistake of slaying the Just Man, who was without fault. The devil then had to give up those who believed in the one unjustly slain. However, the devil kept those who did not believe. In the entire process nothing was done without justice.[72]

De Genesi Contra Manichaeos speaks of the work Christ does. He assumed the cloud of human flesh and caused to fall the rain of the Gospel.[73] All men remain in sin until they possess the spiritual Adam, the Lord Jesus Christ, who restores them to paradise.[74] In Epistola XI he tells Nebridius that Christ's assuming human nature accomplished the work of training man in the correct way to live. He has given an example of what man is

commanded to do.[75]

Christ's work in man's salvation appears strongly in De Vera Religione. Presumably He is the man who has come to deliver people from their errors, a man even Plato should recognize as extraordinary. Surely he could not have accomplished such a formidable task unless he had been prepared from the cradle by the strength and illumination of God. Only this divine favor accompanied by love and authority could lead men to such firm faith. A man who is thus an instrument of the wisdom of God for the salvation of human kind is above the human race.[76] Throughout the world the first verses of the Gospel of John are proclaimed that men might receive the Word and love Him. To the greedy it says lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth, (Matthew 6:19). To the wanton it says he who sows in flesh shall reap corruption, (Galatians 6:8). To the proud it says whoever exalts himself shall be abased, (Luke 14:11). To the wrathful it says turn the other cheek, (Matthew 5:39). To those who strive it says love your enemies, (Matthew 5:44). To the superstitious it says the kingdom of God is within you, (Luke 17:21). To the curious it says look not to the things which are seen... the things not seen are eternal, (II Corinthians 4:18). And to all it says love not the things of the world, (I John 2:15).[77]

Christ's person and work are described in the following elements which pertain to the wholeness of God's mercy which He has exhibited to mankind: Taking human flesh, birth of a virgin, the death of God's Son for men, resurrection from the dead, ascension into heaven, sitting at the right hand of the Father, abolition of sins, the day of judgment, and the resurrection of the body.[78] Although God has adopted several means for the healing of human souls, His greatest act of love for mankind has been the sending of His Wisdom, even His Son to dwell among men. The assuming of human nature was to be its liberation.[79] After a brief sketch of Christ as God and as man Augustine concludes by saying that there is no sin committed by man which is not an avoiding of what He did or a doing of what He avoided.[80]

Christ on earth in the form of man gave his life as a discipline in morals. His method of being an example fulfills the rule of rational discipline, for it teaches openly sometimes, then by similitude, and again by word, deed, and sacrament. The method is also designed for the complete exercise and instruction of the human soul.[81] Before He came, men were under the Old Law. Under the burden of many sacraments they longed for the grace promised by the prophets. Christ's coming, however, liberated men from these bonds. Only a few sacraments were used to maintain the society of those Christian people set free to serve one God. Divine providence is always the same, but it presents itself

to creatures in the way most helpful to them in their time.[82]

References to the work of Christ are also found among the various questions collected. Augustine thinks of the cross of Christ as a useful example. Whereas men fear death, Christ has faced the worst death to show them that they should not fear to die.[83] God first used the law to teach His people; He did not send Christ until they were ready for Him.[84] When exegeting the passage on the Samaritan woman, Augustine lets the sixth hour refer to the sixth or old age of man. Christ has come to make the old man new.[85]

In summary of the work of Christ, Augustine's concept may be divided into two parts corresponding to the nature of Christ. In the earlier writings the divine side is strongly emphasized in the terms of "Truth," "Word," and "Wisdom" of God. In the later writings it gives way to the emphasis of God's sending His Son at the time most beneficial to man. From the human side Christ is seen as a great teacher. On one hand he teaches by precept exhibiting wisdom far surpassing all other men. On the other, he teaches by the example of his life. Both of these views concur in thinking of man's salvation in terms of intellectual enlightenment which is given to them through Christ. The passage giving the theory that Christ freed men from the devil by his death on the Cross is isolated and without parallel in books known to be written entirely in the period here under study. Alfaric is correct in stating that the work of Christ's coming to give man wisdom is more Neoplatonist than it is the Pauline view of His death as a payment for sin.[86] But Augustine's views are more Christian than Neoplatonist. Gilson puts the distinction thus: what Plotinus shows man, Christ conducts him toward.[87]

Augustine's concept of the work of Christ in the early period lacks some elements usually found in a Christian doctrine of atonement. He recognizes the incarnation, but its purpose seems to be to enable the Son of God to function as a teacher through precept and example. As sin is conceived in part as intellectual deficiency and salvation is conceived as vision or full knowledge of God, so the chief role of Christ is that of teacher. His death upon the cross is to teach men not to fear death. This emphasis overshadows any hints of the theories of atonement in the Pauline epistles, Hebrews, the theories of Anselm and Grotius, or even the theory which Aulen calls classical.

Augustine's concept of man's salvation is manifold. Whereas sin is alienation from the eternal, salvation is restoration to the eternal. In his becoming whole man plays as much part as his sinful human condition permits, exercising his will and his intellect. But in his condition of alienation he is dependent

upon God's help. Through various means God makes known to man his sinful condition and supplies him with means for escaping it. The most effective means, however, was the sending of His Son as a divine and human example for man. In Him man knows the Truth and is set free to follow His example in devotion to God, the Eternal.

Augustine's emphasis has points in common with several different systems of thought. His concern for Wisdom and Truth has parallels in Plato, the Stoics, Jewish Wisdom literature, Plotinus, and also passages in the New Testament. One can hardly deny influence from systems of philosophy. But these philosophical strands are presented within the framework of Christian doctrine.[88] God in an act of love, sends His Son--human and divine--at a ripe moment in history to be born of a virgin, to live an exemplary life before men, to die on a cross, to be raised again to the Eternal, and to restore to the realm of the eternal those who abide in Him.[89]

Rashdall has said that the idea of vicarious punishment of Christ is a central one in St. Augustine.[90] When Augustine's later works are considered as well, this statement seems true. But in the early works the idea is overshadowed by Christ as Wisdom or as a teacher of morals. Augustine also allows considerably more worth to man's efforts in this early period than he does in the Pelagian controversy when he places a greater emphasis upon the Grace of God.[91]

The concept of salvation held by Augustine before his ordination is appropriate to his concept of sin in the same period. The faults that he describes as results of sin are cured by the means of salvation which he describes. Augustine maintains, it seems to the present writer, a good balance between the various means open to man which lead to salvation. Certainly a Christian doctrine of salvation should recognize the part man plays in his own salvation. He uses his mind to examine his need for salvation and the means for his becoming whole which are possible for him. He uses his will to commit his life to the way of salvation. He uses his body to express his decision to become whole; he expresses his decision through good works. Then too, Augustine gives due respect to the means of God uses to enable man's salvation to be accomplished. Through the Church man is given an example of the Christian life, and there he is introduced to the Scriptures. Through the Scriptures he is instructed in the way God deals with His people to restore them to the position for which He has created them. Through these means man comes to know of the special saving action of God through his Son Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is at once God and Man. He is God appearing to man in the form of man, teaching him by word, and by deed. All of these means have a place in Augustine's concept of salvation, and no one means of salvation

is emphasized at the exclusion of another. Such a well-rounded outline of the means of salvation occurs all too seldom in the history of Christian theology.

Part II, D

The Relationship of Man and God

2. Salvation

Notes

[1] De Beata Vita ii, 11, P. L. XXXII, 965.

[2] Ibid. iv, 34, P. L. XXXII, 976. Cicero, De Finibus II, xxvii. The wise man must have happiness without the chance to lose it. See B. Roland Gosselin, Notes on De Moribus Ecc. Cath. p. 515, note 3.

[3] Ibid. iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976.

[4] Fuller discussion is found in Retractationes I, iii, 2, P. L. XXXII, 588.

[5] De Ordine I, xi, 32, P. L. XXXII, 993, John 18:36.

[6] Soliloquia I, vi, 12f, P. L. XXXII, 875-876.

[7] De Quantitate Animae xxxvi, 80, P. L. XXXII, 1080. Compare with Plotinus, Ennead VI, ix, 9-11.

[8] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xi, 18, P. L. XXXII, 1319. In Plotinus the soul must be God. Ennead I, ii, 6. Clement says that Plato's idea that man's chief good is assimilation to God has agreement with Scripture. Stromata, II, xxi, xxii, P. G. VIII.

[9] Ibid. xv, 25, P. L. XXXII, 1322.

[10] Ibid. xxv, 46, P. L. XXXII, 1330-1331.

[11] De Libero Arbitrio I, xiii, 29f, P. L. XXXII, 1237.

[12] Ibid. III, xx, 57, P. L. XXXII, 1299.

[13] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos. II, xiii, 10, P. L. XXXIV, 201.

[14] Ibid. II, xi, 32, P. L. XXXIV, 213. Compare with Plotinus, Ennead, II, iii, 9.

[15] De Vera Religione iii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 123.

[16] Ibid. iii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 124.

[17] Ibid. xxvi, 49, P. L. XXXIV, 143.

[18] Ibid. xxvii, 50, P. L. XXXIV, 144.

[19] Ibid. xlvii, 90, P. L. XXXIV, 163. Ille ergo verissime atque certissime invictus homo est qui cohaeret Deo, non ut ab eo aliquid boni extra mereatur, sed cui nihil aliud quam ipsum haerere Deo bonum est.

[20] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, LXVI, 3, P. L. XL, 62.

[21] Gilson, Philosophie et Incarnation selon saint Augustin, p. 34; Introduction..op. cit. "La possession du vrai absolu est la condition necessaire de la beatitude." p. 3.

[22] De Ordine I, ix, 27, P. L. XXXII, 990.

[23] Soliloquia I, vi, 12, P. L. XXXII, 875-876.

[24] Ibid. I, xiii, 23, P. L. XXXII, 881. This statement is clarified in Retractationes I, 4, 3, P. L. XXXII, 590. Christ is the only way to wisdom. John 14:6.

[25] De Musica VI, xii, 36, P. L. XXXII, 1183.

[26] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xii, 20, P. L. XXXII, 1320. Compare to Plotinus, Ennead VI, ix, 7.

[27] Ibid. xix, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1326.

[28] De Quantitate Animae, xxxiii, 76, P. L. XXXII, 1076. B. Swatalski, Plotinus and The Ethics of St. Augustine. For sources of the soul's progress see Plato, Symposium, 208E, Republic VII, 514A.

[29] De Libero Arbitrio I, xiii, 28, P. L. XXXII, 1236.

[30] Ibid. I, xiii, 29, P. L. XXXII, 1237.

[31] Ibid. III, v, 15, P. L. XXXII, 1278.

[32] Ibid. III, vii, 20, P. L. XXXII, 1280-1281.

[33] Ibid. III, xx, 57, P. L. XXXII, 1298-1299.

[34] Ibid. III, xx, 58, P. L. XXXII, 1299.

[35] Ibid. III, xxii, 64, P. L. XXXII, 1303.

[36] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, xxi, 31, P. L. XXXIV, 212.

[37] Ibid. II, xxvii, 41, P. L. XXXIV, 218.

[38] De Vera Religione xv, 29, P. L. XXXIV, 134. Man works, but is under the rule of God.

[39] Ibid. xxxix, 72, P. L. XXXIV, 154.

[40] Ibid. xlvi, P. L. XXXIV, 163.

[41] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus LXXVI, P. L. XL, 87-89.

[42] In the following sections it is seen that Augustine, especially by the time of his ordination, does not hold that man alone can save himself. As M. C. D'Arcy puts it, "Choice, however, is not the same as full liberty. We may choose to do what does not, as a matter of fact, lie in our power, whereas liberty means the power to do what is good." in A Monument to Saint Augustine, p. 191.

[43] De Beata Vita i, 5, P. L. XXXII, 962.

[44] Ibid. iv, 34f, P. L. XXXII, 975-976.

[45] Ibid. iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976.

[46] Soliloquia I, xv, 30. P. L. XXXII, 884-885. Constanter Deo crede, eique te totum committe quantum potes. Noli esse velle quasi proprius et in tua potestate; sed ejus clementissimi et utilissimi Domini te servum esse profitere. Ita enim te ad se sublevare non desinet, nihilque tibi evenire permittet, nisi quod tibi prosit, etiam si nescias.

[47] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae vii, 12, P. L. XXII, 1315-1316.

[48] Ibid. xvii, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1324.

[49] Ibid. xvii, 55f, P. L. XXXII, 1333-1334.

[50] De Libero Arbitrio II, xvii, 45, P. L. XXXII, 1265.

[51] Ibid. III, xx, 57, P. L. XXXII, 1299.

[52] Ibid. III, xxii, 65, P. L. XXXII, 1303.

[53] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, iv, 5, P. L. XXXIV, 198-199.

[54] De Vera Religione, vi, 10f, P. L. XXXIV, 127-128.

[55] Ibid. vii, 13, P. L. XXXIV, 128.

[56] Ibid. x, 19, P. L. XXXIV, 131.

[57] Ibid. xii, 24, P. L. XXXIV, 132.

[58] Ibid. xii, 25, P. L. XXXIV, 133.

[59] Ibid. xv, 29, P. L. XXXIV, 134.

[60] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus. XLIV, P. L. XL, 28.

[61] Ibid. LXVI, P. L. XL, 60-66.

[62] Ibid. LXXXII, P. L. XL, 98-99.

[63] De Beata Vita, iv, 33f, P. L. XXXII, 975.

[64] De Ordine I, xi, 32, P. L. XXXII, 993. John 18:36.

[65] De Musica VI, iv, 7, P. L. XXXII, 1166.

[66] Ibid. VI, v, 14, P. L. XXXII, 1170-1171.

[67] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae viii, 13, P. L. XXXII, 1316, Matthew 22:37.

[68] Ibid. Romans 8:28.

[69] Ibid. xvii, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1324.

[70] De Libero Arbitrio II, xiii, 37, P. L. XXXII, 1261. John 8:31f.

[71] Ibid. II, xx, 54, P. L. XXXII, 1270.

[72] Ibid. III, x, 31, P. L. XXXII, 1286-1287.

[73] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, v, 6, P. L. XXXIV, 199. John 4:14.

[74] Ibid. II, viii, 10, P. L. XXXIV, 201.

[75] Epistola XI, 4, P. L. XXXIII, 76.

[76] De Vera Religione iii, 3, P. L. XXXIV, 124.

[77] Ibid. iii, 4, P. L. XXXIV, 124-125. citations are in essence, not literal.

[78] Ibid. viii, 14, P. L. XXXIV, 129.

[79] Ibid. xvi, 30, P. L. XXXIV, 134-135.

[80] Ibid. xvi, 31, P. L. XXIV, 135.

[81] Ibid. xvi, 32f, P. L. XXXIV, 135-136. Tota itaque vita ejus in terris, per hominem quem suscipere dignatus est, disciplina morum fuit. Compare to Clement of Alexandria's Cohortatio ad gentes, XI and XII, P. G. VIII, and Paedagogus.

[82] Ibid. xvii, 33f, P. L. XXXIV, 136.

[83] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus. XXV, P. L. XL, 17.

[84] Ibid. XLIV, P. L. XL, 28.

[85] Ibid. LXIV, 2, P. L. XL, 55.

[86] Alfaric, op. cit. p. 525.

[87] É. Gilson, "L'Ideé de philosophie chez saint Augustin et chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," Acta Hebdomadae Augustianae Thomisticae, p. 77.

[88] Thimme's statement, "Augustins Erlösungslehre ist im Kern intellektualistisch-platonisch, nicht christlich...." Augustins Geistige Entwickelung p. 159, is not entirely correct for the period before Augustine's baptism, and may be quite misleading when applied to later writings before Augustine's ordination in 391.

[89] Hendrikx is correct in showing that the ordination and ensuing study of Scriptures led Augustine to change his concept of Christianity as une sagesse intellectuelle individuelle to that of une religion de salut individuel et communautaire. R. P. A. de Veer, review of E. Hendrikx Augustinus' visie op het Christendom...Revue des Études Augustinniennes, 1957. pp. 84-85. Vol. III, 1. But Augustine had already accepted on faith many of the Christian assertions. He then advanced to a greater understanding of the doctrines.

[90] Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology, p. 334.

[91] John Furguson, Pelagius. Augustine, De Correptione et Gratia, II, 3, the grace of Christ is essential. On the predestination of the elect, XIII, 39. He admits having been in error on man's ability apart from Grace, Predestination of the Saints. iii, 7.

Part II, D

The Relationship of Man and God

3. Man's Life in Devotion

Man's relationship to God influences his life in the world. By God's mercy and through the means of His Son, Man is permitted to choose to overcome the temporal and to aspire to the eternal. Even in the fallen world man is permitted to begin his return to the eternal. His actions in the world should reflect his will to pass through the grades of the soul leading over nearer to God. In the period immediately after his conversion Augustine devotes considerable effort to how man's life in devotion to God should be lived.

The first concern to man is his personal conduct. Augustine's answer for personal conduct comes in three parts. The first part is in terms of the individual's devoting himself to God. The early dialogues express the need for man's life to be virtuous. According to Monnica, the happy life is based upon a solid faith, a joyful hope, and an ardent love.[1] Considering the kind of life young men should live, Augustine maintains that they should avoid excesses and do all things with consideration. They should not do to anyone else what they would not want done to themselves. Besides serving God with Faith, Hope, and Love, they are to desire a sound mind and a quiet life.[2] The soul finds pleasure in becoming one with what it loves. To be happy, therefore, it must avoid union with that which can be separated from it, for separation brings sorrow.[3] The virtuous life requires right or perfect reasoning. Perfect virtue, reason arriving at its end, is looking for, finding, and enjoying the vision of God.[4] Prayer is to be included in the devoted life, for prayer helps bring the better life.[5]

The dialogues from his Milan period have bearing on personal devotion. The seven stages of the soul in De Quantitate Animae seem applicable to the grades one reaches in the life of devotion. Although the first two are in common with other living beings, the third is that which mothers the liberal arts and so is limited to men alone. In the fourth stage the soul becomes aware of itself and prefers itself to the body. In the fifth place the soul is purged and living in purity. In the sixth stage one understands the highest. The seventh is pure contemplation of God.[6] The command which should motivate all human action, he says in De Musica, is to love God with all one's heart, soul, and mind, and the neighbor as one's self. The yoke of the Lord is light, but

one always concerned with the changing beauty of the world does not find things eternal.[7]

The individual's devotion is described in terms of love to God in De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae. Following after God indicates one's desire for happiness, but reaching Him is happiness itself. One should not think, however, that to reach Him is to become the same as He is. To reach God is to be near Him and to be illumined by Him.[8] In showing honor to God man advances in happiness.[9] Augustine is willing to say that virtue is none other than the perfect love of God. Temperance is love keeping itself entirely for God. Fortitude is love serving only God. Prudence is love discerning what leads to God and what hinders.[10] Or, put in other terms, Temperance is the quieting of passions which may lead one away from God.[11] Fortitude teaches one to suffer much for God.[12] Justice teaches him to serve God whom he loves. Prudence teaches what is to be desired and what is to be avoided.[13]

De Vera Religione also describes stages in the individual's devotion to God. In stage one he is taught by examples in history, in two he forgets things human to think of things divine. Thirdly, he subordinates flesh to reason. Fourthly, he is ready to endure the persecutions of the world. Fifthly, he lives in a realm of supreme wisdom. Sixthly, he forgets temporal life and passes into that perfect form made in the image and likeness of God. Seventhly, he finds perpetual rest and beatitude without any ages which can be distinguished.[14] Contrary to this development are the vices. One who has overcome his vices cannot be overcome by men, for he loves only that which cannot be snatched away.[15] People who pursue vices are, in reality, only seeking knowledge, power, and rest. These ends, however, can be found only in God.[16]

Personal devotion in terms of virtue reminds Augustine of Cicero. Augustine thinks that virtue is simply the soul's conforming to nature and reason. There is no fear in man which is not that of losing what he has or of not getting that for which he hopes.[17] Individual devotion is expressed in terms of virtue. Devotion in virtue is nothing other than man's perfect love of God. But man develops through various stages in his devotion. He at once increases in his awareness of God and in his nearness to Him.

In Augustine's early work there is no opposition between the intellectual life and the devotional life. The end of devotion is the vision of God which leads to the understanding of all being. He does not hesitate to compare the devotional qualities of Christianity with ethical systems of his day. He is aware of two main Christian guides to the life of devotion. One is the command of Jesus to love God entirely and the neighbor as oneself, while the other is St. Paul's emphasis upon abiding faith, hope, and love. Within these outlines devotion increases man's knowledge

and, in return, man's knowledge is used in his devotion. This concept avoids, it seems to the present writer, the intellectual suicide which results from devotion elevated at the expense of intellectual pursuits or the spiritual dryness which results from the intellectual pursuits being divorced entirely form any individual life of devotion.

Augustine adds to personal devotion to God two other aspects of personal conduct. The individual must decide how wealth is to be used and his policy towards marriage. Augustine discusses wealth or the use of the world's goods in the Soliloquia. He has abandoned some foods, so that they no longer tempt him. Other foods give him pleasure if they can be obtained, but they do not disturb his thoughts if they are not present to be eaten. He has also made a similar decision upon baths and other pleasures. He will use them in so far as they contribute to his health.[18] In De Musica he says that the love of the present world is laborious and does not satisfy the seeking of the soul.[19] He exhorts men not to find pleasure in flesh or in the honours of men but in the immutability of God.[20]

His use of things in the world is described further in De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae. He restates his position as to love God and to use sensible things only as they are necessary.[21] For the Manicheans he points to the examples of those in the Catholic Church who do not "use the world," and those who "use the world" as "not using it."[22] An illustration of the latter group is seen in those who have been forced to worship idols. Many have come from all stations in life, rich and poor, to give up their wealth and to die. These martyrs have used their possessions, but they have possessed them rather than been possessed by them.[23]

Wealth is not despised by Augustine when he writes Romanianus in Epistola XV. He advises his friend to be thankful for the privilege of deeper reflection, for a man who can discharge the duties of the world without becoming entangled in them is more worthy of having things eternal committed to him. Augustine exhorts him to forsake the temporal and worldly possessions enough to rise above them to what is eternal. He should remember that the bee needs his wings when the store has been gathered lest he stick.[24]

Augustine clearly admires those who live with a minimum of earthly goods. However, he does not exalt poverty or extreme goods. However, he does not exalt poverty or extreme asceticism. He uses what he needs for health and lets that be sufficient. He does not hold that wealth is wrong. Perhaps he realizes his great debt to a man like Romanianus. But wealth should be used, if one has it, in a way which will not imprison him with cares of the temporal at the expense of his love for the eternal. Weltflucht

in Augustine is not a matter of "...giving or withholding adhesion to the Catholic faith."[25]

The individual should decide, in the third aspect, upon his relationship to marriage. Augustine, after his youth of lustful pleasures, has decided that he must avoid marriage. "Reason's" attractive sketch of married life does not seriously tempt Augustine to take a wife. As to those who think it is a duty to have intercourse and raise children, Augustine thinks he had rather admire them than imitate them.[26] His one desire for union is with Wisdom.[27]

The chastity of men and women in the Catholic Church makes a deep impression upon Augustine. In De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae it is a voice with a touch of "pride in the cause" which says that chastity in the Church has reached such a proportion that some feel it should be limited.[28] The Manicheans, according to Augustine's opinion, argue that after baptism men ought not to marry or beget children. This contention, he counters, is far stronger in demand than that of the Apostle Paul who permits marriage after baptism. Paul holds that it is good for a man not to touch a woman, but if fornication is the alternative, rather let each man have his own wife and each wife her own husband.[29] Of course, his stand is one of permission rather than commandment. Paul wishes all to be as himself, but each man must act according to what God has given to him. Augustine personally believes that complete chastity is best and that marriage is a concession to weaker members whether they be catechumens or full believers.[30]

Augustine does not make his own decision the minimum possible Christian stand. He defends those who take a position of complete chastity. But he also defends the right of those who feel that they should marry. However, he praises chastity and only permits marriage.

To the present writer it seems that Augustine's attitude toward marriage rests upon four points. First, there is his background of sexual indulgence, which to him, after his conversion, seemed unreasonable. Perhaps he bears some grudge against Patricius' treatment of Monnica. There are grounds for saying that Augustine is without close knowledge of a truly happy married life. Secondly, there is the dominant spirit of his age which tends to believe that the holy or devoted man should live in chastity. Thirdly, there are the views of St. Paul that marriage is only permitted to those who cannot discipline themselves to a life of chastity. In the fourth place, the Stoic influence in Augustine makes him despise passion and sensual pleasures--which are usually present in marriage.

This attitude continues in his later works where he permits marriage but would exclude the passionate enjoyment of fleshly

contacts. The pleasure is a sin which marriage neutralizes. His concept is parallel to what is the usual characterization of Victorian ideas of sex.

Present ideas upon marriage and sexual relationships in marriage have changed greatly from those of Augustine. There are, however, groups which maintain what is essentially the same view as Augustine's. But among most Protestant groups marriage with its privileges is respected as a means of allowing man to develop the potentialities God has given to him for the good life. Modern medical science has brought forth the fact of the desirability of exercising the passions one feels--within the balance of good physical and mental health. There may be some good reasons for some devoted men and women to avoid marriage, but the present writer thinks they are not the reasons offered by Augustine the layman.

The individual has relationship with others in the world. Nearest to him is his neighbor. Augustine's first description of loving the neighbor is in terms of his love for his friends. His analysis of man as soul and body influences the essence of his love. He does not particularly love the bodies of his friends, but he loves the soul of even the robber. He loves his friends who use their rational souls and loves those more who use them, or seek to use them, best.[31]

Augustine's greater study of Scriptures is reflected in his improved understanding of man's duty to his neighbor. Writing in Rome, he says that one who loves God must also love himself.[32] There is no more certain step to the love of God than love to man. One really loves himself when he loves God more than himself. On the other hand, the highest aim of love for the neighbor is to have him perfectly love God. From this purpose proceed the duties of society. Love does not injure the neighbor. Injury may be done to the neighbor in two ways. The positive way is to act injuriously with that purpose. The negative way is in failing to help the neighbor when one has the power to do so. One who despises the neighbor cannot come to God whom one loves, but to seek the good of the neighbor is not an easy task. Love to the neighbor requires more than good will.

Love should aid both the rational soul and the mortal body in the neighbor.[33] That which benefits his body is called medicine (medicina) while that which benefits the soul is called discipline (disciplina). The former applies to that which is necessary for the health of the body. It includes food, clothing, shelter, and those things needed for general health. This medicine is to be administered with compassion (misericordes). Stoic influence to the point that a wise man should avoid passion disturbs Augustine only for a moment. He says compassion may be applied to one who in tranquil mind acts not from pain but for benevolence.[34]

Discipline, the latter, applies to the soul and includes both coertion and instruction. They imply fear and love which are given in both Old and New Testaments.[35]

De Vera Religione continues to recognize the twofold division in the neighbor which man is to love. Augustine says that the carnal side of the neighbor is not the object of love. One is to love the neighbor as himself.[36] Love to the neighbor does not work evil.[37] Moreover, the man who would be truly unconquered should also love his enemies. Man is not to love another as an object for gratifying his own desires; he is to love the neighbor even as himself. The neighbor is not to be loved as a member of the family or as a fellow citizen, for that kind of love is temporal in character. To love one because he is a member of the family is selfish and more base than to love one because he belongs to God.[38] Love to neighbor should not be based upon carnal relationship.[39] All men are related who have one God as their Father. They are brothers above all because one Father by His testament calls them to one inheritance.[40]

Augustine's concept of man's love for his neighbor shows a distinct development when he bases it upon Scriptural teachings.[41] However, it leaves much to be desired. The emphasis is upon the rational soul. This is the essential part of man and is the object of his love. It is true that he cares for the body, but it is, of much less importance. One may wonder whether Augustine's principle would lead to a failure to recognize the whole individual as individual. As Bigham and Mollegan have expressed the idea, "... to Augustine our fellowship with our neighbor is never direct love for unique person but a fellow feeling with someone who also is, or is to be, drawn up into a universal."[42]

To the present writer it seems that there are two weaknesses which prevent Augustine's early concept of love to neighbor being adequate for twentieth century Christians. The first weakness stems from his concept of man. Although he recognizes both soul and body and in his love to neighbor holds that the needs of both parts ought to be met, the physical side is slighted. One may well have the impression that Augustine's love for the neighbor is for some abstract of the neighbor and not the neighbor as a whole man. The second weakness is not so clear. But one may wonder whether aid to the neighbor without any passion is truly love for the neighbor. Contemporary theories of counselling or social worker should become involved with the emotion and general situation of the "client." The concern, however, is that the advisor through limiting his emotional involvement shall be better able to help the "client." Augustine's concern for the limitation of passions is not better to help the neighbor but to satisfy a Stoic idea of how the happy man should conduct his affairs.

The state does not become an item of major concern for

Augustine before his ordination. He has little reason to devote a discussion to the individual's relationship to the state, for he is not in circumstances which make decisions thereupon important. He is not a statesman like Ambrose and will not face a crisis upon the Christian's duty to the state until the sack of Rome in 410 A. D. He does, however, make a few references which have bearing upon the subject.

De Libero Arbitrio examines the relationship of the Christian conscience to the state. Self defense is one item for discussion. The law permits a man to slay anyone who would slay, rob, or ravish. Evodius, taking a different view, thinks a man is lustful when he fights for mere temporal goods, which he can lose against his will. On the other hand, if they cannot be lost, why should one kill in order to preserve them. Augustine finds the law unjust in this instance as it is when it commands a soldier either to kill the enemy or to be killed by his general. An unjust law, moreover, is no law at all. Evodius argues that the law permits lesser crimes in order to prevent greater ones. Laws are for the protection of the people, and they may even be passed by unjust men. Although the law gives permission to kill, the decision remains with the individual. There are penalties besides the laws of the state conducive to peaceful life in the community. Augustine finds this distinction to be wise, for Providence punishes many acts which the state leaves unpunished.[43] The law may at one time give people a right to democratic government while at another time the law may deny that right. There is a law, however, which is ever the same and not temporal. Temporal laws are just only in so far as they derive from eternal law.[44]

De Vera Religione continues to discuss temporal and eternal aspects of law. A just judge is one who decides according to laws which have been established by men. A human legislator, who makes those laws, should take into account the eternal law. He decides what should be done at the present moment according to the unchanging rules of eternal life.[45] If one must bow down to men who desire to be worshipped, that is much less severe than to worship demons, for the former do not have control after death while the latter do. Augustine's guiding principle is to render unto caesar the things which are caesar's and to God the things which are God's.[46]

Augustine's comments upon the state are limited. His use of the state in his conflict with the Donatists and his comments in De Civitate Dei which were to fascinate Charlemagne come in a later period of his life.[47] But he does discuss human law. It is, he decides, to be based upon the eternal law and is to apply to the present life. It may be expressed in the thought of B. Roland-Gosselin, "...the ultimate basis of the moral law is the eternal law, which is nothing else than divine reason or will issuing its commands to respect the natural order and forbidding it to be

disturbed on pain of punishment."[49]

Augustine's concept of the State is not expressed in such a way as to enable a reader to tell what his attitude would be in many situations. He gives comparatively little attention to how the individual and the State should be related. His general outlook, however, is not that of one who is out to gain prestige as a pioneer or as an active participant in governing circles. His attitude is that of a person seeking retirement in a realm of unchangeable law and order. Property is permissible so long as it does not cause too much concern or interrupt the intellectual life. The government is to order human affairs according to eternal laws. Augustine has no ambitions to follow Ambrose's influential role in Roman politics. His attitude toward the State may be characterized as a blend of Stoic and Platonic elements. Later events, after his ordination, indicate just how inadequate his concept in the earlier period is. There is very little from his period as a layman which can make a positive contribution to a concept of State for Christians in the twentieth century.

The doctrine of the Church is more fully developed by Augustine. Besides man's relationship to neighbor and state, he is in relationship to the Church. The question arises as to the place which the Church should have. The problem is one of authority. Although authority and reason have been discussed in a preceding chapter, a few special references to authority may be presented here. Firstly, it will be remembered that Augustine decides at Cassiciacum that Christ is the first authority in his life.[47] He is not contradictory to correct use of reason. At Rome he tells the Manicheans that there is nothing more healthful than authority preceeding reason.[48] To Romanianus he writes, in Africa, that any truth he has grasped should be attributed to the Catholic Church. If there is anything doubtful it may be believed until authority or reason either declares it true or false or that it is always to be believed.[49] The above references indicate that Augustine recognizes the Catholic Church as authoritative in his life.

The authority of the Catholic Church, however, rests upon his understanding of that Church's nature. Augustine was slow to recognize it as an authority which he was willing to obey. Many factors were involved in his accepting the Church or Christ through His Church for his authority. Ambrose and Monnica came to the front as powerful representatives of that body. But there were other factors which he recognized as characteristic of the Catholic Church, factors which obviously led to his devotion to that Church.

De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae is the earliest of Augustine's works dealing with his praise of the Catholic Church. His first point for praise is the Catholic Church's use of Scriptures.

Only there, he tells the Manicheans, does one find the harmony of both Testaments. If the Manicheans would listen to that church with the diligence he gave to their sect for nine years, they would find the truth much sooner than he did. Therefore, he advises them to take shelter in the bosom of the Catholic Church.[50] The long usage of the Holy Scriptures by the Churches dispersed throughout the world is a testimony to the truth of those Scriptures. The Christian, unlike the Manichean, cannot speak against the Scriptures. For he has been commanded to love God entirely and the neighbor as himself. Upon this precept are based the teachings of the Catholic Church, that most true mother of Christians (Ecclesia Catholica mater Christianorum verissima).[51]

The second point Augustine praises in the Catholic Church is its teaching. In its task of teaching the Catholic Church has adapted its methods to the mind and to the body of its pupils. Its teachings are childlike for children (pueriliter pueros), forcible for youths (fortiter juvenes), and peaceful for the aged (quiete senes). Women are subjected to husbands in order to bring forth children rather than to gratify the passions. Men are given authority over wives in the law of love. Children enjoy the freedom of subordinates to the parents who bear a godly rule over them. Within the Catholic Church bonds that hold brother to brother are stronger than those of blood kinship. Servants are taught to enjoy their work, and masters are reminded that God is Master of both of them. Citizens of nations and nations, it is taught, decended from common parents. Kings are taught to look to the welfare of their subjects while the people are counseled to be subject to their king. The Church teaches whom one is to honor, and it instructs that love is due to all men, while injury is to be done to none. Those who remain in the Catholic Church are purged from all vices, purified, and sanctified. Sting is removed from death, for the sting of death is sin. To the Mother of Christians, the Catholic Church, he says "yours, as is deserved, are the many hospitable, the many courteous, the many compassionate, the many learned, the many chaste, the many pious, the many burning in their love to God, who in highest continence and unbelieveable contempt for this world find joy in solitude."[52]

Those in the Church who in their love for God avoid the usual life in the world attract special recognition from Augustine.[53] On the one hand there are those who live alone in perfect chastity. They are found particularly in Egypt and in the East in over increasing numbers. With a simple diet for food they inhabit lonely places and hold communion with God only. Their abstinence is carried to such a degree of perfection that many feel that their practices should be limited. On the other hand there are those who use a minimum of worldly goods and who

live together in communities for a life of prayer and discussion. While keeping their minds upon God they also manage to feed themselves by their occupations. Whatever they have in excess of their basic needs they distribute to the poor. The same high standard is kept by women as well as men. They live in complete chastity, but they are industrious in making cloth to exchange with the brethren for food. Augustine finds the monastic life blameless and perfect beyond his powers to describe.

Two other groups of the Church are described who live apart from pleasures of the world. There are the clergy of all ranks who live in moral excellency. Amid the temptations and passions they live with high moral standards. Moreover, there are the houses of saints living together in cities, maintaining themselves by the work of their hands. Besides strictness in morals they maintain instruction and understanding. In all things, however, the requirements are kept in love, and no one is mocked for his lack of strength to imitate the strongest. Quoting Romans 14, Augustine reports that while some eat flesh and drink wine others refuse it, not for silly superstition but for the good of the weak. Love is the principle which governs the lives of these strong Catholic Christians. Of course, among the multitude counted as believers are to be found those who do not measure up to this high standard. Upon them the Manicheans prey.[54] Manicheans need not slander the Catholics, for Catholics criticize the conduct of their own members.

Augustine's exegesis of Genesis helps to clarify his concept of the Church's relationship to Christ. In Adam's clinging to his wife and in the teaching that a man should leave his parents in order to be one with his wife, Augustine finds a parallel to Christ leaving the Father and clinging to His bride, the Church.[55] As the Apostle has said, Christ is the head of the Church which is His body.[56] The Church is taken from His side.[57]

De Vera Religione gives another portrait of the Church painted with bold strikes upon a broad canvas. The teachings of the Catholic Church are applicable to all sorts and conditions of men and have been sent throughout the world. Fertilized by the blood of martyrs, Churches have sprung up, and both men and women live in devoted chastity. Priests steadfast in their responsibility read and expound the precepts of Christianity in the Churches. To this challenge men in every part of the world respond by entering a life devoted to God. Every day, throughout the world humankind with one voice respond, "Lift up your hearts unto the Lord." In the light of this development, asks Augustine, why do men keep mouthing the name of Plato when they could possess truth?[58]

The Church has done such an excellent work, Augustine maintains, that even the philosophers would respect it. If Plato and other great men could see the full Churches and hear their teachings, those men would have to admit their own failures. Instead of converting the people, the philosophers yielded to them.[59] If those men were alive they would follow some Platonists in Augustine's day and become Christians. The Catholic Church is often attacked, but it makes use of all. "Some it invites, some it excludes, some it relinquishes, others it antecedes. To all it gives power to participate in the grace of God whether they are to be formed, reformed, recollected, or admitted."[60]

Augustine's estimate of the Church is seen further in his repudiation of certain elements. He repudiates philosophers who do not work in a religious manner and those who through pride deviate from the rule and communion of the Catholic Church. Moreover, he repudiates those who refuse the light of the New Testament. Augustine believes that one should hold to the Christian religion and to the communion of the Church which is called Catholic even by its enemies.[61]

The method of teaching used by the Church is again praised by Augustine. The Church as adapted its methods for the most fruitful instruction of mankind. Priests do not present matters which are not suited to the people at that moment. Those who require nourishment in milk receive that type of food, while those who are wiser are given something stronger. Although they speak wisdom among the perfect, from those who are not so advanced they withold some information. However, they never lie (mentiuntur), and they do not teach for self-glory. They require that those whom they help to know the grace of God also help others to know it. In this manner divine providence turns the ugliness into a kind of beauty through God's healing mankind.[62]

Augustine's view of the Church as an element in man's devoting his life to God may be briefly summarized. The Church bears authority because it is especially related to Christ. It preserves the true Scriptures. One can hardly give enough praise to its priests and others who live in simplicity and chastity. The breadth of its activities, the scope of its teachings, and the soundness of its pedagogy are most impressive. These are the reasons why Augustine accepts the Catholic Church as his authority on Christian religion and why he devotes his life to its service and defense.

Augustine's conversion is followed by his formal entrance into the Church through baptism. It has been recognized that the Church's authority exerts strong influence in his subsequent intellectual development.[63] To Augustine the Church is a school,

but it is so much more.[64] Although the Scriptures bear witness to the Church, conditions in Augustine's time lead him to stress that Christians' choice of Scriptures rests upon the guidance of the Catholic Church.[65] But Augustine's discussions do not give attention to some important matters. One may wonder what Augustine's full concept of the sacraments of Baptism and of the Eucharist is in this period.[66] One may also wonder about the interrelatedness of Catholic Churches and the position of the Catholic Church in Rome in that interrelatedness.[67] These are, however, questions to be answered from the period after Augustine's ordination as a presbyter.

To Augustine, the Catholic Church is concerned with Truth and the true. It knows the Truth and preserves the true Scriptures. It teaches the truth to people as they are able to understand it. Its members, especially those who live in chastity and poverty, follow the true way of life. These are the elements which attract Augustine the Christian layman. If he is aware of the quarrels among "Catholic" Christians, he overlooks them. He makes no formal distinction between the Church visible and the true Church. He does, however, incidentally make distinctions within the Christian Church. The highest order is that of those men and those women who live apart from the world in poverty and in chastity, devoting themselves to the holy life. Next are those who live in the world, but who are devoted in faith and in practice to the Catholic Church. Below them are those who either do not understand the Catholic Christian faith sufficiently or who do not always succeed in living up to it. The last group are those who claim to be Christians but who persist in violating the beliefs of the Catholics and who refuse correction. Those are called heretics.

In Augustine's early concept of the Church, incomplete as it is, there are certain elements which belong in any adequate concept of the Christian Church. The first is the Church's business to know the Truth. The second is its duty to teach what it knows about the Truth. The third is the responsibility for members of the Church to know its doctrines and to live lives that proclaim their belief in them. The fourth is for the whole Church to distinguish itself from those who believe, teach, or live in opposition to the way of the Christian Church. Upon the fourth point Augustine's views may be examined further.

Augustine thinks that the Catholic Church is to be defended against those who attack it. He begins his refutation of heretics even before his ordination. Although they are to be discouraged, they are not without benefit to the Church.

Heretics drive Christians to a greater study of the Scriptures. If the heretics did not insult them, many Christians

would not turn to seek instruction.[68] Similarity in rites does not mean that those who participate in them are part of the Catholic Church. Those who differ in doctrine, such as Photinians, Arians, and Manicheans, are excluded from the rites of the Catholics. True religion is to be found only among Catholic Christians, that is, keepers of integrity and followers of right.[69] The Church, however, can use those who err for its own progress. It uses nations as material for its operations, heretics to test its own doctrine, schismatics as an example of its stability, and Jews as a comparison to its own excellence. Every man's error is tolerated until he finds an accuser or overly defends his point. Those who refuse correction must leave the Church.[70] Heretics, if left within the Church, would continue to hold erroneous opinions, but when they are put outside the Church they drive some Catholics to seek the truth and others to expound it.[71]

The Manicheans, of course, are the heretics Augustine encounters in this period of his life. In Rome and in Africa he directs three major works at his former teachers. Writing in De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, he points out two tricks used by the Manicheans to gain a reputation as teachers among those who are unsuspecting. Firstly, they find fault with the Scriptures which they either do not understand or do not wish to understand. Secondly, they make a great demonstration of chastity.[72] Augustine attacks them with the purpose of curing their errors. They find fault with the Old Testament and claim that its god is incompatible with God of the New Testament. But who are the Manicheans that they should complain; they worship two gods, one of which is material and bound up with human error. In reality, the God of both testaments is one.[73] Dealing with the second point, Augustine says that Manicheans have little to take pride in if they consider the great chastity found in the Catholic Chruch.[74]

De Moribus Manichaeorum carries further Augustine's destruction of the Manichean myth of abstinence. He cites examples of some Manicheans who do abstain from wine and flesh but who are gluttonous over even more rare foods. In order to free the divine matter in food, some Manicheans have killed members through forcing them to eat too much purified food.[75] Although they prohibit marriage (nuptias), the Manicheans do not forbid the use of concubines (concubitum), which they utilize freely. To them procreation is more sinful than copulation. Even their elect carry out rape and seduction. In these two books on morals Augustine thinks he has shown the weakness of the two strongest arguments used by the Manicheans against the Christians.

De Genesi Contra Manichaeos, which has been discussed in several previous chapters, also contains a summary contrasting

the Manicheans and the Christians. Manicheans hold that God is miserably imprisoned in the world, but the Catholics say that He has created all things out of nothing and that misery comes not by necessity but by man's will to sin. While the Manicheans maintain that the nature of God is changing, Catholics believe that God is constant. Although Manicheans think that God can be harmed by outside sin, Catholics teach that He is incorruptible. Contrary to the Manicheans, Catholics explain that all that is, is good, for there is no evil substance. In these different ways Augustine demonstrates his devotion to God through His Church and by his refutation of heretics.[76]

Two points characterize Augustine's attitude toward heretics. The first is that heretics drive Catholics to know the truth. By distinguishing itself from those who err and through defending itself from those who attack it, the Catholic Church becomes stronger in its essential beliefs and practices. The second point is that Augustine, through pointing out errors and their consequences, desires to win the heretics for the Catholic Church. In this period the only force he appeals to is that of reason. Only when heretics become a violent physical threat does he appeal, in years after his ordination, to governmental power of restraint. Even then his concern is in preventing their violent deeds and having an opportunity to win them to the Catholic faith through reason. These points, applied in Christian love and humility, are nobel enough. Placed in the hands of men of less saintly character they could provoke, and have provoked, almost unbelievable intolerance and cruelty.

Augustine believes that Man being made whole and returning to his correct relationship to God devotes his life to Him. Man is to love God entirely and his neighbor as himself. The individual is to live a life of virtue and to rise ever nearer pure contemplation of the Eternal. In his devoted life he should be careful in his use of the world's resources and in his attitude toward marriage. In his wider relationships he must minister to the physical and spiritual needs of his neighbor, not to glorify himself but through love for a brother with a common Father, God. Besides obeying the minimum standard of justice set by the temporal law, he is to look to the Eternal law to guide his conduct.

The whole life of devotion should be lived through the Church. Man should be obedient to the teachings of the Church which are adapted to promote his growth into the fullness of Christian truth. On the other hand he should exercise care in respect to the Manicheans. Devoting his life in this manner should, with God's help, lead man to a proper relationship to God.

Augustine's concept of the devoted life, although comprehensive in theory, is only an outline to be filled in over

a period of years. Some points he covers rather carefully, and others he only mentions. Like his other doctrines, this doctrine of devotion is based upon acceptance from authority and is waiting to be structured by his increased rational interpretation.

Neoplatonic elements are found in his concept of devotion. If Inge is correct in his interpretation of Plotinus, that virtue is preparation for contemplation, then Augustine is similar to that Neoplatonist.[77] In Augustine's interpretation of law one finds the two realms, temporal and eternal, which may be traced to Platonic origins. This concept is one of the seeds growing to maturity in the De Civitate Dei. These Neoplatonic elements are set within and overbalanced by particularly Christian doctrine. In the years of his bishopric Augustine is to expand many points in his doctrine, but its Christian outline is present before his ordination. The life of devotion springs from a Christian faith. To be a Christian is to live a life of devotion.[78]

Augustine's view of the life in devotion is commendable for several reasons. Although he is concerned for the individual to live a virtuous life, he is aware that the life of virtue is to be expressed in a social setting. The neighbor, the State, and the Church place certain demands upon the individual and also allow him, in return, to express his Christian love. Then, too, Augustine's outline of the areas in which man can express his devotion is broad. The area lacking, from a modern point of view, is man's attitude toward his business world. In Augustine's outline that subject would probably be covered under wealth, neighbor, and State. Before industrialization there was not the same need for a separate discussion of business. Again, his idea of devotion is in keeping with his age. Man is to be in the world but freed from the things which are constantly changing. He does not isolate man from society for purely private virtue, nor does he permit him to be a cynic in the face of social certainties. But from the present day it may seem that Augustine's early view is sufficient only for an intellectual in semiretirement and not for poeple who are busy in the world's activities, whether they be laymen or priests.

Part II, D

The Relationshp of Man and God

3. Man's Devotion to God

Notes

[1] De Beata Vita iv, 35, P. L. XXXII, 976.

[2] De Ordine II, vii, 25, P. L. XXXII, 1006.

[3] Ibid. II, xviii, 48, P. L. XXXII, 1017, to xix, 48, 1018.

[4] Soliloquia I, vi, 13, P. L. XXXII, 876. Clement of Alexandria thinks virtue is correct use of reason. Paedagogus, I, xiii, P. G. VIII.

[5] Ibid. II, vi, 9, P. L. XXXII, 889.

[6] De Quantitate Animae xxxiii, 70-76, P. L. XXXII 1073-1077. Plotinus, Ennead II, ix, 16-18. Purification of the soul.

[7] De Musica VI, xiv, 43f, P. L. XXXII, 1186. Matthew 11:30.

[8] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xi, 18, P. L. XXXII, 1319.

[9] Ibid. xiv, 24, P. L. XXXII, 1321.

[10] Ibid. xv, 25, P. L. XXXII, 1322. Quare definire etiam sic lecet, ut temperantiam dicamus esse amorem Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servantem; fortitudinem, amorem omnia propter Deum facile perferentem; justitiam, amorem Deo tantum servietem, et ob hoc bene imperantem caeteris quae homini subjecta sunt; prudentiam, amorem bene discernentem ea quibus adjuvetur in Deum, ab iis quibus impediri potest.

[11] Ibid. xix, 35, P. L. XXXII, 1326.

[12] Ibid. xxii, 40-41, P. L. XXXII, 1328-1329.

[13] Ibid. xxiv, 44-45, P. L. XXXII, 1330.

[14] De Vera Religione xxvi, 49, P. L. XXXIV, 143-144.

[15] Ibid. xlvi, 86, P. L. XXXIV, 160-161.

[16] Ibid. lii, 101, P. L. XXXIV, 166-167.

[17] De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, XXXI and XXXIII, P. L. XL, 20-23. Ambrose thinks Cicero and philosophers got their idea of virtue from the Old Testament. De Oficiis Ministrorum I, xxvi, P. L. XVI, 75-78.

[18] Soliloquia I, x, 17, P. L. XXXII, 878-879.

[19] De Musica VI, xiv, 44, P. L. XXXII, 1186.

[20] Ibid. VI, xiv, 48, P. L. XXXII, 1188.

[21] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae I, xx, 37, P. L. XXXII, 1327. Amandus igitur solus Deus est: omnis vero iste mundus, id est, omnia sensibilia contemnenda; utendum autem his ad hujus vitae necessitatem.

[22] Ibid. xxxv, 77, P. L. XXXII, 1342-1343.

[23] Ibid. P. L. XXXII, 1343. Ambrose says riches are no help in living a blessed life, but poverty may be. De Officiis Ministrorum II, iv, P. L. XVI, 109-111.

[24] Epistola xv, P. L. XXXIII, 80-81. Laxatis ergo curis mutabilium rerum, bona stabilia et certa quaeramus, supervolemus terrenis opibus nostris. Plotinus Ennead I, v, 10 says a man outside of activity is happier than a man of affairs.

[25] N. Abercrombie, op. cit. p. 37.

[26] Soliloquia I, x, 17, P. L. XXXII, 878.

[27] Ibid. I, xiii, 22, P. L. XXXII, 881

[28] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xxxi, 66, P. L. XXXII, 1338.

[29] Ibid. xxxv, 78, P. L. XXXII, 1343-1344. I Corinthians 6:11-20; 7:1-7.

[30] Ibid. xxv, 79f, P. L. XXXII, 1344. Ambrose De Virginibus, P. L. XVI. Augustine, De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia I, xiv, 16f, P. L. XLIII, 423. Intercourse for pleasure in marriage is venial sin. See also De Bono Conjugali, P. L. XL.

[31] Soliloquia I, ii, 7, P. L. XXXII, 873.

[32] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xxvi, 48-51, P. L. XXXII, 1331-1332.

[33] Ibid, xxvii, 52, P. L. XXXII, 1332.

[34] Ibid. xxvii, 54, P. L. XXXII, 1333.

[35] Ibid. xxvii, 55f. P. L. XXXII, 1333-1334.

[36] De Vera Religione xii, 24, P. L. XXXIV, 132.

[37] Ibid. xlvi, 87, P. L. XXXIV, 161. Romans 13:10.

[38] Ibid. xlvi, 88, P. L. XXXIV, 161-162.

[39] Ibid. xlvi, 89, P. L. XXXIV, 162

[40] Ibid. ...et fratres maxime, quia eos unus Pater testamento suo ad unam haereditatem vocat.

[41] Abbé J. Martin, La Doctrine Sociale de saint Augustin, is arranged in a way which largely ignores the development of Augustine's social consciousness. Hultgren, Le Commandement D'Amour chez Augustin, on the other hand, tries to show Augustine's development.

[42] T. J. Bigham and A. Mollegen, "The Christian Ethic," in Battenhouse, op. cit. p. 380. Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 121.

[43] De Libero Arbitrio I, v, 11f, P. L. XXXII, 1246-1247.

[44] Ibid. I, vi, 14f. P. L. XXXII, 1248-1249.

[45] De Vera Religione xxi, 58, P. L. XXXIV, 147-148.

[46] Ibid. lv, 111, P. L. XXXIV, 170-171 Matthew 22:21.

[47] Montgomery, op. cit. p. 240; E. R. Hardy Jr., "The City of God" in Battenhouse, op. cit. p. 281.

[48] B. Roland-Gosselin, "St. Augustine's System of Morals" (tr. by Leonard), in D'Arcy, A Monument to Saint Augustine, p. 237.

[49] De Vera Religione x, 20, P. L. XXXIV, 131.

[50] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xvii, 32, P. L. XXXII, 1325.

[51] Ibid. xxx, 62, P. L. XXXII, 1336.

[52] Ibid. xxx, 62-64, P. L. XXXII, 1336-1337.

[53] Ibid. xxxi, 65, to xxxiii, 73, P. L. XXXII, 1337-1341. M. Mellet, L'Itinéraire et L'Idéal Monastiques de saint Augustin, pp. 21-28.

[54] Ibid. xxxiv, 75, P. L. XXXII, 1342. As a bishop Augustine becomes painfully aware that there is immorality within the clergy. Epistola CCIX, P. L. XXXIII, 953.

[55] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, xxiv, 37, P. L. XXXIV, 215.

[56] Ibid. Colossians 1:18.

[57] Ibid. John 19:32.

[58] De Vera Religione iii, 5, P. L. XXXIV, 125

[59] Ibid. iv, 6, P. L. XXXIV, 126.

[60] Ibid. vi, 10, P. L. XXXIV, 127.

[61] Ibid. vii, 12, P. L. XXXIV, 128.

[62] Ibid. xxxviii, 51, P. L. XXXIV, 145.

[63] See Capánaga, op. cit., p. 41; Harnack, "Augustins Confessionen."

[64] Alfaric thinks to Augustine it was only a school. op. cit. p. 526.

[65] R. E. Cushman, "Faith and Reason," in Battenhouse, op. cit., p. 296; Cunningham, op. cit., 159; J. H. Smith, Augustine as an Exegete, "Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. LXI, 1904, pp. 318-344.

[66] Alfaric's reference to sacraments, op. cit., p. 526, do not point to more than passing mention of these sacraments; K. Adam, Die Eucharistielehre des hl. Augustin, and A. F. Krueger, Synthesis of Sacrifice According to Saint Augustine discuss Augustine's later development.

[67] Montgomery, op. cit. p. 198-199 thinks Augustine in Sermon 76 interprets Matthew 16:18f in a manner similar to the Protestant view. But this reference is outside the period here under study. Augustine appeals to the Bishop of Rome for counsel in a difficult situation, Epistola CCIX (ca.423 A. D.) P. L. XXXXIII, 953.

[68] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos, I, i, 2, P. L. XXXIV, 173.

[69] De Vera Religione v, 9, P. L. XXXIV, 127. ...vel orthodoxi nominantur, id est integritatis custodes, et recta sectantes.

[70] Ibid. vi, 10, P. L. XXXIV, 127.

[71] Ibid. viii, 15, P. L. XXXIV, 129. Augustine later desires the conversion of the Donatists but their crimes make it necessary to appeal to civil powers. However, he does not wish them punished for revenge. Epistola XCIII and Epistola C, P. L. XXXIII.

[72] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae i, 2, P. L. XXXII, 1311.

[73] Ibid. xvii, 30, P. L. XXXII, 1324.

[74] Ibid. xxxiv, 74, P. L. XXXII, 1341-1342.

[75] De Moribus Manichaeorum, xvi, 52, P. L. XXXII, 1367.

[76] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos, II, xxix, 43, P. L. XXXIV, 220.

[77] Inge, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 162, 178

[78] Roger Hazelton, "The Devotional Life," in Battenhouse, op. cit. p. 399. Augustine "...did not treat the devotional life as a special subject, for the good and simple reason that he did not regard it as an exceptional or separate type of Christian living at all. Anyone who lives as a Christian must live devotedly, in a conscious, deliberate awareness of God and in steadfast adherence to him. So to live is the very texture of the Christian's work, the very presupposition of his thought. Thus the whole of Christian living, and not any part of it alone, displays the genuinely devotional quality."

Part II, D

The Relationship of Man and God

4. The Life Eternal

Man is in relationship with God and may be devoted to Him. But man realizes his temporal nature when he stands opposite the eternal. Death is viewed as something to be overcome. Man seeks to overcome the temporal and to ascend to the eternal. This is one of the first problems that Augustine attempts to solve after his conversion.

Augustine's first concept of overcoming death is in terms of immortality of the soul. In the Soliloquia, "Reason" says that while faith and hope are needed in the present life, only charity will be needed after this life. When the soul is united to God, charity will remain.[1] Among objects of fear Augustine names death. He fears death, for he is uncertain whether what he has learned will be taken away and whether the pathway to greater knowledge will be blocked. He desires to continue life for the sake of wisdom.[2]

Immortality of the soul becomes for Augustine a belief for which he seeks rational proof. He brings forth his first proof for the soul's immortality in the Soliloquia. "Reason" argues that if something immortal is in another thing, the latter must last forever.[3] If a discipline remains forever and the discipline remains in the soul, then the soul must remain forever. Truth cries out in the human soul that it is immortal and will not desert its seat of dwelling by a mere bodily death. There is no death for one unless one forgets that man cannot die.[4]

Argument for the immortality of the soul is continued in more detail in De Immortalitate Animae. Discipline can only be in that which lives. Discipline is eternal. Since discipline is present in the human soul, the human soul is immortal. Truth is immortal and inseparable from the human soul, therefore, the human soul is immortal. Death is the deserting of a thing by that which makes it alive; the soul is the life of the body. Since nothing deserts itself, the soul is immortal. God preserves the soul and does not force it to become a body.[5]

Augustine's works against the Manicheans also discuss life and death. The body is the soul's heavy bond in the present life. The

soul is anxious about the body, but it should turn to God. The soul which is subject to God knows that the body, being used well, will be resurrected, reformed, and subjected to its authority.[6] Although man is now dependent upon exterior knowledge, one day he will see God face to face.[7] He is now under the penalty of sin. But if man will repent, love God entirely and the neighbor as himself, he will come to the tree of life and live into eternity.[8]

De Vera Religione discusses life eternal. Death, Augustine says, is not from God. He is Being. If a thing be really dead, it is reduced to nothingness. Things die, however, as they become less. The life which neglects God and delights in material joys tends to nothing.[9] Such a life does not possess the kingdom of God. Even that which it does love shall be snatched from it. On the other hand, the soul which worships God is reformed by Him. Consequently, after death the body will be restored to its former stability, which does not derive from itself. It will be made sound, peaceful, and holy. Even the body will be cleansed and completely vivified. Essence overcomes nothing and death is absorbed into victory.[10]

The present life and eternal life are of different nature. The great change in the soul comes in the sixth stage of its progress toward God. Man forgets temporal life and passes into perfect form which is made in the image and likeness of God. On the seventh stage ages do not change, for there is eternal rest and perpetual beatitude. While the end of the old man is death, that of the new is eternal life.[11] No one in this present life, however, can live as the new, heavenly man, for he must associate with the old man. The age of mankind may be put into two great divisions. The first age includes mankind from Adam to John the Baptist. The second age begins with the Lord's coming in humility and lasts until the Lord comes in glory. After the judgment, the life of the old man will finally end and the change to angelic life will occur.[12] However, those who have not tried to overcome the old man will be raised to fall to the second death.[13]

Eternal life is life in the Eternal. It surpasses temporal life in vivacity. Only in knowing does one glimpse what eternity is. There one finds no movement, no past nor future. Eternity is ever the same. Eternity alone can say, "I am who I am," and of Eternity alone can it be said, He sent me Who is."[14] Those who desire true ends put off their curiosity, for they have knowledge within as much as is possible in this life. They do not doubt what will be after the present life. Their knowledge, which they now have only in part, will then be made perfect. There will be peace, for the grace of God to will free man from this body of death. When resurrection of the flesh occurs, the corruptible will put on incorruption. What men have loved will be perfected for them.[15] The same principle will be applied to those who choose another way of life. Those who love strife will be excluded from peace. Those

who enjoy lusts will have that disquietude magnified. What they love will be perfected in them, and there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.[16]

A summary of Augustine's concept of life eternal clearly shows a development in his thought. His first concern, after the conversion, is for the immortality of the human soul. He uses arguments of philosophy which assume that the soul is by its nature immortal. The body is repulsive to this spiritual concept. Greater familiarity with Christian teaching, mainly Pauline in origin, gradually leads Augustine to speak of resurrection of the body, judgment, and eternal life. In composing De Vera Religione he speaks of two ways of eternity, both of which begin in the present life and fulfill the desires of the present life. One way is eternal happiness; the other way is eternal misery.

One thread continues through Augustine's changes of thought on eternal life. Early and late he thinks of life beyond the temporal as a perfecting of knowledge. His insistence upon the immortality of the soul is to permit a perfecting of knowledge. Eternal life is a contemplation of God which makes knowledge perfect.

Augustine's early arguments are similar to those of Plato.[17] He also speaks of the soul's progress toward God, as one finds in Neoplatonism. But his concept of the resurrection of the body is in keeping with Pauline epistles. His Retractationes give evidence that it is in the New Testament direction that he develops his concept of man's destiny after his death on this earth.[18] Yet, in all periods Augustine thinks man is destined to live beyond his first death. He lives by virtue of his association with the Eternal.

That Augustine's concept of the Eternal life changes from that of Platonist philosophy to that of Christian theology is clear. Yet, it is also clear that at the time of his ordination he shows only a very slight knowledge of the several views composing the New Testament picture of life beyond the grave. He has not presented his interpretation of the heavenly city, the judgment, rewards and punishments, restoration of the body and other questions which would indicate an understanding of all the books of the New Testament. The Platonist views are supplemented by a few ideas from St. Paul. But the wealth of Christian material upon the subject is largely untouched by Augustine. This is one of those doctrines indicating the firmness of Augustine's intention to be a Christian and, at the same time, his slowness in developing a knowledge of Scriptures and the contents of Christian theology.

Part II, D

The Relationship of Man and God

4. The Life Eternal

Notes

[1] Soliloquia, I, vii, 14, P. L. XXXII, 877. ...post hanc vitam, sola charitas.

[2] Ibid. I, xii, 20, P. L. XXXII, 880.

[3] Ibid. II, xiii, 24, P. L. XXXII, 896.

[4] Ibid. II, xix, 33, P. L. XXXII, 901.

[5] De Immortalitate Animae xiii, 20-22, P. L. XXXII 1031-1032.

[6] De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae xxii, 40, P. L. XXXII, 1328.

[7] De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, v, 6, P. L. XXXIV, 199. I Corinthians 13:8, 12.

[8] Ibid. II, xxvii, 41, P. L. XXXIV, 218.

[9] De Vera Religione xii, 25, P. L. XXXIV, 132.

[10] Ibid. xii, 25, P. L. XXXIV, 133. Vincit enim essentia nihilum, et sic absorbetur mors in victoriam.

[11] Ibid. xxvi, 49, P. L. XXXIV, 144.

[12] Ibid. xxvii, 50, P. L. XXXIV, 144. I Corinthians 15:51.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid. xlix, 97, P. L. XXXIV, 165, Exodus 3:14.

[15] Ibid. liii, 103. P. L. XXXIV, 167-168.

[16] Ibid. liv, 194, P. L. XXIV, 168. Matthew 22:13. See De Gestis Pelagii ad Aurelium Episcopum III, 19, P. L. XLIV, 325. cites Origen's error of non-eternality of punishment of the damned.

[17] Morgan, op. cit. pp. 126-136; Bourke, op. cit. p. 78. C. Boyer, "L'Idée..." op. cit. pp. 214-215. See too Plotinus, Ennead IV. vii. ; life is inherent in soul, but he sees transmigration, III, ii, 13.

[18] Retratationes I, vii, 6, P. L. XXXII, 593-594; I, xi, 3, P. L. XXXII, 601.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ST. AUGUSTINE

FROM NEOPLATONISM TO CHRISTIANITY

386-391 A. D.

CONCLUSION

How did Augustine develop intellectually and spiritually in the years between his conversion and his ordination? The previous chapters have attempted to answer that question by examining many facets of Augustine's life in that period. They have tried to analyze the various elements which were combined to form his thought and action. They have endeavored to indicate how his knowledge of philosophies was combined with Christian doctrine. They have examined Augustine's life and work both historically and systematically. From the results of those chapters of investigation one is able to draw material for a picture of Augustine's life in that period.

In this concluding section the writer attempts to point out and evaluate some of the important details of Augustine's development between 386 and 391 A. D. Such a choice of detail and its evaluation must be, in part, subjective. Others could present different views of the facts or evaluate them differently. However, the following picture is not entirely subjective. It is based upon the preceding chapters which are carefully documented from Augustine's own works and from others' views upon them. The following sections, then, are a selecting, grouping, and evaluating of facts in an attempt to provide an understanding of Augustine which is historically sound.

I

Augustine's Development

According to the Historical Approach

Augustine brought through his conversion experience many influences from his life previous to that conversion. His life was not suddenly ended at conversion in order that a new life might be set down in its place. His previous experiences entered into his

conversion and continued to influence his thoughts and actions in the years which followed. Of some of the influences he was conscious. Of others he did not indicate a full awareness. A few influences operated without his knowledge and can only be isolated by those who study his work carefully over a relatively extended period.

What were some of the influences which started before the conversion? There is a regular list of them which occurs in nearly every work based upon a study of the Confessiones. But at a risk of emphasizing the obvious, the present writer wishes to indicate some of those elements mentioned in the Confessiones and the works of the period under study which have appeared time and again in the preceding historical and systematic analysis of Augustine's development.

The home life of Augustine had a great influence upon the years following his converison. His was not a home of wealth or of poverty. The son was free to receive some education though funds were sometimes limited. Property was owned and passed on to the son upon the death of his parents. There was some financial security, although it was limited to provisions for sensible living. Augustine could work without constant anxiety about riches or the absence of physical necessities. He later decided that struggle for wealth was a waste of time and settled for such things as were necessary for his health.

His home life was not entirely harmonious. During Augustine's early years there was a division of loyalties between Patricius and Monnica. The mother was a Catholic Christian concerned with the piety, devotion, and spiritual wholeness of her son. The father was not a Christian until shortly before his death. His interests were in social prestige for himself and his son. It is likely that he was impatient with the piety of his wife. It is also likely that Augustine was being torn to side with one or the other of his parents. He liked the love and care from his mother, but his youthful, masculine tastes quite naturally favored the program his father preferred. He wanted strange pleasures, professional skill, and public praise. He embarked on the course of his father, but the life offered by his mother was always struggling underneath and rising to the surface at the slightest failure in the program he followed. His father's plan gave him intellectual preparation until his conversion, but in the conversion he submitted to the influence of his mother to establish a growing spiritual life.

Augustine's education was certainly carried through the conversion and until his death. His dislike of Greek and the consequent limited preparation in it kept Augustine from being the exegete or authority on Eastern theology that he could have been. His ignorance of Hebrew led him into some serious errors, as Jerome was quick to point out to him. But his love for Latin

language and literature enabled him to receive an outstanding education and to become an able leader for Catholic Christians.

There was a broadness about Augustine's education which came from studying in several different places. At Tagaste he was under the eyes of his parents, but in Madaura, the home of Apuleius, he was given more freedom to experiment. He became familiar with the heathen and Christian forces operating within that center. In the teeming center of Carthage he was exposed to the wonders, vices, and various schools of thought of the larger city. Besides his knowledge of books, Augustine gained a student's understanding of people and their thoughts.

The professional life of Augustine extended his education and gave him training as a leader. He knew and loved the works of Cicero and had admiration for Varro. Through them he had an appreciation for the several schools of philosophy. He knew how to argue and to write with some skill. Experience in teaching helped him to understand the methods of communication as well as to master the art of guiding individuals to new insights.

His professional life also led him to despise honor and gain from public life. It does not seem, to the present writer, unfair to say that Augustine felt frustrated in his teaching of rhetoric. Of course, his students often did not meet his expectations. But the reason could have been deeper. It is not unlikely that thorugh the early promptings of Romanianus, Patricius, and his African tutors Augustine built up quite an idealized image of himself. He was the small town boy who was going to the big cities and astound the world with his ability. He was never able in reality to live up to that image. He tried moving to other cities. He tried new philosophies. Yet, he had no peace until he threw over the image of himself as one of the world's greatest masters of rhetoric. Augustine maintained, after that experience, a disgust with seeking public approval or rich rewards. He rejected such a life firmly and emphasized the opposite--a life of retirement and study to solve one's own problems or for pleasure.

The philosophy Augustine knew before his conversion continued to be an influence after that experience. From Cicero he had gained a desire for philosophy. Time and again scholars have elevated the importance of the Hortensius. But of more lasting significance was the content of philosophical knowledge which came through other works of Cicero. He had a knowledge of Plato, Aristotle, the Academics, the Stoics, and a history of philosophy in other systems through the works of Cicero. Those philosophies helped to form Augustine's system after his conversion. With Cicero was added information from Varro and other Latin writers.

The Manichean philosophy exerted a strong influence upon Augustine even after his conversion. The radical division between

soul and matter and the bitter attacks on the Old Testament remained with Augustine and shaped his answers to them after his conversion. Their moral practices and ceremonials stayed in his memory. His disappointment with a system which had held him for nine years and which had seemed to him intellectually respectable made him appreciate even more his new philosophy and theology.

Neoplatonist philosophy continued to shape his thinking after the conversion. His reading and appreciation of those books which sprang from Plotinus was aided, probably, by the sermons of Ambrose as well as stories from Simplician. That philosophy helped him to overcome skepticism and radical dualism. Parallels to it could also be found in Christian teaching. It was suitable as an aid in forming Christian answers to philosophical problems.

Augustine's extra-marital relationships had a deep influence upon his later thought. It is probable that by the standards of his own day Augustine was no more lustful than average and more devoted to one partner than was the common practice. It seems that he had a genuine love for the mother of Adeodatus and for the son as well. It is possible that he would have remained loyal to them had not Monnica, more out of concern for Augustine's moral conformity to Catholic doctrine than for his, his son's, and his mate's welfare, proded him to break that relationship. The fact was that Augustine later regarded his practice as horrible lust. There could be no temperance for him, he thought, and so he took the stand of total abstinence. He placed marriage secondary to chastity and tried to remove passion from the duties of marriage. His unfortunate experience has indirectly influenced the mores of all Western Christendom.

The friendships which Augustine made also had a hand in his development after his conversion. Alypius was his closest companion. He seems to have been an assistant to Augustine in teaching and in writing. He followed closely in the footsteps of Augustine in becoming a Christian and in service to the Church. His actions could have given strength to Augustine's own convictions. Alypius was ready to support him in his decisions.

Augustine's friend Romanianus had a great influence upon him. His financial aid prepared the young scholar to be a worthy teacher. Moreover, he had a real passion for knowledge. He was interested in what Augustine was thinking and depended upon him for guidance in philosophy and religion. Romanianus trusted his own son to Augustine's teaching. Together they helped the young teacher collect his thoughts and convictions. They inspired his literary activities. And, indirectly, Romanianus helped to mold Augustine's attitude toward wealth and the life of business. Money and property is not necessarily bad. Business can be permitted. But one should place the intellectual life first and give a minimum of concern to property and business. One should possess his property

without being enslaved to it.

Ambrose and Simplician can be counted among friends whose influence carried through Augustine's conversion. The relationship between Ambrose and Augustine was never warm and personal. It is likely that Ambrose did not realize the force Augustine was to become for Catholic Christianity. But Augustine greatly admired him and was directed by his sermons, his speaking ability, his teaching, and his administration of the Church in Milan. Augustine seems to have been on more personal terms with Simplician. The story he told the young teacher about Victorinus inspired Augustine to imitation. Their friendship continued even after Augustine's ordination.

The Christianity Augustine had known also influenced him after his conversion. It may be that African Christianity was strong and worthy of Augustine's respect and that he withheld his allegiance simply because he was not ripe for conversion. But certain of his early letters indicate that the Churches lacked strong leadership and that Christian doctrines and rites were interpreted in pagan thought forms by the great masses of "Christians." His mother's devotion and piety may have irritated him in his adolescent years and helped set him against the Church. He did not seem to be deeply impressed by the Church in Rome when he was teaching there. It was in Milan that he met Christianity which he respected. His respect for it was due largely to the outstanding ability of Ambrose. Ambrose's form of Catholic Christianity was the positive influence upon Augustine's thought while that of North Africa was more negative.

All of the influences mentioned in the preceding paragraphs started acting upon Augustine before his conversion. They formed his spiritual and intellectual development. They helped to bring about his conversion. They continued to mold his thought in the years between the conversion and the ordination. Yet, in the conversion, the influences were given certain twists. After the conversion they gave a new direction to Augustine's life.

Immediately after the conversion, Augustine's new attitudes indicated how the earlier experiences were affecting him. Those attitudes witnessed to the new direction of life resulting from a change in importance of influences. That change in the order of importance of influences continued to guide Augustine in the years between his conversion and his ordination.

From Augustine's home influence two developments took place. Both may be seen as a turning from the way indicated by his father to that proposed by his mother. He gave up his desire for great wealth and honor. He was satisfied to have only the means to preserve his health and to permit him to search for truth. He gave new importance to piety, moral purity, and Christian doctrine. He

fulfilled the desires his mother had held for him. In his doctrine, wealth was given a secondary place while piety, as well as intellectual and spiritual development, was given primary emphasis.

His previous education was kept and utilized. He never turned his back upon his learning in the arts. There was no great conflict between Christ and Culture, when Culture was interpreted in terms of education. There was a growing seriousness in his use of his education. It was evaluated in light of what was useful in understanding his new life and Christian doctrine. He used his knowledge of rhetoric to understand Christian Scriptures and Catholic doctrine, to apply that understanding to other systems of thought, and to present his understanding to other people through his writings. His profession was not lost, for he continued to teach. He knew how to lead men. His education, both formal and practical, was used to help him develop spiritually and intellectually.

Augustine's knowledge of philosophy was used to help him understand Christian doctrine and to solve the various problems he faced. For him there was no division between philosophy and theology, for both were concerned with truth and correct living. Christianity was the perfect philosophy, and good philosophy was helpful in understanding Christianity. Although Augustine gradually depended less upon philosophies, they dominated the early months after his conversion. Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Manichean thought, and the Academics all helped to shape Augustine's system of thought which he worked out between his conversion and his ordination.

The son, Adeodatus, though loved by Augustine, served as a constant reminder to the father of his slavery to passions. After the conversion Augustine not only denied the longings of the flesh but he also set about denying all passions or any sign that the intellect did not control every action. The love for Wisdom, an intellectual love, was the only one permitted. He loved his friends better the more they used reason, and he removed any passion from love to neighbor. Senses and body were denied in order to give reason supremacy. He took a stand diametrically opposed to the one he had lived by before his conversion.

Augustine's earlier friends continued to bear influence. Alypius followed him in the Christian conviction. Romanianus received his books. Ambrose remained his teacher by word and example. But apart from these men Augustine tried to limit the demands his former friends could make upon him. He was determined to live apart with only the closest group of friends. Although he wrote a few letters to others, he did not often travel to see them. Augustine was a man loved by his friends and who loved them

in return, but he limited all those friendships which did not contribute directly to his intellectual and spiritual growth.

The Christianity Augustine held after his conversion was far removed from that he had encountered in Africa. His faith was not plainly superstitious or based upon ignorance. He accepted a highly intellectual view of Christian doctrine, that which most easily conformed to what he considered as the best of philosophy. Simple faith he permitted to others who could not know better, but his own faith had to be based upon reason. Imperfections of knowledge and in practice of Christian living he could forgive in others, but his own life had to be molded after the most rigorous of Christians. The Christianity Augustine attempted to practice was much like that at Milan and far removed from that which was all too common in Africa.

Those were the forces operating in Augustine after his conversion and which came from the years and weeks before that experience. They were present in him and led him to react in various ways to the new influences which came upon him during the five years before his ordination. Some of the forces continued to grow stronger in encounter with other forces. Others weakened. Others he seemed to begin reacting against. But they were a part of Augustine. One must understand them to understand Augustine's development until his ordination.

New experiences after the conversion had influence upon Augustine. They introduced new forces to interact with older ones he brought into each situation. The places where he lived, the people he encountered, the systems he examined, the discussions he held, the books he wrote, the letters he sent, the letters he received, and his moments of self examination all influenced Augustine's growing system of thought, which in turn guided his action.

The retreat to Cassiciacum was a result of a decision made upon the basis of some of the influences described above. In that action Augustine turned his back upon further advancement in the teaching perofession. He relinquished any claim to future honor and monetary gain as a professor of rhetoric. He set the pattern for his life. He was to live in retirement, pursuing knowledge of his soul and of God and teaching only a select group of friends. In that action many of the disturbing elements of his life were removed. One particular struggle was relinquished. The country air, the relaxed schedule of study, the companionship of congenial friends helped to remove the illness which had overcome him. He was on his way to physical and mental health.

The work which Augustine did at Cassiciacum was both destructive and constructive. He was, through discussion, able

to remove some of the doubts and fears which had possessed him. By a discussion upon the Academics he removed his tendency to epistemological skepticism. There are some things, he discovered, that man can know. He decided definitely to quit giving any thoughts to his becoming married. On the constructive side he stated that his first allegiance was to Christ. He was also confident that Platonist philosophy was not opposed to that allegiance. He began his inquiries into the nature and destiny of the human soul, the problem of evil, the kind of life man should live in order to be happy, and the nature of God.

Augustine's educational and professional backgrounds were of particular value to him at Cassiciacum. The answers to the questions he asked came almost entirely from Stoicism and Platonism, which he probably knew through Cicero. His arguments were based upon syllogisms. His concepts of the soul and of God were largely based upon preconceptions which derived from Greek philosophies known through Latin literature. There was little new information added. The discussions with his pupils merely pulled out of his mind answers which had been there for some time. He was able to collect and catalogue resources which he brought into the conversion experience. The weeks at Cassiciacum enabled him to take stock of his resources and to see where he needed additional information. In those various ways his previous training prepared him for development after his conversion.

The return to Milan in the spring of 387 did not greatly diminish the influence of the arts upon Augustine. He planned to use them to show how a careful study of them could lead to a knowledge of things divine. His discussion of the immortality of the human soul also relied heavily upon his former education. There was nothing particularly fresh or original about his approach or his answers. He needed a vision in a new dimension if he was to make much progress in learning new things about God and the soul.

At Milan Augustine received that vision which opened new doors for his progress. The vision came through two experiences. The discipline of preparation for receiving baptism gave Augustine his first formal instruction in basic teachings of the Christian faith. Although piety and devotion were also products of the instruction, there was a hard core of intellectual content. That instruction showed Augustine the possibilities for a new outlook. Christian doctrine was more than the philosophies he had been depending upon. The Scriptures and the creeds were essential for living a Christian life. The vision also came through the experience of the rite of baptism. That rite gave him a new commitment. He had to renounce his indecisiveness and his service to any but Christ. He made a promise to be loyal to the Christian way. He was identified with the Catholic Christian Church.

The influence of the Catholic Church in Milan upon Augustine

can hardly be overestimated. There he found a vigorous practice of Christian faith. The devoted members were under the powerful leadership of their beloved Bishop Ambrose. He was a first-rate scholar, preacher, and administrator. He held up the celebate life of devotion as an example to be followed by his people. He composed hymns for worship. He defended his people against heretics and even withstood imperial threats. He was advisor to the ruling family. His sermons were rhetorically eloquent and intellectually respectable. His people were able to see him for counsel. There is little room for doubt that the Church in Milan was, for Augustine, a model of Catholic Christianity in essence and how it should be practiced in all places.

When Augustine went to Ostia shortly after his baptism, intending to return to Africa, he had no idea that he was to have two experiences there which would help to shape his whole life. The mystical experience of transcending the transitory and escaping to the Eternal was one for which he had been seeking. Thereafter, the progress of the soul was to be expressed in terms of ascending to the vision of God. Augustine the scholar and administrator could not be separated from Augustine who lived in prayer, seeking direct communication with the Eternal God.

The death of Monnica served to emphasize the uncertainty of the material life. It also interfered with Augustine's plans to go home, so he returned to Rome. As a result of his mother's death, he began to think of the part she had played in guiding his life. The process of analysis continued for some years and later appeared in the Confessiones.

In returning to Rome Augustine received new stimulation for his thinking. The Manicheans were attacking the Catholic Church. From his years of experience in that group Augustine knew both their strengths and their weaknesses. He was ripe, at that moment, to proclaim all of the good things he knew about the Catholic Church, for he had recently joined it and Monnica had been a devoted Catholic. He brought together for comparison the weaknesses of Manichean doctrines and practices and the strength of Catholic doctrines and practices. That work accomplished two things in Augustine's development. It helped him see clearly the difference between the old faith he had dismissed and the new one he had embraced. It also helped to establish his reputation as an able defender of the Catholic position.

Against the Manichean doctrine of evil, Augustine began his answer by a discussion of man's free will. The Neoplatonic view of evil was brought to his service. His view of sin and evil was upon a more definitely Christian line. He was able to go much further in his answer than he was in his discussion of order at Cassiciacum.

What influence the Church at Rome had upon Augustine is uncertain. One wonders how well developed monastic life was and what attention Augustine gave to it. He did not give any account of ministers, services, or administration of the Catholic Church in that city. It was not as important in his life, it would seem, as the Church in Milan. Whether Augustine was repelled by the worldly wealth or the remoteness of the leaders of Rome's Church was not made known by him. Indeed, his reaction to and estimate of the Catholic Church in Rome was one of those unrecorded bits of history which may have been able to explain so many events.

Augustine's return to Africa placed him in surroundings which had been familiar since his birth. There were his property and his friends. There were the churches and the various syncretistic philosophies. There were the people still practicing pagan beliefs and rites often unmoved by Roman language and literature.

Although Augustine's return was not that of a local boy who had successfully conquered the first city of the empire, it was the return of one who saw his native land from a new perspective. Augustine judged Africa by his experience in Milan. He limited his friendships. He avoided involvement in the affairs of public or Church life. He lived a somewhat monastic life, devoting his time to study. He seemed to be more determined than ever to keep himself free for intellectual pursuits.

At Tagaste his work was stimulated by questions from his friends. He was forced to answer their questions orally if they were present. Therefore, copies exist of the answers he gave upon the Christian faith. Correspondance with various people probed him to turn his mind to matters of theology, philosophy, and ethics. Augustine could not escape completely his responsibility to help others come to the new understanding which he had received.

His attack upon the Manicheans, which he had begun in Rome, had to be continued in Africa. His defense of Genesis was probably more influential in changing his own life than lives of the Manicheans. In the first place, he gained a better knowledge of the distinction between Christianity and Manichean doctrine. Secondly, he was introduced to a careful study of the Scriptures which required a defense in addition to a reading and understanding of them. He had to define the method he would use in expounding Scriptures. Thirdly, he learned a Christian approach to creation, sin, and the fall which influenced his subsequent ideas upon those subjects.

Augustine's dialogue upon epistemology served several purposes. It allowed him to survey the theories of knowledge which he had previously held. It led him to state his interpretation

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of the role of Christ as he knew it in the Scriptures. His dialogue showed the development of his understanding of man and the relationship of Jesus Christ to him.

The major work of Augustine preceding his ordination was brought out in his concern for his friend Romanianus. It helped Augustine to clarify his understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. However, the philosophy was of Neoplatonism and of Plato's philosophy rather than that of Academic or of Stoic. It was compared with an understanding of Christianity based more upon a knowledge of the creeds and the Scriptures than Augustine had previously exhibited. The Christianity of the Scriptures and the creeds, such as Augustine knew and understood it, was a perfect fulfillment of the philosophy pointed to by Plato.

It is very likely that a view of Christianity as the perfect philosophy would have remained with Augustine if he had been allowed to follow his own inclinations. He may have grown gradually in his understanding of the Scriptures and in his ability to explain Christian doctrine, but he would have remained apart from public life. His system would have remained one adequate only for a secluded intellectual.

Many things would have kept Augustine from volunterring for active service in the Catholic Church. His letters from that period indicated that Christianity in North Africa was not equal to that of Milan in purity, devotion, and intellectual respectability. It was often confused with pagan ideas and practices. Outsiders could hardly distinguish Donatist from Catholic, except in the places where Donatists attacked Catholics. Circumcellions made life full of dangerous interruptions for the Catholic clergy. It is no wonder that Augustine would have continued to avoid active leadership in the Catholic Church.

His forced ordination accomplished what would have taken years in another manner. Augustine's being placed in such a responsible position and in the midst of everyday activity compelled him to re-examine his development, not in terms of how far he had come but in terms of how far he had to go. He immediately realized that his Christianity was not one adequate for the situation at Hippo. He needed a faith which would serve him as a leader of Catholic Christians. He had already given priority to Neoplatonism supplemented by Scriptures in place of his concepts from Cicero. He decided that his salvation was to be found in a careful study and understanding of the Scriptures. He had to broaden his outlook to new problems and then find answers which he could apply to those problems.

The influences which came to Augustine early in life remained with him through his conversion and until his ordination. During

the years between the conversion and the ordination many new influences were introduced. The new influences interacted with the old. Some of the early influences came into ascendancy while others slipped into the background. Some of the old influences combined with new ones to become powerful forces guiding Augustine's work. But none of the influences was lost entirely. Each one became a part of the intellectual and spiritual development of Augustine.

II

Augustine's Development from 386 to 391 A. D.

According to the Systematic Approach

A systematic study of Augustine's thought discloses the operation of the influences outlined in the historical study. Augustine's system of thought developed slowly and in keeping with the various forces which were shaping his ideas at any particular moment. His home life, education, profession, philosophy, love life, friendships, and Christian knowledge were all reflected in his beliefs upon doctrine.

The doctrine of man was among Augustine's earliest concerns after his conversion. That is understandable, for he was one of his own chief problems and also a man. Immediately after his retreat he devoted some of his time to knowing his own nature and capabilities. He did not give final answers to his questions at Cassiciacum, but he did outline his understanding of himself.

He was content to think of man as a unified division consisting of soul and body. For the body Augustine had little respect. He had the Manichean background which held the body to be evil. Neoplatonism also gave it an inferior place. His experiences with his own body had shown him that it could overcome reason and lead a man to despair. Those were some of the reasons why he assigned it an inferior place in man. However, two influences kept him from dismissing the body as worthless or evil. He agreed with the Neoplatonists that anything which has existence must be good. And he also agreed with the Genesis story that man, including the body, was made by God who declared that His creation was good.

The "soul" was the name which Augustine applied to all of man which was not strictly physical body. It included the life force, reason, and memory. He readily elevated it over the body. Unlike the Stoics he did not conceive of the soul as material. On that point he followed the Neoplatonists who believed that the soul was non-material. Unlike the Neoplatonists he denied that the

soul was a part of the Godhead. He followed Genesis and proclaimed that the soul was only a creature. He was early occupied with proving that the soul must be immortal. Indeed, he relied so heavily upon Platonist arguments that it was only just before his ordination that he admitted the New Testament concept of the resurrection of the dead.

Augustine's concern for man very soon involved him in epistemology. The subordination of the body in his discussion of the nature of man led him to a subordination of the senses in his discussion of how man knows. Like most Greek philosophers he noted the way in which senses are often in error. He had to give credit to Cicero's Academics upon that point. Senses could stimulate the reason and even bring some information, but the real work must be done by the reason.

Augustine assigned reason to the highest bracket in man. Like the Stoics and Platonists he made it the supreme element in existence. He did admit that it could be inadequate to know God fully, but he believed that it could lead to Him. All of the higher pursuits of man, he thought, could be best reached by reason. In addition, within man there is Truth itself, he thought. Man was to turn inward to find Truth who could be none other than Jesus Christ. Stoic influence mixed with New Testament teaching led Augustine into a position which has caused difficulty for his defenders ever since then.

Man is in relationship to God, said Augustine. He could only understand man in the Genesis way as a creature of God. Man even has God present within his own mind leading him to God, the Truth.

Augustine's whole doctrine of man was generally Christian, especially after his exposition of Genesis. He distinguished between positions of that religion as contrasted to Manichean, Stoic, and Neoplatonic thought. Yet, those philosophies were not without their influence. Like Manichean and Neoplatonic thought he minimized the body. He failed to recognize the role it plays in making man a whole person by receiving information, expressing his ideas, and executing commands for work. Like Neoplatonism and Stoicism he elevated the reason without due regard to its frailty. He did not realize the presence of irrational forces that subconsciously control man's reason. In short, his concept of man suffered from lack of information. Much of that information was found after fifteen hundred years by psychological and psysical sciences. It now belongs in any adequate Christian doctrine of man.

Augustine was not content to know himself in isolation. He wanted to understand God and the world in which he lived. Thus,

his doctrine of man was accompanied by a doctrine of the world. The world included creation and those things which were neither man nor God but which could lead man to God.

From his own experience, Augustine believed that man could know some things about God through his own efforts. By observing the order of nature and the evidences of order in the liberal arts, man's senses could lead him to some evidence for God's being. But the senses, he held, consistent with his doctrine of man, are of little value in knowing God. The human reason is able to learn far more from a study of the arts. He did admit, however, that the human reason is often unable to understand the divine. It may be blinded by the very light it seeks. Augustine quite correctly noted both man's ability to know something about God and the limitations which are placed upon the amount of knowledge about God which man can attain alone.

Again, Augustine's experience led him to believe that man's coming to a knowledge of God was partly through divine aid. He had found, in his relationship to Catholic Christianity, that following divine authority was the quickest, surest, and most reasonable way to come to understand God. Authority and reason seemed to him to go hand in hand. He had found that divine aid was given in at least three forms.

He had come to a knowledge of God through the Church at Milan. His appreciation of the Scriptures, of Christian doctrine, and of God's action upon his life had grown out of his association with Ambrose as Bishop of Milan. He saw no reason why the Church should not be regarded as a divine authority leading to a knowledge of God.

In the Church Augustine had come to a knowledge of the Scriptures. Through them he was slowly led to an understanding of God and His relationship to mankind. Like Ambrose, he used the allegorical method of interpretation. That was the method which first won him to a respect of the Scriptures, and which first showed him the possibility of bringing harmony between his philosophical background and the teachings of the Christian Church. Although his tools were inadequate, his study of the Scriptures greatly influenced his growing system of thought.

Through the Church and the Scriptures as well as through two special events Augustine came to believe that God Himself acts upon man, making Himself known to him. Exercising real wisdom, he did not let an institution or a collection of written words come between him and God who not only speaks through those indirect means but also speaks through direct confrontation of the individual man.

On the question of how man in the world can know God,

Augustine kept a balanced view. He did not allow his respect for human reason and philosophical pursuits to blind him to their inadequacies. He sharply realized the need for dependence upon Christian authority for one only beginning in the faith. He also kept a good balance among the sources of authority by preventing either Church, Scriptures, or direct revelation from crowding out the other two.

Through the witnesses which led him to a knowledge of God, Augustine came to a more nearly Christian understanding of the world in which he lived. His position came primarily from his exegesis of Genesis against the Manicheans, although other influences were also present. His first assertion was that the world has been created by God out of nothing. He turned against the Manicheans who held that material is an evil at war with God and seeking to overcome Him. He denied the Neoplatonist ideas that the world is fallen from true essence and is eternal. He could not, like the Stoics, make a close identity between God and the world. With Genesis he proclaimed the world to be created out of nothing by God. Thus, it is neither God nor part of Him.

In his understanding of his world, Augustine secondly asserted that it is good. He had some difficulty overcoming Manichean ideas that the world was evil or Neoplatonist ideas that it was a lesser good to be escaped as soon as possible. Indeed, Augustine did not completely succeed in overcoming those influences. But he did try to take the Genesis view that all things were made by God and as His creation they are good. He was aided in his stand by the Neoplatonic belief that all which has existence is relatively good, for evil does not exist.

Augustine also believed that the world is continuously sustained by God. He has not created and then abandoned it. Christianity, Neoplatonism, and Stoicism all supported him in his belief. Without the continuous presence of the divine, creation would fall into chaos. Existence as it is known would cease to be. Augustine did not think that such a view involved God in evil, for though He made use of evil for good ends once it had occurred, He did not create it.

There is no doubt that the influences described in the historical study of Augustine gradually led him to a Christian understanding of the world. The Genesis view slowly replaced that which came from Stoicism, Platonism, or Manichean thought. When he began his service as a priest, his view of Man in the world had marks which were particularly Christian. Although his view of the world was incomplete, he had a good outline for his age. It is only from the point of view of the twentieth century that his work seems insufficient. The development of a scientific world view since the Reformation and recent Biblical studies combine to throw into question the adequacy of Augustine's

world view for the twentieth century man.

God was an object of Augustine's desire. At Cassiciacum he wanted to know the soul and God. Through his understanding of himself and his world his understanding of God grew. Augustine's concept was molded by his previous knowledge of philosophy as well as by new forces which he listed under divine authority.

His concept of God's nature was an interesting combination of preconceived ideas of God taken from Stoicism and Platonism and the new ideas of God given through Christian authorities. The impersonal, Eternal, One was combined with the personal, dynamic, Trinity of Christian Scriptures. Although in expounding Genesis Augustine accepted something of the concept of God found there, if it did not have to be taken too literally, he obviously preferred the more ontological, philosophical concept. He was fleeing the world of change and sought to reach the presence of that One beyond all change where his knowledge could be made full.

Augustine, even when he held to his philosophies, did not think of God as detached from the world. Manichean thought believed that God was present in the world and involved in continuous struggle. Neoplatonism, Pythagoreanism, and Stoicism thought of all things existing only by remaining in the divine. It was easy enough to add the Hebrew-Christian concept of God as the Sustainer of the world. Augustine's main addition to the concept of the work of God, that is His creating, came largely from the Genesis account. Even though Augustine may have been tempted to follow Gnostic practice of isolating God from any working connection with the world, he resisted that temptation and stressed the dependency of all things upon God.

The Trinity conceived of by Augustine was definitely more Christian than Neoplatonic. He rejected the subordination which was used in Plotinus. Augustine's concept was based largely upon what he had learned from African Christianity and the teachings of Ambrose. He accepted the doctrine on authority of the Church and had only a poor understanding of it before his ordination. He did proclaim the equality of the three members and the presence of all three in the action of any one. The Father he thought of as God, and the Holy Spirit was conceived of as love.

The second member of the Trinity, Jesus Christ, received fuller attention. Augustine recognized both the divine and the human elements. He was aware of the incarnation and the events associated with it. He also knew about the Logos, Truth, and Wisdom. He intended to hold an orthodox Catholic view of the doctrine, which he had taken upon authority. But in practice,

Augustine's love of the Eternal and the intellectual led him to emphasize the divine Wisdom of Jesus. Jesus' reason and gift of Truth were more important to Augustine than the actions of his body.

The God of which Augustine conceived was hardly at peace with Himself. He was composed of many elements that were incongruous. The combined ideas from his philosophic background were not completely harmonious. Mixed with a Christian collection of elements which were not always compatible they could only make difficulties for the rest of Augustine's system of thought. Augustine passed his concept on to "orthodox" Christianity, and his problem has not been solved satisfactorily even by theologians of the twentieth century.

After his conversion Augustine was particularly concerned about his relationship to God. He felt that he was separated from God and needed to find Him. His work was in search of ways by which he might go to God and live in contemplation. From his earliest days at Cassiciacum he was searching for the correct way to use his life. He wanted to live so as to enjoy the life eternal.

Augustine's first definition of sin came from a Platonist background. He thought of sin as a separation from the eternal or as a turning away from the Eternal to a lower place in the scale of being. He also interpreted the Genesis story in that way. Sin is a failure to love God above all else, a desire to act as though one were God, and a turning away from God to love some creature. Unlike Plotinus, however, Augustine did not think of sin and fall as a part of things coming into being. Sin could only be in a voluntary act. An action from necessity is not sin.

With his description of the cause of sin Augustine left his mark upon all subsequent Western Christian theology. There is no other cause of sin than the free will, said Augustine. God did not cause sin. There is no evil power, he argued against the Manicheans, which can cause man to sin unless he should will to sin. Yet, Augustine became aware that man can will to do right and not be able. Even against his conscious will he may act so as to separate himself from God. Augustine's more mature answer was that such a situation was not present before the first sin and that it could only be a result of that sin.

The results of sin Augustine discovered primarily in a study of the Scriptures, although Platonic influence was present. Separation from highest Being, a dependency upon senses rather than reason, and being possessed by the body and change were elements taken from Neoplatonic and Stoic thought. That man can will to do right or return to God and not be able, he

recognized from his study of Christian Scriptures to be a result of sin. In his early period Augustine did not give enough place to the permeating social penalties attached to sin.

Augustine's concept of sin was commendable in many ways. He got at the heart of sin. He was not interested in specific acts, for he correctly saw that sin results from a wrong attitude or a misplaced love. He also defined sin as a voluntary act. Being created or born in the world is a separation from Essence, but in Christian thought it is not a sin and cannot be a sin since it is not voluntary. The results of sin Augustine knew in part from his own experience. But it took St. Paul and Pelagius to make him realize the encompassing penalty of sin.

In his conversion Augustine gave his thoughts to his salvation. He wanted to come to a knowledge of God, to escape the world of flux, to live in the presence of the Eternal, and to know Truth. His unhappiness led him to examine the materials he handed as a teacher of rhetoric. From the philosophies he knew there and from his new-found Neoplatonism he formulated his idea of salvation. Salvation is, he said, man's overcoming separation from God, the ravages of time, and the darkness of ignorance. When he studied the Scriptures and heard the doctrines of the Church he tended to interpret them in those terms.

From his own experience Augustine knew that man can do something toward his own salvation. He can decide that he wants to be made whole. He can begin to live more by reason and less by the desires of the flesh. He can progress toward a perfection of knowledge. That Augustine gave a place to man's action in his salvation is certainly to his credit. To have denied human activity would have been to close the door upon facts he knew from personal experience.

Augustine was also aware that he did not save himself by his own actions alone. He could give no other answer than that his becoming whole had been made possible by and sustained by God's help. At that point special aid from Christian sources overshadowed the idea of general support of existing things found in Pythagorean, Stoic, and Neoplatonic thought. Part of Augustine's salvation was due to the Catholic Church, especially the one in Milan under the direction of Bishop Ambrose. Through its help he came to know his own separation from God and that his salvation was to be met in the Christian religion. Through the Church he gained an appreciation of the Scriptures which gradually led him to understand the various implications of being made whole. He discovered more and more the role of Jesus Christ as saviour of men.

His early concepts of Christ as saviour were almost entirely

in philosophical terms. He conceived of Christ in terms of Wisdom, Reason, and Truth. But through receiving formal instruction, study of the Scriptures, and meditation upon Catholic creeds he gradually enlarged his concept of the work of Christ in man's salvation. He recognized the incarnation as well as the divine side of Christ. He grew to appreciate the human role ad teacher as well as the divine role of reason-principle and Truth. It is true that he did not come to appreciate, before his ordination, the more Semitic concepts of Messiah and sacrificial offering. He only had an outline of the work of Christ which was to be made more complete through years of study. Generally speaking, his concept of Christ was over intellectualized at the expense of the other aspects of Christian witness to the Jesus of history and Christ of Eternity.

Augustine's concept of salvation was definitely Christian by the time of his ordination in 391. It placed strong emphasis upon those ideas which seemed parallel to the best of Greek philosophy. He differed from them especially in his belief in the Incarnation. But he failed to have a knowledge of and a proper respect for the historical side of Jesus' life. He avoided docetism and Arianism. Yet, he lacked a knowledge of New Testament Scriptures which would have given a good balance to his interpretation of the work of Christ.

The system of thought which Augustine developed after his conversion was not purely theoretical. He lived by his discoveries, and he formed his theories upon the basis of his living. He wanted to live a life of devotion which flowed from his growing salvation. Part of being made whole and healthy came from living a whole and healthy life. Of course, Augustine was first concerned about his personal conduct. He was determined to live so as to grow in wisdom and in the contemplation of God. He wanted to live so as to overcome the passions of the body and the changes of the world. He sought to cultivate the classical virtues as he found them expressed in Christian teachings.

Augustine's attitude toward the use of wealth and property was largely determined by his own background and property, Ambrose, and Romanianus. Augustine had not been accustomed to a life of riches, so he could easily forego some of the delicacies available to those with more wealth. He did not have a great amount of property to occupy his thoughts. He must have admired Ambrose who gave his personal property to the poor and his lands to the Catholic Church. But he remembered his debt to Romanianus, without whose wealth he could not have received an excellent education. His attitude was one of frugality. He believed in using wealth with responsibility for the welfare of others and in such a way as not to detract from personal study and devotion.

The relationship of marriage and chastity in Augustine's

system also obviously grew from his experience. He had a horror of the passions of the flesh which were exercised out of and within marriage. In addition to his home life and later love life Augustine had other forces operating upon him which led him to elevate chastity and only permit marriage. Of course, there was his Stoic dislike of passion and St. Paul's attitude toward marriage. But his contemporaries may have shaped his thought. Ambrose was noted for his elevation of virginity and his sister, Marcellena, was living example of his preaching. It is likely that Jerome was making his influence felt in Rome during Augstine's first visit there. Whether Rufinus Tyrranius had an influence upon him in this early period is uncertain. Anyway, Augustine greatly admired monastic life in Milan. Although he did not make that life a minimum standard for Christian living he certainly preferred it to marriage. He was following the spirit of piety in his age. The difficulty of using his attitude towards marriage and sex in the present century is his ignorance of many facts discovered by modern medical sciences which should be considered in a Christian doctrine of marriage or celibacy.

Augustine learned some passages of Scriptures quite early. Among them was the Great Commandment which teaches one to love one's neighbor as oneself. He was concerned very early, then with love for the neighbor. Following his understanding of man, he divided love to neighbor into care for his soul and then care for his body. The neighbor is to be loved because he is a creature of God and not because he is a friend or a relative. He is to be loved for his soul and not for his body. One may suppose that Augustine's intention was to remove any prejudices involved in loving the neighbor. Every man is to be loved simply because he is a child of God. The strength of Augustine's view was also its weakness, for in reducing distinctions he also reduced individuality. He left himself open for the criticism that his love for neighbor was only a love for a manifestation of the universal and not for any individual, human being.

His doctrine of State had little about it which could be called Christian. There was little enough in the New Testament for establishing such a doctrine, but Augustine did not even make use of that material. He was more concerned to retreat from the realm controlled by the State than he was to use it in a Christian way. He did believe, however, that temporal laws should be based upon eternal law.

Augustine's concept of the Church was established almost entirely upon his own experience with it. His appreciation was stimulated by the attacks of Manicheans. Several things impressed him about the Church; it is easy to suppose that he found the first three of them at Milan. He was struck by the Church as a source of Truth. Its authority and its Scriptures had the truth man needed to live a wise and happy life. He appreciated it as a

teaching institution. The Church adapted its methods of teaching to the ability of its pupils. It had instruction for children and for those in old age. His years as a professor of rhetoric made him admire the work of priests in proclaiming the truth. Augustine was proud of the monastic life which flourished under the Church's guidance. To the heretics he could always point to the example of those Catholics who left the goods of the world to live chastely a life of devotion. He was moved by the "world wide" extension of Christianity. It was a philosophy for all people of all places and proclaimed by the Church in every place. The Church was a new center for his life after his conversion. His teachings about it contained many factors which should be contained in any doctrine of the Church.

The life of devotion, in Augustine's thought, accompanied salvation. It allows man to express his love for God and for neighbor and places certain duties upon him. Augustine correctly realized that the individual life of devotion must also express itself in terms of social relations. In his concern with neighbor, State, and Church he covered most areas of man's life. However, he did not develop a concept of man's work or of how he should conduct himself in business. His idea of devotion was better suited to an intellectual man living in retirement than to active priests or laymen living in the midst of the main currents of the world's activities.

In his anxieties at the time of his retreat to Cassiciacum Augustine wanted to be assured of the immortality of the soul. We fell back upon the presupposition that the "soul" is equal to "life." He used arguments which were to be found ultimately in Plato. But as he became more familiar with the Scriptures he began to speak of the resurrection of the dead. That was a major obstacle for him since his own doctrine of man minimized the body and Manichean as well as Neoplatonic thought desired man to escape the body. Yet, Augustine did not take into his system many of those Jewish concepts of life beyond the grave which were found in the New Testament. His view of life eternal could only barely be called Christian in any distinctive way

Augustine's system of thought which he developed both intellectually and spiritually showed traces of many influences. Those forces which were operating upon him beofre his conversion and which continued to guide him interacted with other events and influences after his conversion. All of those factors helped to make Augustine's system. It was definitely Christian in outline and in content. It was not complete nor was it entirely adequate. But it was the beginnings of the system he was to develop later as Bishop of Hippo.

III

A Summary of Augustine's Intellectual and Spiritual Development from 386-391

When Augustine was converted he did not think that there was an incompatible difference between the best of Greek philosophy and Christianity. Jesus Christ was his highest authority, but he saw no reason why he should not use Platonist philosophy to help him in solving his problems. Of course, he knew that Manichean thought was at cross purposes with Christian doctrine. He was also aware of some differences with Stoic philosophy. Yet, he saw no great division between Neoplatonism or Platonism and Christian doctrine. He saw in Ambrose one who had demonstrated the compatibility of the two systems. Christianity was the perfect philosophy, and philosophy rendered the doctrines given by authority in Christianity intelligible through reason. In one way, the intellectual and spiritual development of Augustine between his conversion and his ordination could be described in terms of how he related Christian teaching and Greek philosophy.

In his earliest days after the conversion Augustine did not seem to be aware of any major differences between his ideas from Greek philosophy and his ideas from Christian doctrine. One reason for that belief was a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the systems involved on either side. He had some knowledge of the philosophies from his studies in the Latin classics. But it seems that his discovery of Neoplatonist books was very recent. He was acquainted with some parts, which Ambrose had perhaps used. Yet, he was only growing in knowledge of that system which was so new to him. His knowledge of Christianity was also limited to popular concepts gleaned from his mother and North African Christianity, with the exception of what he could learn from the sermons of Ambrose. He concentrated more upon the similarity of Christianity and philosophy than he did upon their differences.

When he was at Cassiciacum, Augustine had no difficulty in recognizing Christ as his chief authority and then solving his problems primarily upon the ideas he remembered from his days as a student and as a teacher of rhetoric. On the Christian side he remembered his new commitment, some ideas of Jesus as the Truth and Wisdom, some of the terms from the Old and New Testaments commonly applied to God in prayer, and a few teachings from the New Testament. All of those showed only a limited and popular understanding of Christianity. On the philosophical side

Augustine drew heavily from Platonic, Stoic, Pythagorean, Academic, and Neoplatonic thought. His concept of the happy life was under Stoic influence. His arguments for the immortality of the soul could be found in Plato. His discussion on order drew from several philosophies. His discussion of epistemology contrasted different philosophers within the Academy. He had Christian elements in his answers, but the bulk of his discussions drew more from the philosophies.

At Cassiciacum Augustine relied almost entirely upon the Socratic method. He was studying the Scriptures and also the writings of Varro, but there is little evidence that he approached other teachers or written works with the specific purpose of finding answers for particular questions troubling him. He was satisfied to probe the contents of his own mind or the minds of his students. From those sources he composed answers which he gave to questions disturbing him. He explored only those aspects of problems which seemed important to him at that moment. He wanted immediate answers for immediate living. The present writer thinks that one may call Augustine's approach an "existential" one, though he did not despise conceptual thinking.

Augustine's approach had many points to commend it. He was in a position which required immediate answers. His problems had to have some solution in order for him to recover physical and mental health. He was no longer interested in some objective approach to studies. He was personally involved. Moreover, he was almost forced to turn inward. He did not have a Christian tutor. He was not sufficiently advanced to find the Scriptures very helpful. He had little choice other than trying to create meaning for his life out of the fragments he brought with him into the situation.

His approach also had some weaknesses. His personal problems were very limited. By asking the questions and answering only them he did not gain a breadth of knowledge which may have enabled him to ask better questions or approach his problems from a new direction. He used only those portions of philosophy which seemed to have direct bearing upon his situation. He did not stop to consider the validity of the whole systems from which thoughts were taken. He knew only a minimum of Christian doctrine. He used only what he could apply to his problems. Again, he did not deal with a whole system. He selected thoughts that seemed to fit together with the philosophical thoughts. He ignored or was unaware of the fullness of Christian doctrine which would have thrown new light upon his interpretation of isolated passages of Scripture and shown him how different Christianity is from his Greek philosophies. The main weakness of his "existential" approach was that it was far too narrow to begin to comprehend the richness of the whole Christian message.

Augustine gradually grew in his knowledge of Christian doctrine. The preparation he made for receiving baptism from Ambrose in the spring of 387 introduced him to the essentials of Christian belief. That introduction was to continue working in his mind in the months afterwards. He gradually realized something distinctive about the Christian approach and answer to life. He became better acquainted with the Scriptures and the traditions of the Church. Those ideas he had not held before his special instruction. How did they fit into relationship with his background in philosophy?

In light of time and new studies, Augustine's concepts of the various systems of philosophy became clearer. It is not unreasonable to assume that he digested more of the Neoplatonist system and compared it with the instruction he had received from the Catholic Church. He was beginning to see more of the system of Christian doctrine and, at the same time, more of the Neoplatonist system which included elements from the older Greek philosophies. Augustine was not ready to assert one above the other. He had believed in their compatibility, so he continued to try to harmonize the apparent differences.

As he read the Scriptures Augustine knew that many passages were stumbling blocks for either the literal minded or those who held an ontological philosophy. His solution was to approach the Scriptures with a symbolic interpretation. He remembered the allegorical interpretation which Ambrose used. He did not deny the historical account of the Scriptures when certain allowance was made for figures of speech. But in practice he gave preference to allegory. Stories, events, persons, and objects could signify something other than their literal indication. It was up to the interpreter to decide what interpretation should be given. Augustine allowed several different views of any one passage so long as none of the views was in conflict with Christian faith. The view usually held by him was one which could be reconciled to Neoplatonist philosophy.

The advantages of his approach to Scriptures were several. He could dismiss any difficulties in Scriptures as only figures of speech. He could pay lip service to the historical accuracy of accounts in Scriptures without being influenced by them except where they served his purposes. He could explain Hebrew thought, in so far as possible, in terms of Greek philosophies. From his work he could present the Christian religion as compatible with Greek philosophy or even as a superior form of philosophy.

The disadvantages were also numerous. Augustine did not try to fit his mind into the pattern of the writers of the Scriptures in order to know what they meant by their words. He did not try to understand the full implications of the written words in the context which they first appeared. He did not allow them to

stretch his imagination or to give him a new point of view, as they could have done. He made the Scriptures fit his own mind and system of thought. He used only those parts which could be reconciled to his immediate problems or to Platonist philosophy. He ignored, for the most part, the richness of experiences described in the Scriptures which he could not fit into the narrow confines of his personal system of philosophy. For that reason his intellectual and spiritual growth was held to a slow rate. His study of the Scriptures, however, was not without effect in changing his thought forms.

Augustine grew in awareness of the differences between Stoicism, Manicheanism, and Neoplatonism on the one hand and Christian doctrine on the other. His exegesis of the Scriptures, especially of Genesis, led him to hold the views which he found there. He did not go so far as to write down the differences between philosophy and theology, but he was aware of some of them. Where his knowledge of Christian doctrine came into conflict with his knowledge of ontological philosophy, he quietly relinquished the Neoplatonic view and proclaimed the Christian doctrine. When he described the true religion to Romanianus, Augustine, only a short while before his ordination, described it in terms of the true philosophy. He presented the Christian religion as the fulfillment of what Platonism only attempted. He indicated some Christian doctrine which was clearly in conflict with Neoplatonist philosophy. He did not publicly declare the breach, but his philosophical background was becoming secondary to his growing knowledge of Christian teaching.

There were points at which reconciliation of the ontological philosophy of Neoplatonism with Christian doctrine as Augustine knew it in his age was almost impossible. There was the difference in the doctrine of man. The Neoplatonic approach understood man as essentially soul and as an emanation from the divine. On the other hand, Hebrew-Christian thought believed in the unity of man as a soul and body. The body was an important part of man. Man, as a whole creature, was made out of nothing by the action of God, even as Genesis declared. The two systems differed upon knowledge of God. Whereas Neoplatonism and its preceding philosophies emphasized the ability of reasoning man to know all things, Christian thought taught that man was, in the last analysis, dependent upon the revelation of God through His action toward man, especially in His Son, Jesus the Christ appearing in history. The view of the world was not the same in the two systems. The ontological philosophy thought of the world as an emanation of the divine and therefore eternal. Christian doctrine followed the attitude of Genesis and said that the world was created with time out of nothing and that it could not be destined to return to God. The doctrine of God was different. Plotinus thought of Being as unconscious of anything below itself. Christian doctrine depended upon the concept of God as a Merciful and Gracious Father

which was described in the Holy Scriptures. Although the views of the second person of a trinity had a superficial similarity, there were some insurmountable differences. Whereas Neoplatonism held to an impersonal nous, Christianity proclaimed a personal Jesus living in history the full life of a man and who was, at the same time, divine. Platonism thought of the fall of man as identical with his coming into existence. Such a view was clearly in conflict with the Christian view based upon Genesis that man's fall was by free will posterior to man's being created, a fall from a state which was in itself good. Salvation in Platonist philosophy tended to be described as by reason alone. Christianity did not deny the place of human reason, but it had to be accompanied by gracious means offered by God. Those means included the Church, the Holy Scriptures, and an Incarnate Deity. The destiny of man was also conceived differently in Neoplatonism and Christianity. The former joined earlier Greek philosophies in thinking of the immortality of the rational soul. The latter took concepts from inter-testamental Jewish thought and emphasized a resurrection of the body and judgment to be followed by reward or punishment. Augustine slowly became aware, even before his ordination, of those real differences between Platonist thought and Christian doctrine.

Before ordination suddenly interrupted his life, Augustine knew that he needed to spend more time studying the Scriptures. There was a world of thought which could not be learned quickly through sermons or through the creeds. The Scriptures were the basis for Christian doctrine. They dealt with all areas of life. They included answers to problems of life written by many different men. They could make Augustine's intellectual and spiritual development move more rapidly. His knowledge of what the Scriptures could offer him, however, had not led him to a serious and comprehensive study of them.

The event of ordination impressed upon Augustine the necessity of his having a firmer grasp of Christian doctrine. It was not unusual that he should turn to a study of the Scriptures. He was ready to initiate a program for which he had long felt a need. He did not state that he was forsaking his previous positions in philosophy. But his actions indicated that he had found that his previous solutions were no longer adequate for him as a leader in the Christian Church. His answers needed to be Christian. He at least had to know the contents of Christian teaching. His philosophical background could be an aid or a tool; it could not be a substitute for Christian doctrine.

IV

An Outline of the Influence upon Subsequent Thought by Augustine's Life and Work from 386 to 391 A. D.

1. Upon Augustine's Later Life and Works

For Augustine, the influence of the period between his conversion and his ordination was both in direction and in content. He was already Christian in his commitment, but his method was not one which always yielded specifically Christian answers. He went through a period of self examination and summary of the arts. He continued to use philosophy. But he depended more upon Scriptures, councils and creeded, and the practices of the Christian Community. He was set in a direction which led him to deserve his position as one of the great Doctors of the Christian Church.

The content of his early thought was not lost. As the writer has shown in earlier sections, Augustine's first solutions in theology influenced his later development. As he grew in experience and had more time to study, his ideas slowly changed. New events in history showed him problems to which he had not given sufficient thought. To counteract extreme positions he made extreme statements. Few of his ideas in the early period remained unchanged in his later thought, but all of them had an influence in the way he met new situations.

A study of some of his better known positions taken in later years indicates how early answers remained or changed in different circumstances. His early emphasis upon God as unchanging, and eternal remained with him. He said that it was impious to say that God had ever had a new thought. Quite early, then, he included a belief in God's foreknowledge of all events. When Pelagius came emphasizing the freedom and ability of man to do all things, it was easy for Augustine to push St. Paul's position to its extremeties and to declare an absolute predestination.

Augustine continued to meditate upon the Trinity and over a period of years produced one of the classical works upon the subject. Like his earlier references, however, his work suffered from a failure to know and utilize the contributions of the Greek

theologians who did so much to help formulate the "orthodox" Christian concept of the Trinity.

In his doctrine of Sin he had already relied heavily upon Genesis. He had believed in the freedom of the will in sin but had only begun to think of the loss of free will through sin. Again, Pelagius and his followers pushed him to an extreme stand. He followed St. Paul in relying heavily upon the Genesis account of the fall of Adam. He made the account a document of history and extracted an exacting interpretation. He tried at once to maintain his earlier position of freedom of the will and the position that no human being is born without sin.

In his doctrine of salvation he had given a big place to man's ability to return to a proper relationship with God. When Pelagius and his followers seemed to stress man's ability so as to ignore the grace of God, Augustine minimized his earlier stand upon man's ability and put all of his emphasis upon man's dependence on God. Without God's grace operating before hand, man could hardly come to desire salvation. That recognition of grace was present in Augustine's earlier writings but not in such a dominating way.

Augustine's view on the devotion of life continued to guide his later thought in much the same way. His own practice of devotion to God and the life of virtue was well known and admired by his contemporaries. His use of his own property and that which others left to his care was exemplary. His elevation of the life of chastity led to the establishment of houses for men and for women in North Africa. His attitude toward marriage formed the basis for several of his later works dealing with the subject. His attitude toward the State became better defined when Church relationships in Africa became a problem which only civil power was able to handle. His concern for the welfare of prisoners also brought him into contact with the State. His De Civitate Dei, elicited by the sack of Rome, gave his clearest statement of the relationship of the Christian to the State. His early belief that heretics should be converted was maintained in the Donatist controversy, although he appealed to civil power to preserve human life and property.

Both in direction and in content the early five year period of Augustine's life influenced his later development. Through a study of Augustine the Christian layman, Augustine the Bishop is better understood. How the early period affected his final system in precise details is a matter for future research. However, a look at Church History in a broad outline reveals the important place which the period under study here has in Western thought and practice.

2. Upon the History of Christianity

Augustine left his stamp most clearly upon the earlier centuries after his life. He was one of the chief theologians and philosophers for studious persons in those years. His life did much to form the nature of Christianity from the time of his death until the Renaissance. Much of his influence sprang from decisions he made in those first five years after his conversion.

His attitude toward the relationship of the arts and theology helped to preserve the learning of the past in the midst of peoples preoccupied with defense and wars. He had tried to use the knowledge of the liberal arts in his day to lead men to a knowledge of the eternal. Rhetoric, mathematics, and philosophy he dedicated for the purpose of man's salvation. He used rhetoric and philosophy to study and expound the Scriptures, to confound heretics, and to win the minds of intellectual men for the service of Christ. That practice was followed by many priests and bishops who came after him. Churches and monasteries became the leading centers of intellectual activity.

Augustine's early decision for chastity and his admiration for the monastic life also carried much influence in Christian life. He had a place along with Ambrose and Paulinus of Nola, Rufinus and Jerome in establishing the celebate and monastic life as the normal one for devoted Christians. Monastic life became widespread and competed with other professions for possession of the services of some of the world's most able leaders. Monasteries were run with order and balance. They avoided extremes of ascaticism or license, giving consideration to the ability of every member. Such was a life that won Augustine's support even before his ordination.

His use of Neoplatonic philosophy in his early days influenced theology until the time of Thomas Aquinas. Most of the theology and philosophy of the centuries before the rediscovery of Aristotle carried the marks of Plato. Augustine had cared little for what he knew of Aristotle, but he continued to have admiration for Plato and Neoplatonists long after he had shown the difference between their doctrines and those of Christianity. Over simplified, one may say that Plato was the Christian's philosopher for many years after Augustine's death. A notable example of Augustine's Platonist influence upon Western philosophy is seen in the work of John Scotus Erigena of the ninth century.[1]

Augustine's doctrine influenced theology through other great men prior to St. Thomas. St. Gregory the Great relied heavily upon St. Augustine for his theology. Peter Lombard's famous Sentences of the twelfth century contained a wealth of quotations from Latin Fathers, especially St. Augustine.

St. Thomas relied heavily upon St. Augustine. The precise relationship between the two men is still under continuous discussion among Roman Catholic scholars. In general one may say that St. Thomas used Augustine but that he placed his thought in more systematic form and utilized it in light of the controversies which had developed since Augustine's death. He was able to overcome many of the weaknesses which were present in Augustine's system. But St. Thomas' strengthening at times limited some of the beauty of Augustine's system. Augustine's system was always developing. There was a certain dynamic quality about his thought. That fact often made him open to attack, but it always left him free to grow in light of new experience. Thomas and Aristotelianism soon overshadowed Augustine in the late middle ages.

How much Augustine really contributed to the Protestant movement is another question of continuous discussion. The fact was that the Augustinian Luther had a great admiration for Augustine.[2] On the basis of Augustine's anti-Pelagian treatises Luther denounced the Catholic Church's practices as Pelagian and preached a doctrine of salvation by grace through faith. There were doctrines from Augustine's period as a Christian layman which would not have served Luther's views so well. What Augustine would have done had he been in Luther's position one cannot say, but the fact is that Luther persisted in his views in opposition to the Catholic Church whereas Augustine from his earliest days was an ardent supporter of that Church and submitted to its instruction. Protestantism has valued various doctrines found in Augustine, but its many denominations--especially in America--bear witness that the movement has never had Augustine's respect for the unity and Catholicity of the Church.

The influence of Augustine upon Calvin is also debatable.[3] The two resemble each other most strikingly in their views upon predestination. Their common source was the writing of St. Paul. Calvin differed from Augustine's position as a layman by elevating the Scriptures above the Catholic Church and divorcing them from philosophical discussion. There was also a mystical element and a joyous note in Augustine's earlier writings which were lacking in the works of Calvin.

Augustine's influence appeared in other writers as well. Jansen's work in the seventeenth century claimed to be based upon Augustine's works and was condemned as heretical. The relationship between Descartes and Augustine's earlier writings had already been discussed. The connection between them on the cogito seems to the present writer to be more one of parallel beginnings than one of dependence. It has also been pointed out that members of the Society of Friends have taken a view of illumination very similar to that held by Augustine in his early writings. The list of influences upon various theologians could be continued at

length. But enough material has been presented to show that Augustine's years as a Christian layman had some influence upon subsequent philosophy and theology. In some instances where movements were based upon Augustine's later works, the story may have been far different had the leaders considered as well those writings from Augustine's years as a Christian layman which he still held valid when he wrote his Retractationes.

3. Upon Modern Theology

Augustine's influence upon modern theology is great. There is hardly a theologian in Western Christendom who does not seek support from him. He is one of the few Fathers of the Church admired and used by Protestants and Roman Catholics alike. There is hardly any Christian theology which does not show some direct influence of his thought. It would be an impossible task to try to indicate all the ways Augustine's period as a Christian layman has influenced modern theology.

The intellectual and spiritual development of Augustine between his conversion and his ordination may, however, be able to make some direct contribution to mid-twentieth century theology. The writer has already indicated, in his discussion of Augustine's system, certain elements in Augustine's works which should be included in modern theological systems. He has also discussed some weaknesses in Augustine's early thought which modern theology should seek to overcome. Yet, Augustine may be able to offer even more.

He can be studied with more objectivity than one can usually apply to contemporary theologians. Many questions arise in a study of Augustine which might, with profit, be applied to contemporary theologians and theologies. There are points at which there are parallels in environment, problems, and means of solution.

One problem which Augustine and modern theologians share is how to relate the liberal arts to traditional Christian teachings. Augustine was concerned to know how his background in the liberal arts, especially in his knowledge of the philosophies, could be related to Christian doctrine in meeting his personal needs. Modern theologians are trying to decide how the various intellectual pursuits of man, especially philosophy and the sciences, can be reconciled to the heritage of Christian teaching so as to meet effectively the needs of individual men and women living in contemporary world society.

In section III, above, of this summary, the writer has outlined the various ways in which Augustine related his knowledge of the arts and his knowledge of Christian theology. The

possibilities he tried in reaching a solution are, it seems to the present writer, being tried again in somewhat different forms. The success which Augustine had in his attempts may have some information to offer critics of modern theology.

Augustine's first attempt was to apply questions of his existence to the material he had stored in his mind. He had a large body of ideas from the arts, especially philosophies, which had been described in Latin literature. His knowledge of Christian doctrine was somewhat sketchy and included only those elements which readily harmonized with his immediate concerns and his philosophical background.

Such an approach had both advantages and disadvantages for him. Christianity and the arts were not subjects to be viewed from a spectator's point of view. They were of direct concern for his living. He wanted to know what they meant to Augustine. He sought to find meaning and direction for his life. He was concerned with the salvation and not just with systems or theories. The difficulty with his approach was that he was not making use of sources that could have been more beneficial to him. He knew very little about the whole system of Christian doctrine. His combination of theology and philosophy did justice neither to the philosophies nor to the theology. A fuller knowledge of the systems, seen objectively, could have provided Augustine with sounder resources for meeting his personal problems.

It is generally agreed that the modern existentialist approach to philosophy and theology began with Soren Kierkegaard. He was reacting against an indifferent and objective approach in religion. He was reacting against the extreme elevation of reason and system in Hegel. For those reasons he emphasized the intensely personal side of commitment in religion, the limitations of human reason, and the inadequacy of systems of thought. He introduced an element into philosophy and theology which certainly has a place.[4]

His influence in philosophy is widespread. Heidegger, Marcel, and Sartre are only a few of the names which bring Kierkegaard's influence to contemporary students. But of far more concern for the writer in the present chapter is how Kierkegaard and his followers in philosophy have influenced current theology.

Two outstanding theologians, both from German background, represent an existentialist approach to theology. Professor Paul Tillich begins his system of theology from an existentialist's point of view. He describes man's situation in existential terms. The content of the answer to that question, however, he does not regard as existential. Professor Rudolph Bultmann, a New Testament theologian, approaches the New Testament with an existentialist theology derived from the work of Heidegger. His

chief concern is for man in a situation of despair. He dwells most on those elements of New Testament theology which seem best to apply to individual concern for decision.

The existential approach in theology has certain parallels with Augustine at Cassiciacum. It uses an approach which is dominant among intellectuals of the period. It begins with the individual man in his present situation in the world and seeks to answer his primary questions. It prepares to deliver him from a situation which threatens to overcome him and to point him towards becoming a whole person. For these reasons, it seems to the present writer, the approach is commendable.

The weaknesses of the existential approach in Christian theology may be very similar to those weaknesses of Augustine's approach at Cassiciacum. In limiting itself to questions which the individual asks, it ignores the help which outside sources and knowledge of systems could give in asking more helpful questions or in supplying answers more adequate than any the individual has stored in his memory. There is a strong tendency to confuse the point of view with the content of some particular system of philosophy, whether it be an "existential" or an ontological philosophy or a combination of the two. In depending upon a particular simple or syncratistic philosophy there is a real temptation to use only those elements of Christian doctrine which can be adapted with ease to the philosophy and to ignore those which disagree with it. The results of such an approach seem to be that Man is given the central place, some particular philosophy which is itself systematic supplies the outline and part of the contents for answers, Christian elements are inserted at convenient points and take on the color of the philosophy into which they are inserted, and points of Christian doctrine which do not easily combine with the philosophy are ignored or dismissed as irrelevant for the human situation.

As Augustine matured in his understanding of the Christian faith he gradually relinquished the method he had used at Cassiciacum. He became aware of a distinctive content to Christian doctrine, especially as it was based upon the Scriptures. His problem was then defined in terms of reconciling his philosophical concepts with the views expressed in Jewish-Christian Scriptures. He did not deny the historical side of the Scriptures, but in practice he used an allegorical interpretation. By discussing what was symbolized by the words of the Scriptures he was able to give an interpretation which was more meaningful to those people with a background of Greek thought. Jewish and Christian ideas could be presented in the thought forms of philosophy.

Attached to this solution proposed by Augustine were certain advantages and certain disadvantages. It permitted a kind of

harmony between philosophy and theology which had been acceptable to Philo, Clement, Origen, and Ambrose. It did not deny the historicity of the Account in Scriptures. It made the Scriptures seem more relevant to lives of intellectuals. The disadvantage was that interpretation of Scriptures depended upon the particular interest or philosophical prejudices of the expositor. There was no real transferal of the thought forms of the Scriptures to the thought forms of the culture in which the expositor lived; in practice, the expositor's thought forms were imposed upon the Scriptures. The historical depths of the Scriptures were often sacrificed to systematic metaphysics.

The closest parallel in modern theology to Augustine's use of allegory, it seems to the present writer, is Professor Bultmann's introduction of demythologizing. There are, of course, some important differences. Dr. Bultmann attempts to make full use of the results of literary-historical criticism of the Scriptures, which were unknown to Augustine. Dr. Bultmann tries to translate the message of the Scriptures into forms understandable to modern people. He is first concerned to know what the writer of Scripture wanted to say and then to translate it into thought forms of modern intellectuals. But there are some similarities to Augustine. Dr. Bultmann is desiring to translate the meaning of the Scriptures into language and thought of what he believes to be the "dominant" philosophy of the age in which he lives. He tries to present the message that has direct application to man's immediate understanding of his nature and his destiny.

Some of the weaknesses of Augustine's allegorical method seem to be present in Dr. Bultmann's method of demythologizing. Dr. Bultmann thinks that existentialism is the dominant philosophy or attitude of thought of the mid-twentieth century. In respect to a relatively small intellectual group he may be correct, but the present writer is not convinced that it is anywhere near a universal pattern of thought. Bultmann also finds that an existentialist approach is exactly the one taken in the New Testament. But it seems to the present writer that Bultmann is more likely reading Heidegger's existentialism into the Scriptures, even as Augustine read Neoplatonism into them. There has been an ever present danger in the preceding chapters of reading too much "existentialism" into Augustine's early life. There is a real danger in Bultmann's method of his undermining the historical element of the Scriptures in favor of the systematic and metaphysical. As Ronald Hepburn has suggested, Bultmann would be quite embarrassed to find that some of the events he discussed symbolically really did happen in history. The same criticism could be applied in many places to the young Augustine.[5]

Even when Augustine was more aware of two whole systems and was aware of their differences he continued to point out their

similarities. He still related Christian Scriptures and doctrine to the ontological philosophy of Neoplatonism. He presented Christianity to Romanianus as the fulfillment of the best philosophy known to mankind. Christianity utilized and surpassed all of the arts. It was truly the faith for a thinking person of the fourth century. Augustine was an apologist writing for his fellow intellectuals.

In favor of Augustine's approach was the fact that his method could render Scriptures from a Jewish background meaningful for men educated in a background of Greek thought. The ontological philosophy appeared to give a more universal point of view to Christian doctrine and to remove it from the narrow confines and limitations of time and space. Against his approach was his practice of sliding over any mention of real differences between Neoplatonism and Christian doctrine. He gave the appearance that they were in harmony when, in actuality, he sometimes had to choose between them. Sometimes he permitted the use of certain Neoplatonic concepts which would have undermined major points of Christian doctrine. Often he proclaimed his understanding of Christian doctrine when it was in opposition to the ontological philosophy which he claimed Christianity fulfilled. There were some points where reconciliation was almost impossible.

This practice of Augustine's seems to have some parallel in the theology of Dr. Paul Tillich. He has assumed that the most adequate system of thought in which to represent Christian doctrine to intellectuals of the mid-twentieth century is a kind of ontological philosophy which stems from Plato and closely resembles the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. In his use of the Scriptures he follows the work of Dr. Bultmann rather closely. He relies upon a study of the history of Christian doctrine, but he explains ancient doctrines and past events in terms which are appropriate to the particular philosophy and attitude towards the Scriptures which he has taken. Of course, Dr. Tillich is much more aware of the full system of ontological philosophy and the full system of Christian doctrine than Augustine was at the time of his ordination.

Dr. Tillich's approach to theology has much to commend it. He attempts to bring together the whole of Christian doctrine and the whole of modern knowledge of the arts and sciences. He tries to present Christian theology in a way which is meaningful to twentieth century intellectuals. He wants to revive many Christian teachings which have lost their power over men. It must be admitted that he has made great strides in fulfilling his desire.

The study of Augustine's early theology raised questions which may be helpful to apply to Dr. Tillich's theology.

Dr. Tillich has assumed that existentialism and ontological philosophy are the best means of explaining Christian doctrine in the twentieth century. It is true that such thought is widespread in some intellectual circles, but the writer doubts that it is the dominant system of thought. Dr. Tillich's theology makes the heart of Jewish-Christian theology seem to be in close harmony with Greek-ontological philosophy; in many instances the two are in opposition. To keep them together one has to be sacrificed to the other. The points where Augustine had difficulty reconciling ontological philosophy and Christian doctrine are the points where Dr. Tillich has difficulty. His attempts to overcome the difficulties are sometimes similar to Augustine's and sometimes different.

Dr. Tillich attempts to solve the differences between ontological philosophy in the following ways. In his doctrine of man he sometimes speaks of man standing forth from Being into non-Being. That approach sounds familiar to those who know the works of Plotinus. But at other times Dr. Tillich emphasizes the wholeness of man as body, mind, and spirit, which is closer to Jewish-Christian thought than was Augustine's early concept. Discussing the various ways man comes to a knowledge of God, Tillich takes an approach similar to Augustine and gives a place to Scriptures, Church, and direct revelation as opposed to the Greek emphasis upon reason alone. Dr. Tillich's view of the world is described in terms of the Genesis account. The world is made out of nothing and stands under the sway of time. There are instances of Tillich's speaking of the world as standing forth from Being into non-Being but continuing to exist because it is grounded in Being, instances which seem to have a close parallel with Plotinus. Upon the doctrine of God Augustine tended to favor an ontological concept and to minimize the Jewish concepts. Dr. Tillich thinks of God as Being. Contrary to the early Augustine he thinks of Being as dynamic and not excluding the personal element. His concept overcomes the difficulties involved in the use of the space-time metaphors used in various Jewish concepts of God, but one may feel that Dr. Tillich's concept loses much of that personal warmth which is present in some concepts of God found in the New Testament. Dr. Tillich, like Augustine, minimizes the historical life of Jesus. He does not deny his existence in history, but he thinks very little can be known about it. One is dependent upon the witnesses of the faithful followers. His speaking of Jesus as the Christ as the New Being appearing in existence without being overcome by existence is much closer to Plotinus' system than was Augustine's theory of Christ as the Truth and the Teacher. In discussing the fall, Tillich differs from Augustine by not following the Genesis account. In Tillich, fall is identified with coming into existence. On that point he is closer to Plotinus than to Augustine or "orthodox" Christian doctrine. Such a position has

many ramifications upon other traditional Christian doctrines. Salvation in Tillich's system is found in the New Being. It is realized by man's participation in the New Being which is Being in the World yet not overcome by the world. The nature of his New Being is related to Jesus as the Christ, but it is extremely limited in any historical or personal content. Tillich's views of love, which means overcoming the separated. Man is to overcome his separation from God and from the neighbor. His is to live so as to realize his greatest potentialities in the dimension of the Spirit. Like Augustine's early concepts, parallels with Neoplatonism are strong, though Christian teachings are incorporated. Theory is sketched upon a broad theoretical basis, but applications to specific instances are very rare. Tillich and the early Augustine agree that eternal life is not so much a life of extension of time as an overcoming of the threats of time and space. Tillich's attempts to relate philosophy and theology have many similarities to Augustine's early attempts.[6]

Augustine's ordination brought his system of thought into judgment. When it became necessary for him to meet the everyday needs of people, to instruct them in all areas of life, to administer the business of the Church, and to contend with State and forces directed against the State he found his theology inadequate. It had been worked out to suit the needs of intellectuals living in semiretirement. Alone, it was insufficient for a leader in the front line of battle for the Christian Community. His judgment was that he needed to know the contents of the Scriptures better. He needed a fuller and more practical knowledge of Christian teaching. That did not mean that his early system was useless. Indeed, it was great help as he expands the Christian contents of his thought. His more theoretical side needed to be balanced by the practical. The apology for intellectual philosophers had to be supplemented by proclamation of the fullness of Christian witness to mature believers in the Church.

Augustine did not attempt to divorce philosophy from theology in a way which has been attempted by Dr. Barth. He kept philosophy as a helper of theology. But his involvement in active participation of community life resulted in an increased emphasis upon many aspects of Christian doctrine which could not well be fitted into the scheme of any one particular philosophy.

The theologies of Dr. Bultmann and Dr. Tillich have added a new perspective to Christian theology in the twentieth century. They have recovered the meaning of many Christian concepts which had lost their power in the modern world. They have made the Christian message of many Christian concepts which had lost their power in the modern world. They have made the Christian message

relevant to man's position in the twentieth century as it is seen from the point of view of a particular school of philosophy. But Augustine's life raises a question for these apologies. Does the use of an "existential" point of view in combination with an ontological philosophy provide an adequate framework in which to present the variety and the richness which is found in the witness of the Christian community through centuries of history?

Of necessity, the discussion of the influence upon subsequent thought of Augustine's five years between his conversion and his ordination has been brief. Only a few points have been made to show how Augustine's early answers have had a place in later developments of theology and philosophy. When a comparison is made between Augustine and modern theologians there is a danger that an injustice will be done to both sides. However, such a comparison may possibly throw the light of fresh understanding upon both sides. Certainly, seeing the present developments in theology through a point in the fourth century permits a kind of objective perspective.

The writer has tried to present an accurate picture of Augustine's intellectual and spiritual growth between 386 and 391 A. D. He has attempted to show the influences which worked upon Augustine in his conversion and which continued to operate in his thought, life, and work in the years following. He has endeavored to give an history of Augustine's travels and writings and to show the system of thought which slowly emerged from his experiences. At the same time, the writer has undertaken to describe Augustine's debt to thinkers of the ancient world as well as his influence upon thought down to modern times.

It is hoped that the dissertation has presented a picture of Augustine's period as a layman which will be of help in understanding his more mature system of thought. It is hoped that some of the positive contributions of Augustine to theology may be re-introduced in the twentieth century and that his weaknesses may be avoided. If a study of Augustine's years as a Christian layman has failed to reveal a system of thought adequate either for his day or for the present one, perhaps it can furnish thinkers of the present day with questions to apply to their own works.

Conclusion

Notes

[1] S. J. Curtis, A Short History of Western Philosophy in the Middle Ages; É. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages; Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy.

[2] Luther, De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae Praeludium. Weimar, VI, p. 502, 561; Tesseradecas, W. VI, p. 122. Leon Christiani, "Luther et saint Augustin," Augustinus Magister, Vol. II, pp. 1029-1038.

[3] Jean Cadier, "Calvin et saint Augustin," Augustinus Magister, Vol. II, pp. 1039-1056; Dr. L. Smits, Saint Augustin dans L'Oeuvre de Jean Calvin, Part I.

[4] Kierkegaard, S. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Tr. by Swenson and Lowrie. London: Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press, 1941. See also other works.

[5] Rudolf Bultmann, Essays and Theology of the New Testament, 2 Vols.; John Macquarie, An Existentialist Theology; C. V. Jones, Christology and Myth in the New Testament; R. W. Hepburn, "Demythologizing and the Problem of Validity," New Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 227-242. The writer is also indebted to Professor N. H. G. Robinson of St. Mary's College for lectures delivered upon Bultmann.

[6] Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be; Love, Power, and Justice; The Protestant Era; Systematic Theology and other books and articles. The writer also depends upon lectures and seminars held by Professor Tillich which he attended at Harvard University in 1955-1956.

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